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Abstract
This thesis presents the development of Southeast Asian regionalism and in
particular strategies for the sustainable development of ASEAN and East-Southeast
Asian integration are born out. The two strategies that constitute the focal point of
the thesis have been established as openness and deepening and strengthening
foundation. The concrete implementation of both strategies is as follows: in as-
sociation with openness and deepening, to develop ASEAN and East-Southeast
Asia economic integration and simultaneously, in association with strengthening
foundation, to strengthen macroeconomic structures. This thesis concentrates on
convergence and distribution as key factors to achieve both objectives. Accordingly,
it examines how to achieve convergence; in particular, the effects of the conver-
gence of human-capital and technological progress on the convergence of income
and the trend towards integration are contemplated. This thesis examines the exis-
tence of relevant mutual positive relations between economic cooperation and inte-
gration and economic convergence. Convergence supports economic integration by
assuaging the problems of sensitive sectors and hub and spokes bilateralism. Obvi-
ously, economic convergence does not only assist economic integration, but also is
a general foundation for sustainable development. Further, this thesis presents mod-
els of strategies that strengthen economic fundamentals and promote convergence
within an economic structure and illustrates the interrelation of convergence, devel-
v
vi Abstract
opment and economic integration. These strategies aim at coping with economic
disparity within and between countries. In the main, discrepancies in the human
capital and wage-rates of blue-collar (workers from low-income-earner sector or
from poor countries) and white-collar workers (workers from high-income-earner
sector or from rich countries) and in the technology used in different production
sectors are considered. This model can be used on analysis within a country or a
regional grouping which undergoes economic disparity. If it analyzes economic sit-
uation of a single country, the examination carried out will be between blue- and
white-collar workers. On the other hand, if an integrated region is analyzed, this
model originally used for blue- and white-collar workers will be applied for the
case of average workers in the poor and rich countries respectively.
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Introduction
This thesis explores the importance of human capital and technological enhancement
and convergence for economic development in ASEAN. ASEAN is one of the regional
groupings established in 1967 to cope with political and economical hardships. The emer-
gence of regionalism can be observed from the end of the Second World War, a period also
hallmarked by decolonialization. Regionalism gained in importance in Europe, beginning
in the fties with the Paris Treaty on coal and steel in 1951, the signing of the Treaty of
Rome to create the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and the formation of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. In response to the successful es-
tablishment and enlargement of the European Community (EC), regional groupings were
formed in almost all developing regions of the world during the sixties and seventies. Ex-
amples of these include the Latin American Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA) and the Cen-
tral American Common Market, both created in 1960, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973, the East
African Community in 1967 and the Southern African Development Coordination Con-
ference (SADCC) in 19791. Nonetheless, it should be recognized that a large number of
regional arrangements in Africa and Latin America as well as the Caribbean and the Mid-
dle East were decient and largely failed to fulll expectations. ASEAN, however, has
survived until today.
1 An overview of regional groupings of the developing countries in the sixties and seventies, Langhammer,
R. J. and Hiemenz, U. (1990), p. 18-58
1
2 Introduction
The study in the thesis is based on the emergence, evolution, strengths and weak-
nesses and prospective development of ASEAN. Even though the development of ASEAN
has been very slow compared to that of the EU, its work has been very satisfactory. It
managed to solve poltical issues in the region in its early days. Later there were several
economic problems in the region and again ASEAN was able to cope with the problems,
albeit with some difculty. ASEAN has its own characteristics which explicitly distinguish
it from the EU, namely its high pragmatism and exibility. These characteristics should
be taken into consideration in the development of ASEAN itself. In other words, ASEAN
should nd its own path of development which is compatible with its characteristics and
members. Nevertheless, the EU cannot be overlooked as it is the most important exam-
ple of regional integration in the world. Its experiences and success are very valuable to
ASEAN's development process, especially in solving ASEAN's weaknesses and illustrat-
ing a successful integration movement for ASEAN.
In this thesis, two strategies are scrutinized that are intended to lead to sustainable de-
velopment in ASEAN. The rst is opening and deepening regionalism, the second strength-
ening economic structure. With ASEAN's characteristics of high pragmatism and exibil-
ity, the opening and deepening regionalism strategy has potential for success. However,
with respect to the strategy of strengthening economic structure, the prospects are dim.
Almost all ASEAN member states have weak economic fundamentals. This is the main
obstacle to sustainable development within ASEAN. The assumption of this thesis is that
the enhancement and convergence of human capital and technology are means of pursuing
both strategies. These approaches not only strengthen economic fundamentals, but also en-
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courages economic integration, which in turn assists the enhancement and convergence of
human capital and technology in a reciprocal fashion. The results of the study provide a
short- and long-term solution to obstacles hindering the sustainable integration of ASEAN
and a long term basis for ASEAN's future development. The thesis is composed of ve
chapters which are divided as follows.
Chapter 1: Denition
The rst section of this chapter sets out the denition and gives an historical overview of
regionalism. The terms cooperation and integration are classied and then explained.
Based on the denition of integration, this chapter distinguishes three signicantly interde-
pendent aspects of integration: economic, political and social. In particular, the economic
facet, the reasons for integration and the phases of its development will be comprehensively
analyzed. Finally, denitions of cooperation and integration are set out.
Chapter 2: The Development of ASEAN
This chapter illustrates the emergence and development of ASEAN from the outset. It
intends to provide a better understanding of the characteristics and the nature of ASEAN.
This culminates in the realization of the problems in the past as well as its strengths and
weaknesses.
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Chapter 3: ASEAN Regionalism and European Integration
This chapter examines the differences and the resemblances between ASEAN and the EU
 obviously the most successful regional integration process worldwide. This comparison
predominately relates to their economic, political and, to a lesser extent, social dimensions.
Subsequently, prospects for the further integration of ASEAN will be analyzed, supported
by the example of EU development, in order to ascertain what ASEAN can learn from the
European integration. Yet it must be recognized that, even though the EU has conducted
its integration process successfully, it should not be taken arbitrarily as a general benchmark
model for integration process in every other region. It is of signicance to study how to
take advantage of the lesson of the EU, under a prudent understanding of the region's own
specic economic, political, and social structures and circumstances. This approach could
help ASEAN in nding its most efcient way of integration.
Chapter 4: East-Southeast Asian Economic Integration and its
Implications for ASEAN
This chapter considers the prospect of further economic integration of East-Southeast Asian
regionalism. It illustrates ways to cope with the emerging new surges of bilateral arrange-
ments which result from contemporary, complex interactions of political and economic
issues and pressures from internal and external circumstances. Additionally, the chapter
describes a development scheme for East-Southeast Asian economic integration. The role
of ASEAN in the development of East-Southeast Asian regionalism is also introduced and
a strategy for strengthening ASEAN's economic structure is presented afterwards.
Introduction 5
The study is based on the two strategies characterized by openness and deepening
on the one hand and strengthening foundation on the other. The predominant means of
implementing these strategies is via liberalization and facilitation.
Chapter 5: Theory on Economic Integration: Mutual Positive
Relationship between Economic Convergence and Economic Integration
This chapter models strategies that strengthen economic fundamentals and bring about con-
vergence of the economic structure. The aim of these strategies is to work against economic
disparity within and between countries. In the main, the discrepancies in the wage rates of
blue- and white-collar workers and in technologies used in different production sectors are
considered.
Diversity in economic structure can be found in several developing countries and is
regarded as a signicant hindrance in East-Southeast Asian and ASEAN economic integra-
tion Economic convergence and distribution are considered as economic schemes which
may be relevant to the solution of recent economic problems within the region and help
lay down a strong foundation for long-term development. Both schemes lead to improve-
ment as well as convergence in the standard of living and economic structure. These will
provide an essential basis for solving the sensitive sector problems. Sustainable develop-
ment can then be achieved smoothly and the economy will be, to a certain extent, immune
to external pressures. Negative effects from hub and spoke bilateralism will be eased or
hindered and bilateral regionalism will become a stepping stone towards economic integra-
tion. Economic cooperation and integration within the region will support and strengthen
economic convergence and the region's economic fundamentals. This, in turn, should al-
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low countries to achieve regional and global economic integration in the long run. This
reects the mutual relationship between economic convergence and integration, see gure
1.1 for the overview.
One of the relevant supporting measures involves education and technology enhance-
ment. Both serve as cornerstones of economic, political and social structures. Advance-
ment in education and technology will assist economic development, convergence and dis-
tribution by raising income and living-standards, particularly in the poor sector. Conse-
quently, development in economic structure and economic convergence will support and
strengthen economic integration in the region. Due to positive spill-over effects, economic
integration will, in turn, enhance the quality of education and technology development.
Modelling is carried out for short- and a long-term developments separately. The
model is based on the growth model by Garlor and Weil (1999) which analyses the histor-
ical evolution of population, technology and output, encompassing the endogenous transi-
tion between three regimes, a Malthusian regime, a Post-Malthusian regime and a Modern
Growth regime. The growth model by Garlor and Weil is modied and adapted in order
to analyze the long-term development of the economy under inequality between labour
groups and to discover strategies that will strengthen economic fundamentals and assist the
economic integration within the region. The short-term model analyses the economic de-
velopment under inequality between labour groups in the short-run. The model is built,
to a certain extent, so that the structure of the utility function is consistent with the utility
function of the long-term model. Both models use the Cobb-Douglas production function;
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the short-term model assigns a common two-period intertemporal model and the long-term
model is based on an overlapping generation model.
Economic Cooperation/Integration
Solving the
problems of
sensitive sectors
and hub and
spokes
bilateralism
Economic
convergence and
sustainable growth
Convergence and
augmentation of
human capital,
income and living-
standard
Convergence and
development of
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economies
Reduction of the
costs of subsistence
consumption and the
costs of education
Convergence and
augmentation of
wage rates and
income
Direct and indirect supports via
government interference
Figure 1.1: Theoretical mutual positive relation between economic integration and conver-
gence
Chapter 1
Denition
One of the important components of the study of economic integration in this thesis
is the understanding of the basic concept and the denition of the term integration. Since
the term integration has a broad denition, it is therefore essential to determine the term's
specic usage herein and then to demarcate the range of its denition which will be treated
in this thesis.
The rst section of this chapter sets out the denition and gives an historical overview
of regionalism. The terms cooperation and integration are classied and explained af-
terwards. Based to the denition of integration, this chapter distinguishes three signicantly
interdependent aspects of integration: economical, political and social. In particular, the
economic facet, the reasons for integration and its phases of development will be compre-
hensively analyzed. Finally, denitions of cooperation and integration are set out.
1.1 Regionalism
In economic and political literature, the term regionalism often refers to regional integra-
tion or regional cooperation. It conceptually encompasses not only geographical territorial
features but also economic, political and military characteristics. In general, the term re-
gionalism, according to Joseph Nye2, can be dened in the descriptive sense as the for-
mation of interstate associations or groupings based on regions. In the doctrinaire sense
2 Nye, J. (1968a), p. vii
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it can be described as the propagation of such formations. With reference to a successful
regional system Ronald Yalem additionally refers to a denition put forward by Bhoutros-
Ghali, which expressively describes regional understanding as organisms of a permanent
character grouping in a geographically determined region of more than two states which by
reason of their proximity, their communities' interests or their afnities establish an associ-
ation for the maintenance of peace and security in their region and for the development of
their economic, social and cultural cooperation with the nal purpose of forming a distinct
political entity3.
However, various aspects of regionalism refer either to how to demarcate the area
in which the members participate or to the extent to which regionalism in economic sense
should be encompassed. In relation to regionalism, the term region, on the one hand,
refers to a subjectively demarcatable unit that may relate to an economic, political, demo-
graphical, religious or even to an articial feature. This depends on respective circum-
stances. For instance, an economic border, dened as any demarcation over which the
actual and potential mobility of goods, services and factors of production and also com-
munication ows are relatively low, is notably not equivalent to a territorial frontier4. On
the other hand, the presence of a demarcatable and to some extent plausible geographic
geopolitical area is also necessary.
It should be emphasized that it is fairly complicated to nd an appropriate denition
for regionalism adequate for all academic research. The scope of this thesis is thus essen-
tially restricted to the economic aspects of regionalism. Because of this, we can loosely
3 Yalem, R. (1973), p. 218-220
4 Pelkmans, J. (1997), p. 2-3
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dene regionalism for our purposes as any policy designed to reduce trade barriers and
the economic signicance of national political boundaries between a subset of countries
or separate national economies with the intention of institutionalizing into larger economic
blocks or communities within a plausible demarcatable geographic area or subjectively de-
marcatable unit5.
The emergence of regionalism can be observed since the end of the Second World
War and the decolonialization which followed. It was popular in Europe, beginning in the
fties with the Paris Treaty on coal and steel in 1951, the signing of the Treaty of Rome to
create the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and the formation of the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. In response to the successful establishment
and enlargement of the European Community (EC), regional groupings were formed in al-
most all developing regions of the world during the sixties and seventies. Examples of these
include the Latin America Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA) and the Central America Com-
mon Market, both created in 1960, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
in 1967, the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973, the East African Commu-
nity in 1967 and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in
19796. Nonetheless, it should be recognized that a large number of regional arrangements
in Africa, Latin America as well as the Caribbean and the Middle East were decient and
largely failed to fulll expectations.
5 Anderson, K. and Blackhurst, R. (1993), p. 1. Robson, P. (1998), p. 1. Winter, A. L. (1999), p. 8-10
6 An overview of regional groupings of the developing countries in the sixties and seventies, Langhammer,
R. J. and Hiemenz, U. (1990), p. 18-58
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The formation of regional groupings in the sixties and seventies are denoted as old
regionalism or rst regionalism. Its characteristics were based on a large number of as-
sumptions7. One of them was the idea of an increase in welfare deriving from freeing trade
and productivity gain thanks to the economies of scale and improved allocation and avail-
ability of resources achieved by enlarging the size of the domestic market. Furthermore
there was the idea of an increase in welfare from the economic growth ensuing from tra-
ditional customs union, in terms of gains from trade creation and trade diversion which
went hand-in-hand with the idea of growth and modernization as development8. In the eld
of economic development, enhancing industrialization has been accepted as a central goal
policy and has been regarded as a rational social choice by developing countries. Thus, at
the time when import substitution was undertaken as a development policy and a way to
launch industrialization in a country, in the case of a domestic market proving to be too
small to allow import substitution as the starting point of industrialization, the formation
of a regional market was seen as a way around this impediment9. Further benets of this
type of regionalism were the joint production of public goods and protection against ad-
verse developments in the world market. Moreover, it was advantageous in improving the
7 Langhammer, R. J. and Hiemenz, U. (1990), p. 4-12 and Bhalla, A. S. and Bhalla, P. (1997), p. 1-2.
Furthermore, Axline, A. W., (1994), p. 1-4, has characterized the evolution of rst regionalism into 3
generations. The rst generation generation of traditional customs union is characterized by economic
growth resulting from the concept of traditional customs union. In the second generation generation of
regional import substitution, industrialization remains the central goal of development policy. And there is
nally the third generation generation of collective self-reliance, in which joint policies within the region
was improved by regional external policies vis-à-vis third countries and by common negotiation position in
larger international forums.
8 According to the characterization of the evolution of rst regionalism by Axline, W. Andrew, this
assumption relates to the rst generation.
9 According to the characterization of the evolution of rst regionalism by Axline, W. Andrew, this
assumption relates to the second generation.
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collective bargaining power when trading with industrial countries and consensus building
on regional political and security issues. These can be considered as political advantages10.
Unfortunately, as just mentioned, the development of old regionalism outside the EC
and EFTA turned out to be unsuccessful. This failure had several causes. Jagdish Bhagwati
argues that while the developing countries used their regional groupings to promote indus-
trial import substitution through the economies of scale ensuing from a regional market,
they all failed to overcome the difculties of the political allocation of industries. These
difculties originated from the endeavor to allocate industries among the region's mem-
bers by bureaucratic negotiations rather than through the market system and the sharing of
the high costs of the industrial protection11. Taking Bhagwati's assumption further, Robert
Baldwin explains that in the early stages of industrialization, in which developing coun-
tries' regional groupings were established, the most advanced country in the group tended
to benet signicantly, but some of the smaller members were likely to lose out in the in-
tegration process12. Furthermore, there was the fact that the United States, which played
a dominant role in the world market at that time, had changed its policy from regionalism
coupled with a protectionist tendency to a policy of fostering multilateralism and non-
discrimination, for instance by the use of GATT's Article XXIV to impose sanctions in the
case of international discrimination.
Since the sixties, the leading position of the United States in the world market has
been considerably weakened by its trade and budget decits owing notably to the escalat-
10 According to the characterization of the evolution of rst regionalism by Axline, W. Andrew, this
assumption of political advantages relates to the third generation.
11 Bhagwati, J (1993), p. 28-29
12 Baldwin, R (1993), p. 51-54
1.1 Regionalism 13
ing competition from the European Union and Japan. The United States therefore turned
towards regional and bilateral arrangements. In the eighties and nineties, and also in recent
years, interest in regionalism has been revived, partly in response to increasing globaliza-
tion and in the context of regional zoning between the United States, the EU and Japan.
Particularly after the end of the Cold War, the so-called new regionalism or second re-
gionalism envisions greater integration in economic policy and trade among both industri-
alized and developing countries. The new or second regionalism differs substantially from
the earlier regional groupings which were created at a time when their member countries
were at an early stage of development. Whereas earlier regionalism related to the frame-
work of economic planning and government regulation, new or second regionalism, on the
other hand, has been driven and brought about by economic liberalization, market dereg-
ulation and by the increasing interdependence of the world economy. Whereas the earlier
groupings were inward-looking and viewed protective tariffs as an instrument to promote
growth, the new groupings are outward looking and focus especially on intra-regional and
inter-regional trade for their economic growth. In addition, the new regional integration,
which groups its members on a North-South basis (e.g. APEC or NAFTA) instead of North-
North and South-South in the case of earlier regionalism, is also construed in terms of scale
economies, product differentiation, efciency gain, policy coordination and foreign direct
investment (FDI)13.
Nevertheless, there are still debates in economic circles about whether regionalism is
a stepping stone or stumbling block. There is a growing concern that regional blocks may
13 Bhalla, A. S. and Bhalla, P. (1997), p. 17-22
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discriminate against goods and services of non-member countries and thus can be seen as
a barrier to a global free trade. A more positive view is that regional blocks are a rst step
towards globalization and the multilateralization of trade, a supporting argument for which
is that a small number of member countries can more easily agree on harmonizing their
national economic policies and on opening up their markets.
1.2 Cooperation and Integration
The terms cooperation and integration are both broadly dened. They are extensively
signicantly interrelated and appear mostly in relation to the same issues. Nevertheless, the
two terms are not synonymous. Thus a distinction or classication between them has to be
considered within the framework of international or interregional, economic and political
cooperation and integration.
The conditions of classication for regional cooperation and integration are deter-
mined, to a great extent, in institutional and attitudinal terms, and are particularly concerned
with the intensity of international or interregional actions. Brigid Laffan, as a case in point,
indicates that international cooperation and integration both involve states in collective ac-
tion, but the latter can be distinguished from the former by the intensity of relationships
between the participating states and the manner in which these relationships are organized
and managed14. Rolf J. Langhammer and Ulrich Hiemenz view integration as considerably
more intense than cooperation. They differentiate between both terms from an economic
point of view, arguing that, while integration is a process that aims to abolish discrimina-
14 Laffan, B. (1992) p. 2
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tion between local and foreign goods, services and factors, cooperation focuses on reducing
discrimination in certain spheres only15. Still, a classication or distinction between coop-
eration and integration is not simple, and the difculties involved are in particular due to
the demarcation of these two terms.
1.2.1 Cooperation
The comprehensive classication of cooperation presented here is based on the one de-
scribed by Jörn Dosch and by Du-Chel Sin16, and can be explained as follows. Principally,
cooperation refers to any form of collaboration, associated with different scopes (political,
economic, social, military, cultural, technological etc.), initiated and carried on by partic-
ipating actors (individual, governmental or non-governmental organizations, international
or intra-national organizations etc.) who share compatible expectations, in order to achieve
collective interests or objectives and foreseeable advantages, under consideration of the
costs and benets. Cooperation, furthermore, refers to denite purposes, requires no exten-
sive or complicated legitimation and does not imply any restriction of national autonomy
or sovereignty.
Moreover, the study of regional cooperation, according to Ernst B. Haas, can be
viewed as a subset of the study of regional integration or sometimes also as a separate
interest. Regional cooperation, in many circumstances, promotes the processes of integra-
tion17 and is additionally dened as a prerequisite for integration18.
15 Langhammer, R. J. and Hiemenz, U. (1990) p. 1-3
16 Dosch J. (1997), p. 44-45 and Sin, D. (2000), p. 8-9
17 Haas, E.B. (1973), p. 105
18 Dosch, J. (1997), p. 45, and Sin, D. (2000), p. 10
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1.2.2 Concertation
To understand the comprehensive study of the development of regional integration in ASEAN,
an interesting concept needs to be brought up. This concept, called concertation19, falls
between cooperation and integration and was initially developed for the process of politi-
cal coordination in Latin America, particularly during the eighties. For instance, there was
the concertation between Argentina and Brazil in Cono Sur in 1986, which was the trig-
ger for the Treaty of Mercado Común Suramericano (MERCOSUR) in March of 1991, in
which Uruguay and Paraguay also participated. Concertation denotes a type of multilateral
diplomacy, above all on political issues, which is conceptually conducted by a very high or
the highest position of a political decision-making organ, such as the head of the respective
government and its ministers, mainly the foreign minister. The instruments of concertation
are summits between the heads of government, ministerial meetings and the relationship of
dialogue that exists between participating nations.
The main structure of concertation relies on the exibility within the group, in associ-
ation either with the scope of sovereignty in policymaking or the resiliency of membership.
Its partners' interactions are admittedly more substantial than is the case with cooperation,
but the partners have more free room to move compared to integration. However, how one
classies the term concertation depends on one's perspective. A suitable denition may
be a kind of cooperation or a process towards integration, as appeared in Latin America in
the case of the establishment of MERCOSUR or ASEAN in Southeast Asia.
19 Emmes, M. and Mols, M (1993), p. 47, and Dosch, J. (1997), p. 47-48
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1.2.3 Integration
The term integration generally means the bringing together of separate parts to form a
whole20. More literally, integration denotes a reestablishment or formation of detailed ele-
ments into a unit or a whole which, in turn, is more than a mere sum of these elements21.
Approaching a comprehensive denition, integration, on the one hand, is viewed as a ter-
minal or static term, which describes an already existent condition (level of integration) or
one which is expected to be achieved (integration as a goal). On the other hand, integra-
tion denotes a process or dynamic term as well, in which a development from a lower to a
higher level of integration is described. Respectively, disintegration refers to a movement
from a high stage of integration to a lower level of integration. However, there is a lack of
consensus as to whether integration might be viewed as a process or terminal term or even
both. In the economic literature, there are diverse opinions about the denition of the term
integration. Jacob and Teune, for instance, accept integration both as a process and as a
terminal condition, while Haas and Deutsch denote it in a political sense just as a process.
Paul Chamley describes integration as any process leading to the formation of a politi-
cal and economical whole, while Amitai Etzioni, on the contrary, treats integration as a
terminal condition, and not as a process of getting there22.
Similarly to cooperation, the term integration is never precisely dened and cov-
ers many different elds, especially economic, political, military and cultural or social
attributes. Considering that this thesis is intended to analyze the economic aspect of inte-
20 Balassa, B. (1961), p. 1, and Beyarslan, A. (1977), p. 27
21 Smend, R. (1994), p. 1204
22 Haas, E.B. (1973), p. 105-106, and Chamley, P. (1997), p. 39
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gration, it also has to be emphasized that there are several main features that are closely
related to economic aspect and to each other. These must necessarily also be taken into con-
sideration, in particular political and social features. An interesting analytical method of
integration research, which systemically investigates these different attributes, is the per-
ceptual approach of multidimensional conception of integration based on research by
Nye, by Daniel Frei and by Sin23. According to their research, integration can be divided
into three specic dimensions, namely economic, political, and social dimensions, which
are signicantly correlated.
1.3 Multidimensional Concepts of Integration
This section introduces the three-dimensional concept of integration. Firstly, the facet of
political and social integration discussed with reference to the description based on Nye,
Frei and Sin. Then the dimension of economic integration will be comprehensively exposed
in order to serve as a foundation for the research in the forthcoming chapters of this thesis,
the emphasis of which is on economic aspects.
1.3.1 The Political Dimension of Integration
Political integration is usually considered as a move away from national sovereignty with
the aim of attaining some kind of political union such as a supranational community or fed-
eral state. As mentioned by Brigid Laffan, political integration describes the emergence of
23 Nye, J. (1968b), p. 855-880, Frei, D. (1985), p. 113-131, and Sin, D. (2000), p. 41-71. The authors dis-
tinguish integration into three-dimensional concepts - economic, political, and social dimension - established
for understanding and measurement of the intensity of integration.
1.3 Multidimensional Concepts of Integration 19
a political community based on trust, loyalty and shared values24. The intensity of political
integration conceptually refers to and can be estimated by the degree of political interac-
tion. This essentially encompasses the integration of institutions, policies, and security
systems. The scope of institutional resources, visible in the magnitude and development of
the budget and the personnel working in the administrative institutions of the community,
can be used as a measure of institutional interaction. It is also important to consider the
structure and function of the institutions and how they incorporate the executive, legislative
and judiciary powers. Essentially, these mutually functioning institutions are established
to administer the regulations and rules, which run the process of integration. The extent
of power these institutions should obtain, however, is decided by negotiations between the
members of the group and is still the object of many debates. When it comes to policy inte-
gration, decisions have to be taken as to how much responsibility should be transferred to a
supranational level and which policies in particular should be executed on this level. Other
alternatives are joint-execution (intergovernmental) or coordination of a policy from more
than one level.
Furthermore, there is also a joint international security policy which aimed at found-
ing a security community characterized by the expectation of non-violent interstate rela-
tions. This community should not simply be regarded as a barrier against both internal and
external vulnerabilities that threaten or have potential to bring down or weaken state struc-
tures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes. Its establishment, in some
circumstances, also originates political integration for instance the establishment process
24 Laffan, B. (1992) p. 5
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of ASEAN and the EU. Therefore, the intensity of political interaction is indicated not only
by the degree of political integration, but also by security integration. Security integration
indicates the intensity of political integration, in that the closer and more intensive the in-
corporation of security and military policy operated by the members in the region, the more
integrated they are.
1.3.2 The Social Dimension of Integration
Social integration refers to interactions between non-governmental actors or organizations
within the region. These actors or organizations are likely to have both interchangeable and
specic interests. The transactions between them are predominately to be seen in economic
and social activities or businesses. Social integration concerns the social-psychological
perception of the people living in the region in which the public decisions are made and
their opinion of regional integration. Furthermore social integration refers to the awareness
of collectiveness among members in the region and the perception of being associated,
which leads them to express the integrated group as us.
The social dimension is one of the signicant aspects of integration, particularly from
a psychological standpoint. Notably, the public's point of view on regional integration
invariably inuences the integration policy and appears to be one of the most important
indicators that measure the intensity of integration in the region.
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1.3.3 The Economic Dimension of Integration
One of the rst denitions of economic integration was provided by Jan Tinbergen who de-
scribes economic integration as the removal of articial barriers to the optimum operation
of an economy and as a process by which the positive aspects of coordination and uni-
cation come to the fore. Tinbergen25, on the one hand, considers negative integration to
be those aspects of international economic integration which simply involve the removal of
discriminatory and restrictive institutions and the liberalization of economic transactions.
On the other hand, the term positive integration is related to the adjustment of exist-
ing and, to a great extent, to the establishment of new policies and institutions endowed
with coercive powers, in order to enable the market of the integrated area to function prop-
erly and efciently and, furthermore, in order to support other broader policy aims of the
scheme.
Economic integration can be dened both as a process (dynamic concept) and as
a state (static concept) of affairs26. In terms of the static concept, economic integration
encompasses the merging or amalgamation of economic domains or regions into a large
economic area, which can be classied in terms of different degrees of integration. This
depends on the intensity of integration, which is described by the absence of different
forms of discrimination. With regard to the dynamic concept, economic integration de-
scribes the process of discriminatory removal of all trade impediments, including the free
movement of goods, services and factors of production between at least two participating
25 Tinbergen, J. (1965), p. 76-82
26 Balassa, B. (1973), p. 1-2, Langhammer, R. J. and Hiemenz, U. (1990) p. 1-3, Butterwegge S. (1993), p.
45, Swann, D. (1996), p. 3, and El-Agraa, A. M. (1997) p. 1
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nations. The efciency in the use of resources and the establishment of certain elements
of cooperation and coordination between them are also in the nature of economic integra-
tion. Furthermore, the process of integration is viewed as a consequence of a transition
that is the movement between different states, strictly speaking, from a lower degree to a
higher degree of integration27. However, it should be emphasized that a clear-cut explana-
tion that offers a complete interpretation covering all issues of economic integration among
countries is still hard to nd in economic literature. It is therefore useful for a comprehen-
sive understanding to introduce the aims of and the reason for the emergence of economic
integration.
1.4 The Reasons for the Emergence of Economic Integration
Certainly, one may recognize that an increase in social welfare subject to the limited re-
sources available is one of the main objectives of economic activities. Gains in welfare
either involve the increase in welfare of the community collectively or the optimization of
utilities according to individual interests. In economic terms, higher employment levels,
lower ination rates, balanced trade, a higher rate of economic growth and better income
distribution serve as indicators for the well-being of the community. The economic activ-
ities are therefore targeted to realize these objectives. International economic integration,
27 Pinder, J. (1969), p. 143-145, Robson, P. (1998), p. 2 view economic integration only as the discrim-
inatory removal of all trade impediments, including the free movement of goods, services and factors of
production between at least two participating nations, the efciency in the use of resources. Balassa, B.
(1973), p. 1-2, Langhammer, R. J. and Hiemenz, U. (1990) p. 1-3, view economic integration as a movement
from a lower degree to a higher degree of integration.
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in turn, appears to be one of the instruments for the enhancement of welfare either of the
integrated group, of some countries within the group, or of the world as a whole.
One of the primary incentives for the member countries to move towards economic
integration has to do with the expected economic gains deriving from, for instance, an in-
crease in economic growth, as in the growth of gross national product. These real-economic
gains can be explained, for example, by rstly, the extended size and the liberalization of
the market of the participating countries may lead to an increase in production levels and
enhanced efciency in production, which can be brought about by better exploitation of
economies of scale and by increased specialization, according to the comparative advan-
tage; secondly, there are also gains from better terms of trade and improved international
bargaining power vis-à-vis third countries due to the larger size of the community and its
economy; and thirdly, the intensied competition between rms either in the integrated
region or vis-à-vis third countries may enforce changes in efciency, which affect both
the quantity and quality of the factors of production, and in turn, encourage technologi-
cal advances. Furthermore, when there is a higher degree of economic integration, there
are economic gains which can also be achieved by the free mobility of factors across the
borders of member countries.
Besides real economic gains, there are further economic gains associated with mon-
etary economics, which are expected to be attained through monetary integration. For
example, a xed currency or a monetary union may lead to a decrease in transaction costs
and risks triggered by an unstable exchange rate. This, in turn, encourages international
engagements and lessens the misallocation of resources caused by exchange rate specu-
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lations. It is also expected that under both real economic and monetary integration, the
coordination of national monetary, exchange rate and scal policy and the unication of ef-
fort to achieve the economic aims may make it easier and cheaper to attain these economic
targets and welfare gains.
However, it should be emphasized that there is no guarantee that these economic
gains can ever be achieved. It is not a necessary condition for a country's economic suc-
cess that it should be a member of an economic community. In any case, it can be con-
cluded that international or interregional economic integration is established by a group of
countries striving to increase their welfare, believing that partnership, weak or strong, be-
tween countries is a more efcient way to achieve this aim than carrying out unilateral or
independent policy in each country.
1.5 Stages of Economic Integration
Besides the distinction between economic integration as a process and as a state, economic
integration can also be differentiated in two principal features which are interdependent and
essentially inter-correlated, namely economic integration in real and in monetary terms.
Economic integration in real terms is generally related to the transaction within the region
of goods and services, production mobility of labor and real capital, and in addition the
respective economic policies and activities. Economic integration in monetary terms is
concerned with the conguration of exchange rate system, the liberation of nancial and
capital movement within the region, as well as the associated monetary economic policies
and activities.
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There are several levels within the economic integration process, ranging between
the two extremes of absolute isolation and a fully integrated economic and monetary union
 or even a total economic union. Taking roots from Balassa's classication of stages of
economic integration (1961), one may classify the following states of economic integra-
tion: a preferential tariff agreement, a free trade area, a customs union, a common market,
an economic and monetary union and a total economic union, from low to high intensity
respectively.
1.5.1 Free Trade Area and Customs Union
A rst step towards a free trade area is often denoted by a preferential tariff agreement in
which tariffs on trade among the signatory countries are lower in relation to tariffs charged
on trade with third countries. This involves the recognition that a preferential tariff agree-
ment indicates rst and foremost a development of economic interrelation in trade within
the region. In most economic literature however, the primary stage of economic integra-
tion is the creation of a free trade area in which the participating countries liberalize trade
among themselves by eliminating all tariff and quantitative restrictions on mutual trade,
while their national barriers to trade with the outside world still remain. The member coun-
tries maintain the power to x their own separate tariff rates on imports from the rest of the
world. Therefore consumer prices of these imports may differ between countries within the
region. Even so, the segmentation of markets can be retained in a free trade area by adopt-
ing rules of origin. The rule of origin is constituted to prevent trade deection in the form
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of redirection of imports through a member country with relatively lower external tariff, in
order to exploit the tariff differentiation.
The second step towards full economic integration is customs union, in which the
member countries eliminate tariff and quantitative restrictions on internal trade and at the
same time adopt a common external tariff on imports from the rest of the world, which
should principally avoid problems resulting from the rule of origin. The participating coun-
tries may also take part in international negotiation on trade and tariffs as single entity.
Under a customs union the member countries can theoretically set the tariff at a level
which should maximize the welfare of the participating countries as a whole, however, it is
obviously complicated to nd a suitable tariff. What should also be recognized is that, after
the successful establishment of a customs union, the relative prices of goods in the domestic
markets of the member countries may change triggered by the common tariff adopted on
import from the third countries. The shift in relative prices, in turn, could impact on trade
ows, production and ultimately on consumption. Nonetheless, one should also notice
that the gains and losses of a customs union depend not only on its repercussions on the
allocation of resources and international specication but also on the exploitation of scale
economies, term of trade, the productivity factors and the distribution of income.
The free trade area and customs union are generally regarded as signicant funda-
mental phases in the process of economic integration. This can be observed in the devel-
opment of the regional grouping in the world, particularly the historical evolution of the
European Union or the establishment of a free trade area in Southeast Asia. Admittedly,
free trade areas and customs unions are accepted worldwide to be a way to improve so-
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cial welfare  even though they do not maximize it. Emphasizing this point of view, one
can recognize the support for free trade areas and customs unions from GATT-WTO Ar-
ticle XXIV which lays down a guideline permitting the formation of free trade areas and
customs unions as the special exceptions to the rules against international discrimination.
However, there are still some debates and questions about the formation of free trade
areas and customs unions in the area of welfare gains and losses. For instance, the Cooper-
Massell criticism demonstrates that a policy of unilateral tariff reduction is in some cir-
cumstances superior to a customs union28. In accordance with the traditional theory of
customs union, particularly from a standpoint of resource allocation and welfare, Viner in-
vestigates whether free trade areas and customs unions tend to lead to free trade between
members and protection vis-à-vis the third countries, and how advantageous free trade ar-
eas and customs unions actually are. To do this he uses a Ricardian model of production,
which focuses on the welfare effect of changes in the location of production. The tradi-
tional theory has stressed this point of view by analyzing the losses and gains within a free
trade area or customs union in terms of trade creation and trade diversion.
Trade creation refers to a union-induced replacement of expensive domestic produc-
tion by cheaper imports from a partner country. This can be brought about by the two
following means: rstly, by the reduction or elimination of the domestic production of
goods that are identical to those produced abroad, so the goods will be imported from the
partner country, and secondly, by an increased consumption of partner country substitutes
for domestic goods which formerly satised the need at a higher cost.
28 Cooper, C. A. and Massell, B. F. (1965), p. 56-63 and El-Agraa, Ali M. (2001), p. 106-109
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Trade diversion refers to a union-induced shift in the source of import from lower-
cost external sources to higher-cost partner sources. This shift also has two aspects: rst,
an increase in the cost of the goods previously imported from abroad due to the shift from
third countries to partner sources and second, a loss of consumers' surplus resulting from
the substitution of higher-cost goods from partner countries for lower-cost goods from third
countries.
From the traditional point of view, trade creation is regarded as benecial to welfare;
trade diversion, on the contrary, is not. Following the extension and modication of Viner's
analysis by a number of economists, in particular, by Meade and Lipsey29, in which not
merely production effects, but also inter-commodity substitution or consumption effects
are also taken into consideration, it should be emphasized that the traditional conclusion, in
which trade creation is viewed as benecial and trade diversion as detrimental, is no longer
valid. For instance, Lipsey demonstrates that, similarly to production effects, consumption
effects could also have either a welfare-increasing or a welfare-decreasing function. Even
though he does not show that trade creation can lessen welfare, he does prove that trade
diversion can increase welfare. Both of these terms therefore have to be taken into account
and analyzed carefully. It should be considered that not only changes in the volumes of
trade from different resources have repercussions on the magnitude between these two
terms, but the changes in price and cost have to be brought into the picture as well.
Notwithstanding, the above-mentioned debates on welfare gains and losses within
free trade areas and customs unions are merely concerned with the facet of gains in asso-
29 Meade, J. E. (1966), p. 29-52 and Lipsey R. G. (1970), p. 33-55
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ciation with comparative advantage, and to a lesser extent, with economies of scale and
change in the terms of trade. There are a number of other welfare gains that also can be
brought about by free trade areas and customs unions. These include forced changes in ef-
ciency due to increased foreign competition, change in the rate of economic growth, and to
a great extent, economies of scale and change in the terms of trade, the effects of which go
beyond trade creation and trade diversion. These gains, therefore, are the reason why free
trade areas and customs unions are promoted worldwide and inaugurated despite the exis-
tence of several impediments such as the heterogeneity of the political systems, ethnicity
as well as the economies of the countries within the region.
1.5.2 Common Market
Common market, one stage further than customs union, is the third step towards full eco-
nomic integration. According to the static theory, free trade areas and customs union entail
merely the integration of product markets through trade liberalization without any mobil-
ity of production factors, either within the member countries or vis-à-vis third countries.
A common market, on the contrary, encompasses not only the integration of product mar-
kets, but also the integration of factor markets between the members, for instance, labor,
capital and enterprise markets. This is achieved by the removal of impediments to the free
movement of factors. In addition, for an effective integration of factor markets, an adoption
of complimentary harmonization of government policy measures such as taxation, social
security and industrial policies is required.
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From a statistical point of view, the gains that can be derived from a common market
generally involve allocation. A reallocation of factors will eliminate differences, if there are
any, in the marginal productivity of factors in the various member states. The factors from
countries with relatively low productivity will migrate to countries with higher productiv-
ity. Besides, the mobility of factors may also be conducive to the tendency of reducing
disparities in factor earning among the member countries. Notwithstanding, it should be
emphasized that factor mobility may not prot every member country. Moreover, if capital
only moves in one direction, one country could become a depressed area. Hence, the social
costs and benets of such a position have to be considered carefully and some intra-union
redistribution may be essential.
1.5.3 Complete Economic Union
Complete economic union is the most advanced and the last phase towards economic in-
tegration. Conceptually, complete economic union can be subordinated into two stages,
namely, economic and monetary union, and total economic union. The rst stage, eco-
nomic and monetary union, denotes a further phase of commonmarket. This implies further
harmonization and coordination of policies, such as scal, monetary, industrial, regional,
transport and some other policies, but also involves the initiation of central policy-making.
The most intense phase, after the accomplishment of economic and monetary union, is total
economic union in which there are absolutely no administrative barriers to the movement
of goods, services and factors. In case of total economic union, there is a single economic
policy and a supranational government with great economic authority within the union.
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What should be emphasized in this phase is that not only are the aspects of real eco-
nomic integration involved but also the development of monetary integration. Obviously,
at the early stages of economic integration such as a free trade area and a customs union,
monetary integration has not yet been taken into serious consideration. At the end or to-
wards the completion of a commonmarket, a closer cooperation on economic and monetary
policy is an essential instrument to operate with, to progress to economic and monetary in-
tegration. From a monetary standpoint, the framework of economic and monetary union
in general sets out how the transition to the single currency should proceed. This can be
differentiated into three steps30.
The rst stage can be described as a preparation phase in which the single market
should be completed, and in which economic convergence, i.e. closer cooperation on eco-
nomic and monetary policy between the member countries should be initiated. Of particular
importance in this are the common objectives and the rules, by which member countries
should determine their monetary, scal and exchange rate policies and the legal basis for
the introduction of the single policy. The second stage, the aim is to establish the monetary
institute within the union and develop the procedures and instruments of economic policy
required for a single monetary policy. This involves the strengthening of the cooperation
between the central banks of the member countries, the strengthening of the coordination
of the monetary policies of the member countries in order to ensuring price stability or
monitoring the competence of central banks and the stability of nancial markets of the
member countries. In the last stage, stage three, monetary union should be accomplished.
30 Levitt, M. and Lord, C. (2000), p. 80-82
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This stage involves the irrevocable xing of exchange rates among the participating coun-
tries, and besides that, the foundation of a central bank for the union. In particular, the
introduction of a union single currency with closer coordination and mutual surveillance of
economic and scal policies should be pursued.
1.6 Conclusion
Conceptually speaking, the terms cooperation and integration encompass various char-
acteristic features, mainly political, socio-psychological and in particular, economic. Both
terms, in many cases, are determined with regard to the institutions of a region and are
classied by the degree of intensity of international or interregional actions.
Cooperation and integration are seldom separable from each other and can be ana-
lyzed in many characteristic facets. Even though this thesis mainly concentrates on eco-
nomic features, it is not possible to disregard the other relevant features, namely political
and social features. This thesis, besides presenting an in-depth analysis of economic co-
operation and integration within the respective region, also considers the political side of
matters namely the nature and the interaction of the institutions within the integrated re-
gion. In addition to this, the decision-making of the people living within the participating
nations is discussed, in association with the social-psychological aspect of integration.
Cooperation indicates any form of collaboration between members who share the
same purposes, without any implication of restrictions of national sovereignty, whereas
integration is comparatively much more intense in terms of collective actions. On the one
hand, integration can be dened statically, as state of affairs in which different levels of
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amalgamation of regions or economic or political domains are classied. On the other
hand, the dynamic concept of integration denotes the process referring to the movement
from a lower to a higher stage of integration.
The main objective of both cooperation and integration is to improve the social wel-
fare of the members or of a group as a whole or only of some members of the group.
Nonetheless, it should be recognized that even though the implementation of cooperation
and integration may bring about benets, it may also be accompanied by costs as well. The
process of integration, in particular, may entail costs in many ways, and these could some-
times exceed the expected gains, since, compared to cooperation, integration is conducive
to a loss of national sovereignty on the part of the member states. The restriction of national
decision may lead to discrepancy between the aims of the whole group and the specic in-
terests of a single member, for instance the provision of public goods or setting up of proper
policies. This may lead to constraint of national policy, to the extent that the scope of the
use national policy as an instrument to ght against national problems, for example, eco-
nomic asymmetric shocks, is limited. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the costs and
benets of integration and cooperation carefully in order to ensure that an international or
interregional relationship functions as effectively as possible.
Chapter 2
The Development of ASEAN
This chapter illustrates the emergence and development of ASEAN from the outset.
The intention is to provide a better understanding of characteristics and natures of ASEAN.
This culminates in the realization of its strengths and weaknesses. The conclusion and
comments on ASEAN development are presented afterwards.
2.1 On the Way to the Establishment of ASEAN
2.1.1 The Emergence of Economic Development in Southeast Asia
The process of decolonization of the Southeast Asian countries began with the indepen-
dence of the Philippines in 1946 and lasted until Singapore became a sovereign state in
196531. At that time, the Southeast Asian economies were predominantly highly special-
ized in the production of primary commodities for export, while having to import most
of their manufactured products from developed countries. This kind of economic struc-
ture can be regarded as an outcome of colonial rule. The signicant feature of this period
31 The Dutch were forced to engage in an extensive military operation in Indonesia to bring the tide of
nationalism to a halt. However the Dutch had to retreat in the end and Indonesia became independent in 1949.
The USA, on the other hand, kept to its pre-war agreement and granted independence to the Philippines in
1946. Malayan independence was at rst delayed by the Chinese-led communist rebellion started in 1948.
After the communist threat had diminished sufciently, the Malaya also obtained independence from the
British as of 1957. Singapore was initially included in the new Federation of Malaysia in 1963, but by
August 1965 Singapore broke away from this tempestuous amalgamation and became a sovereign state. See
Regional Surveys of the World, The Far East and Australasia (2000), see Cribb R. for the history of Indonesia
and Malaysia, p. 443-455 and p. 661-669, see Brown I. For the history of the Philippines, p. 1063-1075, see
Turnbull C. M. for the history of Singapore, p. 1105-1113, and see McVey R. for the history of Thailand, p.
1182-1194
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Thailand (1960-1966) Import substitution Export expansion Domestic demand expansion
Consumption non-durable goods 14.0 4.1 81.9
Intermediate goods I 39.1 27.6 33.3
Machinery 31.7 0.2 68.1
Total manufacturing excluding food 4.2 15.8 80.0
Thailand (1966-1972) Import substitution Export expansion Domestic demand expansion
Consumption non-durable goods 35.6 12.6 51.8
Intermediate goods I 23.7 10.5 65.8
Machinery 49.0 2.7 48.3
Total manufacturing excluding food 42.1 10.7 47.2
Source: John Wong (1979), p. 164.
Origin: Narongchai Akrasanee (1975), Import Substitution, Export Expansion and Sources of Industrial Growth in Thailand, 1960-72.
The import-substituting industrialization in Thailand can be observed during the period of 1960-1972.
In the initiating period (1960-1966), the import-substitution process was not intensive;
on the contrary, the second phase (1967-1972) was more effective.
It involves the recognition that also the domestic demand had been a relevant source for the industrial growth in Thailand in both periods.
Table 2.1: Import substitution as source of industrial growth in Thailand
was the initiation of industrialization in the Southeast Asian region, by which a process
of industrialization and modernization was accepted as the central policy goal for national
economic growth and development. The manufacturing industry was regarded as a vehicle
that provided the economic process with sufcient dynamism to help an underdeveloped
country emerge into the modern world of high standards of living and employment.
The industrial development process during the independent period and was charac-
terized by two features: nationalism and import-substitution. Nationalism32, which
had been noticeable from the end of the Second World War, was intensied in the early
independent era. At the same time, the region's intense industrialization drive under the
so-called import-substitution strategy began between the late 1950s and the early 1960s,
and only came to an end in the 1980s, see Tables 2.1-2.4.
32 The expectations of freedom and independence among the people of Southeast Asia region were allegedly
raised by the Japanese eviction of the Western colonial powers during the Second World War. See Jorgensen-
Dahl (1982), p. 1-2
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Malaysia (1959-1963) Import substitution Export expansion Domestic demand expansion
Consumption goods 47.59 -1.47 53.84
Intermediate goods 39.59 6.22 54.12
Investment goods 43.30 -6.78 63.40
Total of 27 industries 40.68 -1.29 60.53
Malaysia (1963-1968) Import substitution Export expansion Domestic demand expansion
Consumption goods 49.95 12.66 37.37
Intermediate goods 48.09 14.05 37.86
Investment goods 50.50 11.52 37.95
Total of 27 industries 48.92 12.23 38.85
Source: Lutz Hoffmann and Tan Tew Nee (1971),
Pattern of Growth and Structural Change in West Malaysia's Manufacturing Industry 1959-68.
For Malaysia the import-substituting industrialization had been an essential source for its industrial growth throughout the period 1959-1968.
In the rst phase (1959-1963), the domestic demand also played an important roll for its industrial growth,
whereas export expansion started to arise in the second phase (1963-1968).
Table 2.2: Import substitution as source of industrial growth in Malaysia
Indonesia Consumption goods Raw materials and auxiliary goods Capital goods
1966 42.7 34.2 23.1
1968 37.2 36.3 26.5
1970 25.4 37.6 37.0
1971 19.1 38.8 42.1
1972 16.1 38.3 45.6
1973 23.8 35.7 40.5
1974 18.4 41.2 20.4
Source: Statistik Indonesia 1974-75 (1976)
Relative to the other ASEAN countries, Indonesia was a late comer.
Its import-substitution process started not until the late 1960s and,
at long last, has leaved its import substitution in the 1980s.
Table 2.3: Indicators of import-substitution industrialization process in Indonesia, imports
by end-used in percent distribution
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Philippines
Total
(Producer
goods)
Machinery
and
equipment
Unprocessed
and
semi-
processed
raw materials
Supplies
(Producer
goods)
Total
(Consumer
goods)
Consumer
durable
goods
Consumer
non-durable
goods
1949 62.67 9.86 42.67 10.14 37.33 2.47 34.85
1950 72.04 10.03 44.22 17.78 27.96 1.52 26.44
1955 79.51 8.95 54.25 16.32 20.48 1.55 18.92
1960 86.14 25.22 51.71 9.21 13.84 0.81 14.90
1965 81.49 18.73 57.34 5.41 18.51 0.91 17.56
1970 93.16 18.82 69.11 5.22 6.84 0.60 6.25
1974 92.68 15.03 71.21 6.44 7.32 0.30 7.02
1975 92.14 19.51 68.79 3.84 7.86 0.44 7.24
Source for the Philippines: Central Bank of the Philippines, Economic Indicators and Annual Reports, various years; and NEDA,
1975 Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines (1976).
The Philippines, on the contrary to Indonesia, initiated its import-substituting industrialization in the 1950s.
Table 2.4: Indicators of import-substitution industrialization process in the Philippines,
imports by end-used in percent distribution
In the early development stage of their national independence, countries in South-
east Asia had to confront the problems of national economic and political restructuring,
as well as inter- and intra-state conicts. These newly independent Southeast Asian coun-
tries often identied economic independence with the political independence33 they had
just attained. As a result, the policies these countries carried out on a national level were
decidedly inward-looking, with a view to achieving self-sufciency. In their attempt to
boost their national economies, they adopted various policies to avoid foreign economic
domination34. Increased engagement in and control over modern economic activities by
the indigenous people was an economic priority. Government authority was used to trans-
33 As a result of the fact that during the colonial period, the colonial powers controlled the economy and
political system of their colonies and that the discrepancy between income levels was immensely large and
certainly favoured the controlling classes, the developing countries often identied economic independence
with political independence and adopted various policies to avoid foreign economic domination. See Wu
Ta-Yeh, p. 15 and 20.
34 See Fessen, H., Freitag, G. and Roseno Bambang (1983), p. 36-42 for the evolution of agricultural
production and p. 54-72 for industrial evolution through state's efforts.
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form the foreign-dominated economies into national economies and to assure that the gains
from economic expansion largely beneted national society. Simultaneously, foreign in-
vestment was closely controlled and regulated. These countries were struggling to improve
the performance of their economic policies and institutions, scal systems, social services,
infrastructure, the banking system and economic planning, as well as rural development.
Leaders and policymakers realized that the post-colonial economic structure of their
countries was still immensely dependent on the export of primary products and that this
would not allow for a real development breakthrough. This was due to the limited carry-
over effect of the traditional trade-led type of economic growth as well as the increasing
skepticism about the long-term price development of the major primary export products35.
Consequently, these countries decided on a policy of industrialization as their development
strategy, and invested heavily in the infrastructure they believed necessary for the industri-
alization process. Such an industrial development strategy, which accounted for a period
of growth and development, was prevalent from the late 1950s onwards and is often known
as import-substituting industrialization. Import-substituting industrialization subscribes
strongly to the policy of reducing or eliminating the import of foreign industrial products
through the imposition of discriminating tariffs and quotas, in order to reserve domestic
markets for local products. The degree of restriction ranged from moderate in Malaysia to
highly rigorous in Indonesia36. Indonesia's and the Philippines's import-substitution poli-
35 Wong, J. (1979) p. 54
36 The information about the nominal and effective tariff rates of the countries in Southeast Asia in the
import-substitution period was derived from Wong, J., p. 17: Tariff rates for Malaysia based on M. Ariff
(1975), for Philippines based on J. H. Power (1971), p. 275, for Singapore based on S. Y. Chia (1975) and
for Thailand based on N. Akarasanee (1975).
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cies and their restrictions on the import of foreign industrial products put them in the cate-
gory of inwards-looking industrializers. Indonesia had levied extremely high tariff rates
that escalated from the lower to the higher stages of production and resulted in a negative
value-added at world market prices for many domestically produced goods. In the Philip-
pines, the average nominal and effective rates of the tariff structure were about 30 percent
and 62 percent respectively. This led to a negative value-added at world market prices for
several inefcient, capital-intensive products. Malaysia and Thailand, on the other hand,
were categorized as reluctant industrializers37. In Malaysia, the general pattern of tar-
iffs was such that the rates for intermediate goods were relatively low, those for machinery
moderate and those for consumer goods high. The overall nominal rate was about 18 per-
cent and the effective rate about 44 percent. These tariff rates were quite modest compared
to those in many developing countries'. In Thailand, the tariff structure was milder than in
the Philippines, but more stringent than that of Malaysia. For most items, the nominal tar-
iff rates in Thailand ranged between 20 and 25 percent and the effective rates were higher
still. The policy in Singapore, on the other hand, was quite different. As a result of its small
domestic market and the presence of import-oriented industries, Singapore had been lib-
eral in its trade policies. Consequently tariffs were imposed only on a limited number of
manufactured articles, for the purpose of revenue. The average nominal tariff level for the
entire manufacturing sector was as low as 5 percent, while the average effective tariff rate
was about 18 percent.
37 Power, J.H. (1969), p. 377-378. The term reluctant industrializers may refer to a lack of sense of
urgency about industrialization, which distinguished Thailand and Malaysia from the other inward-looking
industrializers.
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It should be emphasized, however, that the high dependence on manufactured imports
from developed countries was not overcome by import-substituting industrialization. On
the contrary, for most countries38 this policy merely resulted in the replacement of imports
of some consumer goods, such as food, beverages and tobacco, as well as simple man-
ufactured products, while imports of machinery and, later, some industrial raw materials
increased (see Table 2.5).
Most former Western colonial powers were not particularly successful in retaining
their previous leading position in trade with their former colonies. It was Japan and the
USAwho played the predominant role at that time. The Southeast Asian countries exported
primary products to the West and Japan, while their industrialization structure required the
continuous inow of capital, technology and modern equipment from these developed na-
tions. This consequently led to closer trade relationships between the West and Japan
and the Southeast Asian countries. The economic structure of the Southeast Asian coun-
tries happened to be much more complementary with the industrialized market economies
than with any other nation groups. However, it should be stressed that their exports were
substitutable, making the relationship one of one-way economic dependency vis-à-vis the
industrial countries39.
38 With the exception of Singapore, which from the beginning of its industrialization effort did not focus
only on producing simple consumer goods to replace foreign imports, but also on producing intermediate or
even producer's goods.
39 Wong, J. p. 19
2.1 On the Way to the Establishment of ASEAN 41
Land
Indonesia
Food
Other
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
capital goods
Capital goods
1955 9.6 29.5 22.8 9.9 28.2
1960 23.1 21.8 23.9 4.1 27.1
1965 20.8 15.2 15.6 9.9 38.5
1970 15.5 11.5 15.6 9.8 47.7
1971 9.9 10.8 15.1 11.3 52.9
1974 13.5 6.7 28.4 7.1 49.3
Land
Malaysia
Food
Other
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
capital goods
Capital goods
1960 26.0 21.4 17.1 14.7 20.9
1965 23.5 18.0 19.2 9.0 30.3
1970 19.1 15.9 19.2 9.6 36.2
1972 17.6 14.5 19.1 8.7 40.1
Land
Philippines
Food
Other
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
capital goods
Capital goods
1955 18.7 28.6 16.5 11.4 24.8
1960 15.0 12.0 19.2 7.7 24.8
1965 19.3 8.0 23.4 5.5 43.8
1970 9.5 5.8 29.4 9.7 45.7
1973 12.9 9.9 32.5 6.4 38.7
1974 9.9 9.0 41.2 8.0 31.9
Land
Singapore
Food
Other
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
capital goods
Capital goods
1960 16.6 22.5 42.0 8.7 10.2
1965 17.5 27.0 27.7 8.1 19.7
1970 12.6 24.4 25.5 7.9 29.6
1973 10.3 19.1 28.3 6.0 36.4
1974 7.5 14.3 36.2 6.4 35.6
Land
Thailand
Food
Other
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
consumption goods
Materials mainly for
capital goods
Capital goods
1955 8.5 40.3 11.3 9.2 30.7
1960 8.2 31.0 12.1 11.1 37.6
1965 5.5 25.8 18.2 7.4 43.1
1970 4.0 18.8 23.0 7.8 46.3
1973 3.3 13.2 31.9 8.4 43.2
1974 2.9 10.5 36.8 8.8 41.0
Source: John Wong (1979), p. 142, originated from UN, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacic, 1975 (1977)
Table 2.5: Composition of imports by economic classication in percent distribution
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2.1.2 The Regionalism Movement in Southeast Asia between 1945-1967
The development towards regionalism could rst be observed at the end of the Second
World War. During the period preceding the establishment of ASEAN (1945-1967), two
relevant phases of regionalism and regional cooperation in Southeast Asia can be distin-
guished. The rst, from 1945 to 1959, was referred to as the nationalism phase. In this
phase, most countries in Southeast Asia had just attained their independence and had to
confront the task of restructuring their national economic and political systems. Besides
their cultural, ethnic, religious and ideological differences, the Southeast Asian countries
were also confronted with the territorial conicts that were a consequence of long coloniza-
tion40. In this period, there was a lack of regional initiatives coming from the region itself.
Instead, most of the impetus came from outsiders, in particular the United States and Great
Britain. One of the most relevant economic organizations of this period, in which many
Southeast Asian countries participated, was the United Nations Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). ECAFE was established in 1947 at the initiative of the
US and aimed to promote regional economic growth and political stability (the name was
changed to ESCAP in 1974). Another such organization was the Colombo Plan for Co-
operative Development in South and Southeast Asia, established in 1951. This was rstly
a Commonwealth undertaking sustained by British support and focused on economic co-
operation and development in the member countries, although it later also encompassed
countries from outside the Commonwealth. In the military and security sphere, the South-
east Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was founded in 1954, largely thanks to US support.
40 Dosch J. (1997), p. 17 and Sin D. C. (2000), p. 72
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It was a treaty organization for collective defense as a counter-pole to the communist power
in the region.
The second phase covered the period from 1960 to 1967, when most countries in
Southeast Asia were beginning to implement import-substitution as a policy to drive indus-
trialization. The two most signicant organizations of this period were the Association of
Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO. ASA, which can, to some extent, be consid-
ered as the forerunner of ASEAN, was established in 1961 with the Federation of Malaya
(the name was changed to Malaysia in 1963), the Philippines and Thailand as members.
MAPHILINDO, founded in 1963, involved the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines and
Indonesia. The key characteristic of this phase was the fact that regionalism was, for the
rst time, initiated from within the region itself. Both associations aimed to promote eco-
nomic and cultural cooperation41. Yet it should be noted that ambition for military co-
operation obviously existed, in particular vis-à-vis the communist power in the region42.
However, barely having been established, both organizations fell victim to conicts be-
tween their members due to the increasing territorial conict in the Sabah region in 1963
between Malaysia and the Philippines, as well as between Malaysia and Indonesia. A con-
ict broke out over the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia in July 1963, which
encompassed the region of the Federation of Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. This
41 For instance, areas of cooperation within ASA included trade liberalization; joint action to develop in-
dustries and to establish shipping lines and airlines; joint efforts to stabilize primary commodity markets;
technical training and research and promotion of education and of cultural ties among the countries.
42 Furthermore, MALPHILINDO, which may be denoted as a purely political vehicle and racist oriented,
aimed to establish of a Greater Malay Confederation, the hope of president Macapagal, as a means to force
out the Western inuences from the region and try to take over the leading position in the region. See Morgan
T. and Spoelstra N. (1969), p. 10-11, Dosch J. (1997), p. 19, Weggel O. (1984), p. 18, and Sin D. C. (2000),
p. 74
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federation was strongly rejected by the Philippines and Indonesia and this brought about
MALPHILINDO's disintegration. Consequently, Konfrontasi  an armed conict between
Indonesia and Malaysia  and the antagonism between Malaysia and the Philippines over
the sovereignty over Sabah took place. ASA was also set back at an early phase by the
diplomatic break in 1962 between the Philippines andMalaysia over the Sabah affair. How-
ever, it was revitalized in June 1966 with the normalization of relations between the two.
2.2 Development of ASEAN
2.2.1 Establishment of ASEAN
ASEAN was established on August 8th, 1967 under the ASEAN Declaration (the Bangkok
Declaration of 1967) signed by the Foreign Ministers of the ve founding countries 
the former ASA members together with Indonesia and Singapore. The establishment of
ASEAN was essentially of political and, to a lesser extent, economic consequence. During
the post-war period, Southeast Asia was a major cold war arena, and several countries were
struggling for national survival and independence. Although the Bangkok Declaration em-
phasized close cooperation between members in the economic, social and cultural spheres,
the intention to promote national and regional security and sovereignty, especially vis-à-
vis internal and external communist inuences as well as vis-à-vis hegemonic policies of
powerful countries throughout the region can not be overlooked43.
43 Dosch J. (1993), p. 5 and Sin D.-C. (1997), p. 77
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It was the change of political authorities in Indonesia and the Philippines, and con-
sequently, the de-escalation of the Konfrontasi and the Sabah conicts, together with the
skillfulness of Thailand as a negotiation-initiator that brought about dialogue within the
region, and thus, the possibility of ASEAN's establishment. The members displayed dif-
ferent motives for their accessions to ASEAN44. Indonesia intended to assert itself as the
regional authority, whereas Malaysia hoped for acceptance as a fully-edged state, with its
independence and territorial borders being acknowledged. The Philippines hoped to dis-
avow its reputation as a US-marionette and to gain its sovereignty. Singapore put paid
to its reputation as a mini-China by joining ASEAN, while Thailand aimed to improve
its security vis-à-vis its communist neighbors in Indochina through military support from
ASEAN members.
2.2.2 First Development Phase, 1967-1975
The Initial Phase, 1967-1972
Despite the fact that the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 dealt predominantly with eco-
nomic cooperation, ASEAN was de facto primarily a security and politically oriented com-
munity at the beginning of its development. In this phase, the process of political coop-
eration was clearly apparent. In particular, this resulted in the successful institutionaliza-
tion of the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) established by the 1967 Bangkok
Declaration, in which the ASEAN Foreign ministers could draw up policy guidelines and
coordinate activities. The ministerial conference, at the very beginning of ASEAN's estab-
44 Sin D.-C. (1997), p. 77-78 and Narine S. (1998), p. 93
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lishment, contributed to the overcoming of intra-regional (territorial) conicts and has been
a signicant forum for ASEAN cooperation up to the present day. Furthermore, there were
external pressures that intensied ASEAN regional coordination. One of these was the cli-
max of the Vietnam War in the course of 1970s, which caused the security situation of the
region to deteriorate. The ASEAN countries were therefore forced to cooperate, particu-
larly in terms of security policy vis-à-vis communist powers. Consequently, on November
27th, 1971, The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was established by
the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, with the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. With this undertak-
ing, the prole of ASEAN in this phase as a security and political community rather than
an economic community became more and more obvious45.
The concept of ASEAN that can be observed in this rst phase was the intention
to be politically neutral and to bring security to the region. The foundation of ZOPFAN
was intended to serve as an instrument for the achievement of these aims. Moreover, sol-
idarity between members was to be developed through three essential concepts, namely
nding peaceful solutions to intra-regional conicts, non-interference in national affairs
and the implementation of regional objectives under consensus. A further ambition was
to increase the bargaining power against the great power countries46.
Despite several efforts towards and proposals for further economic cooperation, this
phase can be regarded as disappointing in terms of regional economic integration. This has
to do with the fact that the ASEAN members concentrated mainly on their own economic
growth. This was the period of industrialization by means of import-substitution policy, in
45 Narine S. (1998), p. 105
46 Wongboonsin P. (1997), p. 12
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which modernization and industrialization were assumed to be instruments for economic
growth and development. There was a belief that governments, through regulation and con-
trol, could organize and lead economic activity more effectively than the market47. With
government intervention in the economic process through direct control, through public
nancial institutions and through diverse state enterprises, the economic role of the gov-
ernment in these countries could not result in a functional economy with market competi-
tion and efciency. Instead, it resulted in the elite groups who exercised power controlling
and regulating economic activity on a preferential basis, with emphasis on their own na-
tional interests. In order to protect their domestic industries48, in many countries, imports
of particular goods were licensed or prohibited where the domestic production capacity
was considered sufcient for domestic demand. However, imports of modern technology,
machinery, capital goods as well as intermediate goods and raw materials were encouraged
through low protection rates. Because of these efforts, domestic producers began to start
production or expand their capacity in import-competing industries. These opportunities
were predominately exploited by domestic entrepreneurs, who could thus make protable
investments under the protection of the policy of import-substitution. Industrial output grew
moderately. However, several industries used relatively unskilled labor and labor-intensive
processes to produce goods for which a sizeable domestic market existed49. As industrial
development was dependent upon protection, manufacturing outputs were likely to mirror
47 Golay F. H. (1977), p. 94-95, and Krueger, A. O. (1995), p. 6
48 In the period of import-substitution strategy, it was believed that developing countries should protect
their domestic industries, in particular their infant industries, because it was thought that export earnings
from primary commodities would not grow fast enough to compensate the increasing demand for machinery,
equipment, and other imports which should augment investment and industrial activity levels.
49 Krueger, A. O. (1995), p. 8-9
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the historical congurations of the manufactured goods that had previously been imported.
These had been relatively homogenous in this region. Consequently, the patterns of emerg-
ing industries in the countries in this region were similar and output was concentrated in
consumer goods and relatively simple industrial products, such as processed food, clothing,
footwear, textiles, petroleum rening, rubber manufacture, simple metal fabrication, auto-
mobile assembly, pharmaceuticals, simple industrial chemicals and diverse manufactured
products50.
In spite of import-substitution, the import of highly demanded capital, modern ma-
chinery, technology and intermediate goods grew rapidly, while export growth was too slow
to generate adequate supplies of foreign currencies. The incentives for producing interna-
tional value-added in import-competing industries were much stronger than the incentives
for producing international value-added in export industries. The producers of import-
competing commodities had no incentive to expand the existing lines of production more
rapidly than domestic demand grew. Instead, they preferred to invest at less risk in a new
line of production in the domestic market, under the protection of the import-substitution
policy. Several countries in the region were faced with foreign exchange shortages and
balance of payment problems. Therefore, trade regimes were forced to become more and
more restrictive and it was often necessary to restrict import through licensing and other
quantitative mechanisms. In some cases, these restrictions were even enforced on goods
associated with development projects.
50 Golay F. H. (1977), p. 111-112
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Initiation of Economic Integration 1973-1975
At the end of the import-substitution era, many countries of the region with advanced
import-substitution policies were suffering from hampered economic growth. Small na-
tions, in particular, were generally handicapped in their economic growth through the lim-
ited size of their domestic markets. These countries hoped to overcome this obstacle by
gradually changing to an export-oriented strategy  particularly through diversication of
exports in manufacturing products  and by beginning to merge their domestic markets
through economic integration. Balanced growth strategy, the aim of which was the simul-
taneous development of mutually supporting industries that would create markets for each
other's production, was hindered particularly by deciencies in resource supply. Unbal-
anced growth strategy, which is based on the concentrated development of a few industries
that have strong backward and forward linkage effects and on the creation of pressures, ten-
sions and incentives and challenges, was hampered by the problem of a narrow domestic
market and the lack of adequate export outlets. Therefore economic integration, through
the expansion of the market, which allows for specialization, should be considered as an es-
sential means of accelerating economic growth, for both balanced and unbalanced growth
strategies.
It was not until 1973 that the movement towards economic integration was technically
and strategically initiated. It was at this time that the import-substitution strategy of some
ASEAN countries had shown signs of its ineffectiveness. In addition, the oil-crisis had
just begun, an external factor which also signicantly threatened the economic growth of
the ASEAN countries. One has to keep in mind that member states of ASEAN had not
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begun their import-substitution policy simultaneously. Hence the development phases of
their economic situations and their industrialization processes varied considerably. The
outcome of this was that at the beginning of the economic integration movement, there
were controversial opinions and points of view on economic integration among member
countries, resulting from their own economic development situations. On the one hand,
Singapore and the Philippines were striving for a free trade area, in which the existing
customs would be linearly dismantled at a rate of around 10 to 15 percent on average per
round of customs reduction, until 199051. Indonesia and Malaysia, on the other hand, were
of a different opinion. They preferred the option of a selective free trade area, in which the
existing customs would be reduced through the so-called item-by-item procedure, without
a xed time period. Thailand was indifferent in this debate.
Singapore, at that time, already had a relatively prosperous industrialized economy
with low protectionism and was carrying out a strongly export oriented policy, with a
high level of competitive success in the international market. Hence Singapore aimed
to gain market share through free trade in the region without any risk of competition
against its industry sector, since the industrialization development of the partner states
was at a lower level. Due to the fact that the Philippines had begun their industrializa-
tion through import-substitution relatively early, their industrial sector was comparatively
well developed. Hence, the Philippines encountered a situation in which industrialization
through their import-substitution policy was further advanced; so the problems of import-
substitution had already emerged and the impulse of economic growth through import-
51 Kraft A. (1982), p. 58, data originated from Stockwin H. (1975), p. 50-54
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substitution was now hampered. Even though the level of protectionism of the domestic
industrial sector against foreign competitors was still kept high, the Philippines intended
to boost their economic growth through regional free trade. They expected to gain from
an increased regional market share and from diversifying their regional export structure.
However, they had a tendency to protect their industrial sectors against the competition
from partner countries.
Contrary to the Philippines, Indonesia had launched its import-substitution policy
relatively late and was not yet prepared for a free trade area. With the result that its industry
sector was relatively less developed at that time, Indonesia held the opinion that in a free
trade area, with the pressure of competition from partner countries that such an area would
bring, its own industrial development would be delayed. It also believed that with its large
resources, population and a potential domestic market, it had a good prospect of attaining
substantial economic growth without participating in a free trade area. Furthermore, the
initial association of Indonesia in ASEAN was primarily political. Despite its ability to
compete in the industrial sector and a relatively low rate of protectionism, Malaysia was
not ready for a free trade area either. This may be explained by the fact that, at that time,
the Malaysian economy was dominated by a Chinese minority experienced and successful
in trade. Therefore Malaysia was afraid that the Chinese minority would gain from a free
trade area much more than its indigenous people, who still played a subordinate role in the
economy.
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Economic Structure of the ASEAN Countries in 1967-1975
In this phase, ASEAN was economically characterized by import-substituting indus-
trialization. This development strategy essentially involved the import of machinery, equip-
ment and building materials, mostly from developed countries, and resulted in a high rate
of domestic or imported capital formation. In order to increase their ability to support the
increasing import requirements, the ASEAN countries had to increase their exports, which
at that time were concentrated in primary commodities. During this phase, the ASEAN
countries had experienced a high growth performance, which can be put down to two key
factors, namely the export boom and a high rate of capital formation. Despite the strong
growth, there were several major problems that accompanied the ASEAN countries' devel-
opment strategies52. One of the problems was that the export structure relied exclusively
on primary commodities with developed countries as the major trading partners. Further-
more, the overall degree of commodity concentration for the ASEAN countries, except
Singapore, was high. Only a few commodities dominated the ASEAN countries' export
structure. This made the ASEAN countries' exports heavily dependent on the uctuating
conditions of supply and demand at home and in the countries of their trading partners.
The ASEAN countries' economies uctuated with the world price and the world economic
situation, and consequently, these countries had to cope with their vulnerability to exter-
nal instability. With this kind of traditional trade pattern, the ASEAN countries, particu-
larly Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, also faced the problems of limited spread
of carry-over effects. There were obstacles to the structural transformation of the ASEAN
52 Wong J. (1979), p. 12-51
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economies. Furthermore, there was the problem of the distribution of gains from trade,
which has been uneven in most developing countries. Essentially, the gains from trade dis-
proportionately accrued to multinational corporations, middlemen, urban elites or foreign-
ers. Another problem was the fact that some ASEAN countries had to cope with balance of
payments difculties. One of the reasons for this problem was that the ASEAN countries'
industrialization and agricultural modernization program required an increase in imports of
machinery, equipment, and fertilizer. The economic growth had caused a shift in the im-
port structure from private consumption demand to the demand for capital and intermediate
goods with high import content. The increasing imports had exceeded the growth of export.
Moreover, in 1974, the year of worldwide recession, the region's export situation worsened.
This recession worsened the ASEAN countries' trade decits, which amounted to 655 mil-
lion US dollars that year. However, trade decits alone do not cause balance of payments
difculties. Singapore, for instance, experienced high trade decits every year at that time.
However, due to high earnings in the service accounts and unrecorded trade outows, Sin-
gapore did not face balance of payments difculties. The Philippines and Thailand, on
the other hand, were typically faced with balance of payments difculties. These can be
observed in the most developing countries that use import-substitution as their economic
growth strategy (Figure 2.1). There were also threats posed by a lower rate of growth in
the developed countries' demand for primary commodities during the recession along with
a steady rise in the price of manufactured goods.
As a result of these problems, the ASEAN countries needed a comprehensive growth
and stabilization policy in order to cope with the rapidly changing international economic
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Current account balance of the ASEAN-5 countries
(in percent of GDP)
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Indonesia -0,61 -5,62 -7,42 -2,12 -2,21 -4,9 -2,77 -1,57 -1,09 -2,61 -3,32 -2 -1,33 -1,58 -3,18 -3,37 -2,27
Malaysia -5,43 -5,06 5,076 3,257 0,776 4,437 -1,09 -9,87 -13,4 -11,6 -4,88 -1,92 -0,37 8,149 5,382 0,831 -2,03 -8,89 -3,72 -4,66 -6,23 -9,7 -4,63 -4,87
Philippines -3,84 -4,84 -5,46 -5,86 -5,78 -8,58 -8,33 -4,12 -0,12 3,19 -1,34 -1,03 -3,41 -6,08 -2,28 -1,89 -5,54 -4,6 -2,67 -4,77 -5,24
Singapore -17 -12,4 -19,7 -10,3 -9,57 -4,49 -5,77 -7,8 -13,3 -10,6 -8,49 -3,51 -2,05 -0,02 1,768 -0,53 7,548 9,74 8,327 11,25 11,99 7,319 16,16 16,86 15,87 15,37
Thailand -4,07 -2,59 -5,55 -4,8 -7,62 -6,42 -7,38 -2,74 -7,18 -5,04 -3,95 0,573 -0,73 -2,68 -3,46 -8,53 -7,71 -5,66 -5,08 -5,6 -8,06 -8,1 -1,96
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Figure 2.1: Current account balance of the ASEAN-5 countries (in percent of GDP)
situation. The major issues relating to the ASEAN countries' structural adjustment came
to the fore in the second development phase. This refers to the diversication of ex-
ports, which displayed the intention to restructure the existing exports to increase the share
of manufactured and semi-processed products. Furthermore, the enhancement of intra-
regional trade and industrial cooperation was considered relevant for the further develop-
ment of the ASEAN economies53.
53 One of the relevant problems which emerged from the industrialization processes of the developing coun-
tries was that their economic structures were essentially conducive towards the deterioration of their balance
of payments. This was due to a high level of trade dependency, which resulted from the export of primary
products and high import demand for technology and modern machinery. Therefore, the developing countries
were obliged to nd a way to improve the efciency of the import-substitution process which involved export
expansion, in particular, for industrial intermediate and durable consumer products, as well as the restora-
tion of traditional products and primary products export. When domestic markets proved to be too small and
in order to allow an import-substitution policy, the developing countries made efforts to initiate international
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2.2.3 Second Development Phase, 1976-1986
ASEAN Regional Movement in 1976-1986
The second development phase started with the rst ASEAN summit on the 23rd and
24th February 1976 in Bali. The collapse of the non-communist regime in Cambodia and
South Vietnam in April 1975 led to political challenge in ASEAN brought about by united
communist Vietnam and the communist-led revolutionary movements. This triggered the
ASEAN nations to urgently increase their regional cooperation, especially with respect to
regional security policies. Furthermore, pressure from different world economic crises,
such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the Oil-crisis in 1973-
1974 and the subsequent worldwide recession in 1974-1975 and the early 1980s, forced the
ASEAN countries to give economic cooperation their serious consideration.
This rst summit of the heads of government represented a turning point in ASEAN
economic cooperation. Besides the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
and the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, the heads of govern-
ment also issued the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. With the signing of the Declara-
tion of ASEAN Concord, the dispute over the initiation of economic integration between
members nally came to an end. As opposed to the ASEAN Declaration of 1967, the
Declaration of ASEAN Concord contained an unambiguous program of economic coop-
eration, which was divided into four predominating spheres. The rst was cooperation in
the trade of basic commodities, particularly food and energy, which included giving other
economic cooperation within the region and considered the formation of a regional market as a way out of
this impediment.
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members priority to purchase in periods of shortage and provisions for the acquisition of
exports in periods of surplus. The second sphere was industrial cooperation, which called
for the setting up of large-scale ASEAN industrial plants and the preferential treatment of
projects using materials available from member countries. The aims of this were to in-
crease food production, enhance foreign exchange earnings and create employment. The
third sphere focused on cooperation in trade. It included the establishment of preferential
trading arrangements as a long-term objective, an increase in joint efforts to improve access
to markets outside ASEAN for their raw materials and nished products and the adoption
of common approaches and action in dealing with regional groupings and individual eco-
nomic powers. The nal sphere consisted of a joint approach on international commodity
problems and other world economic problems, as well as a joint effort to improve access to
markets outside ASEAN.
In February 1977, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers signed an agreement on Preferen-
tial Trading Arrangements (PTA)54 which involved three main issues, namely, voluntary
listing of products for preferential treatment, bilateral negotiation on a case-by-case ba-
sis, and across-the-board preferential tariff cuts on items with an import trade value of less
than 50,000 US dollars. However, they were not successful in making signicant progress,
since the members were unwilling to include the reduction of tariffs which protected their
domestic producers, in order to avoid the increase of competitive pressure on their pro-
tected producers. The members attempted to put forth a large number of tariff cuts, yet
54 Dosch J. and Rieger H. C. assert that foundation of the early political strategies of the ASEAN economic
cooperation, and also the PTA is based on the so-called Kansu-Report or Robinson-Report, which was made
by the expert team form the United Nations in 1972, see Dosch J. (1997), p. 230, and Rieger H. C. (1988), p.
44.
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the actual preferential tariff cuts issued were of little effect, in that they merely applied
to irrelevant items or dened goods narrowly55. Furthermore, several empirical studies of
the PTA indicated that PTA had a minimal impact on intra-ASEAN trade. By 1981, some
9,000 preferential tariff reductions had been announced; they covered only 2 percent of
intra-ASEAN trade, and even by the late 1980s a mere 5 percent56.
Five industrial projects under the ASEAN Industrial Projects programs (AIPs) were
launched in 1977, focusing on promoting industrial cooperation, particularly in meeting re-
gional requirements for essential commodities. This program obliged members to set up
one of the ve projects in their countries57. The development of AIPs proved unsatisfactory.
Despite the assignment of one AIP to each member country inMarch 1979 and the Japanese
nancial aid for the program58, the rst project did not operate until 1984. At that time Sin-
gapore had effectively withdrawn from the program and Thailand had taken up a decidedly
negative position towards AIPs59. Besides the PTA and AIPs, there were other strategies to
promote intra-regional trade and industrial cooperation. These were the ASEAN Industrial
55 Pomfret R. (1997), p. 303, Tan G. (1982), p. 325-330 and Pangestu M., Soesastro H., and Ahmad M.
(1992), p. 335-336
56 Pomfret R. (1997), p. 303 and Imanda (1993), p. 4-8
57 It was originally envisaged that 60 percent of the equity of the ASEAN projects would be held by the host
country and 40 percent by the other countries.
58 The Japanese Government agreed in 1977 to make available 1 billion US dollars in loans, mainly conces-
sional, for the large scale projects. However, this nance was tied to the use of Japanese suppliers, contractors
and designers.
59 Indonesia wanted a modication of Singapore's original AIP, a diesel engine factory, since a segment of
its output range would contend with an Indonesia plant. However, restricting the output range would make
the Singaporean factory unprotable; hence Singapore replaced the engine project by a hepatitis B vaccine
project and reduced its equity participation in other AIPs from 10 to 1 percent, with the host country holding
60 percent and the other ASEAN countries 13 percent each. Up to half of the share of the host country
can be held by foreign investors. Thailand decided to reject its AIP, a soda ash plant, and launched a urea
fertiliser plant. The Philippines dropped its super phosphate AIP, and decided on a pulp and paper project.
Only Indonesia and Malaysia launched their original AIPs, the urea fertiliser projects, which had to encounter
unwanted competition from the new Thai national project. See Wawn B. (1982), p. 169-170, and Pomfret R.
(1997), p. 304
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Complementation (AIC) and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV). These schemes,
however, put in a disappointing performance due to bureaucratic delays and the failure of
members to agree on the various proposals for joint projects, as well as the protection of
competing infant industries, motivated by national interest60.
In accordance with the aim of developing regional monetary cooperation, the rst
ASEAN summit also resulted in the foundation of the ASEAN Finance Corporation. This
was established in 1981 by 140 commercial banks and individual shareholders, and aimed
to promote economic cooperation among members. However, it achieved poor results and
was restructured in 1987-1988 into a merchant bank that provided limited lending to bank-
able projects within ASEAN. Furthermore in 1977, the ASEAN Swap Agreement was es-
tablished with a total facility of 100 million US dollars, mainly to assist member countries
in getting over temporary balance-of-payments problems. The countries needing support
could borrow up to a maximum of 40 million US dollars for a one-, two- or three-month
period with the option of one renewal. The other countries would contribute equally to
the amount in question up to a maximum of 20 million US dollars each. The ASEAN
Swap Agreement was later doubled from 20 million to 40 million US dollars and the maxi-
mum lending and borrowing limits were put up from 40 million to 80 million US dollars in
1978. The actual form of the support was the simultaneous sale and purchase of US dollars
against the currency of the country in question and forward cover in that currency against
US dollars for the period requested. Even though its development was slow at the begin-
ning  as the local press commented that the members had hardly made use of the facility
60 Bhalla A. and Bhalla P. (1997), p. 72
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so far  the Swap Arrangement can nevertheless be considered in a political sense as a con-
crete product of ASEAN cooperation in the monetary sphere. And at least in the 1980s,
this facility had been actively utilized by its members61.
Another relevant aspect in this phase was the rst ASEAN expansion on January 7th,
1984. Brunei Darussalam became the 6th ASEAN member after having gained indepen-
dence from the British. The intention of Brunei to become an ASEAN member was not
economically motivated. Instead the aspiration to national sovereignty lay behind Brunei's
application for membership. From ASEAN's viewpoint, Brunei's integration was geo-
economically and -politically plausible. In spite of this, due to its small size and limited
international economic relations (with exception of its oil-export business), Brunei did not
bring signicant economic potency to ASEAN62.
Economic Structure of the ASEAN Countries in 1976-1986: Economic Restructuring
and Export Diversication
The 1970s were a time of considerable economic turbulence, starting with the break-
down of the Bretton Woods system of xed exchange rates, followed by a marked increase
in the prices of oil and most other commodities. By the end of the decade, inationary
pressure was on the increase. As a consequence, in order to stop ination, most industrial
countries adopted tight scal and monetary policies. Finally, in the early 1980s, the cy-
cle had got to a turning point and recession set in. In addition, commodity prices sharply
61 Early in 1983, the central banks of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand had all made use
of the facility, but Singapore had not This probably resulted from several changes in the operation of Swap
Agreement agreed during a regional central banker's meeting held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on 16th January
1981, see Skully M.T. (1985), p. 20-21
62 Chirathivat S. (1997) and Wongboonsin P. (1997), p. 4-5
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declined. One of the reasons for commodity price deterioration was that the buoyant com-
modity prices of the 1970s had led to substantial investment and expansion in the capacity
for commodity production, resulting in an excess of supply over demand which led to
lower prices. Another reason was that technological innovations had also led to a decline
in the consumption of raw materials or to their being switched63. In order to provide a
basis for further economic growth, the ASEAN countries were forced to modify their eco-
nomic structure. The ASEAN countries that had beneted from the export of primary
commodities gradually turned towards the export of manufactured products (Figure 2.2).
Thus import-substitution strategy had now evolved into export promotion. The growth of
manufacturing exports was an element that indicated the reorientation towards exports. The
shift to the export of manufactured products was a consequence of declining primary com-
modity prices as well as a result of efforts to promote and diversify exports. At that time,
the ASEAN countries recognized that export promotion was a means for their economic
growth. Furthermore, there were several arguments that supported export promotion. First,
exports yield higher income for domestic producers, and hence produce a source of de-
mand for domestic products. Second, the foreign exchange supply provided by exports
will secure the nance of additional imports of capital and intermediate goods. Third, in-
creasing exports reduces the risk of encountering a foreign exchange crisis, and, therefore,
encourages investment. Fourth, exploiting the comparative advantage, the economies of
large-scale production and higher capacity utilization will enhance efciency. And fth,
63 Wai T. T. (1990), p. 39-44
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increasing competition in foreign markets and technological change will drive domestic
producers to operate efciently.
Manufactures exports of the ASEAN-5 countries
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Figure 2.2: Manufactures exports of the ASEAN-5 countries (in percent of merchandise
exports)
One of the most essential factors for attaining long-term growth has been capital
accumulation, or specically, investment in productive facilities, which has been used to
countervail depreciation and increase a country's stock of productive assets. The primary
source for nancing gross investment is domestic saving. In many countries, developing
countries in particular, that are attempting to grow rapidly, domestic savings have often not
been large enough to completely nance the expected level of capital accumulation. The
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Gross domestic investment of the ASEAN-5 countries
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Figure 2.3: Gross domestic investment of the ASEAN-5 countries
difference between investment and saving is denoted as the domestic resource gap. To
overcome the resource gap, countries may exercise the following policy options. They can
use foreign savings  foreign loans, foreign grants or foreign direct investment  or they
can conduct a policy that promotes the reduction of the investment level. In the late 1970s
and the early 1980s, the ASEAN countries kept their investment levels above 30 percent of
GDP. These high investment levels produced a resource gap of about 7 percent in the early
1980s (Figures 2.3 and 2.4). Therefore it was essential to use foreign savings, in particular
foreign loans, to nance the gap.
Later, in about the middle of the 1980s, the ASEAN countries had realized the sit-
uation and tried to avoid their debt trap by beginning to reduce their investment in order
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Gross national savings of the ASEAN-5 countries, including NCTR
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Figure 2.4: Gross national savings of the ASEAN-5 countries, including NCTR (in percent
of GDP)
to decrease the resource gap as well as by pursuing other forms of foreign savings64. The
most important alternative source of foreign savings for the ASEAN countries has been
foreign direct investment (FDI). It is particularly attractive, since there is neither net inter-
est, nor are there compulsory repayments for this form of foreign savings. The repayment,
prot and interest are dependent on the investment viability. Furthermore, foreign invest-
ments are long term and the prots are often reinvested65. Singapore and Malaysia have
64 Thailand had already reduced its investment levels during 1980 and 1981. On the reducing of the resource
gap of ASEAN countries, see Villegas B. M. (1990), p. 27-32.
65 Of the four ASEAN countries, Malaysia had made the most use of foreign direct investment, in particular
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made use of FDI since as early as the 1970s. In the other ASEAN countries, the use of for-
eign direct investment as a source of economic growth gradually began to play a relevant
role, particularly in the late 1980s and the 1990s (Figure 2.5).
Foreign direct investment (FDI) of the ASEAN-5 countries (in percent of GDP)
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Figure 2.5: Foreign direct investment (FDI) of the ASEAN-5 countries (in percent of GDP)
2.2.4 Comments on the Development of ASEAN's Economic
Cooperation and Integration in 1967-1986
From the establishment of ASEAN, it took a decade before the ASEAN countries could
agree on a program of economic cooperation through a cautiously delineated Preferential
in the early 1980s. This may explain why Malaysia was able to keep its high investment levels of around 30
percent, although its resource gap was about 10 percent to 14 percent of its GDP.
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Trading Agreement (PTA), inaugurated in 1977. According to the stages of economic in-
tegration, the preferential trade agreement and/or respectively preferential tariff agreement
are considered as a preliminary step towards the rst stage of economic integration, namely
a free trade area. Even though the PTA in ASEAN seemed unsuccessful, a concrete process
towards economic integration had, at least, been initiated.
An obvious objective or advantage which came about through the ASEAN foundation
was the fact that the ASEAN countries have been generally accepted as a unit. This led to
an increase of their bargaining power. They increasingly negotiated with one voice and
gained weight in trade negotiations, for instance, with the European Community on the
latter's trade restricting measures. Furthermore, they played an active role in the UNCTAD
Common Fund, and, to a greater extent, in the 1986-1994 Uruguay Rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations66. ASEAN had proved effective in its relations with other countries
as well, for instance through establishing regular dialogues with Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, the EEC, the US and some UN bodies.
However, in the initial phase of development, there were several difculties facing
economic integration in ASEAN. One of the major problems was the fact that the members
were pursuing different strategies in their economic policy. At one extreme, Singapore had
departed from its import-substitution policy after its independence in 1965, and was highly
dependent on the world market. It was more developed than the others and had the lowest
trade barriers. Even though Singapore had strived for ASEAN economic cooperation and
integration, it did not want this to lead to a misallocation of its resources. The other four
66 The increasing bargaining power of ASEAN was further intensied as ASEAN's individual countries
experienced accelerated economic growth in the late 1980s, see Pomfret R. (1997), p. 306.
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countries still pursued import-substitution policy throughout the 1970s and only moved
away from protectionism gradually during the 1980s. They still had high tariff barriers,
especially Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. At the other extreme, Indonesia was
inward-looking and had relatively underdeveloped industries. With its large market, it was
anxious that trade liberalization and subsequent increased competition would adversely
affect its manufacturing sector. Another major difculty facing economic integration in this
phase was that intra-ASEAN trade was only a small part of each member's total trade and
consisted of entrepôt trade through Singapore. Furthermore, this small intra-ASEAN trade
concentrated on primary products, whilst the manufacturing sector played only a small role
at that time, even though efforts had been made towards export diversication since the
early 1980s. Besides these internal difculties, it should be stressed that the economies
of the ASEAN countries still depended on the world economy, particularly the effects of
economic developments in the West. These developments consisted of the decline of the
prices of a number of main commodities in the region in the second half of 1980 and in 1981
and the adverse effect on the labor intensive manufactures67 caused by the protectionism
in the West in the mid-1970s68. So the ASEAN countries had to look to their regional and
national steady and sustainable economic growth in order to counter the signicant external
threats effectively.
67 For instance textiles, clothing and footwear, processed primary products and agricultural products
68 Furthermore, high interest rates in the US were slowing down growth through their effects on domestic
interest rates in the ASEAN countries and on the cost of external borrowing, and the rise in the US dollar
caused a strengthening of ASEAN currencies against those of their important trading partners, see Wawn B.
(1982), p. 179.
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2.2.5 Third Development Phase, 1987-1997
Increasing Emphasis on Economic Cooperation, 1987-1991
In this phase, the political tension resulting from the Cold War, and thus related to the
communist power in the region and the Cambodia-conict, had eased. The Asia-policy ini-
tiated byMichail Gorbatschow had, to a certain extent, brought détente to the region. Under
pressure from the Soviet Union, Vietnam had moderated its policy in the Cambodia-conict
and began to concentrate on its own internal reforms. In the sphere of political coopera-
tion, ASEAN's efforts proved effective, in particular in relation to the Cambodia conict.
A breakthrough of certain measures was achieved after Indonesia took an important role by
initiating informal talks among various contending parties. This led to the much-publicized
Vietnamese military withdrawal from Cambodia by September 198969. By 1990, with the
support of China and the Soviet Union and with greater interest from the United States,
France, Australia and Japan through several joint initiatives, a conciliatory approach had
been brought to bear on the conict. The next step of the peace process was initiated by
the UN Security Council, which gave the major assignment of conict rapprochement to
the UN, based on an Australian peace formula. Furthermore, at the International Confer-
ence on Cambodia in Paris, chaired by France and Indonesia as interlocutor of ASEAN,
the Paris Peace Agreement was signed on 23rd October 1991. This served to open the door
for the UN's effort in Cambodia in respect of peace-keeping, holding free elections and
handing over to the new government by October 1993.
69 Thambipillai P. (1994), p. 119-120
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Even though the complications with regard to political issues had been alleviated,
the deteriorated situation of the world economy had affected and threatened the economic
prospects and performance of the ASEAN countries. Most ASEAN countries experienced
economic weakness in the late 1980s, especially after the economic downturn in 1984-
1986, triggered, to a great extent, by global recession in 1980-1982. This had reduced
the trade and nancial ows of the ASEAN market. The commodity prices in real terms
were at their lowest levels since the 1950s70. And moreover, the increasing protectionism
in the West was endangering ASEAN export markets. For this reason, at the third ASEAN
Summit in December 1987 in Manila, economic cooperation was the primary topic of dis-
cussion, along with the future of ASEAN and the preparation for the problems to come
after the  by that time  foreseeable end of the Cold War. It can be concluded that, due to
the differences in economic and security policies of the ASEAN members, many relevant
initiatives were not yet practicable71; this remained so until 1992. In any case, despite the
fact that there were some disagreements over decision-making among members and insuf-
cient development of the intra-ASEAN issues, ASEAN can be regarded as a successful
political organization in terms of ASEAN's foreign issues, particularly the peace process
in Indochina.
The phase of ASEAN's economic development between 1987 and 1991 was charac-
terized by a sudden increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) inows into ASEAN. These
FDI inows brought about essential economic progress in the region through promoting in-
70 Frost F. (1990), p. 22-26
71 For instance, Malaysia and Indonesia suggested establishing an Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. How-
ever, this was rejected at the time, because of diverse military interests within and outside of the region, see
Sin D.-C. (1997), p. 87-88.
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dustrial growth and export capabilities. The most important factor leading to rapid ows of
FDI into ASEAN was the appreciation of the Japanese Yen, partly caused by the agreement
on the G-5 Plaza Accord. The appreciation of the currencies of the Asian Newly Indus-
trialized Economies (NIE) in 1985-198672 contributed in a similar way. Many Japanese,
Korean and Taiwanese export manufacturers therefore looked for lower-cost locations and
invested in the ASEAN developing economies. In addition, there were several other rea-
sons for the increased FDI inows, such as the increasing labor costs and the fact that the
status of the NIEs had changed from developing to newly industrializing countries, which
meant the loss of US GSP (Generalized System of Trade Preferences to developing coun-
tries) privileges. These arguments also led to investments being relocated to the ASEAN
countries that possessed relatively much lower-priced labor and still gained from GSP. It
can be observed that by the second half of the eighties, Japan and the Asian NIEs had over-
taken the position of major investors in ASEAN from the US and Europe. This situation
may partly have derived from the stagnation of the Western economies and the diversion of
Western investment into Latin America and Eastern Europe.
ASEAN in the New World Order and ASEAN's Reorientation, 1992-1997
The decline and eventual disappearance of the Soviet Union as a superpower nally
led to the end of the Cold War. Besides the resolution of the geopolitical confrontation in
Europe, this put an end to the ideological confrontation between communism and capital-
ism. It was the beginning of the New World Order, which has inuenced the economic
and political features of regional cooperation among developing countries considerably.
72 Bhalla A. and Bhalla P. (1997), p. 81-83
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The signicant characteristics of the NewWorld Order that may have impacted on regional
cooperation among developing countries were as follows:
- The end of the ideological and strategic confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union (the end of the Cold War)
- the decline of American hegemony; the process of globalization of production
and ideology
- and nally, the restructuring of the world political economy into three blocs,
namely the American, centered on the US; the European, centered on the European Com-
munity; and the Asia-Pacic bloc, centered on Japan73.
On the one hand, the emergence of the EC and NAFTA, in particular, provided the
impulse to establish a free trade area within ASEAN. On the other hand, the ASEAN coun-
tries had to react against the growing protectionism by the EC, vis-à-vis third countries and
against the apprehension inspired by Mexico's membership in a free trade agreement with
the US and Canada. This agreement raised concerns that the possibility for NAFTA's to
expand towards South America would re-route US trade and investment from the ASEAN
region. Furthermore, there was also the threat of increasing competition from the other de-
veloping countries such as China, India and the emerging economies of Eastern Europe74.
On the 28th and 29th of January 1992, the heads of government of the ASEAN
countries came together for the ASEAN fourth Summit Meeting in Singapore, an event
which brought about a turning point in regional cooperation, particularly in the push to-
wards greater economic cooperation. The Singapore Declaration laid down the Framework
73 Axline A. W. (1994), p. 217-223
74 Bhalla A. and Bhalla P. (1997), p. 75
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Agreement on Enhancing the ASEAN Economic Cooperation, which set out a basis for
intra-regional cooperation in trade, nance, energy, agriculture and communication. The
most relevant outcome of this summit was certainly the establishment of the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA)  in addition, in 1995 the ASEAN leaders also concluded the supple-
mentary ASEAN Framework Agreements on Services (AFAS) and in 1998 ASEAN min-
isters established the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). At the time of AFTA's foundation,
AFTA was to reduce intra-ASEAN tariffs to 0-5 percent within fteen years starting from
1st January 1993 for intra-ASEAN imports. This reduction process started with a range
of priority items of capital, manufactured and processed agricultural products originating
from member countries [the details were made explicit in the Agreement on the Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme, the forerunner to the AFTA]. However, tar-
iff reductions only apply to products that comply with the ASEAN content requirement,
meaning that at least 40% of the value of a product must originate from ASEAN countries.
AFTA planned to establish a regional market of 500 million consumers and a competitive
production base. According to the original plan, AFTA would be completed by 2008, but,
in 1994 the process was accelerated to reach completion by 2003. In 1995, the deadline was
further brought forward to 2002 and it was decided that the tariffs on intra-ASEAN imports
should be completely eliminated by 2010 for ASEAN-6 and by 2015 for ASEAN-CLMV
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). Finally, AFTA was implemented in 2003.
Taking into account the disappointing trade performance in the past  through the
earlier PTA scheme in particular  one of the concerns about AFTA at that time was its
practicability. Even though AFTA experienced start-up difculties, it was given greater
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credibility than PTA in its way of functioning. In the move towards the preferential tariff,
AFTA required the listing of exclusions rather than detailed negotiation on what should be
included. The principle of six minus x, by which two or more member states may carry
out economic arrangements rst if other member states are not ready to implement, allows
the slower members to be excluded rather than impede the progress of the others75. While
the unsuccessful earlier policies of ASEAN in the 1970s aimed essentially to increase intra-
regional trade  through mechanisms such as, PTA, AIPs, AIC and AIJV , increased
intra-regional trade played only a subdominant role in AFTA. In accordance with the low
intra-regional trade and the highly similar economic structures of the member countries
as well as the fact that the policies of the ASEAN countries had changed from import-
substituting industrialization to the outward-oriented development strategy, AFTA had set
out three following principal objectives:
- Firstly, to enhance the investment attractiveness of the region through the cre-
ation of a larger market in order to attract FDI via tariff reductions.
- Secondly, to make ASEAN products more competitive internationally.
- And, thirdly, to strengthen extra-regional economic relationships76.
As a means to achieving the aims of AFTA, the Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) was established to implement AFTA in practice. This required reductions in re-
gional tariffs on all manufactured and semi-manufactured products, including capital goods
75 Thambipillai P. (1994), p. 127-128, Pomfret R. (1997), p. 309. The difculty at the beginning was that
the original announcement of AFTA had not been preceded by sufcient preparation at the national levels.
During the next twenty months, the national governments responded to the concerns of protected domestic
producers by drawing up long exclusion lists. A relaunch in October 1993 redressed the situation by bringing
reductions on high tariffs (those over 20 percent) forward to January 1994.
76 Yeung M. T., Perdikis N. and Kerr W. A. (1999), p. 53, Ariff M. (1994), p. 150-170
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and some processed agricultural products. A distinction was made between a fast track
and a normal track, in order to allow for an implementation of the liberalization process
at different paces. By 2002, the products on the Inclusion List (IL) had to be immediately
liberalized through a reduction of the CEPT tariff rates to a maximum of 5%. On the other
hand, the AFTA agreement allowed for the exclusion of certain sensitive products from
tariff reduction and there are Temporary Exclusion Lists (TEL), Sensitive Lists (SL) and
General Exclusion Lists (GE) which were established by the members. Products in the
TEL can be excluded for a limited time period, but ultimately all of these products must
be transferred to the IL. The SL contains raw agricultural products which have to be liber-
alized by 2010 for the ASEAN-6. And products in the GEL are excluded form the trade
liberalization for reasons of protection of national security, public morals, public health,
environmental protection and protection of articles of artistic, historic or archaeological
value. Interestingly, for the ASEAN-CLMV the liberalization process is less stringent. The
deadline to meet the AFTA objectives is 2006 for Vietnam, 2008 for Laos and Myanmar
and 2010 for Cambodia, comparing to 2002 for the ASEAN-6. Provisions were made to
act as security measures against serious injury to domestic producers and certain items
excluded from tariff reductions. Within ve years under CEPT, quantitative restrictions on
products, such as prohibitions, quotas and restrictive licensing, were to be removed when
tariff rates reached 20 percent, while other non-tariff barriers were to be eliminated step by
step77.
77 CEPT implementation is on a quid pro quo basis, i.e. that a member will not be qualied to use the
preferences granted by the other members until its own tariffs are reduced to 20 percent, see Bhalla A. and
Bhalla P. (1997), p. 79.
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It is worthy of note that AFTA appears to differ from other free trade areas, which
have aimed to expand the domestic market through diminishing trade barriers. Promot-
ing intra-regional trade might be obstructive for AFTA due to its small internal market,
low intra-regional trade and uneven protection and economic performance of its members.
Thus, AFTA runs a more outward-oriented strategy, in line with its strengths in the areas of
extra-regional trade and investment within the region, and with the purpose of establishing
an integrated area in order to increase its competitiveness in the world market.
One of the signicant developments in this phase was the admittance of Vietnam
as the 7th ASEAN member on 28th July 1995. This evidently indicated the evolution
of ASEAN's ambition from one of being a counter-pole to communist power to one of
growth- and welfare-oriented regionalism through political and, to an increasing extent,
economic cooperation. Vietnam's political motives were to restore diplomatic relations
with the United States, reduce risk and increase bargaining power against China, as well
as become a part of regional and global society via ASEAN. Economically speaking, Viet-
nam saw ASEAN as a source of support for its economic development, of advantages from
increasing trade and investment with ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries and of advan-
tages from absorbing advanced technology. Furthermore, joining was a way to become
a member of APEC and WTO. What ASEAN expected from Vietnam's admittance was
investment opportunities and the expansion of its intra-regional market, as well as an in-
crease of economic and political bargaining power and the prospect of a fully integrated
ASEAN-10 coming into existence, thanks to the greater incentive for Laos, Myanmar and
Cambodia to join ASEAN.
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With regard to ASEAN political and security cooperation, the Fourth Summit called
for intra-regional dialogues on ASEAN security cooperation and also cooperation with
ASEAN's dialogue partners. The Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) plays an important
role in the latter and is intended to serve as an instrument to promote external dialogue
on regional security. Furthermore, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established
by decision of the Foreign Ministerial Meeting held in Singapore in 1993. The ARF is
intended to be of assistance to a multilateral security regime for the Asia-Pacic region,
in that it administers political and security issues and the exchange of information. It is
important to note that the emphasis of the Fourth Summit was on the restructuring of the
association. This restructuring particularly affected the position of the ASEAN Secretariat,
by expanding its role together with the quantity and quality of its professional workforce.
Nevertheless, the issue of the decision-making power of the Secretary-General was contro-
versial; members still wanted to retain their national decision-making powers and did not
consent to the transfer of power to a supranational institution. The restructured Secretariat
was aligned towards intra- and extra-regional economic operations, especially in respect
of the AFTA issues and economic interrelation between ASEAN and its foreign trading
partners. Additionally, the heads of government consented to meet formally every three
years with informal meetings in between, in order to ensure that regional activities proceed
continuously and effectively.
2.2.6 Comments on the ASEAN's Economic Development (1986-1997)
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ASEAN's High Economic Performance (1986-1997): A New Tiger is Born?
Growth rates in the ASEAN countries were high between the late 1980s and the rst
half of 1997, before the outbreak of the Asian Crisis. During this phase, Southeast Asia
was regarded as one of the world's most dynamic regions. The region experienced 8%GDP
growth and accounted for a rapidly growing share of world output. The growing weight of
the ASEAN countries in the world economy also increased steadily. Singapore joined the
ranks of the rich industrial countries. The real per capita incomes of Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand rose by more than double over the period and more than threefold since 1970.
Even though the Philippines had experienced difculties with their economic performance,
especially in 1991-1992, their growth rate began to rise closer to that of the other members
at the end of this phase (Figure 2.6).
The economic success of the ASEAN countries may be attributed to the following
causes78. Primarily, it was the result of their strong domestic fundamentals in combina-
tion with their openness to external trade. It was particularly their market-friendly and
outward-oriented strategy, with liberal external regimes, that kept them in a strong com-
petitive position. Capital inows due to high investment rates, high saving, and, critically,
the successfully tapped foreign savings and FDI also contributed to high economic per-
formance. Secondarily, there were several key policy factors that may have contributed to
the ASEAN countries' economic development. These include nancial policies that keep
the ination rate low, prudent government intervention, for instance, in anti-poverty pro-
grams or government spending on education and health, aiming at productivity and growth,
78 Hicklin J, Robinson D., and Singh A. (1997), p. 2-3, and Larson F., and Aziz J. (1997), p. 300
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GDP growth of the ASEAN-5 countries (annual percent)
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Figure 2.6: GDP growth of the ASEAN-5 countries (annual percent)
along with the willingness to adjust policies exibly in response to external economic dis-
turbances.
Furthermore, economic growth and efciency in the region was encouraged by expo-
sure to the external environment, through participation in the competitive global market and
the global nancial system. One of the factors that brought about the economic miracle
in the ASEAN countries was the effects of the G-5 Plaza-Accord79, signed in September
79 The Plaza Accord was essentially designed to coordinate economic policy in the major industrialized
countries and to resist protectionism. As part of the agreement, Japan agreed to stimulate its economy in
order to augment domestic demand for U.S. products and the G-5 also privately agreed to intervene in foreign
exchange markets to drive down the U.S. dollar. Furthermore, the Plaza Accord also resulted in a decision to
decrease Japanese interest rates. This contributed to the Japanese bubble economy in 1987-1989, see Miller
G. P. (1996) and Funabashi Y. (1988).
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1985. This led to the depreciation of the US dollar vis-à-vis the Japanese Yen, in associa-
tion with the globalization of the world economy. It encouraged nancial globalization and
the increasing volume of capital ows, particularly to emerging market economies, such
as those in the ASEAN region. The capital-ows stimulated international trade, for ex-
ample by increasing purchasing power and demand brought about by direct investments,
augmentation of capital movement and the growth of the capital market. Therefore, af-
ter the Plaza-Accord, the export growth of the ASEAN countries increased steadily. In
addition, the expansion of capital volume and ows brought development to the nancial
sector. New and advanced nancial institutions emerged, especially institutions dealing in
risk management products, such as Futures, Options, Forwards and Swaps in the nancial
and capital markets. Net international bank lending was increased from 1,480 billion US
dollar in 1985 to 5,015 billion US dollar in 1996, and net international bond nancing rose
from 550 billion US dollar in 1985 to 2,391 billion US dollar in 1996. The expansion of
the capital supply resulting from its free movement led to a decline in the cost of capital,
which in turn stimulated the demand for capital. Financial globalization changed the role
of the nancial sector, which now no longer operates merely as a service sector for the real
sector, since money has become a commodity in the global nancial market itself.
From the point of view of the globalization of the international nancial markets, it
is clear that the ASEAN countries have indeed attracted a large share of foreign capital
ows. Nevertheless, it should be noted that relying on large foreign capital inows as a
growth strategy, with strong domestic demand, has brought about not only increased in-
vestment and growth, but also risks of economic and nancial instability. This strategy
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encouraged the economy to develop in the direction of a bubble economy, with a boom
in the real estate sector and an expansion of stock market values associated with inated
assets stimulated by speculation. Large net private capital inows tended to cause a rise
in aggregate expenditure, raise inationary pressures and increase current account decits.
Furthermore, globalization has brought a new complexity to the domestic nancial system
and to banks in particular. Large capital inows have often been conducive to an expansion
of domestic credit, which, in turn, may lead to problems in the nancial sector, if capi-
tal adequacy requirements are not met and prudential supervision is lacking80. Despite the
intense concern about regional economic fundamentals, such as the scal position and do-
mestic saving, there has been greater volatility in the exchange markets and pressure on
private sector credit and domestic prices.
The Economic Situation before the Crisis
Even though the outbreak of the Asian nancial crisis was sudden and unexpected, in
the view of many observers, it should be recognized that before the emergence of the crisis
there had been warning signals that the economic development in the crisis countries was
unstable81.
80 Camdessus M. (1997), p. 20-24
81 For example, in April 1995 the Hypo-bank alerted international investors to be cautious concerning the
economic perspectives of the countries in East and Southeast Asia. In January 1997, Karl D. Jackson (a rep-
resentative of a rm in New York) informed the Central Bank of Thailand about the foreseeable crisis, com-
paring it with the breakdown of the American Savings and Loan Organisation in the late 1980s. The Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco warned its customers about a variety of problems associated with externally
motivated capital inows: rstly, they may suddenly reverse to capital outows, secondly, the nancial sys-
tems of emerging market economies may be incompetent and thirdly, capital inows may be associated with
a real appreciation of the domestic currency and lead to a deterioration of export competitiveness, see Rieger
H. C. (2000), p. 17-18.
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The critical economic features before the outbreak of the crisis can be observed by
examining several economic situations. For instance, there was a sharp appreciation of
the domestic currencies since 1995, in particular against the Japanese Yen. Since most
crisis countries kept their exchange rates xed or quasi-xed against the US dollar, the
sharp appreciation of the US dollar against the Japanese Yen and European currencies af-
ter 1995 brought about the appreciation of the dollar-pegged Asian currencies vis-à-vis the
Japanese Yen. The resultant capital inows were immense, despite the decreasing invest-
ment quality. The ASEAN countries experienced an export slowdown in 1996. Domestic
production prices increased faster than the world export prices did. There were concerns
about the surplus in the world markets for some of Asia's products and too many Asian
countries exporting the same or nearly the same products. This contributed to the fact that
the world prices for manufactured products, which climbed slightly in the 1990s, fell 3 per-
cent in 1996 and 8 percent in 199782. There was an over-expansion in some key sectors
and wages increased. In addition, the emergence of new competitors, namely China, India
and Mexico, together with the weakness of the Japanese economy, restrained the economic
perspectives for the countries in Southeast Asia.
2.2.7 The Asian Financial Crisis: July 1997
The extraordinary growth of the ASEAN countries over the decade came to an end with the
Asian nancial crisis that began in July 1997, and the deep recession which followed. In
82 Hussain M. and Radelet S. (2000), p. 71-84
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terms of its emergence and its development, the Asian crisis may be distinguished by two
signicant components.
Firstly, a nancial crisis occurred, starting with a currency crisis. This followed the
three-stage process typical of such a crisis affecting a country that participates in large-scale
international borrowing:
- In the rst stage, the exchange rate became overvalued as a result of internal or
external causes.
- In the second stage, the exchange rate was defended, but only at the cost of an
exhaustion of the central bank's foreign reserves.
- In the last stage, the depletion of reserves, mostly in association with currency
devaluation, induced a panicked rapid outow of short-term nancial capital.
Consequently, policy-adjustments had to be made, which in this case meant changing
from a xed to a oating exchange rate during the period of loss of condence. Finally, the
currency depreciations and high domestic interest rates resulting from currency oats led
to the collapse of domestic nancial institutions.
Secondly, an economic crisis originated from the nancial crisis and led to macro-
economic collapse, characterized by a contraction of output, rising interest rates, depressed
equity prices and a descending currency. These led to the loss of government revenue,
employment, and household incomes.
It should be noted that all of the countries that experienced the Asian nancial cri-
sis  in particular the ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, and outside
ASEAN, Korea  had the three following similar features. Their successful economies
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were attractive to substantial capital inows during the 1990s. Their exchange rates were
xed or quasi xed to the US dollar. And last but not least, the combination of immense
capital inows under the situation of declining investment-quality and a xed exchange
rate policy had driven these countries into economic and nancial vulnerability. Signs of
this vulnerability were an overvalued currency, falling foreign exchange reserves and high
foreign debt, particularly short-term debt83.
The factors that contributed to the Asian nancial crisis can be divided into inter-
nal and external factors. The term internal factors refers in this case to deciencies in
the fundamental structure, such as high current account decits (Figure 2.1) in accordance
with a weak and unstable nancial sector, poor banking supervision, a speculative real
estate boom, a credit boom, a deterioration of investment quality, corruption and a mis-
alignment of exchange rate policy. T. C. Daquila (2000) argues that economic crisis facing
the ASEAN region partly related to the interactions between the households, corporate
and government sectors, and thus, involvement in the three main economic activities (pro-
duction, demand and income). The rising income expectations due to high growth in the
pre-crisis period had led to high levels of consumption and investment, particularly specu-
lative investments in property and capital markets, high levels of current account decits,
high levels of external debt due to the increase of expensive short-term private debt, and
rapid domestic credit creation84. One of the relevant internal factors was the nancial sec-
tor's weakness. In the 1990s, the countries that later faced the Asian nancial crisis had
liberalized their nancial markets. Consequently, domestic banks and corporations could
83 Sachs J. D. and Woo W. T. (2000), p. 22
84 Daquila T. C. (2000), p. 118-119
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borrow from foreign lenders. In addition, the capital inows were reinforced by the fact
that; in the expectation of further economic growth, the government pursued a strategy
of keeping domestic interest rates high relative to the interest rates in the West or Japan85
(Figure 2.7). These capital inows were largely short-term (Figure 2.8).
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Figure 2.7: Real interest rate of the ASEAN-5 countries
The fact that several banks transformed these short-term capital inows by handing
out long-term loans to the domestic borrowers increased the fragility of the nancial sector.
85 Moreover, in some cases, for instance in Thailand, the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF),
which were established to promote Bangkok as regional nancial center and intended to increase funds from
non-residents and lend them on to other non-residents, turned out to be an instrument for Thai banks and
rms to borrow abroad, see Goldstein M. (1998), p. 13.
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Short-term debt of the ASEAN-4 countries
(in percent of total external debt)
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Figure 2.8: Short-term debt of the ASEAN-4 countries (in percent of total external debt)
It was argued that, following the relaxation of banking regulations, the local commercial
banks in some ASEAN countries, in this case Thailand, were inexperienced in conducting
foreign exchange transactions with offshore banks directly86. There were various instances
of connected lending  for instance, lending to bank directors and their related busi-
nesses  and insufcient loan approval processes, which thereby led to high credit risks.
The crisis countries found themselves in an original sin situation, in which the domes-
tic currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long-term. Moreover, there
were currency mismatches and maturity mismatches in many investment projects. Invest-
86 This, according to Dr. Olarn Chaipravat (president of Siam Commercial Bank), was Thailand's mistakes
in its nancial and foreign market regulation, see Daquila T. C. (2000), p. 118.
2.2 Development of ASEAN 85
Study of Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
BIS (1997),
ofcial estimate for 1996
8.8 3.9 - - 7.7a
Peregrine (1997) 15.0 15.0 7.0 4.0 36.0b
Ramos (1998),
Goldman Sachs
9.0 6.0 3.0 2.0 18.0
Jen (1998),
Morgan Stanley
12.5 6.0 - - 18.0
Eschweiler (1998),
JP Morgan
11.0 7.5 5.5 3.0 17.5
Source: Morris Goldstein (1998)
a: Estimate for 1995
b: Includes nance companies
Table 2.6: Estimates of ratio of actual non-performing bank loans to total bank loans in
selected Asian emerging economies
ment with currency mismatches refers to projects that generate domestic currency while
they are nanced with foreign currency, and investment with maturity mismatches refers
to long-term projects which are nanced by short-term loans. As such, the situation was
one of nancial fragility87. There was excessive government involvement in banks, pro-
viding an oblique mechanism for helping the ailing industries with government assistance.
This led to moral-hazard problems. There were several inefcient or over-ambitious pub-
lic investment projects, such as infrastructure projects. Furthermore, some estimates of
actual non-performing bank loans indicated the extent of repayment difculties, a sign of
economic hardship (see Table 2.6).
This overextension of credit made the ASEAN-4 economies sensitive to any change
in credit conditions and to cyclical conditions. At that time, the nancial situation was not
thought to be risky, because the domestic currencies had been stable against the US dollar
for many years. The currencies of the ASEAN-4 economies at rst followed the US dollar
87 Eichengreen B. and Hausmann R. (1999), p. 3
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down vis-à-vis the Japanese Yen in the rst half of the1990s, but then followed the dollar's
appreciation against Yen. In particular, in the period 1995-1997, these countries noticed an
appreciation of their real effective exchange rates. The credit boom, liquidity/currency mis-
matches and large current account decits created an environment conducive to speculative
attacks. In addition, besides large current account decits, decreasing quality of invest-
ment, and appreciating real exchange rates, the ASEAN-4 countries had to face a marked
export slowdown in 1996, intense export competition from China, India, and Mexico, con-
cerns about overproduction and a rising protectionism movement from the West. These
circumstances served to deteriorate their economic situation88.
External factors89, such as the stringent monetary policy of the United States in or-
der to bring budget decit under control and to increase market competitiveness, the ris-
ing discipline over scal- and monetary policy in the EU countries in order to fulll the
Maastricht-criteria, the low economic performance and nancial crisis in Japan and fur-
thermore, the increasing competition from China, India and Mexico, brought about a de-
terioration of the economic situation and of the export markets of the ASEAN countries.
Consequently, the ASEAN countries encountered increasing difculties in keeping their
xed currencies, which were pegged or quasi pegged to the US dollar, compatible with
their current account decits. Furthermore, the depreciation of Chinese Yuan, starting in
1994, led to an increase of Chinese exports, thus an increasing competition for ASEAN
export markets. The low interest rate policy and the weak economic development in West-
88 Furthermore, this situation of weak economic activity, a high level of bad loans and public antipathy to
bailing out banks appeared to indicate the weak economic situation, as did the low interest rates in Japan, see
Goldstein M. (1998) p. 9.
89 Rieger H. C. (2000), p. 29-30, and Dieter H. (1998), p. 65-68
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ern Europe in the mid 1990s as well as the unexpectedly low investment opportunities in
Eastern Europe contributed to bringing about high levels of capital inows to the ASEAN
countries. Another important cause of these inows was the Japanese low interest rate pol-
icy, conducted in order to counter the deation of its real estate market. In April 1995, the
Japanese discount rate was reduced from 1.75 to 1.0 percent and in September it amounted
to only 0.5 percent. Consequently, the Japanese banks could provide themselves with do-
mestic capital at a low cost and then invest, mostly short term, in the foreign capital market
at high interest rates, particularly in the ASEAN-4 countries. This brought instability to
the ASEAN nancial markets, since the capital inows were mostly short-term, and the
current account surplus in Japan helped to induce current account decits in the ASEAN
countries. It can be concluded that it was not merely the decient policy and weakness of
the economic structure of the crisis countries that led to the crisis, but also the capital move-
ment from the West and Japan aiming at high and instantaneous prot for their investors.
ASEAN was particularly affected by this type of investment, the conditions of which are
often detrimental to the countries targeted for investment90.
Structural Weakness and Triggers of the Financial Crisis
In order to understand the Asian crisis, it is essential to analyze the framework of
causes of the currency and nancial crises. The framework presented in this work demon-
strates that a possible reason for the nancial crisis was a combination of fundamental
structural misalignments and nancial panic. At rst, it was the misalignment of the fun-
damental structure that led to economic vulnerability. Then, as the economic situation
90 Rieger H. C. (2000), p. 30, and Huffschmid J. (1999), p. 64-68
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deteriorated, the severe structural misalignment acted as a signal, which inspired nancial
panic, or even as a trigger of the crisis by itself.
The problem of the fundamental structure has two aspects: the deciency of eco-
nomic institutions and problems related to growth theory. These are characterized by the
following main features91; 1) the appreciation of the real exchange rate and a high level of
structural current account decits in the 1990s 2) over-investment in risky and less prof-
itable projects, 3) moral hazard effects and 4) a high level of short-term foreign debt in
foreign currencies. It was presumed that increasing current account decits, building up
foreign debt, keeping domestic currency pegged or quasi pegged to the US dollar and the
government acting as guarantor for loans were all integral parts of the strategy aimed at
sustaining high investment. However, it was overlooked that this can also lead to declining
quality and protability of investment92. The road to economic crisis began when the mis-
alignment of the fundamental structure brought about economic vulnerability which can be
mainly denoted by three indicators. These three indicators, which may indicate the eco-
nomic vulnerability of a country to currency and nancial crises, are rstly, the adequacy
of reserves relative to the stock of volatile capital, secondly, nancial sector fragility and
thirdly, real exchange rate misalignment93.
According to Peter G. Warr's framework of these three indicators for vulnerability
to currency and nancial crises, the rst indicator adequacy of reserves essentially refers
to the stock of funds, precisely the volume of volatile capital, which can be turned over
91 Klump R. (2000), p. 37-39
92 Corsetti G., Pasenti P. and Roubini N. (1998), p. 4
93 Warr P. G. (2001), p. 5-16
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at short notice against reserves. The change in the level of reserves (ow) R is equal
to the net balance on capital (ow) K plus the net balance on current account (ow) C;
R = C +K:
The capital account balance K consists of volatile components such as equity (con-
sisting of stock market purchases), debt instruments (such as bonds), short-term bank credit
and non-resident bank accounts, and non-volatile components such as foreign direct in-
vestment and long-term bank credit, expressed as an equation: K = Kv +Knv:Where
Kvis the change in the stocks of volatile capital and Knv the change of non-volatile
foreign capital, including long-term bank credit. As a result, we can substitute this into
the equation for the change in the level of reserves and rearrange slightly to show that:
C + Knv = R   Kv:The right-hand side of this equation reects the change in the
vulnerability of reserves94. It should be noted that large current account decits are not nec-
essarily required to raise the vulnerability, but it is, to a great extent, the size of the current
account decit relative to the volume of non-volatile capital inows that gives rise to vul-
nerability. If the volume of non-volatile capital inows is relatively small or decreasing and
the accumulated stock of volatile capital becomes large relative to international reserves,
this will make the reserves vulnerable to capital outow.
In the fragility of the nancial sector hypothesis, the ratio of total loans from the
banking system to GDP is used as a measurement to reveal the banking system's vulnerabil-
ity to increased interest rates. The average quality of loans may be expected to deteriorate
as this ratio rises. An increase in interest rates95 will bankrupt the weak borrowers and
94 The right side may be negative even though reserves are rising.
95 If reserves are inadequate to sustain a sudden outow of capital and the government still wants to retain
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therefore the banks themselves. The ratio of foreign liabilities to total loans is used as a
measurement of exchange rate exposure of the banking system. This exposure results from
the fact that exchange rate depreciation increases the cost of servicing foreign loans relative
to bank revenues.
Finally, in accordance with the theory of misalignment of the real exchange rate,
the proper magnitude of a real appreciation can be analyzed by one of two types of mea-
sures. Either the relative prices of traded and non-traded goods within a country are com-
pared (domestic competitiveness), or the prices at which country's tradable goods can be
exchanged internationally with the tradable goods of other countries are analyzed (interna-
tional competitiveness).
Vulnerability and the actual start of a crisis are related to each other. Since vulner-
ability does not cause a currency or nancial crisis by itself, a disturbance is needed to
move from a vulnerable condition to one of collapse. At the second stage of misalignment
of the fundamental structure, the economic situation is one of continuous deterioration.
The hallmarks of this deterioration are a persistent overvaluation of the real exchange rate,
over-investment in risky and non- or insufcient-protable projects, moral hazard effects
resulting from implicit and explicit credit-guarantee on the part of the government, and
immense short-term foreign debt in foreign currency. A critical point may be reached, at
which the economic situation alone will act as a signal for nancial panic or as a trigger for
the xed exchange rate, one possible response is to increase the interest rate. Firstly, this may help to maintain
relative expected returns on investment in the country by compensating for the potential loss of return due to
the expected exchange rate depreciation. This, in turn, reduces the net capital account decit resulting from
investor panic. Secondly, increases in the interest rate may lead to a decline in domestic private consumption
and investment, which, in turn, reduces the negative value of the net current account balance. See Warr P. G.
(2001), p. 8-9.
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collapse. The most important signal that can trigger nancial panic is when a policy of long
defense of a xed exchange rate is followed. In this case, the real damage comes from the
depletion of foreign exchange reserves resulting from the attempt to defend an overvalued
currency. Following the depletion of reserves, devaluation can trigger panic96. Alterna-
tively, nancial panic can be triggered by the sudden discovery that reserves are less than
previously believed and/or by an unexpected devaluation in a neighboring country, leading
to contagion of panic. There are two plausible frameworks of contagion97. The rst one is
the wake up call hypothesis. In the case of the Asian nancial crisis, Thailand's situation
acted as a wake-up call for international investors to reassess both Thailand's creditworthi-
ness and that of the other Asian borrowers. In the reassessment, the investors discovered
economic inrmities in several Asian countries, such as weak nancial sectors with poor
prudential supervision, appreciating real exchange rates, export slowdown, over-expansion
in certain industries and a lowering quality of investment. As a result, the crisis spread.
The second concept of contagion relates to the theory of competitive dynamics of deval-
uation. After a depreciation of one country's currency, the countries (in particular, when
the countries have trade linkage with each other), which have not devalued may become
less competitive. This will leave their currencies in a state of vulnerability.
After the panic reached its climax, the economic situation was one of devastation.
The real exchange rate depreciated sharply and the current account shifted from decit to
surplus. As debt was drawn down, the banking system encountered illiquidity and market
96 Radelet and Sachs indicate that when the ratio of short-term debt to the level of the central bank's foreign
exchange reserves is greater than one, the country is prone to creditor panic, see Radelet S. and Sachs J.
(1998), p. 1-90.
97 Klump R. (2000), p. 17-22
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real interest rates rose to high levels. Furthermore, the collapse of bank lending led to a
deterioration of trade and production and consequently to economic contraction.
2.2.8 Fourth Development Phase
Economic Development since the Crisis
In order to combat the crisis, the ASEAN countries adopted various policies, ranging
from intervention in the foreign exchange market, reliance on international nancial assis-
tance and bank restructuring, to demand management policies, supply-side policies, capital
controls and privatization. Which policies were implemented depended on the extent and
nature of the crisis (for instance the level of foreign debt), the severity of its impact (for
instance the impact on banking sector), the governments' priorities in terms of achieving
either internal balance or external balance or both and the leaders' willingness to accept
international nancing and its conditions98. The economic development of the ASEAN
countries following the deep recession brought about by the nancial crisis99, in terms of
how they responded and attempted to recover, can be divided into three phases.
The rst phase, the end of 1997-1998, was a phase of unsuccessful attempts at re-
covery in which the crisis countries, particularly Indonesia and Thailand, operated tight
scal and monetary policies, in particular by implementing the adjustment program put
forward by the IMF. However, the economies of the ASEAN countries showed no signs of
recovery. On the contrary, the adjustment program drove ASEAN economies into a deeper
98 Daquila T. C. (2000), p. 118-130
99 Sabhasri C., Charoenseang J., and Manakit P. (2000), p. 21-29, Sachs J. D. and Woo W. T. (2000), p.
36-40
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recession100. Malaysia, on the other hand, did not ask for the IMF nancial package, since
it did not want to follow the IMF's strategy of imposing high-interest rates and reduced
spending. Nevertheless, Malaysia did also tighten scal and monetary policy, for instance
by controlling credit expansion and increasing interest rates, despite the Malaysian gov-
ernment's stronger preference for a low interest rate and increased spending. The impact
of the crisis on Singapore's economy was not severe. Indeed, Singapore was actually in a
position to lend nancial assistance.
In the second phase, 1999-2000, the panic ended and working capital began to ow
again. However, the nancial panic had left bad debts throughout the economy. The bank-
ing sector had been in difculties, with bad loans and currency depreciation. The high
interest rates, the shortage of working capital and a depressed domestic market worsened
the situation of bank and non-bank institutions. To solve these problems, the governments
of the crisis countries moved from tight scal and monetary policies to an expansionary
policy strategy designed to promote economic activities. This new approach turned out to
be successful.
100 At the end of October, Indonesia received a 23 billion U.S. dollar assistance package from the IMF, on the
condition that it adopt scal and monetary discipline and also restructure its banking sector. Moreover, the
Bank of Indonesia supported a large amount of liquidity for nancial institutions that were experiencing dif-
culties, in order to prevent bank runs. However, the combination of this uncontrolled monetary expansion and
insufcient structural reforms induced hyperination and currency depreciation, with GDP growth declining
to -13.1 percent. Thailand received a 17.2 billion U.S. dollar assistance credit from the IMF in August 1997,
on the condition that it tightens scal and monetary policies. Examples of such policies were maintaining
an ination rate at 9.5 percent in 1997 and 5 percent in 1998, and to reaching a budget surplus of 1 percent
of GDP in 1998. However, the economy showed no signs of recovery. On the contrary, the adjustment pro-
gram drove the Thai economy deeper into recession and GDP growth fell to -10.8 percent in 1998. Malaysia
also tightened its scal and monetary policy, for instance by controlling credit expansion and increasing in-
terest rates. The monetary and scal discipline, however, failed to augment the economic development. On
the contrary, the control over credit led to economic recession and the Ringgit continued to depreciate. The
impact of the crisis was not so severe in the Philippines compared to Indonesia and Thailand. GDP growth
rate was at 5.1 percent in 1997 and declined to -0.6 percent in1998.
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In Indonesia, the economy started to recover in 1999 with a GDP growth rate of 0.3
percent. A steady increase of reserves and tight monetary policy supported the stability of
the exchange rate. Ination and interest rates reached at a lower level relative to previous
years and the decline in imports led to a current account surplus of 4.9 billion US dollar
in 1999. Despite a weak export performance, the substantial depreciation of the Rupiah
increased the incentive for many countries to import from Indonesia. This led to an increase
in the GDP growth rate to 4.8 percent in 2000, and FDI increased by 60 percent relative to
1999. However, as a consequence of expansionary policies there was a sharp increase in
public debt, 4.8 percent of GDP in 2000 relative to 3.7 percent in 1998. In Thailand, GDP
growth amounted to 4.2 percent in 1999 and 2000. The Thai expansionary policies began
in the latter part of 1998. The stimulus packages encompassed the reduction of value-added
tax rate from 10 to 7 percent and tax cuts on petroleum products. In addition to the tax and
tariff reductions, the government engaged in a program of expenditure, spending 53 billion
and 100 billion Baht. The ination decreased from 8.1 percent in 1998 to 0.3 percent in
1999, despite the expansionary policy, and interest rates also fell to low levels. Besides the
expansionary policies, Malaysia also implemented temporary capital controls. The GDP
growth rate was much higher than in Indonesia and Thailand at a rate of 6.1 percent in
1999 and 8.3 percent in 2000. This performance was, to a great extent, due to a strong
external demand for manufactured goods, increased consumer demand, and a recovery in
gross xed investments. In the Philippines, GDP growth rate was at 3.3 percent in 1999.
This was, to a great extent, induced by the recovery of the agricultural sector from the El
Nino phenomenon in 1998. The trade balance improved to a surplus of 14.7 percent in
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1999. In 2000 the net export supported economic development, and was the main factor in
a resultant GDP growth rate of 3.9 percent. The ination rate was contained at 6.6 percent
in 1999 and 4.4 in 2000. This drove the Philippines to reduce interest rates in 2000. The
efforts to stimulate domestic demand led to an increased scal decit of about -3.7 percent
in 1999 and -4.1 percent in 2000. Although the short-term capital outows continued, the
current account was in surplus of 9.1 percent, as a consequence of a two-year standby
facility granted by the IMF.
It can be concluded that the economic recovery in 1999-2000 was brought about by
the expansionary policies and export expansion. At the beginning of the crisis, the export
performance of the ASEAN-4 countries was very weak. The export value in 1998 decreased
in every country, except in the Philippines. This was a result of the fall in export prices
due to fallen regional demand from the ASEAN countries themselves, as well as from the
NICs and from Japan. Thereafter, the export situation recovered; the real depreciations
made ASEAN exports more competitive, while the currency depreciations made ASEAN
exports cheaper in US dollar terms. The value of exports from the ASEAN countries to
the industrialized countries grew rapidly, except to Japan. As the ASEAN currencies had
stabilized by the middle of 1999, ASEAN exporters became more competitive than they
had been prior to the crisis. An effective indicator of this phenomenon is the real exchange
rate index101 that displays real depreciations about 10-20 percent for June 1999 relative to
June 1997. Furthermore, the expansionary policies have enhanced demand in the ASEAN
101 The real exchange rate is calculated as the ratio of the trade-weighted average of the major trading part-
ners' wholesale price indices to the local consumer price index. An increase in the real exchange rate index
displays depreciation. See Hussain M., and Radelet S. (2000), p. 80
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countries. By increasing intra-ASEAN export, these policies raised the export value growth
rate from the middle of 1999 onwards. Nevertheless, ASEAN exports are still weak and
have not completely rebounded, because of low world prices and the continuing weakness
of regional demand.
In the third phase, both banks and non-bank institutions have already cleared their
debts, or are in the process of doing so. The most signicant aims of this phase are to sta-
bilize the economy and to improve and secure long-term competitiveness. Even though the
ASEAN countries traditionally have real sector oriented economies, it is now relevant to
pay serious attention to the development of their nancial sectors. Since the Plaza accord,
nancial globalization has increased the role of the nancial sector; hence as economic de-
velopment progresses, the nancial sector is not negligible and has to be harmonized with
the real economic sector. Furthermore, the governments should improve the effectiveness
of fundamental political and economic institutions, nancial market oversight, prudential
regulation and supervision. Accounting practices should be brought up to international
standards. Financial institutions should report their balance sheets more fully and fre-
quently. Regulations for the entry of foreign banks should be relaxed in order to increase
competitiveness in the nancial sector. The capitalization of banks and non-bank nancial
institutions should be improved and their risk management systems should be made more
efcient. Moreover, as the real sector experiences a fundamental recovery, the ASEAN
countries should take more advantage of their access to a well-trained workforce, their
many years of experience of competing on world markets and their advantageous location
near to major markets like China and Japan. One of the most important points to bear in
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mind is the need to improve human and physical capital as well as technology. These must
be compatible with each other and harmonized in order to upgrade the countries' export in
the eld of higher-end products. Furthermore, infrastructure and communications have to
be improved both within the individual countries and internationally.
The ASEAN countries should not merely work individually to improve their real and
nancial sectors; instead they should cooperate and carry out the development together.
Furthermore, they should seriously consider the option of economic and monetary integra-
tion. Economic and monetary cooperation must continue within ASEAN, and the ASEAN
countries should act as a group to cooperate with the other major countries, such as China,
Japan and the NICs, as well as the United States and the EU.
Development of ASEAN Regionalism since the Crisis
The emergence of the Asian nancial crisis gave rise to skeptical public discussion on
the subject of regional economic integration in Southeast Asia102. For instance, one of the
issues widely discussed is whether the nancial crisis would lead to a weakening or even
the downfall of AFTA and consequently perhaps to the break-up of ASEAN. However,
ASEAN realized that a reversal of its development course in these difcult times would
have been self-destructive for the member nations. To overcome these difculties, ASEAN
decided to speed up the process of creating an expanded regional integrated market to
attract investments. Even though the crisis caused the economic situation of the ASEAN
countries to deteriorate, it did not stop the development of ASEAN economic integration.
On the contrary, as has always been the case when the ASEAN countries have had to face
102 Severino R. C. (2000), p. 218
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severe external problems, the crisis drove the ASEAN countries to cooperate, to solve the
problems jointly and to further their regional economic development.
At the height of the crisis, the ASEAN members issued the ASEAN Vision 2020
statement at their second informal summit in Kuala Lumpur 15th December 1997. In this
statement, they committed themselves to moving towards closer relations and agreed to
advance economic integration and cooperation. The ASEAN leaders resolved to sustain
regional macroeconomic and nancial stability by fostering closer consultation on macro-
economic and nancial policies. They further decided to continue to liberalize the nancial
service sector and to closely cooperate in issues relating to the money and capital markets,
tax, insurance and customs. At the sixth ASEAN summit in Ha Noi in December 1998,
the ASEAN heads of state issued a Statement of Bold Measures. This announced the
acceleration of the programs to liberalize trade and investment with a view to economic
integration and the bringing forward of the target date of AFTA programs from 2003 to
2002. Furthermore, ASEAN called for the introduction of the ASEAN Industrial Cooper-
ation scheme (AICO), under which products originating from and traded between at least
two ASEAN companies would be given a preferential tariff of 5 percent or less. The mem-
bers also aim to create an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), in which investments are to
ow freely. As regards nancial cooperation, the ASEAN Finance Ministers agreed in Oc-
tober 1998 to set up an ASEAN Surveillance Process, in order to prevent a recurrence of
the nancial crisis. In the third informal summit held in Manila on November 30th, 1999,
the ASEAN leaders agreed to accelerate the AFTA process and to intensify cooperation,
in particular on nancial issues, with China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Coopera-
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tion with the latter is managed within the ASEAN+3 framework of East Asian cooperation.
Consequently, in May 2000, the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers agreed to establish a re-
gional nancing arrangement called the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), consisting of an
expanded ASEAN swap arrangement and a network of bilateral swap arrangements among
the ASEAN countries, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
The fourth phase of ASEAN development involves economic integration and coop-
eration in three signicant ways, namely economic integration and cooperation in the real
sector, nancial cooperation and further economic cooperation with ASEAN's neighbor
countries, particularly nancial cooperation.
Economic integration and cooperation in the real sector encompasses:
1) The acceleration of AFTA: At the third informal summit in 1999, ASEAN
brought forward the date of AFTA's nal target, the establishment of a truly free trade re-
gion, from 2015 to 2010 for the ASEAN-6. The newer members, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar
and Cambodia, have committed themselves to eliminating all import duties by 2015, with
some sensitive products to follow by 2018, the original target for these members. Mean-
while, ASEAN has also been working on reducing the tariffs on an increasing number
of products and on simplifying and harmonizing the national tariff nomenclatures of the
products. The CEPT agreement, the main mechanism by which AFTA is implemented,
has brought down the average tariff among the ASEAN members from 12.76 percent in
1993 to 4.43 in 2000. ASEAN also aims to harmonize the product standards of member
countries with international standards, and encourage and liberalize the linkages among
intra-ASEAN countries, by adopting a Framework Agreement on Services to create a free
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trade area for services. The AFTA program has brought about progress, not only in terms
of increasing FDI, but also in intra-ASEAN trade, which expanded from 43.26 billion US
dollar in 1993 to 85.4 billion US dollar in 1997. Intra-ASEAN trade shrank to 68.8 billion
US dollar in 1998, because of the Asian nancial crisis. However, it rose to 74.4 billion
US dollar in 1999. However, it should be recognized that, despite the success in decreas-
ing tariffs within AFTA, the non-tariff barriers still exist. ASEAN has done little to combat
these103.
2) Industrial development: In 1997, ASEAN agreed to establish the ASEAN
Industrial Cooperation scheme (AICO), which may be seen as a replacement for the unsuc-
cessful programs of the 1970s, such as the Industrial Joint Venture and the Brand-to-Brand
Complementation schemes. Under an AICO arrangement, manufacturing enterprises op-
erating in at least two ASEAN countries participate in a strategic alliance and obtain full
AFTA treatment, that is to say 0-to-5 percent tariffs. The advantages of AICO for the com-
panies include economies of scale, a reduction in production costs and the efcient division
of labor and industrial resources. Furthermore, at the 30th ASEAN Economic Ministers
Meeting in Manila in October 1998, the Framework agreement for the ASEAN Investment
Area (AIA) was signed. The AIA seeks to make the region an attractive investment area
and encourages inows of direct investment within and into ASEAN. In the fourth phase of
ASEAN development, FDI still plays a great strategic role, despite a decline in FDI ows
into ASEAN from a peak of 27.6 billion US dollars in 1997 to 19.5 US billion dollars in
1998 and 16.2 billion US dollars in 1999.
103 Wongboonsin P. (1997), p. 46-47. Even though the reduction of non-tariff barriers was an aim of PTA, it
has never been pursued practically and seriously.
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3) Infrastructure and communication: ASEAN has four signicant long-term
projects to develop its infrastructure. These are the ASEAN Power Grid, the Trans-ASEAN
Pipeline Network, the ASEAN Highway Network and the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link.
In the communications sector, ASEAN is working on interconnectivity to enhance the
seamless roaming of telecommunication services. Additionally, at the ASEAN informal
summit in November 1999, the ASEAN leaders and private sector representatives orga-
nized a high level e-task force with the aim of developing a broad-based action plan to
promote an ASEAN cyberspace. The e-ASEAN Framework Agreement was signed at the
fourth ASEAN informal summit in November 2000, committing to the development of
the ASEAN information structure, facilitation of e-commerce, liberalization of informa-
tion and communication technology goods, services and investments, capacity building,
e-society and e-government.
Financial cooperation and cooperation with neighbor nations encompasses:
1) The ASEAN Surveillance Process: In order to prevent a recurrence of the
nancial crisis, the ASEAN Finance Ministers agreed on a framework for consultations
on economic policies in October 1998. The ASEAN Surveillance Process has two main
features. Firstly, it aims to look after the recovery process and to observe any indication
of vulnerability in the ASEAN nancial system. The second element is the peer review,
which provides a forum for the ASEAN Finance Ministers to exchange information on the
development of their domestic economies. This is intended to help counteract potential
threats to member countries' economies collectively.
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2) The ASEAN+3 Financial Cooperation (ASEAN+China, Japan and the Re-
public of Korea): The ASEAN+3 nance and central bank deputies met in Bandar Seri
Begawan in March 2000. They agreed to set up a system of monitoring capital ows and to
strengthen the regional surveillance mechanism in East Asia. Moreover, they put forward
proposals for a regional support mechanism, which is to consist of a network of newly built
East Asian training and research institutes along with a regional nancing arrangement de-
signed to enhance existing international facilities.
3) The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI): On the 6th May 2000 in Chiang Mai, Thai-
land, the ASEAN nance ministers agreed to inaugurate a regional nancing arrange-
ment called the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), a system of swap arrangements within
the ASEAN+3 countries. The CMI encompasses two features. The rst is an expanded
ASEAN Swap Arrangement, which now includes all the ASEAN countries and has the
expanded facility of 1 billion US dollar. The second is a network of bilateral swap arrange-
ments and repurchase agreements among the ASEAN+3 countries, aimed at accommo-
dating temporary shortfalls in nance for members that encounter balance-of-payments
difculties. The integrated foreign exchange reserves of these thirteen nations are evalu-
ated at more than 800 billion US dollars. In the long-run, the ASEAN members would be
well advised to give serious consideration to structural reforms and trade policy. Areas for
such consideration include promoting wage and price exibility, reforming and strength-
ening the nancial sector, assuring central bank independence and harmonizing monetary
policy, in order to cope with the global external disturbances effectively. The ASEAN Fi-
nancial Arrangement serves as a means to prevent an extreme crisis, systemic failure and
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over-accumulation of foreign reserves. As such, it counteracts the problem of speculative
attacks. In the long run, it may also be seen as a rst step to achieving the above mentioned
long-term objectives. However, it is important not to neglect the arguments against the
ASEAN Regional Financial Arrangement104. Examples of such arguments are that regional
funds could exacerbate moral hazard problems or that the political preconditions that are
essential for a durable regional arrangement are still far from being satised relative to the
European Union.
It should be recognized that, in the fourth phase of development, ASEAN is largely
concentrating on economic development. In particular, the Asian nancial crisis has shown
the signicance of the nancial sector at the further stage of economic development and in
times of globalization, even for real sector oriented economies like the ASEAN economies.
Consequently, it is now clear that, aside of intra-ASEAN economic integration, external
economic cooperation between ASEAN and its neighbor countries has been increasing
immensely.
In accordance with a policy of expansion of ASEAN membership, Laos and Myan-
mar were admitted as the 8th and 9th member of ASEAN in 1997. Following the admit-
tance of Cambodia into ASEAN on the 30th April 1999, all ten Southeast Asian nations are
now members of ASEAN. The entrance of Laos is expected to bring about new resources to
ASEAN, for example hydroelectricity. Laos is an interesting investment area for the other
ASEAN members and foreign investors. Laos' motivation for entering ASEAN was its
hope to attain political and economic stability and to promote its economic development.
104 Park Y. C. (2002), p. 4-7
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The admittance of Myanmar into ASEAN plays a great role in terms of geo-economic and
geo-political strategy, since Myanmar can be seen as a gateway for ASEAN to the Middle
East, China and India. Last but not least, Cambodia became a member despite its troubled
political situation. Its acceptance was seen as completing ASEAN. It should be emphasized
that the entrance of these members has brought a new economic and political situation to
ASEAN. While some member countries of ASEAN are relatively well developed, the de-
velopment in others is further behind. This has brought both advantages and disadvantages
to ASEAN economic integration. Furthermore, it should be noted that ASEAN is now di-
vided into socialist and democracy oriented countries and that political turmoil still exists,
particularly in Myanmar and Cambodia. These situations hardly serve to ease the integra-
tion process.
2.3 Comments on ASEAN Development
2.3.1 Economic Aspect
The concept of the economic evolution of ASEAN in terms of its structure, strategies and
integration process, may be divided into three eras. The rst one can be classied as the
old perception of ASEAN economic cooperation and development, the second one refers
to the new or second perception of ASEAN economic integration and development and
the third one is the era of the new approach towards sustainable ASEAN economic devel-
opment under opening and deepening regionalism.
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The old perception of ASEAN economic cooperation and development played a sig-
nicant role in the 1960s but faded out in the 1970s and 1980s. At that time the ASEAN
countries accepted import substitution as a policy that could potentially bring development
and as a way to launch industrialization in their economies. Hence, when domestic markets
proved to be too small to accommodate import substitution as the starting point of indus-
trialization, regional market integration was seen as a means towards industrialization and
economic development105.
The predominant characteristics of the old perception are as follows: rstly, region-
alism was driven by the states or governments. Secondly, import substitution was a base
for industrialization and economic development. Thirdly, there was discrimination against
third countries. Finally, there were efforts made towards intra-regional trade and secu-
rity. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, pressured by changing external circumstances  as
previously analyzed , the ASEAN countries had to modify their economic development
concept.
The modication of the economic development concept of the ASEAN countries
from the eighties until the out break of the nancial and economic crisis of 1997-1998
achieved an impressive result in terms of increasing economic growth in the ASEAN coun-
105 One of them was the idea that welfare could be increased by allowing free trade and by raising produc-
tivity, in terms of achieving economies of scale and improving the allocation and availability of resources,
through enlarging the size of the domestic market. Furthermore there was the idea of an increase in welfare
from the economic growth that ensues ensuing from traditional customs union, through trade creation and
trade diversion. This went hand in hand with the idea of growth and modernization as development. To help
development, enhancing industrialization has been accepted as a central policy goal and has been regarded
as a rational social choice by developing countries. Additional advantages are the joint production of public
goods and protection against adverse developments in the world market, as well as improved collective bar-
gaining power towards industrial countries and consensus building on regional political and security issues.
These can be considered as largely political advantages. For more about the old regionalism see chapter 1
and for the economic development in ASEAN in the sixties and seventies see the previous sections in this
chapter.
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tries. It was the changing external factors accompanied by suitable ASEAN development
policies that supported this outcome. The external factors were essentially trade liberaliza-
tion under the auspices of the GATT and the increasing international capital mobilization,
particularly after the Plaza Accord in 1985. These, in turn, led to the appreciation of the
Yen and the immense inow of FDI into the ASEAN countries. The ying geese pattern
led by Japan further supported the economic development of the ASEAN countries106. In
addition, the ASEAN countries have adapted themselves, particularly their development
policies, to exploit these changing circumstances.
The new or second ASEAN regionalism has changed, so that it is based on a mar-
ket driven concept, in which the economic development policies have been formulated
in accordance with an outward-looking development strategy. Such policies include ex-
port promotion, trade liberalization, open trade investment and growth, non-discrimination
against third countries and the aim of global competition. Charles Harvie and Hyun-Hoon
Lee (2002) explain the change towards an outward-oriented development as follows: the
countries had started from a low level of national income and income per capita, so domes-
tic producers were faced with a limited domestic market. As a result, an export-oriented
policy for industrial growth and development was chosen as a suitable process to overcome
this impediment. The outward-oriented strategy provided the domestic rms with oppor-
tunities to absorb foreign technology and managerial know-how and drove them to operate
efciently, in order to be able to compete in the global market. Furthermore, this policy
also brought about gains in external balances as well as purchasing power to acquire tech-
106 More about the Flying Geese Pattern of Economic Development, see Kwan C. H. (2001), p. 16-18.
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nological inputs, while increasing demand and generating growth. Another consideration
was the stable macroeconomic management, whereby rates of investment were high and
allocation was encouraged by reducing ination, promoting price stability and keeping the
exchange rates competitive. In addition, Nicolas Craft (1998) asserts that the initial po-
sition of economic backwardness of these ASEAN countries was the main factor that led
to their catching-up so rapidly. He adds that advantages from demographic change of ris-
ing labor force participation, falling birth and death rates and the signicant increase of the
proportion of the population who are of a working age supported their rapid growth107. To
conclude, there are several points of view on the main reasons for the strong economic de-
velopment in East Asia, including ASEAN, in the 1980s and 1990s108. Trade economists
point to the outward oriented policies; macroeconomists to the stable macroeconomic man-
agement and the labor economists to education development. While interventionists give
the selective interventionist policies of the government as the reason; free market econo-
mists view the small governments, the market mechanism and the private initiatives as
reasons for the signicant economic growth. Taking into account the above-mentioned
suppositions, all of these policies have, in their own ways, supported the strong economic
growth in East Asia. The combination between these policies and external circumstances
has brought about remarkable economic outcomes for the East Asian countries. These in-
clude high levels of domestic saving and private domestic investment as well as increased
foreign direct investment and rapid export growth. Catching up with foreign technologies
has brought about increasing industrialization, economic growth and a decline in poverty.
107 Crafts N. (1998), p. 1-45
108 Harvie C. and Lee H.-H. (2002), p. 130
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Besides its outward-orientation, the new or second ASEAN regionalism is also char-
acterized by non-discrimination against third countries. In line with this, there has been
cooperation between countries from different regions, for instance, the establishment of
APEC in 1989. Furthermore, the progress of regionalism has now become more by the
market-driven, and the development policies have been encouraging the region's ability to
compete globally.
Since the nancial crisis in 1997, the external and internal situations that have changed
considerably have led the ASEAN countries to rethink their development strategies. At
present, the global economy is developing rapidly. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round
and the establishment of the WTO have driven the ASEAN economies to open their do-
mestic markets, particularly in trade and investment. The ASEAN economies are on the
way towards becoming mature economies and they have to be alert and prepare themselves
for global pressures. On the one hand, the ASEAN countries may have access to the global
market, but on the other hand, they have to open their markets to foreign competitors as
well. In addition, the expansion and strengthening of regionalism, specically in Europe
and America, is noticeable, while other rapidly-developing economies are emerging, in par-
ticular China and India. China has acceded to the WTO, has a lot of potential to develop
and is on the way to being one of the leading economies in Asia. These circumstances in-
crease competition on the ASEAN regional and global market and roll back their export
growth. Meanwhile the ASEAN economies have also lost the ying geese pattern due to
the economic difculties of the leading goose, Japan. The ASEAN countries, moreover,
are encountering difculties in nancial sector, in which they have limited experience, be-
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cause their economic structure has been based predominately on the real economic sector.
The rapid progress of information and communication technologies is another important
area in which the ASEAN countries have to be alert and adapt, in order to take advantage
of these external changes. Now the ASEAN economies are getting more and more ma-
ture. The industrialization process continues and labor wages increase, but demographic
changes are no longer serving to increase the area's productivity. Therefore even though
there is still some scope of their catch-up potential, it is very hard for them to gain such
high economic growth as in the 1980s.
As the ASEAN economies have grown towards advanced economies, encouraged
by increasing technologies and higher skilled workers, other regional economies, such as
China, have also emerged, with labor intensive, low skilled production and high skill pro-
duction is on progress. Hence it is signicant for the ASEAN countries to modify their de-
velopment model in order to cope with this competition. They have to move towards higher
skilled and creative production in every market sector and use high technologies in order
to improve their competitiveness in the global market. Proceeding towards prosperous de-
velopment, the ASEAN countries have to amend their planning, taking into consideration
the fact that they are continuously moving towards open economies.
The development of ASEAN was rapid, allowing little time for a proper foundation
of its structures. However, the recent emergence of the e-commerce market offers ASEAN
a renewed chance to lay meaningful foundations for itself. By building on bilateral arrange-
ments and moving away from multilateral action, ASEAN seeks to deepen its integration.
Subject to these internal and external constituents, the ASEAN countries should operate
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a proactive development strategy, which involves the simultaneous execution of defen-
sive and offensive plans of action. Defensive strategy refers to the strengthening of
internal economic and political sectors to reinforce the economic and political basis. This
should enable ASEAN to cope with continuously changing external threats and to realize a
stable development. The defensive strategy encompasses bringing in stable macroeconomic
policies, aiming to achieve price stability, low budget decits and surpluses, reduction of
public and foreign debt (particularly short-term dept) to a sustainable amount and ensuring
the competitiveness of the exchange rate. The ASEAN countries should encourage com-
petitiveness via market-based mechanisms, establish institutional frameworks that support
open market and competitiveness, encourage interregional cooperation in trade and nance
and ameliorate the governance of private and public sectors. The latter can be achieved, for
instance, through monitoring the performance and the usage of nancial resources, in par-
ticular, of the private sectors. In addition, investment in human-capital is one of the crucial
basic factors to realize a long-term economic development, along with the development of
technologies in the areas of production, services, knowledge and information109.
This defensive strategy should be accompanied by an offensive strategy, under which
the ASEAN countries may, on the one hand, be able to reduce the risks of external threats
and, on the other hand, be able to initiate their own means of development. The offensive
strategy is one of regional outward-orientation, with two focuses. First and foremost, it
aims for Asia regionalism, in particular with China, Japan, Korea and also with the CER,
both in nancial and real sectors. Secondly, it considers the tendency towards worldwide
109 According to the policy factors for a new East Asian development model, see Harvie C. and Lee H.-H.
(2002), p. 135-136.
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globalization, particularly at the global multilateral level, including for example the EU and
American regionalism. Even though the ASEAN economies should enhance their efforts in
export policy, they should not ignore the import side, in which they can gain technology and
know-how relating to products and management, besides gaining acceptance in the world-
trade arena. Hence the ASEAN countries should intensify and expand both inter-regional
and intra-regional trade and investment, under the support of competitive discipline, includ-
ing movement towards dismantling tariff and non-tariff barriers. Consequently, they should
improve their competitiveness, strengthen and stabilize their economic sectors, especially
their nancial markets, in order to effectively cope with the expansion of competition in
their domestic markets and to gain access into international markets through greater eco-
nomic integration. In addition, the ASEAN region should alter its governing institutions to
make them more efcient, to support increased interdependence among the members for
a stable integration and to increase their bargaining power in the face of world economic
globalization.
To conclude, under the external circumstance of increasing globalization, the free
market and internal circumstances such as the recovery and improvement of regional mar-
ket from the consequences of the nancial crisis, the ASEAN economies should move to-
wards openness and intensifying inter and intra-regional trade and investment. The strategy
that the ASEAN countries may exert is a balance between the defensive and the offensive
strategies, encompassing the strengthening of their economic structure (stability) combined
with the initiation of their economic development towards the future. This development in-
cludes opening and deepening regionalism (initiation and development).
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2.3.2 Political, Security and Social Aspects
Two main perspectives have affected the way the ASEAN has evolved in terms of its
structure, integration process and cooperation between its members. The rst one is the
national building approach, which adheres to the concepts of national and regional re-
silience. The second one is the movement towards balance between open and deeper
regionalism110 inuenced, to a great extent, by internal and external economic pressures,
including the development of the ASEANmembers' economic structures and also the trend
towards globalization. Institutional building has been an important issue and characteristic
under the development of this second perception. The structural change accompanying the
movement from the rst to the second standpoint is dynamic and gradual. Both standpoints
are not yet completely separated from each other. There is still an overlap between the two
approaches, meaning that the national building approach is still operating. The overriding
trend, however, is towards open and deeper regionalism.
1) National building approach based on national and regional resilience
Since ASEAN's setup, the signicant characteristic of the ASEAN development has
been its emphasis on national building, which has been reinforced through the ASEAN
philosophy of national and regional resilience. The national building approach could be
observed since the end of the colonial era. It is possible that because the Southeast Asian
countries had just obtained their independence, they were very sensitive about autonomy
issues. Manfred Mols notes that the handing over of sovereignty is always sensitive, par-
ticularly in the case of inhomogeneous members. In the case of ASEAN, in which the
110 See Thanadsillapakul L. (2000)
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members are inhomogeneous as regards their levels of economic development, religions
and social and political aspects, the common interest of the member states extended no fur-
ther than sorting out their geo-political situation111. The Southeast Asian countries were
very unwilling to give up any part of their sovereignty, and by establishing ASEAN, the
member states focused on preserving regional autonomy from external threats, as well as
maintaining their national sovereignty. Mols further asserts that the ASEAN states have op-
erated an interrelated Double-strategy aiming at existence-maximization, which includes
striving for autonomy (national resilience) and preserving regional autonomy (regional re-
silience)112. Susanne Feske also notes that the rst priority of the development of regional
cooperation between the Southeast Asian countries has been the pursuit of their common in-
terests of preserving their national security and territorial integrity, including the long-term
assurance and consolidation of the individual nation-states without restriction of national
sovereignty113.
With respect to ASEAN regionalism in the period characterized by the intensive na-
tional building approach, most authors have concentrated on the theme of sovereignty in
the Southeast Asian countries. There have been several denitions and interpretations of
ASEAN114 that indicate that ASEAN is a region established as a defense mechanism and
that the ASEAN members are unwilling to lose their national sovereignty. For instance,
Donald E. Weatherbee describes ASEAN regionalism as a Conict Avoidance System,
111 Mols M. (1996), p. 282
112 Mols M. (1996), p. 284
113 Feske S. (1995), p. 88-98
114 These interpretations have been assembled by Dosch J. (1997), p. 30-31, 33-34, based on Weatherbee D.
E. (1984), p. 259-287, Sopiee N. (1993), Leffer M. (1995), p. 129-142, Antolik M. (1992), p. 316-329, and
from an interview carried out by Dosch with Chandran Jehurun in March 1993 in Singapore.
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Noordin Sopiee speaks of a Southeast Asia Concert of Nations, Chandran Jeshurun coins
the term Integrated Solidarity, Michael Leffer views ASEAN as a Diplomatic Commu-
nity, and Michael Antolik asserts that the Concordance SystemModel might be suitable
for ASEAN regionalism. Based on interviews with Xuto and Thanat Khoman carried out by
Dosch, Xuto describes ASEAN as an Umbrella Concept and Khoman denes ASEAN as
Collective Political Defense. Both denitions strongly emphasize the aspect of ASEAN
as a defense mechanism115.
There are several political science analyses of the development of the ASEAN inte-
gration process, which refer to the period of the ASEAN establishment and national build-
ing. Two of them have been presented by E. D. Solidum and Somsakdi Xuto. Both authors
dene cooperation as an early stage of the integration processes in which ASEAN nds
itself. Solidum116 views that cooperation is a necessary precondition for integration. Coop-
eration establishes the social and psychological basis for the setup of a transnational society.
This basis includes common values, habits and expectations. These may, subsequently, be
conducive to mutual understandings and condences and furthermore to the development
of a political community with joint institutions. Xuto classies the approach to regional
integration as a three-stage process117  rst, cooperation, second, coordination and third,
integration. Similarly to Solidum, Xuto asserts that cooperation is a necessary stage, in-
cluding the establishment of mutual understandings, condences, and common interests.
In this phase of intensive national building approach, Xuto, furthermore, states that inte-
115 Interviews of Dosch with Somsakdi Xuto in August 1993, Bangkok, and Thanat Khoman, also in August
1993, Bangkok, see Dosch J. (1997), p. 30
116 Solidium E. D. (1974), p. 2, and Dosch J. (1997), p. 32
117 Xuto S. (1973), p. 3, 17, and Dosch J. (1997), p. 35
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gration might be out of the question for ASEAN, and that ASEAN is just concentrating on
cooperation and developing strategies aiming at coordination, since the ASEAN countries
have not been ready to give up their sovereignty. Regarding the characteristic of ASEAN,
it can be concluded that the aims of the regional cooperation in Southeast Asia are, on the
one hand, to establish a framework for strengthening and preserving national building as
well as political stability under the pressure of external threats and, on the other hand, to
strive for harmonization, particularly in matters of foreign affairs, interests and strategies
leading towards a strong position on the international stage118.
The characteristics of ASEAN can be classied under the ve following facets:
- National building
- National and international resilience
- Consensual society (decision making based on the Musyawarah principle)
- Paternalism and a regime based on political elites
- Defense mechanism
An argument for the ASEAN characteristics and for the reason why ASEAN might
choose this way of policy has been made by K. H. Shaw. He asserts that while the EU has
been following a bottom-up integration process, the ASEAN, contrarily, has not much time
to put such a gradual evolution process into practice. He reasons that it is pragmatic for
ASEAN to implement top-down politicalization; comparable to evolution of Singapore, in
order to make progress in integrating the multi-ethnic community119 on a regional basis. It
could be concluded that the main attribute of ASEAN has been the fact that the young na-
118 Dosch J. (1997), p. 42
119 Shaw K. H. (1976), p. 154
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tional states of which it consists are focusing on preserving their autonomy, including their
political independence, in particular vis-à-vis the hegemonial countries. Along with this
goes the desire to preserve national sovereignty in economic sector. Until present, even
though several scholars have been studying and supporting the ASEAN political integra-
tion process, concentrating largely on the adjustments of ASEAN's institutional system as
basis for the future development, it should be noted that there is still a lack of political
willingness120 and no sign of a tendency towards political integration in ASEAN.
2) Tendency towards balanced open regionalism and deeper regionalism
At present, changes in the global economy are continuing, and this also includes
changes in legal frameworks for trade and investment. These have been a driving force
towards the opening-up of several economies. The competitive pressure has also driven
the ASEAN members to consider improving their harmonized regulations as well as in-
stitutionalized cooperation and integration, in the aim of facilitating an effective regional
integration and global economic cooperation.
In order to cope with this challenge, the ASEAN countries are on the way to amend-
ing their development model121 by strengthening regional economic integration and open-
ing their markets towards globalization  in other words, generalizing liberalization with
deeper regional integration, which is considered as a means to overcome current imped-
iments and as a building-block for future development. This new approach particularly
needs support for the harmonization of its operation and of its legal systems. One of the
120 Thanadsillapakul L. (2000), p. 1
121 For further changes in the global economy and the ASEAN economic development plan, see understand-
ing ASEAN under its economic aspect in the same chapter.
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reasons is that it is not only the border barriers that hinder the free ow of economic trans-
action, but it is also the differences in internal regulations and in legal and political systems
that bring about distortions to the economy. It is therefore necessary to harmonize stan-
dards, establish mutual qualication of products and services and their procedural require-
ments. Doing so will support the removal of non-tariff barriers and mobilize economic
integration. It should be considered that ASEAN does not need to remove national regula-
tions, nor need it establish new common ASEAN laws. However, it might be effectual to
guarantee the enforcement and coherency of the national regulations among member coun-
tries, thus avoiding and eliminating the hindrances to regional economic performance122.
Currently, ASEAN exerts only a exible legal framework which lacks basis in the
form of a treaty123. Even though ASEAN agreements are legal and obligate the member
countries, they fall short when it comes to consequential details and instruments to en-
sure their implementation. The most recent ASEAN framework agreements, for instance
the AIA, AFTA, AFAS or IP (ASEAN Intellectual Property), are solely declarations and
initiatives to implement closer economic cooperation and integration. Under the pressure
of external circumstances and the increasingly closer relations and cooperation among the
ASEAN economies and into the world economy, it is becoming crucial to put effective im-
plementation mechanisms into place, including institutions and regulations to support these
issues.
Thanadsillapakul makes a suggestion for a possible development for ASEAN in the
form of a bottom-up liberalization and institutionalization. She indicates that at the pre-
122 Thanadsillapakul L. (2000), p. 87
123 Pelkmans (1997), p. 211
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liminary stage, ASEAN should concentrate on harmonization, cooperation and also es-
tablishing mutual regulations in the following elds: the entry, establishment and opera-
tion of foreign investment, mutual recognition of substantive and procedural requirements
for merchandise and service trade, harmonization of double taxation avoidance, competi-
tion rules, competition policy, labor standards, intellectual property protection cooperation,
transportation and communication, and dispute settlement for the private sector. After ful-
lling these fundamentals, ASEAN might be ready to move on the next step that begins to
tackle sensitive issues surrounding the harmonization of national laws and regulations in
several spheres that impact the implementation of the ASEAN framework agreements.
In his denitions of economic integration, Tinbergen classies negative integration
as the aspects of international economic integration which simply involve the removal of
discriminatory and restrictive institutions, along with the liberalization of economic trans-
actions. Positive integration relates to the adjustment of existing and, to a great extent, to
the establishment of new policies and institutions endowed with coercive powers, in order
to enable the market of the integrated area to function properly and efciently and, further-
more, in order to support other broader policy aims of the scheme124. It could be concluded
that, at present, ASEAN regionalism may be categorized as negative integration125. This
state of affairs can reasonably be expected to continue into the near future, while ASEAN
countries work to strengthen and harmonize their institutional economic structure and reg-
ulations. Even though ASEAN countries are considering a shift towards positive integra-
tion, this is a very sensitive issue and there are numerous disparities between the legal and
124 Tinbergen, J. (1965), p. 76-82
125 See also Thanadsillapakul L. (2000), p. 80-83
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political systems of the different ASEAN countries that will hinder the evolution process.
These differences stem largely from the countries' different former colonial masters126. Be-
sides, there are differences in culture, ethnicity and religion, geographical distance, and the
by no means insignicant fact that these countries are not eager to loose their authority and
independence. Until now, the ASEAN countries have preferred a exible framework with
coordinated regulations based on mutual recognition.
Thus, if ASEAN has to develop or integrate its institutional framework, in order
to cope with the internal and external changes, a careful cost-benet analysis should be
carried out, in order to nd the key areas for integration and the appropriate degree and
type of institutionalization for ASEAN. In other words, a balance between deepening and
opening regionalism has to be struck.
2.4 Conclusion
ASEAN could be regarded as a successful association. When ASEAN was founded, the
region was in turmoil, with several countries striving for national stability and indepen-
dence. At rst, the ve original signatory countries signed the ASEAN Declaration, which
aimed principally to improve political stability and to provide a counterweight to com-
munist power, particularly in the region. Today, ASEAN encompasses all ten nations of
Southeast Asia, regardless of their political regimes. ASEAN has survived internal and,
in particular, external threats and disturbances. Indeed, such exogenous factors often op-
erated as an impetus towards regional cooperation and integration. This was the case for
126 Thanadsillapakul L. (2000), p. 81
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the end of the Cold War as well as for the Asian nancial crisis. Since the 1990s, ASEAN
has increasingly concentrated on economic cooperation and integration, not only among
its member nations, but also with neighboring countries. AFTA is on its way to success in
tariff reduction, while intra-ASEAN trade is increasing, albeit slowly.
However, it is also possible to view the development progress of ASEAN as unsat-
isfactory, since the evolution of ASEAN has been slow and unsteady. It has to be noted
that the impulses for ASEAN cooperation and integration have often come from external
pressures. For instance, the Cold War and counteraction vis-à-vis communism inuenced
ASEAN to increase political cooperation, while the world economic crisis in the 1970s
 that is, the collapse of the Bretton Woods systems in the early 1970s, the oil crisis in
1973-1974 and the following worldwide economic recession in 1974-1975  led ASEAN
to make serious efforts in terms of economic cooperation. Other crucial external factors in-
clude the increasing role of the world economy since the late 1980s. The globalization of
nancial sector partly as an effect of G-5 Plaza Accord, the end of the Cold War leading
to the New World Order were all part of this phenomenon. The nancial crisis in July
1997 was a later external factor. Every time such external events occurred, the ASEAN
countries were enthusiastic to cooperate with each other in order to overcome their difcul-
ties127. However, whenever the intensity of the external disturbances eased, the cooperation
efforts also slowed down. The internal impetus to develop economic and political coopera-
tion and integration has been and is still inadequate, particularly due to the lack of regional
institutions with the necessary power to act and efciency in doing so. Furthermore, sev-
127 It should be recognised that the economic structures of most ASEAN countries are nearly the same; hence
the external shocks affected these countries symmetrically.
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eral pieces of research128 have indicated that the ASEAN functional cooperation plans need
to progress more effectively and that the development of the fundamental factors in most
ASEAN countries is not yet efcient. Particularly poor are social development, develop-
ment of human resources and technological development. Remarkably, the extent to which
human resources and technology are developed within the original ASEAN signatories,
as well as between the original ASEAN countries and the new ASEAN members, varies
markedly, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Now ASEAN is experiencing a further stage of integration and cooperation, with the
globalization of its nancial and real sectors. It is not enough to be reactive to the external
sector. In order to overcome vulnerability to external disturbances, ASEAN also needs
to be proactive and to seize its own initiative to create effective economic and monetary
integration. ASEAN has recently signed and established several agreements and plans for
its real and monetary economic sectors to grant them much-needed advanced and effective
management. Besides the strengthening of fundamental factors these programs require
a simultaneous development of the management sector. In other words, the countries'
institutions must also be improved. The development of the European Union's institutions
and economic structures offers an interesting comparison, particularly as it has occurred
and is occurring contemporaneously with that of ASEAN. Bearing this European model in
mind, it may be time for ASEAN to rethink its strategy of non interference in national
issues and the excessive decentralization of the ASEAN decision making processes129, in
128 Thai AIPO National Group (1997), p. 21-23, and Wongboonsin P. and Wongboonsin K. (1995)
129 Pelkmans J. (1992) describes how the excessive decentralization of the ASEAN decision making process,
the neglecting of the Secretariat, the lack of clear, long-run guidelines for economic cooperation and the
emphasis on ad-hoc projects led to a tendency of trying to exploit ASEAN. See also Chirathiwat S. (1996),
122 2 The Development of ASEAN
order to give more supranational power to ASEAN. In addition, there is great diversity and
heterogeneity within ASEAN in terms of economic levels, social and ethnic features as
well as government regimes, particularly after the entrance of the new members. All of this
poses a tough challenge for ASEAN's future development.
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Chapter 3
ASEAN Regionalism and European
Integration
The main objective of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the ASEAN integration
process and to explore possible opportunities for its future development. It is important to
understand the structure, characteristics and the fundamental intention of the ASEAN in-
tegration, in order to recognize its strengths and weaknesses. First, this chapter examines
the differences and the similarities between ASEAN and the EU  obviously the most suc-
cessful regional integration process worldwide. This comparison predominately relates to
their economic, political and, to a lesser extent, social issues. Subsequently, the prospect
of further integration of ASEAN will be analyzed, using the EU development as a support-
ing example to show what ASEAN can learn from European integration. Nevertheless,
it must be recognized that even though the EU has carried out its integration process suc-
cessfully, it should not be taken arbitrarily as a general benchmark model for integration
processes in every other region. It is important to study carefully how best to take ad-
vantage of the lessons to be learned from the EU, whilst being careful to understand the
region's own specic economic, political, and social structures and circumstances. This
approach could help ASEAN in nding itself an efcient path to integration.
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3.1 ASEAN and the European Union
The conguration and the scope of the ASEAN and EU integration processes have had sig-
nicant implications for countries involved in integration processes of their own worldwide.
At present, ASEAN, consisting of newly industrializing and developing countries, exem-
plies a lower level of economic integration and is in the form of an inter-governmental
association with a loose form of cooperation and no supranational approach. To a certain
extent, ASEAN's integration process may serve as a useful instance and a case study for
other regionalization processes among developing countries. The EU, on the other hand,
represents the most advanced regional integration, in terms of both economic and politi-
cal features. The EU is now a community of industrialized countries in monetary union130,
based on a very formal institution with a supranational approach. Although its integration
process has not always run smoothly, the EU continues to grow and develop further into a
more advanced state of integration. As such, it is worth studying the evolution of the dif-
ferences in characteristics and objectives between both ASEAN and the EU, in order to aid
efcient planning for the future development of ASEAN.
Looking back on the period before the establishment of both institutions, it is ap-
parent that while the Southeast Asian countries were in a colonial period with no sign of
any concept of integration, the idea of integration was already present in Europe since the
1920s and had gained momentum after the end of the war. From a supercial perspec-
tive, the circumstances surrounding European integration bore a resemblance to those of
130 More precisely, the EU is still not a complete economic union, but can be positioned at the rst stage
of the complete economic union, which is called economic and monetary union, as mentioned in chapter 1.
The EU, at present, can be positioned more than halfway between common market and economic union, see
Cuyver L. (2002), p. 1.
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the ASEAN integration. Both associations were encountering external threats and were
striving for external and internal stability in the political and economic spheres. Through
the establishment of ASEAN, the region expected to reduce and solve political tensions be-
tween the members, particularly on territorial issues, as well as to reduce the inuence of
the dominant powers in the region. In Europe, there were, rst of all, attempts to avoid a
resurgence of excessive nationalism by building European international relations. Besides
this, the emergence of a new World Order with two superpowers (the USA and the Soviet
Union); the division of Europe, and the threat of communist inuences and the Soviet red
army were the other crucial factors that had given impulse to the European cooperation. In
order to overcome the poor economic situation that was a consequence of the war and to
initiate European economic and political cooperation, the reconstruction of West Germany
was seen as indispensable for a successful future for Europe. Additionally, the reconcili-
ation of France and Germany was perceived as the right point of departure for European
stability.
A. Etzioni131 points out that economic cooperation has frequently served as a start-
ing point for integration. Etzioni argues that economic cooperation supports regional in-
tegration through the so-called take-off processes and will bring about cooperation and
integration on the political stage afterwards. Etzioni asserts that there is a higher expecta-
tion of success if there is a harmonization of interests among the integrating members on a
lower integration level rst (cooperation without losing sovereignty), before moving grad-
ually towards a higher level. In the context of the ASEAN development, E. D. Solidum132
131 Etzioni A. (1965), p. 269-300, and Dosch J. (1997), p. 32
132 Solidium E. D. (1974), p. 93-94, and Dosch J. (1997), p. 33
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denotes an analogous starting point between ASEAN and the EU. The ASEAN members
started by cautiously determining a common interest project; without any risk of dispute or
restriction of national autonomy. Now ASEAN has initiated further processes of coopera-
tion and integration. This argument relating to the cautious consolidation of ASEAN has
also been supported by Michael Antolik133.
There are certainly signicant differences to be seen between the EU and the ASEAN
regionalism. Indeed, external threats have played a signicant role in initiating the develop-
ment of ASEAN and since the beginning ASEAN has focused predominantly on imminent
problems. For instance, in the Bangkok Declaration, the short-term objectives are clearly
dened, contrary to the long-term objectives. In fact, this kind of short-term planned
and reactionary policy has been a characteristic of ASEAN until the present day. Ac-
cordingly, Somsakdi Xuto134 asserts that the process of ASEAN regional cooperation can
be regarded as directionless and unplanned. The political objectives and the implementa-
tion of political strategies thus remained unclear. Contrarily, since its beginnings, the EU
has set great store on long-term development of Europe, striving for amity between France
and Germany and stability and peace in Europe by integrating the economies of the mem-
ber countries. In this way, it has established a long-term plan with political aims through
an initial economic approach, proceeding by the Community Method.
As already mentioned, the external threats have always given impulses to the direc-
tion of ASEAN development. Until now, there have been three types of substantial external
133 Antolik M. (1992), p. 316-329
134 Dosch J. (1997), p. 35, based on Xuto S. (1982), p. 56, in retrospect, views and comments from selected
writings, Bangkok
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inuence that have forced ASEAN to react. Firstly, the political aspect; in the beginning,
it was the Cold War and the threat of communism in the region that inuenced ASEAN
to move towards political cooperation. Second is the real economic aspect. Later on, in
the 1970s, the world economic crisis, including the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
in the early 1970s, the Oil-crisis in 1973-1974 and the subsequent worldwide economic
recession in 1974-1975, led to serious efforts to initiate ASEAN economic cooperation.
Furthermore, since the end of the 1980s, the end of the Cold War has led to the New World
Order. This has brought the start of economic globalization, and the economic issue has be-
come prominent. Afterwards, ASEAN reacted to these circumstances by establishing the
AFTA in 1992, and has made a great move towards economic integration. The third type
of external inuence relates to monetary and nancial aspects. Stemming from the outset
of nancial sector globalization since the late 1980s, partly as an effect of G-5 Plaza Ac-
cord, ASEAN encountered a nancial crisis in July 1997. This brought down the ASEAN
economies, but provided impetus and direction for ASEAN development again. Every time
a problem or external threat occurred, ASEANmembers were eager to cooperate in order to
overcome the hardship. The incentives towards further integration were therefore revived.
It is noticeable that ASEAN has always withstood all the imminent external threats suc-
cessfully135. Nevertheless, once a problem is solved, the integration process quietens down
again. In terms of short-term planning and the knowledge of how to react to threatening
135 Besides these three inuences on ASEAN integration, it should be noted that the EU development has
inspired and partly served in many situations as a sample or working model for the evolution of ASEAN,
particularly in the initial period.
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problems, ASEAN is denitely experienced, but it lacks experience in long-term planning
and setting long-term objectives136.
Almost 40 years of hardships and experiences, the ASEAN characteristics and points
of view have become increasingly clear. The ASEAN characteristic of solving imminent
problems under the acceptance and respect of national sovereignty, and by consensual deci-
sion  through the so-called ASEANWay  has been more and more obvious throughout
ASEAN development. It has been suggested that the implementation of the ASEANWay
is based on the inherent political culture of the region delineated by the Musyawarah prin-
ciple of decision-making process137. The Musyawarah principle derives from the java
philosophy of Musyawarah (discussion), Mufakat (consensus), and Gotong Royong
(collective)138. This principle has inuenced and has been implemented in the ASEAN
philosophy for centuries. Now it has become an essential foundation for the ASEAN
philosophies of national resilience and regional resilience139, and particularly comes to
the fore in the decision-making process. This consensus-based, no-vote system is viewed
as effective in avoiding conicts and confrontations. In some literature, this exible princi-
ple is claimed to be an instrument for ASEAN success and stability140. Another signicant
ASEAN characteristic lies in the economic sphere. ASEAN has gained momentum in
136 For instance, the failure of the ASEAN Industrial Projects programs (AIPs), ASEAN Industrial Comple-
mentation and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV), launched at the end of the 1970s, see chapter
2.
137 Thanadsillapakul L. (2000), p. 1, Sin D. C. (2000), p. 177-180, and Dosch J. (1997)
138 Thambipillai P. (1992), p. 72-75
139 The ASEAN states have operated an interrelated double-strategy aiming at existence-maximization,
which includes striving for autonomy (national resilience) and preserving regional autonomy (regional re-
silience). See Mols M. (1996), p. 284
140 Sin D. C. (2000), p. 178
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changing its direction of development from political to economic since the end of the Cold
War. Moreover, the lesson from the 1997 nancial crisis has brought ASEAN to realize its
weaknesses and strengths on the international stage. As a consequence, ASEAN has been
given serious momentum in both real economic, as well as nancial economic develop-
ment and integration. Aiming at efcient and stable development, ASEAN is now moving
towards opening and deepening economic integration.
3.1.1 Political, Security and Social Aspects
The Political Aspect: Comparison between ASEAN and the EU Institutional System
ASEAN is an intergovernmental association, the decision-making processes of which
are based on the consensus principle. The Foreign Ministerial Meeting or the ASEAN
Economic Ministerial Meeting possesses the authority to making decisions associated with
economic cooperation. While the EU continually sets its sights on political union, issu-
ing Treaty and binding rules which gradually have become part of national law systems,
ASEAN, contrarily, has developed itself mainly by way of declarations141, putting out
non-binding declarations, action plans and agreements, except on the external security is-
sue. The EU prefers formal agreements  leading it to be known as a contractual society
 with generally more idealistic approaches, while ASEAN prefers informal arrangements
or consensual society with relatively pragmatic approaches. This can also be observed
in ASEAN business relations142. Additionally, V. Boltevogel asserts that instead of work-
141 Sin D. C. (2000), p. 242-243
142 See Urban W. (2001), p. 1-2, Waltraut Urban raises the question as to whether these differences exist
because of different levels of integration or because of differences in attitude.
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ing by contract, ASEAN has established Forums with the following attributes: consultative
instead of binding, pragmatic instead of dogmatic and exible instead of exclusionary143.
These Forums may serve as a means for ASEAN to nd a collective orientation, to clear
up any controversies and to build up condence between members, subject to the respect
of the national sovereignty.
Comparing the ASEAN and the EU institutional structures, the following aspects
should be noted:
First is the quantitative difference in budgets and staff:
Shortage of resources is one of the key difculties that ASEAN has to cope with.
While the EU has its own resources to nance its budget and a permanent stream of incom-
ing revenue, the budget of the ASEAN Secretariat has derived from equal contributions
from all of its members (since 1980). That means the share is consequently limited by the
contributing capacity of poorest member country. Various projects also receive support in
the form of funding from the ASEAN Fund, the ASEAN Foundation and from funds set
up in ASEAN external relations with dialogue partners. However, the implementation of
several projects has been based on cost sharing, in which each participating member has to
nance its own disbursements. Even though the number of the ASEAN professional staff
has been increasing steadily  from 64 in 1992 to 99 in 1998144 with additional support
from 99 indigenous Indonesian employees , it is doubtful that they are capable of operat-
ing the ever-increasing number of ASEAN activities effectively and sufciently. Termsak
143 Boltevogel V. (2001), chapter 12
144 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Annual Reports 1998-1989
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Chalermpalanupap145 suggests that, in the long run, creative resource mobilization mea-
sures might be essential in order for ASEAN to initiate a permanent ow of capital. Thus
a change of structure in terms of a legal framework must also be considered.
The second difference has to do with the way that institutions function and are
structured, i.e. an intergovernmental versus a supranational approach:
ASEAN started out as an intergovernmental association with an unsophisticated le-
gal framework and institutions. The latter encompass the Meeting of the heads of state
or government in the form of the highest decision-making body, the ASEAN Ministe-
rial Meeting (AMM), as well as an annual meeting of the Foreign Ministers (AFMM)
and, since 1977, the ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting (AEM). These are the cen-
tral decision-making bodies. Furthermore, the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), Se-
nior Ofcial Meeting (SOM), Senior Economic Ofcial Meeting (SEOM), committees of
specialists, and ASEAN Secretariat were established to support the decision-making in-
stitutions. None of this second group of institutions holds legislative functions or sets
up binding rules for the association. There are parallels between the ASEAN Secretariat
and the European Commission as well as between the AMM and the Council of Euro-
pean Ministers. However, while the European Commission has an executive and legislative
framework, the ASEAN Secretariat is limited merely to consultation and the implementa-
tion of the decisions of the Meeting of the heads of state or government and the AMM. It
possesses no direct role in implementing ASEAN treaties and agreements, but merely mon-
itors the implementation process. Even though the AMM, AEM and AFMM are the central
145 Chalermparanupap T. (2001), p. 8
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decision-making bodies, comparable to the Council of European Ministers, they have no
denite legislative competence146 and the extent of their power is much less. Furthermore,
there is no ASEAN-Parliament. That being said, there is the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary
Organization (AIPO), the activities of which are on the increase. However, it is not a part
of the ASEAN structure, but an NGO that has merely a consultative function. There is also
no Court of Justice in ASEAN. Perhaps the closest equivalent is the ASEAN High Coun-
cil, but it does not take a judicial role. Article 15 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia (TAC) states that: The High Council will merely recommend to the par-
ties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good ofces, mediation, inquiry or
conciliation, and when necessary appropriate measures for the prevention of a deteriora-
tion of the dispute or the situation. For disputes related to ASEAN economic agreements,
a Dispute Settlement Mechanism is now in place for their resolution. The Dispute Settle-
ment Mechanism, signed by the AEM in 1996, is based on the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding147. In addition, it should be noted that most ASEAN treaties and agreements
deal with the region's governments and not directly with individual citizens. There is no
ASEAN Ombudsman to represent the opinions of individuals or their dissatisfaction over
ASEAN activities, or over issues of integration and cooperation.
146 Their agreements are binding, but only the cooperation of the national legislature and the relevant author-
ities in each member is required to implement.
147 If settlement cannot be reached on bilateral negotiation, disputes can be referred to the Senior Economic
Meeting (SEOM). Assisted by a panel of experts, SEOM will make a decision based on a simple majority
 without the participation of the disputing parties. If the ruling is found to be unsatisfactory, a party to the
dispute can appeal to the AEM, who will then make a decision, also based on a simple majority. Moreover,
the ASEAN Secretariat is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ruling of the SEOM and
decision of the AEM, see Chalermpalanupap T. (2001), p. 6.
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Third is the difference in the decision-making process  consensual society ver-
sus qualied majority voting with the right to veto:
The EU decision-making process qualied majority voting with the right to veto
has been developed to enable effective decision-making and to keep plans moving faster.
The EU has also adopted the Subsidiarity Principle148 in respect of regional and national
competencies, to support the vertical decision-making process. The ASEANWay, however,
has derived from the ASEAN philosophy of national and regional resilience. Even though
many economists have judged the ASEAN Way to be a means of promoting ASEAN sta-
bility and success, Dosch and also Sin hold the opinion that in practice, the consensus prin-
ciple has been counterproductive to numerous decision-making processes. In many cases,
delicate and sensitive issues have been ltered out of ofcial dialogues, in order to avoid
controversy. Moreover, decisions made in the AMM are not bound by contract. These
circumstances have hindered ASEAN's further development and its integration process149.
Fourth is the difference in political will:
In ASEAN, political will is still modest and there is a lack of effective institutional
organizations and legalization. There are no clear aims, visions and consequential imple-
mentations. In addition, there hardly is any support from the social side which due to the
148 Since EU membership has increased both in number in diversity, to reduce the complications and costs
of the implementation of decisions, the EU may take decisions in which there are economies of scale and
which involve issues that the members cannot handle in an efcient way individually. Of course, there are
many cases that should be implemented at the local or national level. Therefore the decision of how to
assign competence might be taken on the basis of a cost-benet analysis. Although the denition of the term
subsidiarity is very sensitive and it can be interpreted in several ways, this principle plays a key part in paving
the way for more powerful EU institutions. This principle states that the EU would take action only if and in
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufciently achieved by the member states and can
therefore, by reason of scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the community (Article
G).
149 Dosch J. (1997), p. 40, and Sin D. C. (2000), p. 179
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EU's experiences is very relevant for a strong political structure; on the contrary, there
is still social reluctance to full trade liberalization and very limited social participation in
the integration decision. There are heterogeneities in size, standard of living, and politi-
cal objectives. Divergences of national interests and differences of conceptions of national
economic policy still exist. Additionally, there are differences in political structure, in par-
ticular discrepancy between democracy and authoritarianism. These are some points that
discourage the augmentation of political will in the region. The process of the European
integration shows that in order to achieve a successful integration in the long-run, it is nec-
essary to operate a strong collective political will in the region. This political will might not
merely operate at national government and ASEAN level, but also at regional level, par-
ticularly at the levels of the ASEAN+3. Apparently, the role of the signicant economies
in East-Southeast Asia, namely ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea will be the leading cau-
cus for the open and deepen regionalism and will be a consequential force towards global
liberalization.
The Security Aspect: Cooperative Security versus Pluralistic Security
Community
Neither ASEAN nor the EU can be characterized as a military alliance. According
to Deutsch's political security concept (1957), the EU might be classied as pluralistic se-
curity community150. Contrary to the EU, ASEAN has not shown any sign of developing
150 In 1957, in cooperation with other scholars, Karl Deutsch introduced the concept of security commu-
nity to the study of the possible ways in which men some day might abolish war. Deutsch and the scholars
dened the security community as a group of people that had become integrated to the extent that there is a
real assurance that the members of that community will not ght each other physically, but will settle their
disputes in some other way. They classied two types of security communities. The rst type is an amalga-
mated (unied) security community. The United States is an instance of such a community. The second type
is a pluralistic security community, where the community government retains the legal independence of a
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into a security organization, despite the fact that one main motive for the establishment
of ASEAN was political security, particularly in the context of the Indochina conict, the
threat of communism and the hegemonies in the region. ASEAN has no institution com-
parable to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) or the West European Union
(WEU). There have merely been bilateral or trilateral military relations, including military
training and information exchanges.
Susanne Nicolette Strauß151 views the ASEAN security cooperation as a security
complex characterized by the geographical proximity of the participant countries and their
very similar security circumstances, particularly in terms of similar external threats. The
ASEAN security concept is founded on ideals of peace and freedom in the region and
moves towards them by increasing interregional cooperation and bringing the members
closer together. The legal frameworks that back up this concept are Zone of Peace, Free-
dom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Southeast Asian
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF
in particular is considered successful in achieving its aims of diplomacy, condence build-
ing and settlement of controversies in the Asia-Pacic region, and has played a signi-
cant role in the development of political security. Nonetheless, in comparison to the EU,
ASEAN is presently still far from being a pluralistic security community. In the opinion of
Acharya, Simon, Weatherbee, Leifer and Sin, the structure of the ASEAN security policy
separate government. See Hallenberg J. (2000), p. 1
151 Strauß S. N. (1995), p. 173
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should be classied as a cooperative security approach, in the sense that military force or
operations are unlikely to be considered as options for conict-solving152.
The Social Aspect
While the people in the EU have already been involved in the EU integration process,
in ASEAN only policy-makers and an elite circle, including academics and some pro-
fessionals from the economic sector, have been involved in giving direction to ASEAN's
development. It is noticeable that the ASEAN integration process has brought about in-
creasing interaction between the three elite circles, namely the state, academics and the
economic circle, but there are not any signs of a trend to involve the people. The people in
ASEAN have never been asked whether they want integration to take place or not. Only
the state and the elite circles have been running ASEAN. There is no public opinion poll
about how integration should proceed or what direction ASEAN should follow. European
integration, on the contrary, has been supported by the majority of the public according to
opinion polls, even though there have been concerns about the EU's declining popularity
with the public since the 1990s.
From the outset, it has been always the state sector that has taken the initiative in
the ASEAN integration process. Not until the 1970s did the private sectors and the Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs) increase their involvement. The number of NGOs ac-
tive in the region rose from 4 in 1980 to 53 in 1999153. This increased involvement was par-
152 Archarya A (1991), p. 159-177, Simon S. W. (1992), p. 122, Weatherbee (1993), p. 414, Leifer M.
(1999), p. 25-38, Sin D. C. (2000), p. 249.
153 ASEAN Secretariat 1999, and Sin D. C. (2000), p. 220. The most important NGO is the ASEANChamber
of Commerce (ASEAN CCI) established in 1972. The ASEAN CCI serves as a cooperation-link between
the Government and the private sectors. It, furthermore, has brought about efcient and effectiveness in the
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ticularly noticeable in the economic sphere, including economic development and the trans-
formation of the ASEAN economies154. Nonetheless, the private sectors in other spheres
have not yet been signicantly integrated to the ASEAN development, and there are still
no consulting-institutions to handle cooperation between ASEAN and the NGOs. Contacts
between the two sectors have only been organized and supported under the ASEAN Sec-
retariat and the Standing Committee. This shows a marked contrast to the EU, where a
number of economic and European social interest groups have been involved in and have
supported EU integration since its outset  there were about 1500 registered European inter-
est groups in 1999155. The private sectors and the NGOs are able to inuence the integration
process in their own interest, formally through the economic and social committee, which
serves as an institutional link between the EU and the private sectors, and informally by
means of lobbying, which can mostly be observed in the Commission156.
3.1.2 The Economic Aspect
A Comparison between the Economic Structures of ASEAN and the EU
At present, ASEAN and the EU share some signicant similarities in their economic
objectives157. Firstly, they are both open to foreign trade and investment, embarking on
the road to an open international economic and nancial system. Secondly, since both
economies experienced severe economic and nancial crisis in the 1990s (the EU was hit
economic cooperation between both bodies.
154 Chatterjee S. (1990), p. 58-82
155 Sin D. C. (2000), p. 238-239
156 Sin D. C. (2000), p. 239
157 Barrell R. and Choy Amanda (2003), p. 9-11, and Verbeken Dirk (2003), p. 2
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by the EMS crisis in the early nineties and ASEAN was hit by the nancial crisis in 1997,
however it must be emphasized that the reasons for the crisis in the two regions were very
different), they are aiming to strengthen and obtain better control of their economic and
nancial systems. Both instances of regionalism are aimed at immunity against the detri-
mental forces of nancial globalization, and at attaining economic stability and sustainable
growth. Thirdly, both regions have a complex economic and social structure. Consequently,
while they have incentives to retain the positive characteristics of their individual members,
they also have to increase their exibility with regard to the force of globalization and the
maturating world economic and political situation. Nevertheless, despite the resemblances
in their objectives, our two examples of regionalism are very different in numerous facets.
The EU members are mostly developed countries, while the ASEAN members range from
a newly industrializing country (Singapore), to countries at a very early stage of develop-
ment (for instance Cambodia). The consequential dissimilarities in economic structure of
the ASEAN and the European regionalism can be characterized as follows: diversity versus
homogeneity, export-oriented growth versus more internal-trade oriented growth, orienta-
tion towards external FDI versus mainly investment within the community and an economy
based on the real sector versus real as well as monetary based economy. Moreover, there
are also differences at the level of economic integration as well as the incentives for and
efforts towards deeper economic integration.
At least three facets of economic structure should be distinguished in considering the
progress towards economic integration158. The rst is the increasing interdependence of
158 Iwami T. (1998), p. 2
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real transactions (for instance, trade and FDI). The second is the growth of nancial and
monetary interdependence (for instance, co-movements of interest and exchange rates).
The third is the establishment of a trade and/or monetary bloc, which calls for mutual de-
velopment to a higher level of economic and political integration. When ASEAN and the
EU are considered in terms of these facets, it is noticeable that there are several structural
dissimilarities between their economies. These distinctions have signicantly affected the
way economic development and integration have unfolded. The characteristics of the eco-
nomic structure focused on here are founded on the criteria of the theory of the Optimum
Currency Area (OCA), including trade openness and FDI, income convergence, syn-
chronization of the business cycle, exchange rate variability, convergence of interest
rate, convergence of ination rate, and the integration-effort on the monetary and -
nancial sphere.
1) Interdependence of real transactions (trade and FDI)
The differences in intra-regional trade between the two regions are very conspicu-
ous. The trade pattern in Europe can be classied into two phases. In the rst phase, the
European regional integration focused on the removal of trade barriers, leading to the in-
crease of intra EU-trade between 1960 and 1980. The second phase was characterized by
the elimination of barriers to competition159. The ratio of intra-regional trade to total trade
in Europe, which had already been very high since the 1960s, stabilized between 1980 and
2000. The shift to stabilization of the EU intra-regional trade share is a result of various
159 On the one hand, an increase in competition may bring about higher specication and therefore an increase
in trade, and higher price competition may also make the market more contestable, leading to more efcient
factor usage. On the other hand, elimination of barriers to capital mobility may reduce trade, if it allows rms
to locate in other countries in the region with lower production costs, see Barrell R. and Choy A. (2003), p.
5.
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factors, for instance, the fact that many possible trade gains had already been exploited by
1980, and that further advantages were then brought about by the increasing competitive-
ness. Another such factor is that the implementation of common standards may change
import demand, particularly in the EU160.
As opposed to the EU, the ASEAN countries are externally oriented in trade. Even
though the intra-regional trade as a share of regional GDP is nearly similar to that of the
EU and larger than that of MERCOSUR and NAFTA, ASEAN has a low level of share
of intra-regional trade to total trade. Although this share is increasing, it remains low 
at about 21 percent in 1997. The ratio of intra-regional trade to total trade within the EU
was much higher, about 62 percent in 1997, despite the slight declining tendency from
1991 until 1997. The relatively low share of intra-regional trade to total trade in ASEAN
is mainly a consequence of the very similar and competitive production and export-import
structures of most Southeast Asian countries. Notably, ASEAN integration is not aiming
to establish a discriminatory trading bloc, but rather to strengthen international competi-
tiveness. Hence, instead of working predominantly towards increasing intra-regional trade,
ASEAN aims to develop the ASEAN market into an attractive area for international trade
and investment within for the world economy. This development is facilitated by economic
integration, particularly the increasingly free mobility of investment within ASEAN161. The
high degree of openness of the ASEAN countries has been reected particularly in the di-
versied geographical direction of the ASEAN trade, mainly to the United States, Japan
160 Swan P, Temple P., and Shurmer M. (1996), p. 1297-1313, and Barrell R. and Choy A. (2003), p. 6
161 Thanadsillapakul L. (2000), p. 69-70
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and Europe162. From their study based on the basic gravity model, Frankel and Wei (1998)
observe that, besides the fact that ASEAN countries are found to be more open than aver-
age countries, trade among the members is higher than expected from their economic and
geographic attributes163, and has been increasing continuously.
Another contrast between the EU and ASEAN has to do with intra-regional direct
investment. While the EU demonstrates a strikingly high level of intra-regional direct in-
vestment between members  about 67 percent in 1997, with an observable increase of
intra-regional direct investment in 1991-1997 , the intra-regional direct investment among
the ASEAN members has been comparably disappointing. Admittedly, efforts have been
made in recent years in intra-regional direct investment, particularly on the part of Singa-
pore. However, the investment in ASEAN has depended largely on extra-regional investors.
The economic growth of the ASEAN countries, apart from growth stemming from export-
led strategy, has essentially taken root in FDI from outside the region, mainly from Japan
since the late 1980s and from the East Asian newly industrializing economies (NIEs) since
the 1990s. Contrary to the case in the EU, FDI strategy in ASEAN has predominantly been
focusing on increasing export-competitiveness to outside world, instead of increasing the
effectiveness of the rms that service their domestic market164. In addition, much of the
162 It can be concluded that the uctuation among the ASEAN countries is higher than that of the EU coun-
tries, so that none of the major currencies could be denitively preferred for a common peg. On the contrary,
since European countries have a very high share of trade within the region and are highly dependent on the
euro, they have signicant incentives to enter into the EU and take part to euro membership, see Bayoumi T.
and Mauro P. (1999), p. 6-7.
163 Frankel J. and Wei S.-J. (1998)
164 A large amount of FDI was welcomed in the export sector, whilst FDI in the domestic markets was
subjected to many restrictions, see Barrell R. and Choy A. (2003), p. 13.
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FDI was directed towards a small number of products, for instance electronic products.
Consequently not many local rms have gained spillover advantages.
2) Income convergence
Income convergence is one of the indicators that show the potential for economic in-
tegration. Higher levels of integration and openness are related to higher mobility of the
factors of production, resulting in more income convergence. The gains from economic
integration are larger among the countries with more similar levels of income and eco-
nomic development, since they have incentives to trade and invest more with each other165.
Furthermore, convergence supports the prospect of strong economic interaction and coor-
dination in the long run, whereas divergence may bring about tensions and conicts in the
short run166.
Implementing Theil (1967) measures of inequality and the data source from the Penn
World Table (PWT) version 5.6.3, Park D. and Rahman S. (2003) have examined the in-
come convergence of the ASEAN countries and also the ASEAN-5 countries in the period
from 1960 to 2000167. They found that for both ASEAN-10 and ASEAN-5, there is no
income convergence within the region. Instead of this, signicant divergence could be
observed. They reason that the performances of the higher income countries, namely Sin-
gapore, Malaysia and Thailand, exceeded the performances of the lower income countries.
165 Stylized facts suggest that a similar level of economic development often support ows of goods, services
and capital, see Jovanovic M. N. (1998), and Park D. and Rahman S. (2003), p. 2.
166 Donghyun P. (2000), p. 2
167 The advantage of using PWT data is that all economic variables are denominated using a common set of
prices and in a common currency, thus this enhances the comparison. However its limitations are the fact
that, despite its accuracy relative to other sources, for example the International Financial Statistics (IFS),
PWT data are still inaccurate for less developed countries and the Theil indices merely show the inequality
measure.
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The lack of convergence was worsened by the severe contraction of output in Indonesia af-
ter the crisis, and the Philippines did not perform well during the whole period relative to
the other core ASEAN members.
Another interesting analysis of income convergence among the ASEAN countries
was made by Heng T.M. and Siang T.C. Based on the Barro and Sala-i-Martin model. They
classify the difference between absolute and conditional convergence which can be deter-
mined as followed. The hypothesis of absolute convergence is that poor economies tend
to grow faster than the rich ones. This is, however, subject to the condition that if produc-
tion technologies, saving rates and population growth rates are the same across countries,
all countries have the same steady state and differ merely in terms of initial conditions.
Contrarily, the hypothesis of conditional convergence is that an economy grows faster the
further it is from its own steady state. This is subject to the theory that even if production
technologies, saving rates and population growth rates differ across countries and even if
the countries may consequently each have a different steady state, each economy, neverthe-
less, will eventually still converge to a steady state. On the one hand there was no support
for the absolute convergence hypothesis among nine countries from the ASEAN-5 and the
East Asian countries168. On the other hand, based on the level of physical and human cap-
ital, the authors estimated that the speed of convergence for these nine countries between
1960 and 1990 results at 4.8 percent per year. Additionally, they found that more intensive
convergence could be observed among the East Asian countries than among the ASEAN
countries.
168 Including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand (ASEAN-5), and Hong Kong, Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan (East Asia)
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Even though a level of regional income convergence similar to that of the EU coun-
tries may not be obtained in the near future, Park views the lack of income convergence in
ASEAN as being largely structural and not undesirable. Notably, all the ASEAN countries
still have potential to develop and to attain accelerated growth in productivity and conse-
quently in their per capita incomes. In terms of fullling these objectives, Heng T.M. and
Siang T.C. suggest that the ASEAN-5 countries have the potential to catch up with the East
Asian countries, if they were to achieve a high saving rate and develop their educational and
technological levels. This would require an increase in capital accumulation either through
domestic saving or via FDI, accompanied by an improvement of human capital and the
quality of labor. This could be achieved, for instance, through investment in education, in
order to reap the benets of the technological spillover and transfers. It is important to en-
sure the continuity and constancy of the incoming technology transfers and that sufcient
capacity exists in the qualied workforce to absorb these.
3) Synchronization of the business cycle
The synchronization of the business cycle indicates the interdependence of the economies
between countries and may conrm that each economy is, to a great extent, driven by ex-
ternal shocks169. The higher the synchronization, the higher is the interdependency of the
economies and the lower the cost of deepening integration and conducting common poli-
cies.
Using the structural vector auto regression (VAR) approach, Zhang, Sato andMcAleer
(2001) estimated the structural shocks, including supply, demand and monetary shocks, for
169 Artis M. and Zhang W. (1998), and Dorrucci E., Firpo S., Fratzscher M. and Mongelli F. P. (2002), p. 12
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the East Asian and ASEAN countries between 1980Q1 and 1997Q1 (before the nancial
crisis) and between 1980Q1 and 2000Q3 (encompassing the period of the nancial crisis
and its aftermath). Their ndings reveal that the supply shocks are signicantly correlated
only in some ASEAN countries and in some Asian NIEs, and that the 1997 nancial crisis
augmented the number of the signicant correlations between supply shocks. However, no
signicant correlation of supply shocks between Japan and the other East Asian countries
including ASEAN could be observed, except of those between Japan and Malaysia. The
demand shocks and monetary shocks are highly correlated among the ASEAN countries
and also the Asian NIEs, the monetary shocks, however, are much less strongly correlated
than the demand shocks. As in the case of the supply shocks, the 1997 nancial crisis also
increased the number of signicant correlations of demand and monetary shocks. Since
Japan is a key source of imports for the Asian economies, the increased price level engen-
dered by demand shocks in Japan may lead to a negative impact on demand in the other
Asian countries. This is indicated by the negative correlation of demand shocks between
Japan and the East Asian and ASEAN countries. Following the impact of the nancial
crisis, however, this correlation became positive. Contrarily, the number of signicant cor-
relations of monetary shocks between Japan and the East Asian and ASEAN countries
declined after the crisis.
In the case of the EU, the signicant correlations between structural shocks, which
mainly consist of correlations between demand shocks, predominate only in a sub-group
of the region. This consists to a great extent, of the core EU countries, among which
Germany plays a leading economic role. In a comparison between macroeconomic distur-
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bances occurring in ASEAN and those in the EU, Bayoumi and Mauro (1999)170 indicate
that the correlations of aggregate supply shocks in ASEAN during 1968-1996 are rela-
tively similar within the region, and are comparable to those in the EU in 1969-1989  the
period before the Maastricht Treaty. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore had experienced
relatively similar disturbances, whereas the Philippines and Thailand had faced more idio-
syncratic shocks. Further, they assert that this pattern is analogue to that which can be
observed in the EU, where highly correlated shocks could be observed between France and
Germany, while there were more idiosyncratic shocks between Italy and Spain. Notably,
Demertzis, Hallet, and Rummel (2000) indicate that the symmetry correlation of struc-
tural shocks in Europe is predominately caused by policy intervention rather than natural
developments171.
Based on the analysis of Zhang, Sato and McAleer (2001), it is apparent that, com-
pared to those of the EU, the average size of the supply, demand, and monetary shocks is
much larger in the East Asia and ASEAN region. The speed of adjustment to shocks is
mostly within one or two years. The larger size of the disturbances and the higher speed of
adjustment in the case of ASEAN as compared to the case of the EU have been also con-
rmed in studies by Bayoumi T, Eichengreen B, and Mauro P. (1999), and Bayoumi T, and
Mauro P. (1999). The comparably high speed of adjustment in ASEAN may be explained
by the exible labor market and wage rates in the economies. Furthermore the ndings of
Zhang, Sato and McAleer indicate that the size of supply shocks is the greatest in the most
170 Bayoumi T. and Mauro P. (1999), p. 7-8
171 Demertzis M., Hallet A.H., and Rummel O. (2000), p. 657-679, see also Zhang Z., Sato T. and McAleer
M. (2001), p. 572
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open economies, such as Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and also Hong Kong, and
the size of the demand and monetary shocks tend to be greater in the Philippines, Indone-
sia, China and Taiwan. The nancial crisis has contributed to an increase in the size of the
structural shocks for those countries hit by the crisis.
4) Exchange rate variability
A low level of exchange rate variability expresses on the one hand the convergence of
ination rates and on the other hand the stability of the currencies. Thus the lower the levels
of exchange rate variability, the lower are the costs of abandoning exchange rate exibility
and the costs of moving toward monetary integration.
The ndings of Zhang, Sato and McAleer's 2001 analysis show that the exchange
rates of the East Asian including ASEAN countries were relatively stable against each other
between 1980Q1 and 2000Q1. With the exception of the Indonesia rupiah, the volatility
of exchange rates between the region's currencies is below 5% and below 4% against the
US dollar. Despite the impact of the 1997 nancial crisis which brought volatility to the
exchange rates for the Indonesia Rupiah, Korea Won and Thai Baht, the currencies of the
other countries in the region showed a low volatility. Furthermore, it should be noted
that the ASEAN economic recession in the middle of the 1980s and China's unication of
its dual exchange rate in 1994 did not cause high exchange rate volatility in the region172.
Contrarily to ASEAN, the EU already has its own currency, namely the Euro, launched in
January 1999. Consequently, the nominal exchange rate variability has diminished and the
real exchange rate variability has sunk to the lowest level. On the topic of the development
172 Zhang Z., Sato T. and McAleer M. (2001), p. 570-571
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of the exchange rate dynamic from 1957 until 2001, Dorrucci E., Firpo S., Fratzscher M.
and Mongelli F. P. (2002) present an indicator of exchange rate variability for the EU. Their
ndings indicate that generally the variability has declined over the whole period, However,
there were signicant resurgences in the post Bretton Woods period and due to the EMU
crisis in 1992 and its aftermath. Moreover, their analysis points to an observable fact that
the EU tends to follow a pattern of nominal convergence, which according to Dorrucci E.,
Firpo S., Fratzscher M. and Mongelli F. P., is a major requirement for successful economic
integration173.
5) Convergence of ination rate and convergence of interest rate
Moderate, convergent ination rates among member countries enhance the integra-
tion process and are an important criterion for deepening economic integration in the re-
gion. In addition, the convergence of interest rates is an indicator that denotes the level of
integration of the nancial market among member countries. The more uniform the devel-
opment of the level of interest rates among members is, the lower the costs are of moving
towards common monetary policy.
Referring to data from the European countries, the mean averages of the annual in-
ation rates of the eleven EU countries during 1995-1999174 were between 1.73 percent
(1999) and 3.44 percent (1995). These are considerably lower than those of the ASEAN-5
countries. It should be recognized that among the ASEAN-5 countries, the ination rates of
173 In 1957-1998, real exchange rate variability always exceeded that of the nominal exchange rate. It could
be concluded from this that the EUmembers with higher ination rates accepted swings in and an appreciation
of their real effective exchange rate, in order to achieve disination and restructure domestic industry to
improve its global competitiveness. Consequently, this sometimes led to unsustainable movement in real
exchange rates. See Dorrucci E., Firpo S., Fratzscher M. and Mongelli F. P. (2002), p. 17-18
174 Tse, W. (2000), p. 13
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Malaysia, Thailand, and particularly Singapore are not much higher and sometimes even
lower than those of some EU countries. It was the unstable economic development of
Indonesia and, to a much lesser extent, of the Philippines that drove the mean regional in-
ation rates to a high level. Based on the standard deviations, it could be observed that
there is no sign of the ination rates among the ASEAN-5 countries converging. This is in
stark contrast to the EU countries, the data for which indicate a continuous convergence,
shown by decreasing means and standard deviation.
As regards the development of the real interest rates among the ASEAN-5 countries,
positive evidence of convergence could be found during the period 1992-1997. The de-
creasing trend in the standard deviation, although slight, indicates the convergence of the
real interest rates among the ASEAN-5 countries.
6) Integration effort on the monetary and nancial sphere
The rst signicant initiative towards nancial integration among the original ASEAN-
5 was the ASEAN Swap Agreement (ASA) established in 1977. However, this was hardly
used by the members. It should be recognized that, contrary to trade and macroeconomic
developments, there were no substantial incentives for nancial integration in ASEAN.
Park Y. C. (2002) argues that liberalization and market opening were the main factors re-
sponsible for increasing the opportunities to gain from economic integration among the
ASEAN and the East Asian countries, although nancial deregulation has hindered these
economies from further regional nancial integration175. Admittedly, the linkages between
these countries and the international nancial markets have been increased, but the devel-
175 Park, Y. C. (2002), p. 8
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opment of nancial cooperation among countries within the region has been disappointing.
Moreover, Park comments that the nancial markets of the East Asian including ASEAN
countries at present are still less developed than those of the European countries in the
1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, the situation has changed for the ASEAN and East Asian
countries, at least since the breakout of the Asian nancial crisis in July 1997. On 6th May
2000, the ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South Korea agreed on a system of swap
arrangements, called Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The CMI has two components, an ex-
panded ASEAN swap arrangement and the establishment of a network of bilateral swap
and repurchase arrangements among the members.
At least since the 1997 crisis, several scholars have contemplated the possibility of
establishing a common currency area in ASEAN or even in East Asia. Even though sev-
eral different opinions still exist related to this matter, most scholars are still suspicious
about the readiness of the ASEAN and the East Asian countries to establish a common cur-
rency area. As already mentioned, Zhang, Sato and McAleer (2001) argue that symmetry
in structural shocks may be observed among sub-regions in East and Southeast Asia such
as ASEAN and NIEs, but not between these countries and Japan. Park comments that -
nancial market integration among the East and Southeast Asian countries is much less than
that of Europe in the past. The study carried out by Madhur (2002) supports the fact that
ASEAN has already met some of the economic requirements for an optimum currency area,
including high factor mobility, wage and price exibility, high rate of trade to GDP ratio
and increasing intra-regional trade, as well as acknowledging that a comparable symmetry
in shocks among the countries in the region with those of the EU can be observed. In spite
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of this, Madhur views that the realization of a currency area in ASEAN or East Asian re-
gion might be burdensome, particularly because of the difculties in sustaining a currency
area after its adoption. This idea is also shared by Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) and
Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro (1999)176. Clearly, the objective of creating a currency
area faces numerous constraints and hindrances, such as the disparity in the level of eco-
nomic development among the countries in the region, the weakness of the nancial sector,
inadequate institutional support and the lack of economic, political and social precondi-
tions for deepening a monetary integration. The latter include central bank independence,
nominal convergence criteria, an interim form of exchange rate arrangement, scal rules,
capital and labor mobility and a regional competition policy177.
To better measure the suitability of ASEAN for the establishment of a common cur-
rency, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1997) have developed an OCA index (using data from
1995), which indicates the expected level of exchange rate variability for the Asian coun-
tries178. They found that ASEAN is less suitable for a common currency than the European
countries were in 1987, the period before the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, the discrep-
ancy is not large. Thus the ASEAN countries are not far from the appropriate stage for
establishing a common currency area. In conclusion, there are several economic, politi-
cal, and institutional barriers to monetary integration in ASEAN and East Asia. A number
176 Bayoumi T., Eichengreen B. J. and Mauro P. (1999), p. 1, and Madhur S. (2002), p. 7
177 Bayoumi T. and Mauro P. (1999), p. 9-14
178 The index is derived from the results of a cross-sectional regression covering advanced and East Asian
economies that relates observed exchange rate variability to four optimum currency indicators, namely the
standard deviation of the difference in growth rates across the two economies; the dissimilarity of the com-
position of trade; the level of bilateral trade and the size of the two economies. Using the data for 1995,
they found that the predicted level of exchange rate variability across the ASEAN-4 countries (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) lay uniformly in the 8-11 percent range. In comparison, those of the
EU, using the data from 1987, fall within the 6-9 percent range. See Eichengreen B. and Bayoumi T. (1997)
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of empirical studies indicate that ASEAN plus 3 does not yet meet the conditions for an
optimum currency area, as compared to European qualication for a common currency in
the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, the ASEAN countries have already fullled several
economic conditions and are on the right path towards further integration.
3.2 The Prospect of ASEAN Economic Integration and the
EU's Lesson
The characteristics of ASEAN integration can be dened as high pragmatism and ex-
ibility, but the absence of a hard core integration process179. Unlike the EU, whose de-
velopment and expansion have been very prudently considered and planned, the integra-
tion of the ASEAN countries has been open, exible, and pragmatic. On the one hand,
these characteristics reect the strength of the region regarding adjustment to external and
internal disturbances, but on the other hand, they have hindered the effectiveness of the
development process of regional integration. Whereas the EU has already acted as a one-
voice union representing one of the important pillars in the world arena, it still cannot be
said that ASEAN has acted as a unit in international affairs. The ASEAN member coun-
tries have typically been entering into overlapping agreements, negotiations and bilateral
non-cooperative games, all of which fail to contribute to regional institutional building.
Re-distributive rules among members are also in largely absent, because of their open pol-
icy and dependency upon the world markets. As a result of this, there is a lack of common
objectives and initiatives to move towards a hard-core integration for the ASEAN region.
179 See also Boyer R. (2002), p. 25
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In order to make effective progress in economic integration, ASEAN has to realize
its strengths and its weaknesses, while also learning from the EU's integration experiences.
The foremost strengths of the ASEAN countries lie in their openness and their exibil-
ity, whereas their weaknesses lie in their diversity, indetermination in exerting economic
and political objectives, and their insistence on preserving of national authority. Hence,
in order for the ASEAN countries to develop their integration process, they need to nd a
common objective to implement, which can be planned for in the long-term, medium-term
and short-term and which would necessitate the adoption and promotion of their open-
ness and exibility. ASEAN should not try to completely emulate European integration,
particularly in the political sphere, in which the two regions differ signicantly  rstly
in the diversity of their political regimes and secondly in the unwillingness of individual
members to lose authority. Therefore, at least to start with, instead of attempting political
integration, in which ASEAN has no experience and for which it has little enthusiasm, it is
better to intensify and complete the objective of economic integration, which is based on
ASEAN's strengths. This improvement may subsequently assist regionalism in the political
sphere within ASEAN in its own way. Etzioni has pointed out that economic cooperation
has served as a starting point towards integration. Economic cooperation would support
regional integration through the so-called take-off process and bring about cooperation
and integration on the political stage afterwards180. It has been said that one of the con-
ditions for successful integration is to set up a common economic and political objective
among the members181. There is a higher expectation of success if there is a harmonization
180 Etzioni A. (1965), p. 269-300, and Dosch J. (1997), p. 32
181 Boyer R. (2002), p. 13
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of interests among the integrating members, at rst on a lower integration level, for exam-
ple, cooperation without losing sovereignty  prior to gradually moving towards a higher
level182. In order to achieve the aim successfully, an organization should take an appropri-
ate step rather than a progressive step and the projects aiming towards integration should
not be too ambitious. As to this point, the EU has shown its failure in  and learned its
lesson from  the EMS crisis in the early 1990s that made it realize that the road to the
establishment of monetary union was, inevitably, to be long.
At present, the problem does not lie in setting an objective, but rather in its exertion,
completion and sustainability. ASEAN is doing well with the new aim of establishing the
ASEAN plus three free trade area; however, the way to achieve this goal remains unclear183.
Additionally, most of the objectives have not been completed yet, and several projects have
failed. Therefore, ASEAN should not set itself the high aim of political integration like
the EU, but the ASEAN members should instead concentrate on how to achieve economic
integration and how to reap advantages from it. With respect to monetary integration or a
common currency, it may be considered that the high openness of the ASEAN countries
reects in the particularly diversied geographical direction of ASEAN trade (mainly to the
United States, Japan and Europe) and entails high uctuations of diverse currencies among
the ASEAN countries. Therefore, it is difcult for ASEAN to dene a major currency that
might be preferred as a common peg. Another option would be to set up a new ASEAN
182 Etzioni A. (1965), p. 269-300, and Dosch J. (1997), p. 32
183 Furthermore, since the imminent external threats have again subsided, the pressure for further integration
has abated. After the 1997 nancial crisis, there have been high concerns about monetary integration within
Asia. The Chiang Mai initiative was established in 2000 with the expectation of being a bridge towards
monetary integration in Asia. However, since its introduction, the leaders of the CMI group have yet to create
a supporting operational structure, in particular a mechanism for monitoring and surveillance, see Park Y. C.
(2000), p. 7.
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currency. However this requires a long period of development  as experience in the EU
has shown  and several studies indicate that ASEAN is not ready for a currency union
yet184. Consequently, the right objective for ASEAN in terms of monetary integration is to
improve its economic structure, which can probably be benchmarked by proper criterions
such as, for example, the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty leading up to the EU monetary
union.
The objectives of the further ASEAN integration should be classied into; rst, the
completion of ASEAN economic integration and realization of the economic integration
among ASEAN and the East Asian countries and moving towards openness and deepening
vis-à-vis the world economies; and simultaneously second, running strategies of fundamen-
tal strengthening and the introduction of convergence criteria along with economic and po-
litical preconditions for further economic and monetary integration, besides strengthening
political will and institutionalization of economic integration. To achieve these aims, the
ASEAN countries may employ an offensive strategy simultaneously with a defensive
strategy, which are induced from the concept of openness and deepening and strength-
ening foundation.
3.2.1 Defensive Strategy: Strengthening Foundations and
Institutionalization of Economic Integration
The defensive strategy is based upon strengthening the internal economic sector and sup-
porting institutional mechanisms, in order to create stable development and to be able to
184 Park Y. C. (2002), p. 7, and Eichengreen B. and Bayoumi T. (1997), Bayoumi T. and Mauro P. (1999), p.
8
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withstand external threats brought about by continuously changing globalization pressures.
The defensive strategy can be realized in the form of stable macroeconomic policies, aim-
ing at price stability, low budget decits and surpluses, the reduction of public and foreign
debt (particularly short-term debt) to a sustainable amount, and ensuring the competitive-
ness of the exchange rate. As to this matter, ASEAN can learn several things from the
EU's experiences, to help promote its own strengths. These include the fact that it should
support the market-based mechanism which encourages competitive discipline, establish
institutional frameworks that support the open market and competitiveness, encourage in-
terregional cooperation in trade and nance, and improve the governance of private and
public sectors, for instance by monitoring the performance and the usage of nancial re-
sources of the private sector in particular. In addition, investment in human capital is one
of the key basic factors to ensure long-term economic development as well as the devel-
opment of technologies in production, services, knowledge and information185. Moreover,
ASEAN should reduce its structural weaknesses, by strengthening the supports for real
and monetary economic convergence, reducing diversity, promoting the mobility of capi-
tal and labor, and initiating a proper distribution measures. The defensive strategy would
not merely make ASEAN immune against external and internal threats but also support the
process of ASEAN regionalism into the future.
On the other hand, institutionalization of economic integration and strengthening and
initiating common political will towards integration are very relevant for the sustainable of
economic development and regionalism. The success of the European integration has pro-
185 For details of the policy factors toward the new East Asian development model, see Harvie C. and Lee
H.-H. (2002), p. 135-136
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vided several integration schemes that ASEAN can study on the institutionalization of the
European regionalism, despite different conguration of regionalism the East-Southeast
Asian integration possesses. Examining the evolution of the EU precisely, it can be ob-
served that rst the European regionalism has begun with free trade zone, custom union,
common market, economic and monetary union and now the proceeding of the political
union, respectively. The interrelation of every single step has shown the evolution of rele-
vance and complexity of the institutionalization movement. Every stage of economic inte-
gration has called for an effective managerial strategy and measure. Further, as integration
becomes mature and more complex, more effective managerial measures and strategies are
required aftermaths.
Considering the establishment of supranational authority within the East-Southeast
Asian region or even merely among the ASEANmembers, admittedly several scholars hold
the opinion that the East-Southeast Asian integration might need supranational institutions,
in order to carry on a prosperous economic and political integration. In the near future, this
might be a very hard aim to be achieved. Instead of vigorously moving toward suprana-
tionalism, the ASEAN and East Asian countries should mutually strengthen their political
will, and gradually exert collective policies in an efcient way as a basis. The ASEAN
and East-Southeast Asian regionalism is now merely at establishing free trade zone which
corresponds to the rst stage of regionalism. Contemporary, this not necessarily requires
a high degree of institutionalization or establishing of a supranational institution which
might not be urgent for the ASEAN and East-Southeast Asian region at the moment. As
shown in the experiences of the European integration, every new stage of economic integra-
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tion calls for an adjustment of the existing domestic regulations that in turn involve further
coordinating measures. Similarly, every move of the advancement of the ASEAN and East-
Southeast Asian economic integration will ask for a competent institutionalization, and this
will gradually enhance the potential of political cooperation over time. The movement to-
wards economic integration in East-Southeast Asia has turned to nancial integration. In
particular after the nancial crisis in 1997, the interrelation among the nancial sectors of
the ASEAN and East Asian countries has been enhanced and there are less discriminatory
issues in the international monetary spheres. This might be a turning point and may be able
to break through the institutionalization process of the East-Southeast Asian regionalism.
Finally, depending on the future outcome, the establishment of a supranational institution
may be a suitable solution for East-Southeast Asian in the future.
At present, one solution to the concern on nding a third party can be assigned to
a multilateral institution, particularly APEC or WTO. However, it involves the recogni-
tion that the agreements on APEC and WTO are mostly voluntary. ASEAN and East Asia,
therefore, has to give more relevance to such multilateral institutions. If the voluntary
agreements are still ineffective, compulsory agreements have to be concluded, particularly
on the sensitive and sophisticated issues. Among the ASEAN and East Asian countries,
the governmental initiatives toward economic integration have been operating well until
now. However, there are lacks in mutual social understandings and an initiative to bring
about closer relation among populations. Hence, there is no collective thinking. The es-
tablishment of supranational authority in the EU has shown that not merely convergence in
economic and political structure are necessary (convergence criteria), but to a great extent,
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regarding the subsidiarity principle, political and social understandings are inevitable as
well. This indicates that besides the initiatives from the member governments, the mu-
tual understanding among populations of the member countries have to be improved and
strengthened. These are the fundamentals for developing a political will and hence, fur-
thering economic and political integration in the region, particularly for the countries with
a democracy regime.
Regarding political and economic issues, ASEAN has been proceeding well until
now. It has gained signicance on the global stage in both economic and political relations.
Concerning the economic integration among the East-Southeast Asian region, ASEAN
has been accepted as a functioning group. Remarkably, besides Japan, China and Korea,
ASEAN is one of the most signicant participants that initiate the East-Southeast Asian
economic integration. However, the progress towards economic integration among ASEAN
members has been initiated merely by the policy-makers, a group of the elite-circle which
includes academics and some professionals from economic sectors. There are increasing
interaction between the three upper class-circles, namely the state-, the academics- and the
economic circle, unfortunately there are not any signs of trend in folks-involvement. The
way to cope with these fundamental impediments and to support economic integration is
to work on the constitution of the social and political fundamentals, bringing the inter-
national knowledge to the folks and promoting NGO-cooperation within and between the
members. The ASEAN countries, until now, have been exerting closer relations among the
governmental institutions, academics and some economic sectors; however, there is still
neither elementary education about the present status of neighboring countries and about
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the relation among the members nor the tendency to bring the folk relations closer or the
feeling of unity. Thus, as a basis for the long-term development, the member countries
should seriously enhance both the quantity and the quality of education and increasingly
support and promote the cooperation and mutual understanding among themselves in both
governmental and non-governmental sectors.
3.2.2 Offensive Strategy: Opening and Deepening Regionalism
Using ASEAN's openness as its strength, the offensive strategy embodies the region's out-
ward orientation, not solely aiming at Asian regionalism, in particular with China, Japan,
Korea, in both the nancial and real sectors, but also considering the increasing tendency
towards worldwide economic and political relations, particularly at the global multilateral
level, including for example the EU and American regionalism. Even though China is
the strongest competitor vis-à-vis ASEAN in the global markets, ASEAN should not act
against China, but rather the two should cooperate with each other. It is best for ASEAN to
enhance its competitiveness, technology, productivity and quality of products, play a fair
competitive game and increase its regional cooperation. In addition, this East-Southeast
Asian regionalism movement should be simultaneously accompanied by the strengthening
of ASEAN integration focusing, to a great extent, on economic affairs.
The offensive strategy might be classied into short-, medium-term and long-term
operations. The short- and medium-term plan encompasses two points. The rst is to
strengthen ASEAN regionalism, not with the aim of creating an ASEAN political union,
but rather of establishing ASEAN economic integration, including a single market with
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high competition. The second is to strengthen monetary cooperation with respective sup-
port institutions and mechanisms. As a result of its openness, the way for ASEAN to go
is no doubt towards competition in international markets. Thus, the best plan to follow is
the enhancement of competition and the harmonization of economic standards and rules in
trade and investment at the global level. The economic integration within the region with
high competition can be seen as a qualifying round for the regional rms before entering
the world arena. However, there are winners and losers from economic integration, so it be-
comes necessary that an effective distribution measure must be initiated. In support of the
idea of distribution, the study of Higgott R. A. and Nesadurai H. E. S. (2002) indicates that
the development process of the Southeast Asian economies has been centered on growth
as an objective, an approach which is increasingly being perceived as inadequate186. Be-
sides setting growth and market efciency as objectives, the economies should not neglect
distribution policy for a successful long-term development.
The long-term plan focuses on economic integration within Asia. Besides the lessons
learned from the 1997 nancial crisis, Wei Kait Yip (2001)187 denotes two other new driving
forces that may give a push towards further economic integration between ASEAN and East
Asia. The rst of these is the failure to launch a new round of trade negotiations during the
WTOMinisterial Meeting in Seattle, which has raised doubt about its ability to function and
a risk of emerging protectionism between economic blocs. The second is the widening and
deepening economic integration in Europe and North America that represent two pillars
and play a signicant role in the global market. These factors have spurred the Asian
186 Higgott R. A. and Nesadurai H. E. S. (2002), p. 27-39
187 Yip W. K. (2001), p. 109
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countries to consider their economic integration. In addition, the hegemonic position of the
United States188 and its inuence in Asia, which was a main reason for the sluggish growth
of East-Southeast Asian regionalism, has already faded. Thus, it is time for Asian countries
to take the initiative in starting their own regionalism. At present, there is a project for a
free trade area between ASEAN, China, Japan, and North Korea; nevertheless, as asserted,
not only the initiation, but also the completion and the sustainability of the project have to
be seriously considered.
For ASEAN, economic integration with the East Asian countries is the most signif-
icant step towards its long-term objective. From the experience of the European regional-
ism, fundamentals that might be able to bring forth both ASEAN and East-Southeast Asian
integration process entail following relevant political conditions. First, common political
objective among the members is needed. Second, relative size in economic and political
power of the members is relevant. Third, a third party is necessary, in order to sustain a
cooperative strategy. Effective managerial institutions or measures are required and should
be enhanced over time to be able to handle with the increasingly complicated integration
structures. EU experience shows that a strong leader is required on the path to successful
integration. In the European integration process, France and Germany have been the two
leaders in the European integration arena. With the political power of France and strong
economic power of Germany  even though at present Germany has also taken a dominant
role in EU politics , the process of EU integration functioned well. One the one hand, the
existence of two leaders may help to counterbalance the monopolistic position and interests
188 Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has sought to protect and advance its major
interests in East Asia. See Yip W. K. (2001), p. 107
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of one leader. On the other hand, however, a third party might be necessary to manage the
cooperation and hinder conicts of interest between both leaders. Hence, in the European
integration, a supranational institution is the solution to this concern189.
Within ASEAN and East-Southeast Asian regionalism, common political objectives
and political will are still modest, thus the members should as aforementioned start on
harmonization of interests among the integrating members primarily on a lower integration
level and gradually moving towards a higher level with more sensitive issues.
According to the relative size of economic and political power, the East-Southeast
Asian region has made a substantial progress. Contrary to the past, where the political
power was handled by the West, economies were led by Japan, and China has had no inter-
est in participating in the East-Southeast Asian integration (before its entrance on the WTO
and gradual openness to the world market), now the role of political and economical power
are becoming clear and more balance. Japan and China are or will denitely be economic
hegemonies, whereas ASEAN has become stronger and increased gain in economic rele-
vance in the region. Considering the rivalry between Japan and China, it is now, ASEAN
who set the initiatives and both Japan and China are the authorities who mark on the agree-
ment decisions. This way of regionalism process seems to work out under the momentary,
political and economic circumstance in the region.
Indeed in ASEAN there is no member country that plays an outstanding leadership
role. Singapore, despite its eminent economic position in the world, is subject to its very
small size and hence relatively small absolute values. Contrary to this is Indonesia, which
189 See also Boyer R. (2002), p. 13
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despite its large size only has a moderate economic performance and often suffers from
turmoil in political and social spheres. Thailand and Malaysia may be the best candi-
dates; however neither has a strong enough position to become an effective leader in the
region. The development of ASEAN regionalism has shown that the source of integra-
tion initiatives was the United States in the early years and subsequently external threats
and pressures. Therefore no ASEAN country needed to take a leadership role. Instead,
the ASEAN countries might be viewed as followers who pursue a reactive strategy. So,
alongside economic gains, the economic integration with the East-Southeast Asian coun-
tries has brought potential leadership candidates to the region in the form of China and
Japan. However, as previously mentioned, the ASEAN and East Asian countries are not
eager to lose their authority, meaning that the establishment of a supranational organiza-
tion might be very difcult in the near future. At this stage, a strong ASEAN might serve
as a third party, helping to achieve smooth cooperation within the region.
Now, it is still unclear who will occupy the pole position because of differing interests
of the two leading economies, China and Japan. The future relationship between the two
countries regarding the pole position in Asia is not yet clear for three reasons.
- Firstly, the evidence tends to suggest that China may become the production
state for the world and hence a strong economy. However at present China is still devel-
oping, so large areas are still underdeveloped and a there is a high requirement for capital
and investment to continue its evolution. On the other hand, Japan has already played a
signicant role in the international arena, but now the economy is experiencing regression
and indicating uncertainty in development. Several studies predict cooperation in the form
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of Japanese products made in China or China, the factory of the world and Japan, a
savior in times of hardship however it must be noted that the development directions of
the two economies differ signicantly. Whereas the economy of Japan has come to a halt
or even deteriorated, the economy of China is growing at an enormous pace. These dif-
ferent positions have been partly responsible for the discrepancy between the two parties'
interests.
- Secondly, while China is mainly developing its real economic sector, not only
working towards a free trade area with ASEAN, but also tightening cooperation with Russia
and the South Asian countries, for instance through the establishment of the Shanghai co-
operation organization, a cooperative arrangement among Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China, Japan is more interested in the nancial sector, includ-
ing the creation of an effective surveillance mechanism for the region. However, it can be
observed that Japan tends hardly to be able to pursue its strategic interests in the region,
because of its deteriorated economic situation and its lack of geographic contiguity to the
other member countries190.
- Thirdly, contrary to France and Germany in the EU, the large differences in
size and military power between the two countries may be one of the signicant hindrances
to their cooperation and hence to economic integration in the region. These obstacles may
obscure the way forward for ASEAN and East Asian regionalism, and it now remains
unclear who might play the role of leader in the political and economic spheres.
190 Park Y. C. (2002), p. 7-12
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Besides exerting concrete common objectives and concern on relative size in eco-
nomic and political power of the members, another relevant condition lies in the issue of
nding a third party and exerting competent and efcient institutional management. Both
issues have been simultaneously solved within the EU successfully by establishing a supra-
national institution. However, the experiences of the European regionalism show that mov-
ing towards political integration is much more difcult and complicated than setting up an
economic and monetary union. The conguration of the East-Southeast Asian regionalism
is different from the EU. The EU prefers formal agreement or contractual society with
generally more idealistic approaches, whereas the strength of the East-Southeast Asian
regionalism contrarily is characterized by pragmatic and exibility. The less of polit-
ical intervention among members has brought about high exibility to the region. On the
one hand, highly exible integration process can be viewed as advantageous; on the other
hand, this has conducted to lack of establishment of formal harmonization and coopera-
tion among the members, which in turn has led to difculty in setting and implementing
concrete common political objectives. In addition, although the economic integration with
the East-Southeast Asian countries, besides its economic gains, has brought about poten-
tial regional leader, namely China and Japan, the ASEAN and East Asian countries are still
not eager to loose their authority; the establishment of a supranational organization might
be very difcult in the near future. At this stage, a multilateral institution or as asserted
a strong ASEAN might serve as the third party aiming at smooth cooperation within the
region.
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In the end to achieve a successful economic integration, improvement and harmoniza-
tion in the political sector, harmonization and convergence movement in economic policies
and in the social sphere, including enhancement of social relation between the member
countries are the other spheres that have to be seriously considered. In other words, to
achieve successful economic integration, the social and political spheres cannot be ignored.
These three pillars  economic, politic and social  are linked together and hence have to
be advanced simultaneously for a prosperous long-term development.
3.3 Conclusion
The EU is no doubt the most advanced example of regionalism in the world. The commu-
nity has carried out its integration process successfully, accomplishing the highest level of
economic integration and continuously deepening its political integration. The experiences
of European integration are denitely a useful guiding example for ASEAN regionalism.
Nevertheless, before adopting any European lessons of integration, the best way forward
for ASEAN countries is to realize their own strengths and weaknesses and understand the
characteristics of their own regionalism as well as those of the EU, in order to be able to
learn effectively from the EU experience and to develop their own integration effectively.
From the start, ASEAN and the EU have chosen their own way to develop, with dif-
ferent issues relating to dissimilarities in culture, history, politics, society and, to a great
extent, economic structure. These different experiences have consequently differentiated
the evolution of both regionalisms. While the EU is now a community of industrialized
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countries in a state of monetary union191, based on very formal institutions with a suprana-
tional approach, ASEAN, consisting of newly industrializing and developing countries, is
currently at an earlier stage of economic integration, and is an inter-governmental associa-
tion with a loose form of cooperation and no supranational approach.
Moving towards a long-term successful integration process, ASEAN has to overcome
its weaknesses and use its potential in openness and exibility. The ASEAN countries may
apply a proactive development strategy, which involves simultaneously carrying out de-
fensive and offensive plans of action. The defensive strategy involves the strengthening
of internal economic and political sectors, with reinforcement of the economic and polit-
ical basis. The defensive strategy should be accompanied by an offensive strategy, under
which the ASEAN countries may, on the one hand, be able to reduce the risk of exter-
nal threats, and on the other hand, initiate their own development process by themselves.
Using its strength in openness, the ASEAN offensive strategy embodies regional outward-
orientation. However, there are winners and losers from economic integration, so it should
be noted that an effective distribution measure has to be initiated.
For ASEAN, economic integration with the East Asian countries is the most signi-
cant step towards its long-term objective. The EU's experiences have shown that successful
integration requires a strong leader. In ASEAN, no member country seems able to play an
outstanding leadership role, and the history of ASEAN regional development has shown
that the integration initiatives often need external pressures. Within East-Southeast Asian
191 Precisely, the EU is still not a complete economic union, but can be positioned at the rst stage of the way
to complete economic union, which is called economic and monetary union, as pointed out in the chapter 1.
The EU, at present, can be positioned more than halfway between common market and economic union, see
Cuyver L. (2002), p. 1.
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regionalism may China and Japan will obviously become potential regional leader. And
as the ASEAN and East Asian countries are not eager to lose their authority, the establish-
ment of a supranational organization might be very difcult in the near future. At this point,
a strong ASEAN might serve a third party to help smooth cooperation within the region.
However, the future of the relations between the two countries regarding the pole position
in Asia in still not clear, due to their different interests and economic structures.
Besides these suggestions for the achievement of successful economic integration,
improvement and harmonization are needed in the political sector and in the social sphere,
since these three pillars are linked together, and hence, have to be advanced simultane-
ously for prosperous long-term development. Finally, it should be noted that the integra-
tion process of ASEAN, in its successes as well as its failures, might well serve as a useful
instance and a case study for other regionalization between developing countries, as the EU
regionalization has done before it.
Chapter 4
East-Southeast Asian Economic Integration
and its Implications for ASEAN
This chapter considers contemporary circumstances that play a decisive role on the
further development and the prospect of further economic integration and a conceivable
economic concept for East-Southeast Asian regionalism. This concept is introduced in
order to cope with the surge of new bilateral arrangements and to promote regional eco-
nomic integration. This chapter shall focus uniquely on the economic sphere, examining
openness and deepening and strengthening foundation as its main characteristics and
liberalization and facilitation as the dominant mode of implementation. In particular, the
ASEAN outlook is contemplated.
The rst part (sections 4.1 and 4.2) of the chapter looks at economic relations among
the East-Southeast Asian countries. Internal and external economic circumstances, incen-
tives and impediments are examined.
The second part (sections 4.3 and 4.4) deals with problems hindering recent economic
integration and possible solutions to these problems. Complex interactions of political
and economic issues and pressures from internal and external circumstances have led to
the emergence of a new wave of regional integration. This new scheme of regionalism
 the so-called bilateral based regionalism  may disturb further regional integration
and may harm global liberalization. It is considered as a stumbling block rather than a
stepping-stone to global economic integration because of the lack of long-term objectives
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and proper measures. The rst issue dealt with in the second part is the new surge of
bilateral arrangements in East-Southeast Asia, the second introduces an economic policy
that might solve the uncertainty of East-Southeast Asian regionalism and, nally, the third
suggests a development scheme for East-Southeast Asian economic integration. The last
point examines, in particular, the case of ASEAN. An overview of the role of ASEAN
in the development of the East-southeast Asian regionalism is given and a strategy for
strengthening the ASEAN economic structure is presented afterwards.
4.1 East-Southeast Asian Regionalism
The East-Southeast Asian countries' economies have long been highly interrelated and in-
terdependent. The high level of intra-regional trade since the beginning of the nineteenth
centuries afrms the signicance of the development of economic interdependence within
the region (in 1913 intra-regional trade accounted for 42 percent of the region's total trade,
46 percent in 1938 and 47 percent in 1993)192. Since 1997, the Asian crisis has played
an important role in bringing the East-Southeast Asian countries to understand the signi-
cance of their economic interrelation, particularly in their nancial sectors193. This has led
to a new wave of enthusiasm for nancial integration, which might be viewed as a timely
driving force towards the further development of East-Southeast Asian economic integra-
192 In the late nineteenth century, it was the Western imperialistic powers who laid down networks of treaty
ports and a basis for intra-regional trade. Then in the early twentieth century imperial Japan initiated eco-
nomic integration among the Northeast countries, such as Korea and Taiwan. Since the eighties, the rapid
economic development has generated linkages that have an intra-regional bias. See Yip W. K. (2001) and
Petri P. (1993)
193 Important initiatives for East Asian regionalism's progress are the establishment of ASEAN+3 and, in the
eld of regional nancial cooperation, the Chiang Mai Initiative.
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tion. This includes promoting deeper regional integration and initiating collective institu-
tion building with more mature, complex and effectively organized economic integration
structures194.
At present, almost every economy in the world is searching for a new, effective way
to enhance its economic development. In particular, regional and bilateral cooperation, the
development of which is planned under the scheme to open and deepen regionalism in
order to counteract its discriminatory effects, are viewed as options to sustain economic
progress. This new surge of regional development is now accepted by several economies
including the East-Southeast Asian economies.
4.1.1 Development of East-Southeast Asian Regionalism
With regard to liberalization of trade and investment, the East-Southeast Asian countries,
until now, have been doing quite well with the reduction and removal of barriers to trade in
goods and services and barriers to labors and capital movement, especially with the reduc-
tion of the tariff barriers. This achievement has been assisted by the open economic pol-
icy, which has been chosen as a strategy for sustainable growth among the East-Southeast
Asian countries since the eighties and nineties. Besides this, restrictions on capital move-
ment have been eased over time. Although there are still restrictions on the long-term
mobility of unskilled labor, restrictions on short-term labor movement have been gradually
194 An example for this initiative was the Japan's proposal in September 1997 to establish a 100 billion dollar
fund to help regional governments to cope with the currency crisis, which was considered as a rst step
toward the establishment of the Asian Monetary fund (AMF) and prospective monetary integration in East
Asia  nanced and managed by the East Asian countries and independent from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Although this initiative was rejected , it indicated a new surge in the momentum of nancial
integration in the region.
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removed. The East-Southeast Asian countries also have been making an effort to reduce
several non-tariff barriers195  particularly by means of economic facilitation, such as mu-
tual harmonization of standards, economic regulations and reducing risks in international
commerce. However, because of a lack of political will, of effective administrative insti-
tutions and implementation measures, the existing non-tariff barriers are still a signicant
hindrance.
Today, the closely interlinked economic relations of the East-Southeast Asian coun-
tries, which have been supported by the liberalization of trade and investment since the
second regionalism era, are now being focused on facilitation of trade. The traditional free
trade approach, which has been characterized by the reduction of border barriers relating
to trade in products, is becoming less relevant. Instead of this, modern trade development
aims to promote economic integration by such means as the harmonization of standards,
efcient competition policies, efcient customs procedures, higher factor mobility, pro-
moting e-commerce, and improving education, human capital and technology. Along with
these initiatives, development in capacity building and social issues such as labor and the
environment is emphasized. These all are means of economic facilitation and, moreover,
can be assisted by investments in human and physical capital and the advancement of busi-
ness networks and infrastructure, transportation and communication technology, as well
as the reinforcement of socioeconomic knowledge, for instance about language, culture,
standards and business practices.
195 Previous EU experience has revealed this undertaking to be one relevant factor for establishing a common
market.
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AFTA
The ASEAN countries refuse to lower tariffs on their sensitive products to below 5 percent, for instance:
1) Indonesia: textile and petrochemical
2) The Philippines: cement
3) Malaysia: Automobile
ASEAN-China FTA
1) China excludes rice and palm oil.
2) ASEAN members each request exclusion of many manufactured products from China.
Japan-Singapore FTA 1) All agricultural products are excluded.
Korea-Chile FTA
1) Refrigerator and washing machine are excluded.
2) Apple, pear and rice are excluded.
3) Further, concession on more than 370 agricultural products has been withheld.
Source: Soogil Young (2003)
Table 4.1: Some sensitive products under bilateral and sub-regional agreements of the East
Asian countries
Several countries in the East-Southeast Asian region at present are showing some
willingness to reduce tariff and non-tariff impediments individually and as a group. Un-
der the auspices of APEC, they have been implementing several voluntary programs of
concerted unilateral liberalization in several spheres. ASEAN, in particular, has been ef-
fective in dealing with these issues and has become a model example for the reduction of
tariff-barriers. Nonetheless, when examining the reduction of tariff-lines closely, it can be
observed that certain high tariff barriers still exist and have hardly been decreased. These
high tariff lines apply to the sensitive sectors which vary among economies and remain
a signicant hindrance to economic integration in the region (see Table 4.1 for some sen-
sitive sectors of East-Southeast Asian countries). Admittedly, the global institutions like
the WTO or APEC have helped accelerate the reduction of tariffs in several sectors over
time. Several of their policies, for instance the Doha Development Round of the WTO,
support the reduction of the remaining high border barriers. Nonetheless, several signi-
cant economies are unlikely to be ready to remove the tariffs on their sensitive sectors yet.
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This outcome has exposed the current absence of a competent multilateral institution for
the promotion of trade liberalization and cooperation at the global level.
4.2 Signicant Circumstances Affecting East-Southeast Asian
Regionalism
The current state of East-Southeast Asian regionalism has been brought about particularly
by the fast pace of globalization and can be understood in terms of two main movements196.
The rst is the interdependence and interweaving of the global economy, a scheme that
supports global integration. The second is the diversity in the international economy
which, in contrast to the rst scheme, discourages progress towards integrated global gov-
ernance and hinders the advancement of regionalism. In certain respects, both aspects
progress mutually and are interrelated. However, they are not in line with each other in
terms of whether they support global economic integration.
1) Interdependence and interweaving
Interdependence and interweaving denotes the state of affairs in which the global
economies are networked and nested together. The increasing interdependence between
markets has partially decreased the signicance of national autonomy which, in turn, calls
for international economic policy. At present, there is growing need for interweaving
multinational regulations at the international level. Thus, multinational institutions and
collective policies will come to play in international issues, particular in the area of eco-
nomic liberalization and integration.
196 See also Boyer R. (2003)
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2) Diversity in international economy
At the same time as regional economies have become interdependent and interweav-
ing, the emergence of diversity and unbalanced governance has become apparent and im-
portant. Diversity and unbalanced governance are factors that signicantly hinder the
progress of global liberalization. It is hardly possible to nd a one-t-for-all policy, and
obviously the more diverse the different economies, the more difcult it is to execute col-
lective multinational policies. Experience shows that permanent changes in global eco-
nomic pressures have hindered multinational institutions in executing such one-t-for-all
policies successfully. In recent history, several multinational systems or institutions were
unable to prevent the recurrence of economic crises, for example the Bretton Woods sys-
tem in the seventies and the IMF in the nineties. And recently, the failure of the WTO to
promote global trade liberalization has raised concern among the East-Southeast Asian and
other economies about the competence of global institutions to manage the further progres-
sion of the global economy.
The contradictions between interdependence and interweaving and diversity in in-
ternational economy create a dilemma in the East-Southeast Asian region. On the one
hand, globalization pressure has driven the region towards opening and deepening region-
alism leading to interdependence and interweaving. On the other hand, the diversity of
different economies within the region has diminished the ability of multinational institu-
tions like WTO or APEC to pursue their objectives of trade liberalization. Consequently,
the East-Southeast Asian region and the economies elsewhere in the world are trying to
take forward economic cooperation through initiatives of their own. These are bilateral and
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sub-regional, and mostly take the form of CEPs and PTAs, in particular between partners
who set out mutual economic gains, irrespective of whether it is a South-South or North-
South relation. This circumstance may bring uncertainty to the process of the long-term
economic integration regionally and also globally.
4.2.1 Incentives and Driving Forces for Further East-Southeast Asian
Regionalism
Efforts towards further regionalism among the East-Southeast Asian countries have been
gradually strengthened. At the end of a long process, they have now established regional
relations in both the economic and political spheres. These countries comprehend the
prospect of operating collectively and the possible advantages to be gained from doing
so, and are on their way to nding a strategy that will further their sustainable economic
development and interrelation.
The reasons and incentives for East-Southeast Asian regionalism and the securing of
the East-Southeast Asian regional markets can be summarized as follows197:
1) Several politically-motivated ambitions bring about a closer economic rela-
tionship between the East-Southeast Asian countries. The East-Southeast Asian economies,
therefore, need instruments to establish a sense of security and to assure trade and invest-
ment with their existing trading partners. By means of trade and investment policy dia-
logues, East-Southeast Asian economic cooperation will bring about better understanding
and more efcient management of trade conicts in the region. In some cases, the aspect of
economic complementarities between partners is subordinate to achieving a sense of secu-
197 See also Kawai M. (2004), Giang B. T. (2003), and Yip, W. K. (2001), p. 106-111
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rity  this purpose is one reason behind economies such as Korea's entering the ASEAN+3
arrangements.
2) The East-Southeast Asian countries have looked to regional nancial coop-
eration as an effective means of prevention, management and resolution of the nancial
crisis. The hope is to meet these objectives through systematic regional cooperation, ef-
fective monitoring, mutual surveillance and liquidity support arrangements, as well as a
concerted undertaking to internalize externalities and spill-over effects.
3) East-Southeast Asian regionalism will enable capacity building and a con-
structive response to globalization pressure, in that the regional markets for trade and in-
vestment will be enlarged, efciency increased and productivity and competitiveness im-
proved. These outcomes can be achieved through reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers,
reducing the costs and risks of trade and investment and increasing economic facilities
among members.
4) Through higher international competitiveness in particular, the East-Southeast
Asian economies intend to be economically competent in the global trading system, to be
able to stand up to global competition and to become one of the three major economic
leaders of the future, namely the EU, NAFTA and Asia.
5) The East-southeast Asian countries are looking for a strategy to cope with
the increasing number of regional trade arrangements in other regions, particularly in Eu-
rope and North America. Simultaneously, they hope that their own regional arrangements
will constitute a foundation for economic progress and trade with an increasing range of
partners.
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6) The failure of multilateral institutions in promoting trade liberalization and
cooperation at the global-level, particularly the decline of the WTO's role, the inability of
the IMF to solve the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the ineffectiveness of the APEC
process, have retarded the development of global liberalization. The increase in bilateral
agreements, while multilateral agreements are losing their relevance, is symptomatic of this
failure.
7) Furthermore, the original objective of regionalism remains, in that the coun-
tries still hope to gain international political inuence.
Moreover, it can be concluded that, contemporarily, the driving force towards region-
alism comes from two sides, namely from the nancial and real economic sectors. The
driving force from the nancial sphere was triggered by the nancial crisis in 1997, which
led people to understand the importance of increasing nancial interrelation in the region.
The driving force from the real economic sector, particularly in the area of liberalization
and facilitation of trade and investment, stems from the increasing number of bilateral
agreements being concluded in the form of PTAs and CEPs. Both spheres are pushing the
region to accomplish its rst stage of economic integration.
1) Driving force from the real economic sector: liberalization and facilita-
tion of trade and investment
As mentioned in the previous section, the new surge of bilateral regionalism has led
the East-Southeast Asian countries to react. Due particularly to the imminent negative
effects form the hub and spoke bilateralism198, the best way forward for the East-Southeast
198 The hub and spoke effect occurs when one country concludes PTAs with several other countries that
are not in the same PTA as each other. This has a negative effect, if a hub country concludes a separate FTA
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Asian economies is to accelerate the regional FTA programs. This circumstantial pressure
can be viewed as the driving force behind East-Southeast Asian regionalism in the real
economic sector.
2) Monetary cooperation: a driving force towards East Asian economic in-
tegration
The East-Southeast Asian countries realize that trade agreements are politically dif-
cult to reach, particularly due to the heterogeneity in trade liberalization policies and con-
cern over the sensitive sectors. It can be observed that the East-Southeast Asian countries
are engaging in economic integration by means of nancial cooperation which progresses
much more rapidly than trade liberalization and discriminates against third parties less
than trade liberalization. Even though ASEAN and the East Asian countries already have
some experience relevant to nancial cooperation, for instance through the ASEAN sur-
veillance mechanism and the ASEAN+3 currency swap arrangement, the East-Southeast
Asian economies, with the exception of Japan and Singapore, are based on a real economic
sector and are still immature in the monetary eld compared to the US or the EU. Us-
ing nancial cooperation as a driving force towards regional economic integration is still a
complex issue and requires great care, especially on the part of ASEAN as the initiator.
The different countries' nancial sectors are increasingly initiating economic coop-
eration within East-Southeast Asia. Yet due to a real economic based economic structure,
East-Southeast Asian countries have to continue cooperation in the real market sectors as
with each spoke country without liberalizing trade among them. The hub country will gain preferences and
investments, but spoke-to-spoke trade will be distorted by discriminations that each spoke has to encounter
in other spoke's markets, due to competition with the hub country. Discrimination against spoke countries
increases when the hub country concludes better PTAs with other new spoke countries.
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well. However, there are still obstacles to the development of this scheme of economic
integration. The lack of collective institutional and managerial measures that has tradition-
ally plagued East-Southeast Asian regionalism has become increasingly relevant, as the
economic interrelation and integration structures of the East-Southeast Asian countries are
getting more complex.
The success of East-Southeast Asian economic integration depends on mutual func-
tionality of the two facets of the integration development scheme, namely, the political facet
involving the development of functioning institutions and the economic integration facet
including both monetary and real economic aspects. Therefore, if the rst step of East-
southeast Asian economic integration is achieved successfully, its further progress can be a
turning point towards institutionalization and the establishment of long-term supranational
political cooperation initiatives. The experiences of European integration have shown that
it was rst the economic integration, and then the complexity of integration procedures
that created the need for effective institutions. This, in turn, has led to the move towards
political integration.
4.2.2 Difculties in the Progress of East-Southeast Asian Regionalism
At present, East-Southeast Asian regionalism has been developing signicantly on a bilat-
eral and sub-regional basis, but it seems that a collective move towards global economic
integration has been neglected. As far as trade policy is concerned, the new surge of bi-
lateral arrangements has led to a situation of competitive hub and spoke bilateralism.
Several countries are competing to develop as many spokes as possible, in order to reap
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economic gains and secure their export markets and investment. In addition, this situation
has deteriorated because of the domino effect and by problems in handling sensitive issues
which lead to an increasingly serious spaghetti bowl effect199.
Besides contemporary complexities emerging from the new surge of bilateral agree-
ments, there have been numerous hindrances and complications to integration. These en-
compass not only internal deciencies, for instance inefciencies in structural management,
lack of political will and lack of coordinating institutions, but also unavoidable external
pressures or economic shocks. As East Asian economic cooperation progresses and world
economic pressures increase, the difculties in continuing regional integration efciently
become increasingly complex. These difculties in the East-Southeast Asian regionalism
can be described as follows200:
1) As asserted, political will is still modest. There is a lack of effective insti-
tutional organizations and of a legal framework. There are no clear aims or visions and
implementation has been inconsistent. In addition, there is hardly any support from soci-
ety; on the contrary there is still social reluctance to full trade liberalization.
2) There are heterogeneities in the size, standard of living, and political objec-
tives of the region's countries. There are divergences of national interests and different
conceptions of national economic policy. Additionally, there are differences in political
structure, in particular a discrepancy between democracy and authoritarianism. There are
political and economic rivalries between Japan and China; distrust of the hegemonic po-
sition of Japan and China is still strong in the region and there is a high level of social
199 See the forthcoming part about hub and spoke effect and spaghetti bowl effect
200 See also Kawai M. (2004), Giang B. T. (2003), and Lee J.-S. (2002)
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and cultural difference, which particularly affects relations between North and South in
East-Southeast Asia.
3) Another substantial pressure in the East-Southeast Asian region is the fact
that most countries in the region compete directly with each other. In particular, China's
emerging economy has strongly affected the prospects of all of the East-Southeast Asian
economies, causing serious issues for regional integration. For instance, ASEAN members
have lost a large sum of FDI to China, since most ASEAN members are direct competitors
to China in the market for labour-intensive products.
4) The East-Southeast Asian market is very dependent on the global market.
Therefore the East-Southeast Asian countries are obliged to carry out their integration
process while maintaining openness. Such policies often restrict or even hinder collec-
tive integration decisions.
5) With increasing intra and inter-regional trade, the difculties related to sen-
sitive sectors are getting more complex.
6) The nancial sector has become increasingly important. However, many South-
east Asian countries lack experience in this sector. While the East-Southeast Asian economies
are gradually learning and gaining knowledge of nancial issues, worldwide nance be-
comes increasingly integrated and complex. Therefore, it is important for ASEAN and
East Asian integration to be in-line and consistent with global nancial arrangements, in
order to control the region's nancial development easily.
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7) After the nancial crisis, the national monetary policies of several countries in
the region have lost credibility. In addition, increasing capital mobility has been reducing
the signicance of national monetary policy authorities over time.
To sum up, various difculties have accompanied the integration process from the
outset and gradually become more complex over time. External pressures result in a need
for effective adjustment mechanisms and exibility. On the one hand, the best way to be
able to cope with external shocks or threats is denitely to have a rm foundation and
strengthen the economic, political and social sectors. On the other hand, exibility is also
relevant, in order to cope with and adjust to the inevitable shocks as and when they oc-
cur. Flexibility and a strengthened foundation are two fundamental points to which the
East-Southeast Asian economies should give serious attention. So far, the East-Southeast
Asian economies have shown their capability for economic exibility. However, their lacks
of operating institutions, the vulnerability of their economic structure and social disintegra-
tion have been weak points since the beginning.
4.3 General Approaches to East-Southeast Asian Regionalism
The East-Southeast Asian countries are increasingly carrying out their own initiatives for
economic and political cooperation. Three types of approach to regional integration have
been put into practice within the East-Southeast Asian region, mostly on a preferential
trading agreement basis. These are a bilateral approach (among individual countries or be-
tween individual countries and a group), a sub-regional approach (within the northeast or
southeast sub-region), and a regional approach (within regions). Whereas the rst two ap-
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proaches are taken as a rst step towards deeper regional integration, the regional approach
is set as a long-term target, in the hope of assisting global liberalization. Nevertheless, there
is still some debate among scholars as to whether these approaches play a relevant role in
giving momentum and direction to the development global economic integration and if so,
whether they impact in a positive or negative way.
The bilateral approach is very popular in the region. Today it has been developed to
such a great extent that the East-Southeast Asian region can be characterized as a bilater-
alism based regionalism. The emerging webs of PTAs or FTAs in the region are expected
to contribute to regional trade liberalization. However, these arrangements and agreements
vary signicantly, so that it becomes considerably difcult to merge them together because
of differences in standards and regulations, particularly disparities in how sensitive sec-
tors are dened and handled.
The sub-regional approach in East-Southeast Asia is viewed as a movement of eco-
nomic cooperation and integration between the emerging northeast economic group, en-
compassing China, Japan and Korea, and the already existing organizations ASEAN and
AFTA in the southeast region. Recently, there has been intensive cooperation among the
Northeast Asian countries, particularly a potential FTA between Japan and Korea which
can be seen as a starting point for economic integration in the East Asian region. Still, nei-
ther the East nor the Southeast economic amalgamation is yet accepted as a solid economic
group or entity. There are divergences in historical and political characteristics among the
east group, difculties regarding convergence of economic structures among the ASEAN
members and a certain sense of distrust of the leading nations such as Japan and China
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among the other countries. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that an effective strategic joint
action between both groups would lead to a potential East-Southeast Asian economic inte-
gration and be a key step along the path to region-wide integration. Whether this happens
depends heavily on the openness of the bilateral approach and whether effective strategies
can be found to merge these bilateral agreements together.
The regional-wide approach is a long-term objective that needs careful economic
planning and a strong political will. The emergence of an East-Southeast Asian trade bloc
might contribute to stabilizing the structure of Three World Economic Blocs. These blocs
should be open and not discriminate each other. The cooperation between blocs is greatly
dependent on the willingness of the participants and the effectiveness of the multilateral
institutions.
While bilateral and sub-regional initiatives are regarded as a quick-x concept for
short- and medium-term development, it is also hoped that as a part of the strategy to
open and deepen regionalism, these bilateral and sub-regional approaches will become a
stepping stone towards multilateral liberalization and thus contribute to global economic
integration in the long-run. Taking a rst step by promoting sub-regionalism and region-
alism before moving towards globalization is a positive move, which should facilitate fur-
ther progress201. Even though the East-Southeast Asian regionalism is at an early phase,
the prospect of achieving successful regional economic integration is very feasible. Intra-
regional trade within the East-Southeast Asian region has been increasing signicantly dur-
201 For instance, Etzioni asserts that there is a higher expectation of success, if there is a harmonization
of interests among the integrating members on a lower integration level rst (cooperation without losing
sovereignty), before moving gradually towards a higher level. See Etzioni A. (1965)
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ing the last two decades. Much statistical evidence supports the general assumption that
it is the internationalization force that currently drives deepening economic exchanges
among countries within the same region and impels the regionalism movement202. The
ASEAN+3 has the potential to contribute to a full-edged East-Southeast Asian FTA and
will possibly become a sort of East-Southeast Asian Community203. With proper strate-
gic planning, this might be a relevant driving force that will aid the progress of economic
integration in the East-Southeast Asian region into the foreseeable future.
4.4 The New Surge of Regionalism Arrangements in
East-Southeast Asia
This section focuses on a new surge of economic cooperation in East-Southeast Asia, which
has taken the form of bilateral and sub-regional trading arrangements. The main aims of
this development are to reap advantages from economic integration among members and
to circumvent inefcient multilateral institutions. However, unless it is implemented in a
competent manner, this undertaking might create uncertainty in the development towards
regional and global economic liberalization.
4.4.1 Bilateralism and Sub-Regionalism Based Regional Movement
There is currently a new trend towards regionalism in the global economy. Several coun-
tries are showing signs of closer cooperation in the form of bilateral and sub-regional Pref-
erential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) or Closer Economic Partnerships (CEPs). On the
202 Boyer R (2003), and Flingstein N. and Sweet A. S. (2002)
203 Harvie C., and Lee H.-H. (2002)
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one hand, if these kinds of emerging PTAs and CEPs are open to the non-member coun-
tries, they will be able to support economic liberalization and facilitation. On the other
hand, if member economies are not ready to open their sensitive sectors to global competi-
tion, and establish PTAs among themselves without liberalizing their sensitive sectors, this
will denitely cause economic discrimination against the third parties.
Due to differences in economic structures in the East-Southeast Asian region, it is
probable that numerous PTAs will emerge with nonconforming sensitive sectors, where
high-tariff barriers remain. These sensitive sectors are a signicant problem that will mean
that several PTAs become stumbling blocks to global economic integration. CEPs are a
kind of economic cooperation that can support global integration and are very welcome,
on the condition that they also offer free access for non-members to the economic facilita-
tion programs they operate, without obliging them to adhere to discriminatory conditions
existent among members204. Furthermore, the CEPs should be set up in line with or as a
pathnder-action for regional or global facilitation.
The type of regionalism in East-Southeast Asia today has become clear and can be
described as a bilateralism based regionalism movement. There are currently various
types of preferential trading arrangements among East-Southeast Asian members and be-
tween East-Southeast Asian countries and outsiders. These can be classied as Intra-East-
Southeast Asia, Intra-Western Pacic, and Trans-Pacic. There have been several bilateral
arrangements for each of these types, between large and small countries, between small
countries, and between large countries. The number of such arrangements is on the in-
204 For instance, the new members are obliged to enter the existing PTA and the full program of the CEP,
even if the new members merely want to access a particular program of the CEP.
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crease. There are also plurilateral PTAs, including amalgamations of existing groups or
existing bilateral agreements. From a positive viewpoint, these trading arrangements are
not merely concluded among members of a single bloc, but rather constitute the basis of
a web that is spreading globally between economies from different economic blocs. This
certainly supports global liberalization. However, one common characteristic of these bilat-
eral and sub-regional arrangements is the use of preferential trading agreements, which
are mostly conceived as discriminatory agreements. Therefore, if the member countries
are predominately aiming at individual economic gains, without any effective control, this
might turn out to be global inefcient in the long run. At this point, it would be a great
advantage to have effective multilateral institutions.
Even though membership of multiple PTAs with inconsistent arrangements is con-
ducive to higher transaction costs for trade relations among the members, countries are
continuously seeking for these kinds of arrangements, in order to gain political inuence
and dominance in trade and investment, through increasing market-size, acquiring poten-
tial access to other major markets. Generally, small economies derive signicant welfare
advantages from these trade arrangements with large economies. Within a large economic
bloc (for instance the East-Southeast Asian trade bloc), the members make large economic
gains. However, for non-members, the outcomes tend to be negative, especially for non-
members with major trade links (for example the negative impact of the establishment of
East-Southeast Asian trade bloc on Australia). Contrarily, welfare gains from bilateral
trade arrangements between small economies are mostly insignicant. Nonetheless, such
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arrangements are viewed as tactical initiatives205. Smaller countries enter into them to avoid
future exclusion from larger arrangements and to send a signal showing that they are al-
ready prepared for economic partnerships.
As aforementioned, this kind of economic cooperation in the East-Southeast Asian
region can become both a stepping stone and a stumbling bloc for further regional and
global economic integration. For an efcient and successful path to integration, it is clear
that long term objectives should be set and implemented seriously; thus a strong political
will and efcient implementing measures are indispensable.
4.4.2 Uncertainty in Further East-Southeast Asian Economic
Integration
Several nancial agreements have been established on a sub-regional and regional ba-
sis (particularly at the period during and after the crisis), and efforts are being made to-
wards deeper integration by means of closer economic partnerships and preferential trad-
ing arrangements predominately as bilateral arrangements206. The surge of these bilateral
preferential trading arrangements is viewed as a factor that brings uncertainty to the devel-
opment of deeper integration in East-Southeast Asia.
Several proponents regard such arrangements as global trade liberalization supporting
since these arrangements bring countries closer together and negotiations among a small
group of closely associated members are viewed as practicable. This opens an opportunity
to promote mutual advanced economic facilitation, for instance mutual harmonization of
205 Scollay R. (2002)
206 Elek A. (2003)
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legal frameworks, coordinated corporate privacy standards or even mutual recognition of
certication authorities for digital signatures. These trade facilitations correspond to ad-
vanced procedures that are foundations for the so-called new economy207. Accordingly,
a bilateral FTA agreed between Japan and Singapore in October 2000 and the Japan-Korea
FTA are signicant examples. They are even taken as a major breakthrough in the bilat-
eral trade agreements among the East-Southeast Asian countries and are expected to bring
about positive spill-over effects and a demonstration effect within the region208. In
many respects, modern PTAs are also viewed as spreading and functioning well beyond
conventional FTAs and Custom Unions and can be a possible springboard for advanced
multilateral arrangements, for instance a scheme of wider WTO-plus provisions209.
However, several possible negative facets must also be investigated. Besides increas-
ing transaction costs due to inconsistent provisions among different PTAs, there are uncer-
tainties surrounding the so-called spaghetti bowl effect and the hub and spoke effect
which can be described as follows. The term spaghetti bowl effect denotes webs of multi-
PTAs, which are multiple and overlap to a great extent. Under the inuence of this spaghetti
bowl effect, the webs of rules of origin, technical standards and conformance requirements
become complex and complicate economic transactions among members. In addition, the
crisscrossing FTAs bring about higher administrative and transaction costs, for human, -
nancial and also political resources. The spaghetti bowl effect is apparently a signicant
factor that hinders the prospect of convergence in the region. The hub and spoke effect
207 Yip W. K. (2001), p. 109-110
208 See Baldwin R. (2003) and Yip W. K. (2001)
209 Scollay R. (2002)
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occurs when one country concludes PTAs with several other countries that are not in the
same PTA as each other. This has a negative effect, if a hub country concludes a separate
FTA with each spoke country without liberalizing trade among them. The hub country will
gain preferences and investments, but spoke-to-spoke trade will be distorted by discrimi-
nations that each spoke has to encounter in other spoke's markets, due to competition with
the hub country. Discrimination against spoke countries increases when the hub country
concludes better PTAs with other new spoke countries. This leads to a situation in which
several countries or trade blocs are trying to become a hub and trying to develop as many
spokes as possible. The bilateralism-based trade policy in East-Southeast Asia, so far, has
led to a competitive hub and spoke bilateralism, in which the large economies (for in-
stance Japan and China), are competing to become a major hub in the web of bilateral
FTAs. These countries are seeking economic dominance in the region based upon their
market size and their ease of access to major markets. Despite of this, the small economies
are eager to negotiate new PTAs or enter existing PTAs, since they are afraid of the con-
sequences of being excluded. These circumstances, consequently, lead to the negative
domino effect.
The negative effects which are brought about by hub and spoke bilateralism are
potentially harmful to East-Southeast Asian regionalism. These effects have been analyzed
by Richard Baldwin and can be described as follows210:
1) Allocation effect
210 Baldwin R. (1999)
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If tariffs on imports are reduced only among members and not on imports from other
countries, this can create an articial incentive for domestic purchasers to shift away from
trade partners who are not members and buy the cheaper products. Hub and spoke arrange-
ments can lead to trade diversion, through preferential trading with the hub country.
2) Costs from the rules of origin
Due to the rules of origin, trading partners have to bear the cost of administrative
procedures for rms and governments. This circumstance increases the potential for cor-
ruption, since rms have a cost-saving incentive to try to illegally avoid the rules of origin.
Due to a high rate of corruption in several East-Southeast Asian countries, this problem
may signicantly hinder regional integration.
3) Investment-deterring effect
Hub and spoke trade agreements can have the effect of marginalizing the spoke coun-
tries. The factories in the spoke economies have articially lower market access than the
factories in the hub economy. As a consequence, an investment gap develops between the
spoke economies, creating an articial deterrent to investment. It should be noted that this
investment-deterring effect would emerge on the margin only. In other words, there are
some marginal investments that will be deterred by the spoke-to-spoke trade barriers.
3) Hysteresis in location
Due to the investment-deterring effect, there might be uncertainty about where to
invest. This temporary effect can have long-term negative consequences. It can be observed
that the heavily industrial economies have a high potential to achieve economic growth,
whereas the other economies are hardly able to catch up. Since the hub economy is the
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favored industrial location under hub and spoke bilateralism, the hub economy has a good
chance to grow and the spokes will lose out in the long run. Therefore, the countries are
competing to become a hub and trying to hinder other countries from doing so. This retards
economic integration in the region.
4) Accumulation effect
Since hub and spoke bilateralism is seen as an incomplete liberalization, it will en-
hance economic growth less than a complete economic liberalization.
5) Discouragement of spoke-spoke trade
Most countries are interested in trading with large economies. Therefore, it is the
hub rather than the spokes that will gain trade partners. If exporters are generally in favor
of liberalization and the import-competing industries against liberalization, under hub and
spoke bilateralism the pro-liberalization party will prefer trading with the hub rather than
with a spoke and the anti-liberalization party will be generally against every kind of trade
arrangement between countries. The outcome would be that, one the one hand, trade with
hub will be stimulated by the pro liberalization forces, but on the other hand, spoke-to-
spoke trade will be hindered by the anti-competitive force and lack in interest from the
pro-liberalization side.
4.4.3 Coping with Uncertainty Concerning the New Surge of Bilateral
and Sub-Regional Movement
A predominant and fundamental course of action to cope with the uncertainty surrounding
the new surge of bilateral and sub-regional PTAs is to promote open regionalism. This
will support plurilateralization, which is achieved by amalgamating the emerging PTAs.
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Plurilateralization should consequently turn bilateral initiatives into a stepping-stone to-
wards economic liberalization. Another relevant condition for turning bilateral agreements
into a building block comprises the gradual reduction of external barriers to non-members
and opening access for new members.
In order to achieve this target, a strong collective political will is needed in the re-
gion. This political will might not only operate at national government level, but also at
regional level, particularly at the level of the ASEAN+3. Apparently, the role of the sig-
nicant economies in East-Southeast Asia, namely ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea will
be to form the leading caucus for the open and deepen regionalism. They should act as a
powerful force towards global liberalization. This action should be taken in line with the
policies of APEC and WTO, since these multilateral institutions, if working effectively,
will potentially support trade liberalization and assist in the collective solution of sensitive
issues. Besides, the policies of the multilateral institutions will take into account the wel-
fare of the members as a whole and will set an effective benchmark for the path towards
global economic liberalization through regional development
From an economic viewpoint, two possible ways that may hinder the negative effects
of the new surge of bilateral regionalism are as follows: First, spoke economies should con-
clude a free trade agreement among themselves rst, and then establish a free trade agree-
ment with the hub. This will have the same effect as a FTA between all of the economies.
And/or second, economies should carry out unilateral tariff reduction and create a unilateral
FTA. This automatically avoids the problems brought about by the conclusion of bilateral
agreements, and furthermore, there is no discrimination against third countries.
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Since, a unilateral FTA is not easy to introduce, in general, the best way to solve
the problems emerging from hub and spoke bilateralism and the spaghetti bowl effect is
to create a free trade area among hub and spokes. Within a FTA, the new members will
automatically provide a tariff-free agreement for all incumbent members. Simultaneously
the new members will gain tariff-free access to the markets of all members. FTAs are
able to reduces the fraction of diverted traded and thus the trade diversion effect. Further-
more, within a FTA the rules of origin will be harmonized and the economic and political
marginalization effects will be eliminated. These include the investment-deterring effect,
hysteresis in location and the discouragement of spoke-to-spoke trade. Since a FTA brings
about complete trade liberalization within the region, the production factors accumulate,
raising growth in the region.
However, there is concern about sensitive sectors, which serves as a signicant hin-
drance to the potential establishment of a FTA in the region. How to deal with politically
sensitive high border barriers is an important difculty that blocks the way towards fur-
ther economic integration. This problem has been exacerbated by the increase in bilateral
arrangements, particularly those with complex tailor-made conditions. At present, coun-
tries which have some sectors that are not yet prepared to enter international competition
participate merely in the sectors where they are capable of competing, or exclude particular
sectors from the agreements. Since the sensitive sectors vary from one PTA to another and
seem to proliferate over time, it becomes harder to integrate these emerging PTAs. An ex-
ample is the PTA between Japan and Korea which excludes rice. Such an agreement is not
suitable for extension to all of the East-Southeast Asian economies, since those economies
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that are not willing to exclude rice, for instance Thailand, might not be able to participate
in this PTA.
Coping with Sensitive Sectors
The issue of these highly protected sensitive sectors is unlikely to be solved through
unilateral voluntary cooperation, at either the East-Southeast Asian or APEC level211. From
a political and economic point of view, this problem should be worked out under orga-
nized formal arrangements through a step-by-step progress, particularly through CEPs
conducted and monitored on a regional level. Nonetheless, the support of institutions at
the global level (APEC or WTO) is also needed. One possible approach is as follows: The
PTAs should anticipate future change and gradually develop the sensitive sectors in the
countries concerned to be increasingly competitive. This could be accomplished through
an agreement by which sensitive products excluded initially must be included subsequently
over time (for example in 5 to 10 years). In this way, the range of PTAs' conditions will
be extended and it will be easier to merge the bilateral arrangements. It is important that
the PTAs move towards global liberalization and aim to merge with other PTAs and of-
fer lower border barriers to other economies. Such conditions should be set at the outset
of the PTAs. This would set a higher standard than current WTO disciplines; so they t
into the general category of wider WTO-plus principles. This kind of principles should
be introduced step by step, rst within PTAs themselves and then regionally. Under such
WTO-plus principles, sensitive issues will be dealt with within a time limit. Furthermore,
because the region-wide merged PTAs will be gradually linked to global-level principles,
211 Elek A. (2003)
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PTAs will contribute to global economic integration. In particular, these kinds of principles
might be suitable and feasible for East-Southeast Asia, since East-Southeast Asian coop-
eration has recently gained more momentum and interests and is seeking wider economic
integration, particularly through PTAs, in order to be ready to compete in the global market.
Pathnder Strategy
One of the rst steps in promoting region-wide economic integration is to support
region-wide facilitation in trade and investment. Facilitation has proved to be easier to
implement than liberalization among PTAs. Economic facilitation is a signicant factor
that encourages economic convergence and, in turn, makes liberalization easier to achieve.
Simultaneously, it is very important to reduce the barriers to accession and increase the op-
portunities for collective participation in the facilitation arrangements. CEPs are viewed as
providing a suitable means of and framework for economic facilitation, since there is less
economic discrimination among their participants and they seem to bring about develop-
ment and growth in the members' economies. It is therefore very desirable to promote all
arrangements that facilitate trade and investment, even as a part of CEPs or other regional-
wide arrangements. There are two paths that should be followed to facilitate trade and
investment. The rst path works on a global and regional basis, the second on a bilateral
and sub-regional basis.
The rst path involves supporting the ongoing operation towards region-wide and
global facilitation. APEC has done well on this issue. APEC's region-wide collective facil-
itation is conducive to region-wide gain, fromwhich many East-Southeast Asian economies
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are already beneting, for example, the concept of pathnder initiatives which was es-
tablished in the Shanghai Accord (2001). Pathnder initiatives reafrmed a exibility
principle that allows APEC members who are not ready to implement the facilitating
arrangements to join at a later stage. Under this scheme, the economies will be able to deal
with easier sectors rst, and then gradually move towards more and more sensitive issues.
This region-wide planning may become a benchmark and a pathnder for progress towards
economic integration among the region's members.
According to the second path, region-wide and global facilitation in trade and invest-
ment should be supported by cooperative arrangements at bilateral or sub-regional levels.
This can be enhanced and developed through CEPs as well. In East-Southeast Asia, the
emergence of several CEPs has led the way in prospective innovative arrangements and
new methods of facilitation. This, in turn, supports and accelerates APEC-wide facilita-
tion, since joining a cooperative facilitation arrangement pioneered by the other economies
will necessitate capacity building. Any innovative facets of facilitation will function as a
precedent for future implementation and inspire more ideas along similar lines. Develop-
ment of these pioneer facilitation measures can be supported by regional wide institutions,
through information sharing, experience and technology exchanges. The economies, there-
fore, should encourage each other to assent to any practical arrangements that facilitate
trade and investment, be it on a bilateral, sub-regional, regional or global basis.
Nonetheless, most CEPs nowadays include a general clause, encompassing condi-
tions for accession, which makes it very difcult for third economies to enter the arrange-
ments. Several CEPs have a general clause declaring that only third economies that are
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willing to accept all the provisions of existing agreement can join the CEP. In addition, the
permission to enter is subject to authorization by the existing partners. In other words, if an
economy wanted to participate in particular arrangements for facilitation that were already
in place, it also might be obliged to join the PTA, besides all other facilitation arrangements
of the existing CEPs. This would be very hard or even impossible for third economies that
are only ready to join some facilitation agreements of the existing CEPs, but not the existing
PTA because of differences in sensitive issues.
To overcome these difculties and meet the objectives for integration, concrete po-
litical will is one of the most decisive factors. A model approach for establishing a con-
sensus as the basis for political will and the accompanying requisite measures within the
East-Southeast Asian region, from the point of view of what roles the various multina-
tional institutions can play, is as follows212. As mentioned, the best way to deal with the
proliferation of bilateral and sub-regional PTAs in East Asia is to open and deepen region-
alism. This essentially requires a collective political will to come into existence and be
exerted, encompassing cooperation at the levels of the ASEAN+3 and APEC, as well as
support from the WTO. While the ASEAN+3 members are aiming to establish their own
East-Southeast Asian FTA, they should also keep APEC's objectives in mind, for example
APEC's Bogor Goals and APEC's vision of regional open trade and investment. More-
over, WTO concepts can support the cooperative and collective facets of the various PTAs.
The WTO schemes can serve to enhance the development towards open sub-regionalism,
in particular by helping to resolve the issues surrounding sensitive products and industries
212 Young S. (2003)
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or issues where individual governments' political positions make it difcult for them to
make progress. For instance, in East-Southeast Asian economic integration, ASEAN+3
will be the main force to develop regional economic integration, with mutual support from
APEC and the WTO at the regional and global levels. Young213 has outlined the following
course of action to create the requisite political will: Firstly, misconceptions about PTAs
and FTAs should be set straight, leading instead to a serious discussion of the uncertainty
and the progress of the PTAs and FTAs. Secondly, the regional and global institutions
should declare a set of rules to open sub-regionalism. These rules should be such that the
governments of the members can follow them and apply them to all PTAs afterwards. And
thirdly, the regional and global institutions should take efforts to provide and publicize in-
formation resulting from a systematic and rigorous analysis of the possible benets and
risks of PTAs and how to cope with them effectively.
4.4.4 The Prospect of East-Southeast Asian Regionalism: the
Implications for ASEAN
This part analyses the surge of bilateralism in East-Southeast Asia. The negative effects
of hub and spoke bilateralism and the spaghetti bowl effect in particular create a situ-
ation where ASEAN economic integration is impeded. This then distorts the prospect of
East-Southeast Asian economic integration. This section describes the development of the
difculties and suggests potential solutions.
Development of the New Surge of Bilateral Regionalism in East-Southeast Asia and
213 Young S. (2003)
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Solutions to the Rising Problems
A new wave of regionalism has been spreading over the East-Southeast Asian region.
The negative effects brought about by hub and spoke bilateralism are hard to avoid. The
role of hub and spokes seems to be clearly dened.
This part gathers some of Baldwin's results on the hub-ness of the world economy
and analyses the prospect of East-Southeast Asian integration214. Baldwin measures hub-
ness by examining the extra export to a hub due to conclusion of a bilateral agreement with
that hub economy. In order to calculate the hub-ness, he uses a gravity model initiated
by Helpmen and Krugman, which is based on the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic
competition, as a fundamental for his research. The results are illustrated in the Figures
4.1-4.6.
Hub-ness of Japan
source: Baldwin (2002)
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Figure 4.1: Hub-ness of Japan
214 Baldwin R. (2002)
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Hub-ness of Korea
source: Baldwin (2002)
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Figure 4.2: Hub-ness of Korea
Hub-ness of China
source: Baldwin (2002)
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Figure 4.3: Hub-ness of China
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Hub-ness of ASEAN
source: Baldwin (2002)
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Figure 4.4: Hub-ness of ASEAN
Hub-ness of Japan Korea FTA
Source: Baldwin (2002)
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Figure 4.5: Hub-ness of Japan Korea FTA
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Hub-ness of Japan China Korea FTA
sourc: Baldwin (2002)
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Figure 4.6: Hub-ness of Japan China Korea FTA
The outcome shows that Japan possesses the greatest hub-ness as an individual coun-
try. The hub-ness of China is considerably smaller. As an economic group, the Japan-
China-Korea FTA is the biggest hub, followed by the Japan-Korea FTA and, to a much
lesser extent, ASEAN. Furthermore, the data from the analysis reveals that it is more ad-
vantageous for individual ASEAN members to conclude a bilateral agreement with Japan
than within ASEAN itself. This may be the incentive for the ASEAN members to turn in-
dividually towards bilateral agreements with Japan. Thereby integration within ASEAN
itself may be neglected. This incentive will be stronger as soon as the Japan-China-Korea
FTA or just a Japan-Korea FTA is set up.
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The current situation is that East-Southeast Asian countries have concluded several
bilateral agreements individually, not only with countries outside the region, but also with
other countries within the region. The present situation of economic integration in the
region has the two following characteristics.
1) It seems that some ASEAN members are individually concluding bilateral
agreements with a potential hub economy such as Japan and China. Although the PTAs be-
tween ASEAN-Japan (2001) have been concluded and a framework agreement for ASEAN-
China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation came to effect in 2003215, some strong economies
in ASEAN tend to initiate bilateral trade agreements individually. Examples of this are the
Japan-Singapore FTA signed in January 2002, the China-Thailand PTA that commenced in
2003, the initiation of negotiations for establishing the Japan-Thailand Economic Partner-
ship Agreement in December 2003, a joint study on the Japan-Malaysia Economic Partner-
ship and the initiation of a Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement. This may
destabilize ASEAN integration, due to the hub and spoke effects.
2) Even though a bilateral agreement between Japan China and Korea is hard to
achieve due to political obstacles and unstable relations, the FTA between Japan and Korea
only is progressing rapidly. This is assisted by the two countries' similar economic special-
ization and stable political structures. The prospective Japan-Korea FTA is very promising.
Both countries share similar heritage and cultural values and both economies have much in
common. Japan is currently the second largest trading partner for Korea, while Korea is the
third largest partner for Japan. Moreover, Japan is the second largest source of FDI for Ko-
215 In 2002, ASEAN and China agreed on a FTA which is to be completed by 2010.
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rea. Bilateral trade between Japan and Korea has increased over time (Japan's trade with
Korea was 42.66 billion US dollars in 2001 and 43.86 billion in 2002. Korea's trade with
Japan was 43.14 billion US dollars in 2001 and 45 billion in 2002). As soon as the Japan-
Korea FTA is accomplished, the ASEAN members will increase their efforts to conclude
bilateral PTAs with the Japan-Korea FTA. Operating individually, each ASEAN member
will certainly become a spokes. As a spoke, each ASEAN economy will be on the receiv-
ing end of the negative effects of bilateralism. This may damage the prospect of ASEAN
economic integration and, subsequently, East-Southeast Asian regionalism.
At present, it seems that Japan and Korea are successfully moving towards the rst
step of economic integration. The Japan-Korea FTA may be achieved in the foreseeable fu-
ture. This undertaking has put pressure on ASEAN to react, due to the aforementioned sup-
position about the ASEAN members becoming spokes. The best way forward for ASEAN
is to accelerate AFTA and nish it as soon as possible. Simultaneously, ASEAN should
take control of bilateral trade negotiations between their individual members and poten-
tial hub-countries, particularly Japan and China. These agreements should be collectively
planned and should support regional integration. If ASEAN is successful in this course
of action, the new surge of bilateral arrangements will change their focus to one which
supports integration. The process of East-Southeast Asian economic integration can be de-
scribed as follows (see Tables 4.2 and Figures 4.7 and 4.8 for the main characteristic of the
new surge of bilateral-regionalism, the solution to this and the suggestion for the prospect
of the East-Southeast Asian Economic integration).
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New Surge of bilateral based regionalism
Hub and Spoke effects & Spaghetti bowl effects
1) Allocation effects
2) Costs of the Rules of Origin
3) Investment-deterring effects
4) Hysteresis in location
5) Accumulation effects
6) Discouragement on spoke to spoke trade
Contemporary circumstances
1) Each ASEAN member is aiming at concluding bilateral PTAs with
Hub-potential countries, particularly Japan.
2) ASEAN countries become spokes.
3) Establishment of Japan-Korea FTA is very promising and
can become a great Hub in the region.
4) Initiative for ASEAN members to trade individually rises.
This intensies the hindrance of the ASEAN integration
.
Table 4.2: New surge of bilateral regionalism in East-Southeast Asia
1) At the rst step, ASEAN should complete AFTA as soon as possible. This
move will also be forced by the development of the Japan-Korea FTA.
2) At the second stage, there will be two FTAs in the East-Southeast Asian re-
gion, namely AFTA and the Japan-Korea FTA. Since the hub-ness of the Japan-Korea FTA
is relatively high for ASEAN members, it will not be difcult for both FTAs to merge to-
gether. At this phase, ASEAN should intensify trade relations with China and accelerate
the ASEAN-China FTA, which is currently planned to be accomplished by 2010. Several
studies show that the ASEAN-China FTA will provide net gains for both countries216.
3) At the third stage, the ASEAN-Japan-Korea FTA will be complete and so
will the ASEAN-China FTA. At this point, ASEAN will operate as a connecting-bridge
for economic integration throughout East-Southeast Asia. ASEAN has already shown the
potential to be a middleman for Japan and China and to be an initiator of East-Southeast
Asian economic integration, for instance with the initiation of the ASEAN+3 summits.
216 For instance, Chirathivat (2002) and Tongzon (2001)
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Accomplishment of AFTA
Difficulties: Sensitive sectors
Solution: Convergence criteria
Possible approach:
Through convergence and
distribution strategy based on
increasing skilled-human capital
and enhancement in technology
ASEAN-China
FTA
East-Southeast
Asian FTA
Driving force
Japan-Korea FTA
Very promising
Japan-Korea-
ASEAN
FTA
Figure 4.7: Suggested solution for ASEAN and East-Southeast Asian regionalism
This is a sign that ASEAN could play a positive role in the encouragement of relations
between China-Japan and Korea.
Looking back on the rst step, one of the signicant hindrances retarding the progress
of ASEAN economic integration and the accomplishment of AFTA is the level of diversity
among member countries. To solve out this complication, this thesis suggests economic
convergence and distribution, which not only help to solve the sensitive sector prob-
lems, but also strengthen the internal economic structures of the countries and the region.
In this way, the economies will be able to achieve sustainable development more easily
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Achievement and contemporarily
development path
Need for an Asian Monetary Institute
Solution: accomplishment of AFTA and
move towards East-Southeast Asian FTA
Convening in May 2000:
Chiang Mai Initiatives
(Swap arrangement)
1997: Impact of financial crisis:
Realizing the interrelation of financial
sectors
Driving force from monetary sector
Contemporary: New surge of bilateral PTAs
(since ca. 2000)
Driving force from real economic
sector
Deeper financial
integration
Elimination of barriers to
trade and investment
Assisting East-
Southeast Asian
regionalism
Prospect of ASEAN regionalism
ASEAN Single Market
Evolution from negative to
positive integration
Call for common regulations:
Emergence of initiatives on
institutionalization in ASEAN
Accomplishment of
AFTA
Common regulations in East-
Southeast Asia
East-Southeast Asian Single
Market
East-Southeast Asian
FTA
Figure 4.8: Proposal on East-Southeast Asian regionalism
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and become, to a certain extent, immune to external pressures. In the context of Euro-
pean integration, meeting the convergence criteria217 has been a strict condition for the
EU membership and has improved the prospect of successful integration. Convergence
and distribution as development strategies would not only support the establishment of
AFTA, but also be a rst step towards economic integration within the East-Southeast Asian
region.
The strategy for economic convergence and distribution must have a wide scope.
In order to carry out development in an appropriate manner, the implementation of both
schemes requires careful attention to be paid to the economic and political circumstances
of the country or region under consideration. The East-Southeast Asian economic struc-
tures of the northeast region are considerably different from those of the southeast region.
While the northeast region consists of industrialized countries, the economies in the south-
east region are still some way behind in this respect. This thesis predominantly focuses on
the convergence and distribution scheme of the southeast region, specically the ASEAN
economies. A proposal for a sustainable development strategy will be made for this south-
east region.
The scheme presented in the thesis is just a part of numerous development strategies
that should be exercised to progress towards prosperous economic integration. It includes
a suggested scheme for strengthening the economic structures, which relies on economic
convergence and distribution within the countries and sub-region. Furthermore, there is
a positive interrelation between convergence and economic integration. Economic inte-
217 Only three East Asian countries currently meet the convergence criteria of the EU (1992-1996), namely
Japan, Taiwan and Singapore. See Boyer (2002)
212 4 East-Southeast Asian Economic Integration and its Implications for ASEAN
gration is able to support the economic convergence of the whole region in the long run,
for instance in terms of mobility of production factors and/or convergence of technolog-
ical progress. In turn, convergence of living standards and regional economies will have
the positive effect of nally easing the problem of the sensitive sectors, thus simultane-
ously supporting integration. The supporting measures involve enhancing education and
technology, which serve as signicant fundamentals for the economic, political and social
structure. Advancement in education and technology will support economic convergence
and distribution by raising income and living standards. In turn, the development of the
economic structure and economic convergence will support and strengthen economic in-
tegration in the region. The process works both ways, in that, due to positive spill-over
effects, economic integration will encourage the progress of education quality and technol-
ogy development. Hence, it can be concluded that both terms (economic integration and
enhancing education and technology) will assist each other on the way to further economic
development in the region and will, in the long-term, support inter- and intra-regional eco-
nomic integration. This development strategy will be described and modeled in the forth-
coming chapter.
4.5 Conclusion
The East-Southeast Asian economies are facing a dilemma as a result of the difference be-
tween the interdependence and interweaving of the global economy, which support eco-
nomic integration and diversity in the international economy, which is, on the contrary,
a hindrance to regionalism and global cooperation and tends to undermine East-Southeast
4.5 Conclusion 213
Asian regionalism. Both circumstantial pressures have arisen, to a great extent, from the
movement towards globalization and the increasingly integrated world markets. To coun-
teract this state of affairs, economies worldwide are seeking an appropriate solution. The
most common source of economic gain found is the conclusion of bilateral arrangements.
The new surge of bilateral regionalism can currently be observed in every region. Such
regionalism, however, has led to uncertainty about the correct path for the economic devel-
opment. The negative effects caused by bilateral trade agreements, especially the hub and
spoke effects and the spaghetti bowl effect, can have a severe effect on further integra-
tion.
The economic integration of ASEAN in particular can be harmed by this situation.
ASEAN members are concluding bilateral trade agreements with several economies in-
dividually. This may not only retard collective ASEAN integration, but also deteriorate
ASEAN, and subsequently East-Southeast Asian, economic integration. The best way out
of this negative situation is for ASEAN to move forwards, accelerate its FTA plan and
achieve the rst stage of economic integration. This, in turn, will reduce or even elimi-
nate the negative effects of hub and spoke bilateralism and turn bilateral regionalism into
a stepping-stone towards regional economic integration. With the accomplishment of the
AFTA, ASEAN will form a bridge connecting Japan and China, which would result in
East-Southeast Asian economic integration in the long run.
This thesis focuses on diversity of the economic structures of the different countries
as a signicant hindrance to ASEAN economic integration and suggests a possible way out.
To resolve the diversity issue, this thesis puts forward economic convergence and dis-
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tribution as dominant strategies. The combination of these two approaches not only helps
solve the sensitive sector problems, but also strengthens the internal economic structures of
the countries and the region. In this way, the economies will be able to achieve sustainable
development more easily and become immune to external pressures, at least to a certain
extent. Furthermore, there is a positive interrelation between convergence and economic
integration. By means of economic integration this strategy will also be able to support
the economic convergence of the whole region in the long run. One positive effect of the
strategy is that convergence in living standards and regional economies will nally make
the resolution of the sensitive sectors issues easier. The supporting measures involve en-
hancing education and technology, which serve as signicant fundamentals for the region's
economic, political and social structure. Advancement in education and technology will
support economic convergence and distribution by raising income and living standards. In
turn, development of the economic structure and economic convergence will support and
strengthen economic integration in the region. The benets also impact in the opposite
direction: due to positive spill-over effects, economic integration will enhance education
quality and technological development, which will lead to an augmentation of economic
convergence in the end.
Chapter 5
Theory on Economic Development and
Integration
In the previous chapters of this thesis, strategies for the sustainable development of
ASEAN and East-Southeast Asian integration have been examined. The two strategies
that constitute the focal point of the thesis have been established as openness and deep-
ening and strengthening foundation. The concrete implementation of both strategies is
as follows: in association with openness and deepening, to develop ASEAN and East-
Southeast Asia economic integration and simultaneously, in association with strength-
ening foundation, to strengthen macroeconomic structures. The thesis concentrates on
convergence and distribution as key factors to achieve both objectives. Accordingly, the
thesis examines how to achieve convergence; in particular, the effects of the convergence
of human-capital and technological progress on the convergence of income and the trend
towards integration are contemplated.
This chapter ve presents models of strategies that strengthen economic fundamen-
tals and promote convergence within an economic structure. Additionally, it illustrates the
interrelation of convergence and economic integration. These strategies aim at coping with
economic disparity within and between countries. In the main, discrepancies in the hu-
man capital and wage-rates of blue-collar (workers from low-income-earner sector or from
poor countries) and white-collar workers (workers from high-income-earner sector or from
rich countries) and in the technology used in different production sectors are considered.
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Whether a distinction is made between blue-collar and white-collar workers or between
workers in poor and rich countries depends on the character of the model-analysis. If the
model analyzes economic situation of a single country, the examination carried out will be
between blue- and white-collar workers. On the other hand, if an integrated region is ana-
lyzed, the model originally used for blue- and white-collar workers will be applied for the
case of average workers in the poor and rich countries respectively. For a better understand-
ing, the thesis will focus either on an economy which has both blue-collar and white-collar
workers or on a region with workers in the poorer and richer countries.
Diversity in economic structure can be found in several developing countries and is
regarded as a signicant hindrance in the context of the ASEAN and East-Southeast Asian
economic integration. Economic convergence and distribution are considered as schemes
that could be implemented to solve recent economic problems within the region and lay
down a strong foundation for long-term development. Both schemes lead to improvements
as well as convergence in the standard of living and the economic structure of the region.
This will provide an important basis for the solution of the sensitive-sector-problems. Sus-
tainable development can then be achieved easily and the economy will be, to a certain
extent, immune to external pressures. Negative effects from hub and spoke bilateralism
will be lessened or hindered and bilateral regionalism will become a stepping stone to-
wards economic integration. Economic cooperation and integration within the region will
strengthen regional economic convergence and economic fundamentals. These, in turn, are
the very factors that allow countries to achieve regional and global economic integration
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in the long run. This reects the mutual relationship between economic convergence and
integration.
One of the relevant supporting measures is the enhancement of education and tech-
nology. Both serve as essential basic components of economic, political and social struc-
tures. Advances in education and technology will assist economic convergence and distri-
bution by raising income and living standards, particularly in poorer sections of the pop-
ulation. Consequently, development of the economic structure and economic convergence
will support and strengthen economic integration in the region. Due to positive spill-over
effects, economic integration will, in turn, enhance the quality of education and techno-
logical development. In addition, higher levels of integration and openness are related to
higher mobility of the factors of production, resulting in more convergence of production
factors and income.
The origin model is based on the growth model by Garlor and Weil (1999) which an-
alyzes the historical evolution of population, technology and output, encompassing the en-
dogenous transition between three regimes, a Malthusian regime, a Post-Malthusian regime
and a Modern Growth regime. In this thesis, modeling of a short- and a long-term devel-
opment are distinguished. The growth model by Garlor and Weil is modied and adapted
in order to analyze the short- and long-term development of the economy under inequality
between labor groups and to discover strategies that will strengthen economic fundamen-
tals and assist economic integration within the region. The short-term model is built, to
a certain extent, in such a way that the structure of the utility function is consistent with
the utility function of the long-term model. Both models use the Cobb-Douglas production
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function; the short-term model assigns a common two-period inter-temporal model and the
long-term model is based on an overlapping generation model.
The rst part of this chapter describes the fundamental structure of the model which
refers to the production relations under inequality between labor groups. Using the results
derived from the production relations, short- and long-term effects caused by an increase in
the quality of human capital are captured and strategies are suggested for the development
of an economy which is initially characterized by inequality between labor groups. These
strategies are, rstly, augmentation and convergence in the quality of human resources
within a sector and between different sectors and, secondly, assisting technological progress
and fusing technology levels in the two economic sectors.
The second part of this chapter introduces the short-term model and implements it
for simulations and analyses. The results show that, in general, two strategies are effec-
tive and should be simultaneously implemented. The rst of these is reducing the costs of
subsistence consumption, which is a relevant strategy to lessen economic divergence and
support economic convergence. The second is reducing the costs of education and imple-
menting distribution, which brings about an increase in the quality of human capital and
also an increase in income. While reducing the costs of education only benets individuals
who are able to invest in education, reducing the costs of subsistence consumption, on the
other hand, supports all individuals. If the reduction of the costs of subsistence consump-
tion is large enough, several individuals who were previously unable to invest in education
will be able to invest in education after the costs of subsistence consumption decline. This
implies that the quality of human capital and income will rise and the number of individ-
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uals who benet from the educational support will increase. Economic convergence will
be supported  or, more precisely, divergence will be eased  since the level of investment
in education for low-income-earners depends on the level of subsistence consumption. By
means of combining the reduction of subsistence consumption costs with higher invest-
ment in educational support for low-income-earners the number of individuals who invest
in education and the quality of human capital of the blue-collar group will be increased,
and this also lessens divergence and bolsters convergence.
The second part, in addition, conducts a theoretical analysis of the short-term devel-
opment under inequality between labor groups from an economic policy perspective. The
role of government is analyzed, focusing particularly on convergence and augmentation of
the quality of human capital and income. In the model, individuals' utility is, besides their
income and consume, also established in terms of a trade-off between paying income tax
and gains from government spending. The government plays a signicant role in imple-
menting distribution and achieving convergence. The government's main instruments are
taxation and public spending. In the short-run, taxation and direct government supports
(including redistributing income from rich to poor individuals) lead to income distribution,
which, in turn, brings about an increase in education levels in the low-earning-sector. In
the model, convergence through indirect supports (through reduction of the costs of educa-
tion) leads to an increase in level of investment in education and to distribution of education
among the individuals earning above an amount of ztb(budget constraints are not binding).
z is the level of an individual's income, which depends on the level of human capital and
wage rate of an individual, and ztbdepicts the level of individual earnings at which budget
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constraints are exactly binding, meaning that budget constraints of individuals earning be-
low ztbare binding. However, the model induces a trade-off, since indirect support leads
to a reduction of the level of investment in education for the individuals earning below
ztb(budget constraints are binding). Furthermore, the model shows that the reduction of
the costs of education directly via taxation supports convergence only among the group of
individual earning above ztb, in the contrary the incentives to invest in education of the
individuals earning below ztbdecrease. Therefore, These results lead to the fact that it is
necessary to secure the income level or living-standard of the individuals (in the model, the
breakthrough point is ztb) which will be a signicant fundamental for economic develop-
ment.
Furthermore, the Median Voter Theorem is used to capture a theoretical outcome of
the decision-making process for political strategies, which indirectly affect the development
path of economic growth and economic convergence. The main outcome is the revelation
of one of the explanations for why several political programs diverge from the rst best
solution. The result shows the consequence of the distortion of the government's decision,
brought about by its predominant interest in winning votes. It can be observed that there
are several opportunities for political programs that are more efcient and utility in the
economy can be increased, if the governments are social welfare oriented. In addition, this
model also shows that if there is no inequality in the economy, government interference
is not needed, since this merely brings about distortion due to the deadweight-loss. Yet,
if there are disparities in the economy, it is worthwhile to accept the deadweight-loss, in
order to achieve distribution, convergence and sustainable development. In the context of
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economic integration, the role of government in this issue can be assigned to a supranational
institution in an economic union.
The third part illustrates analyses of the long-term model accompanied by its simula-
tions and analyses. Human capital must be improved as a whole and convergence of skills
among individuals from high and low income sectors must be achieved. The development
process is examined in a deeper manner by focusing on the next generation of human cap-
ital. Diversity among the population is manifest, particularly in the developing countries;
low-income earners usually have less economic and social (in this case educational) oppor-
tunities. For this reason, the government must interfere to enhance an equal distribution
of opportunity among individuals. Taxation policy and direct government support aimed
at income distribution must be implemented. If individuals have higher income, they can
invest in the next generation of human capital, engendering a sustainable long-term devel-
opment and convergence in skill and income. Enhancement in the wages of labor-groups
can be achieved through technological change. Progress in technology bolsters the produc-
tion sector and increases the wage rate. Also, convergences in technology standards among
different production sectors bring about convergence in wage rates. The main factors that
are conducive to technology development are research and development (R&D) and eco-
nomic integration. Whereas the pursuit of R&D needs a high investment in terms of nance
and time, technological progress through economic integration requires less time. For in-
stance, it can be achieved by taking over higher foreign technologies. Moreover, economic
integration also lays a foundation for more effective R&D, for example by joint venture
or international R&D and production. A greater augmentation of technology in the low-
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income-earner-sector than in the high-income-earner-sector leads to a higher increase in the
wage rate, level of investment in children's education and utility in the low-income-earner-
sector and is conducive to convergence. These, however, affect only individuals earning
above ztb and there is a trade-off, since the level of investment in the education of the in-
dividuals earning below ztb declines. An example of this long-term development can be
seen in Thailand, where government interference is leading to economic distribution and
convergence, and in addition total per-person level of investment in education is on the in-
crease, but, as a trade-off, the total per-person utility is declining. In this model, the reason
for the decline of total per-person utility is the inherent deadweight-loss of taxation and
the indirect distribution of government spending (in this case, government support in edu-
cation and technology progress) which due to the individuals' viewpoint is less preferable
comparing to the direct distribution. This decrease in total utility may be avoided by a bet-
ter tax rate and tax structure. Nevertheless, there is signicant distribution effect regarding
the individuals' utility. There are winners and losers from the action of government inter-
ference (via progressive tax structure) and the lower the tax rate one has to pay, the higher
the gain potential.
In the fourth part, the model is applied to analyze the prospect of international and
regional basis, in which the data and development of ASEAN is chosen as an example. Fi-
nally, the last part depicts the theoretical relationship between economic integration and
convergence, and concludes on the results of the short- and long-term modeling, discussing
relevant economic strategies that should be implemented. To conclude, the existence of
signicant mutual positive relations between economic cooperation and integration and
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economic convergence is borne out. Convergence supports economic integration by easing
the problems of sensitive sectors and hub and spokes bilateralism. Obviously, economic
convergence not only assists economic integration, but is also a general fundament for sus-
tainable development. The fact that economic cooperation and integration simultaneously
support economic convergence and development (in this model, by means of convergence
and augmentation of technologies and reduction of subsistence consumption and costs of
education) conrms the importance of moving towards economic integration. In the model,
economic integration between countries always brings about advantages, as soon as there
are technological differences in any sector or in production processes, regardless of whether
this integration is between two industrial countries, two developing countries or between
industrial and developing countries.
5.1 The Fundamental Structure of the model
5.1.1 General Production Relations
The aggregate production Yt, at period t occurs according to the Cobb-Douglas production
function with a constant-returns-to-scale technology. This can be written as:
Yt = K

t (AtHt)
(1 ) (5.1)
 2 [0; 1]. Ht,Kt andAt > 0 are the efciency unit of labor, the aggregate capital
input and the productivity parameter of technology over the period t, respectively. The
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product of technology parameter At and labor Ht represents the total efciency of labor
forces.
The output per worker yt, produced at time t is
yt = k

t (Atht)
(1 )  y (kt; ht; At) ; (5.2)
where yk (kt; ht; At) > 0 and yh (kt; ht; At) > 0 8 (kt; ht) > 0:
Lt is the aggregate worker, kt  KtLt the quantity of capital per worker, ht  HtLt the
effective unit of labor per worker (embodying quantity and quality of labor per worker) and
Atht  At HtLt is the absolute efciency unit of labor per worker, at time-period t.
It is assumed that the economy is small and open to the world capital market; hence
the interest rate is regarded as exogenously given. The capital market equilibrium condition
implies that
@Yt
@Kt
= 

Kt
AtHt
(1 )
= r (5.3)
In a competitive labor market, each worker receives wage rate w, which is equal to
the marginal product of labor. The marginal product of labor is dened as follows:
@Yt
@Ht
= 

Kt
AtHt

At = wt (5.4)
5.1.2 Production Relations under Inequality between Labor Groups
It is taken for granted that the economy consists of two classes of labor forces, the blue-
collar workers (if the economy is a country) or workers in the poor countries (if the econ-
omy refers to an integrated economic region) and the white-collar workers or workers in the
rich countries  for simplicity the thesis uses only the terms blue-collar and the white-collar
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workers for both interpretations. At time t, white-collar workers work with technologyAht,
while blue-collar workers work with technology Alt. It is also assumed that in an economy
with disparities in the incomes and wage rates of different groups of workers, white-collar
workers are educated to a higher level, possess a higher quality of human capital and uti-
lize higher technology. The high level of economic disparity, notably, leads to a larger
difference in the levels of education and income between the two groups.
The aggregate output of the economy, over time period t, given by the Cobb-Douglas
production kernel is
Yt = K

ht (AhtHht)
(1 ) +Klt (AltHlt)
(1 ) ; 0    1 (5.5)
Ajt describes the productivity parameter of technology, with j = h; l. Hht and Kht
are the aggregate effective labor and the aggregate capital input in sector h applied with
higher technology parameter Aht. In analogy, Hlt and Klt are the aggregate effective labor
and the aggregate capital input in sector l with the lower technology parameter Alt.
Capital is perfectly mobile between sectors. Hence, in a competitive equilibrium, the
marginal product of capital must be identical in each sector. This implies that
@Yt
@Kht
=
@Yt
@Klt
(5.6)
Applying the Cobb-Douglas production function, this can be written as


Klt
AltHlt
( 1)
= 

Kht
AhtHht
( 1)
(5.7)
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The capital market equilibrium condition implies that the capital stock per total
efciency unit of labor must be identical in each sector; therefore
Klt
AltHlt
=
Kht
AhtHht
(5.8)
As already mentioned, it is assumed that the economy is small and open to the world
capital market. It follows that


Klt
AltHlt
( 1)
= 

Kht
AhtHht
( 1)
= r (5.9)
Equation 5.9 shows that the aggregate capital amount of both sectors are determined
negatively by the world interest rate and positively by the total efcient labor forces in the
respective sector (AjtHjt, with j = h; l).
It is assumed that competitive labor is only mobile within each economy, whereas
capital is perfectly mobile within economies and also among regions (globally). In a com-
petitive labor market, the wage rate w, received by each group of workers is equal to the
marginal product of labor in the respective sector.
In sector h, the marginal product of white-collar workers' labor at time t is
@Yt
@Hht
= (1  )

Kht
AhtHht

Aht = wht (5.10)
and the marginal product of blue-collar labor in sector l at time t is
@Yt
@Hlt
= (1  )

Klt
AltHlt

Alt = wlt (5.11)
wht denotes the wage rate of white-collar workers working with high technology Aht
at time t and wlt the wage rate of blue-collar workers working with low technology Alt at
time t. Equations 5.10 and 5.11 show that wage rate depends positively on the technology
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parameter and the aggregate capital amount and negatively on the aggregate human capital
in the respective sector (Hjt = hjtLjt, with j = h; l).
Production Relations under Inequality of Labor Groups Regarding Disparity in
Skills and Wage Rates
This section presents an analysis of short- and long-term development brought about
by production relations under inequality of labor groups. The rst part focuses on the
short-term development and the effects of change in human capital quality. The second
part concentrates on the long-term development. Finally, the last part unveils strategies that
may bring about convergence and development in the economy.
Inequality between the two labor groups in terms of disparity in skills and wage rates
can be found in several developing countries. A signicant factor behind this situation
is the difference in levels of education, which makes for unequally skilled workers. This
not only leads to disparity in income, but also retards further development in the affected
countries.
In the model, it is assumed that, in an economy with disparity in income and wage
rates between groups of workers, white-collar workers are educated to a higher level and
possess a higher quality of human capital than blue-collar workers. None of the white-collar
workers has any incentive to leave their current work position and take on a blue-collar job.
The level of economic disparity is directly inuenced by the difference between the lev-
els of education, incomes and the technologies used. Factors that play an essential role in
income and economic disparity are a difference in wage rates and in education levels of hu-
man capital. Admittedly, workers' wage rates and skills affect the progression of income,
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but it is technological progress that mainly determines the development of wage rates and
production in both sectors. The development of these determinants  education levels, wage
rates and technology parameters  reects the evolution of the respective economy. In order
to achieve sustainable economic development, it is important not only to consider the ad-
vancement in production and income, but also to take thorough account of the improvement
of the economic structure, particularly in association with the disparity among production
sectors and different skills of the workers. Appropriate strategies that steer these factors
onto an efcient course of development will support economic convergence and assist eco-
nomic development. The model reveals two main schemes that inuence the convergence
of the economic structure.
First, in equilibrium, equations 5.10 and 5.11 reveal that disparity in wage rates be-
tween high- and low-skilled workers can be reduced through a convergence of technolo-
gies between the two sectors. This can be induced, rst, by enhancing technology used
in the low-skilled labor sector, with a view to catching up with the standard of technology
available to high-skilled workers, and second, by means of supporting the transformation
of low- into high-skilled labor. The economy should be bolstered towards economy with
high-skilled labor working with a higher technology level with high quality in both man-
ufacturing and services in the main economic sector. The second main scheme works on
the basis that income can be continuously increased by enhancing the quality of human
resources. Convergence in income disparities can always be combated by improving the
quality of low-skilled labor to catch up with high-skilled labor, mainly through investment
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in education. This will be substantially assisted by a convergence of wage rates between
the two sectors.
Short-Term Effects Induced by Increase in Qualities of Human Capital
In the short-term, it is assumed that signicant technological progress can not be
achieved through Research and Development (R&D). Technology parameters remain the
same, since R&D needs a certain period of time to initiate substantial change in techno-
logical progress. Technology parameters, nevertheless, can be augmented by taking over
foreign technology, although good quality labor must be available within the economy to
implement this. It is further assumed that progression in skills through investment in edu-
cation in this short period is not high enough to allow individuals to change jobs by moving
to the production sector, which requires higher skills and utilizes higher technology. In
other words, despite the fact that individuals in both sectors can develop skills, individuals
working in sector l are not capable of advancing to sector h. In comparison, individuals
working in sector h have no incentives to take a demotion by moving from the high- to the
low-skilled sector. This means that no job-switching between workers from the two sec-
tors is allowed. In addition, it is assumed that the quality of human capital of workers from
both groups hjt, can only be ameliorated.
Considering equations 5.10 and 5.11, both equations shows that in the equilibrium
an increase in the efciency unit of human capital hjt, all in all, does not affect the ratio
between the two wage rates. In the beginning, a ceteris paribus increase inHht, through in-
vestment in education, brings about a temporarily decrease in the wage rate of high-skilled
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labor, thus breaking the equilibrium. Precisely, an increase in the quality of human capi-
tal in sector h leads to an increase in the efciency unit of labor hht, therefore temporarily
lowering the wage rate of sector h but not that of sector l. In analogy, an increase in Hlt
by investing in education an amount that is not high enough to transform low- into a high-
skilled labor, brings about a temporarily decrease in the wage rate of low-skilled labor, also
breaking the equilibrium status. As time passes, the equilibrium condition of the competi-
tive international capital market will lead to a quotient of low- and high-skilled wage rates
equivalent to that which existed under the old equilibrium. In other words, an increase
in Hht (Hlt) will raise productivity in sector h (sector l) which reduces the wage rate of
high-skilled (low-skilled) labor rst, leading to productivity enhancement and additional
opportunity gains in sector h (sector l). As a consequence, rms ask for additional capi-
tal investments. And since this is a small and open economy with capital perfectly mobile
capital, foreign capital will be raised until old equilibrium is reached where the wage rate
rises to the old equilibrium level again.
Although convergence of wage rate disparity through improvement in human capital
is transient and instable, an increase in the quality of human capital will raise the efciency
unit of labor hjt, leading to higher income in the end (the income of an individual is dened
by the product of wage rate and efciency unit of labor wjthjt). To conclude this section,
enhancement in the quality of low-skilled labor does not reduce disparity of wage rates, but
at best supports the convergence of income disparity between both groups in the short- as
well as in the long-term.
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Long-Term Effects Induced by an Increase in the Quality of Human Capital
According to equations 5.10 and 5.11, an increase in the quality of human capital
supports the improvement of income levels, but it does not affect wage rate disparity pos-
itively or negatively. In the long-run, the crucial factor to increase wage rates and their
parity is improvement and convergence of the technology parameters of both sectors. Be-
sides investment in R&D, technology advancement in both production sectors can also be
brought about by external effects initiated by international trade, joint ventures and, signif-
icantly, through economic integration with advanced economies. It must be considered that
technologies taken over from partner countries must be implemented and operated using
the available abilities of existing human resources. As a result, one of the main issues that
should be considered, in order to achieve a prosperous long-term development, is the ne-
cessity to implement strategies which enhance human resources and technological progress
while simultaneously reducing the gap between sectors.
In the short-term development, the realistically achievable improvement in human
capital and accompanying progression in skills are not great enough for individuals from
low-skilled sector to alter their jobs to the high-skilled production sector. In the long-run,
however, the individuals in sector l have time to invest in education, allowing them to
switch to sector h. Transformation from low- to high-skilled labor raises the amount of
high-skilled labor available and at the same time, reduces the amount of low-skilled la-
bor (increase in Lht and reduction in Llt, since Lt = Lht + Llt must be valid). As long
as the economy has not yet reached a status of parity in technologies, skills, wage rates
and income, an increase in individuals' skills in the long-run will lead to transformation in
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the structure of production sectors. As their skills improve, individuals will search for the
best choice, assuming that they will always strive for higher income. If blue-collar work-
ers gain enough skills to become a white-collar worker, they will always choose work in
the white-collar sector, because under inequality of labor groups with disparity in skills
and wage rates, white-collar workers earn a higher salary than blue-collar workers (re-
ferring to equations 5.10 and 5.11 with Aht  Alt). This leads to the fact that, in the
long-run, improvement of low-skilled labor brings about not only convergence in income,
but also transformation in the production structure of the economy, moving away from the
less productive sector to a highly productive sector with high technology and high skill
requirements. Another nding is the fact that, in the long-term development, income con-
vergence, led by the merging skills levels of both groups of workers, will be signicantly
supported by convergence in wage rates applied by convergence in technologies used in
both production sectors as shown in the equations 5.10 and 5.11.
Convergence among technology parameters brings about wage parity and supports
income convergence, but it also retards the structural transformation effect in those two
production sectors. Nonetheless, in the end, when different technology parameters between
both sectors become equal, wage rates will be equal in equilibrium and preferences of the
individuals, which are based on wages, will remain the same in term of their choice of
preferred working sectors. At this point, the convergence of the economy is only dependent
on the quality of human resources and the prospect of economic convergence becomes
achievable.
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To conclude, the long-term strategies that the economy should work on are conver-
gence and enhancement of technology and human capital quality in both sectors. Conver-
gence will support economic fundamentals and enhancement will lead to further economic
development. Cooperation of the two main strategies will not only strengthen internal eco-
nomic structures and ease the problems triggered by the external pressure, but also bring
about the opportunities for the economy to initiate development measures within the coun-
try and the region.
In this model, the analysis of long-term development will study the development of
the relation among two generations. This means that the focus is now on the progress of the
human capital of the children and the outcome of the economic convergence and growth
will be resulted in the era of the second generation. The conditions for the economic
development still remain the same as the above mentioned long-term analysis.
Strategies to Pursue
As examined in the discussions of short- and long-term development, this model
suggests strategies that can assist economic convergence, which makes a substantial con-
tribution to national economic development and serves as a basis for achieving interna-
tional economic integration. Solving economic disparity is the main issue addressed by
this model. There are two main strategies that should be pursued simultaneously.
1) Augmentation and convergence in the quality of human resources within
a sector and between sectors
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This can mainly be supported by investment in education and income distribution.
Enhancement of the workers' human capital quality and education not only increases pro-
ductivity and workers' income, but also raises their standard of living. In addition, higher
education also supports development in the political and social sectors. Improvement in ex-
pertise, in the long-run, leads to an increase in the number of high-skilled workers in sector
h and a decrease in the number of low-skilled workers working in sector l. This brings
about structural change in the economy. The sector with greater productivity, which ap-
plies high-skilled labor and advanced technology, will become the main economic sector.
This structural change does not impair convergence; on the contrary, it even assists income
convergence and furthers economic development (by increasing the number of high-skilled
workers and reducing that of low-skilled workers). The course of the structural change
slows down as the convergence of wage rates increases. It is important that the quality of
individuals' human capital not only be improved, but also converge. If only higher edu-
cated individuals develop their skills and the less-educated individuals do not, the levels of
income in the two groups will diverge.
2) Technological progress and fusing of technology levels in the two eco-
nomic sectors
Technological progress raises the productivity of the economy and increases the wage
rate of the individuals. This, in turn, augments individuals' income and living-standards.
Moreover, convergence of technology levels in both sectors leads to convergence of wage
rates, which signicantly assists income convergence. Difference in technologies between
sectors, contrarily, brings about disparity in wage rates and increases income inequality. It
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should be noted that the effect of income divergence, triggered by the difference in technol-
ogy levels between both sectors, can also be lessened by the relatively greater improvement
of individuals' skills and the education of the low-skilled workers. This will lead to income
convergence and changes in production structure, as previously stated.
5.2 Modeling a Short-Term Strategy
This section focuses on short-term economic development, where economic progress is de-
pendent on the improvement of the labor force's education and skills. The short-term period
is dened as having a length of 5 years. The model studies solely a small, open economy
that functions in a completely competitive world, where international capital movement is
unrestricted, contrary to international labor movement, which is not free.
5.2.1 Basic Preferences
The short-term development of an economy is analyzed in this section, over a ve-year
period in the individuals' working lives, hereafter called the work period. The working
generation consists of Lt individuals who join the labor force. The whole work period
is subdivided into the rst work period and the second work period. The rst work
period (at time t) refers to the present working status of individuals. In the rst period, each
individual is endowed with one unit usage of time, which is allocated between individual's
labor force participation, savings and expenditures on further education. The second period
denotes the future status of the individuals (at time t + 1) where individuals receive their
second period wage, which will be higher if they have invested in education, to reect the
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increased quality of their skills. They also receive their individual savings with accrued
interest in the second period. The increase in income is brought about by a new wage rate,
if there is positive real wage growth and by higher human capital, if the individuals have
invested in further education in the rst period. For simplicity, it is assumed that if an
individual has not invested in further education, his or her skills in the second work period
remain the same as they were in the rst period. In this case, the adjustment of individuals'
new income in the next period depends entirely on the change in the wage rate. Further,
it is assumed that the income of the individuals in the rst work period consists solely of
income from working and that the individuals possess no assets from previous savings.
The utility of each member of the working generation t, is dened over consumption
in the rst work period ct, and over obtained assets in the second period, which comprise
second period income and savings wt+1ht+1 + s (1 + r)wtht. The utility of an individual i
is presented by the function
Uit = (cit)
(1 ) (wit+1hit+1 + si (1 + r)withit)
 (5.12)
In the rst work period, the consumption potential of the individuals is dependent on
their chosen amount of savings and expenses for their further education. The consumption
dened in the individual's utility needs to be above subsistence level cs > 0, which is
assumed to be identical for every individual. Each person is endowed with one unit usage
of time which is allocated between labor force participation, savings and investment in
education. Hence, the utility function of an individual i can also be written as
Uit = (withit (1  ei   si))(1 ) (wit+1hit+1 + si (1 + r)withit) (5.13)
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 is the fraction of the individual's unit usage time endowment required for each unit
of further education. ei  0 is the level of further education that an individual attains
and therefore, ei is the time cost for an individual i to invest in further education. wit
is the wage rate per efciency unit of labor for individual i in the rst work period. This
is given for all individuals as well as the level of efciency unit of individual i in the
rst work period hit. wit+1 is the expected wage rate per efciency unit of labor in the
second work period which can be estimated by the production relations, precisely by the
marginal product of labor. hit+1 is the efciency unit of human capital of an individual
i during the same working period. It is assumed that hit+1 is the sum of the previous
level of efciency unit of an individual i and the additional performance brought about
by investment in education hitei which is dened by the product of the efciency unit of
human capital that an individual already possesses hit, and the level of additional education
that an individual i attains depending on investment efforts in the rst period ei.
hit+1 = hit (1 + ei) (5.14)
hitei is the additional performance brought about by investment in education or in-
dividual i's absolute gained level of further education and withitei is the absolute cost of
investment in education of an individual i. It should be noted that even if the unit of fur-
ther education. ei between individuals are identical, the individual i's absolute gained level
of further education hitei may vary due to different level of efciency unit hit. And also
the absolute cost of investment in education withitei may vary due to different level of
efciency unit hit and wage rate wit.
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The utility function of an individual i can now be written as
Uit = (withit (1  ei   si))(1 ) (wit+1hit (1 + ei) + si (1 + r)withit) (5.15)
The utility function is strictly monotone increasing and strictly quasi-concave; satis-
fying the conventional boundary conditions that assure that, for sufciently high income,
an interior solution exists for the utility maximization problem.
Nonetheless, for a sufciently low level of income, the subsistence consumption con-
straint is binding; in this case there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption
level. If an individual i devotes his or her entire time endowment to labor force partici-
pation, the amount of income that he or she would earn in the rst work period would be
withit. Since the potential income in the rst period is divided between expenditure on fur-
ther education, at opportunity costs ei , savings at the saving rate si, and consumption cit,
then individual i will meet the following budget constraint
withit (ei + si) + cit  withit (5.16)
5.2.2 Optimization
Optimization with Respect to Education Level e under Exogenous Saving rate
An individual iwho earns an amount of income at a certain (high) level, meaning that
the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding, will set his or her own saving rate.
In the model saving rate is assumed to be exogenously given and will be dened by s. In
contrast, individuals whose income is low, so that the subsistence consumption constraint is
binding, will rst spend on subsistence consumption cs. The remaining income, therefore,
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will be left for savings which will not exceed the saving rate s. If any income still remains
after expenses on subsistence consumption and savings, then individuals will invest this
amount in education. This is summarized under the equation
s =

s if zit > zb
max [0; s] if zit  zb (5.17)
where zit is the level of potential income of an individual i at the period t and zb the
level of potential income at which the subsistence constraint is just binding, with
zb =
cs
1  ei    s
(5.18)
Under the aforementioned assumption of an exogenous saving rate, an individual i
chooses the level of investment in education and therefore sets his or her own consumption
and future assets in such a way as to maximize the utility function. Simultaneously, the
individual i has to assure the level of subsistence consumption. This can be written as
max
ei
Uit (5.19)
= max
ei
(withit (1  ei   s))(1 ) (wit+1hit (1 + ei) + s (1 + r)withit)
s:t:withit (1  ei   s)  cit
Optimization with respect to ei implies
@Uit
@ei
= 0 (5.20)
This represents the following interior solution
ei =


(1  s)  (1  )

1 + s (1 + r)
wit
wit+1

(5.21)
For a sufciently low level of income, the subsistence consumption constraint is bind-
ing and there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption level. Subject to the
240 5 Theory on Economic Development and Integration
budget constraint
withit (1  ei   s)  cs (5.22)
the corner solution is
ei =
1


1  s  c
s
withit

(5.23)
It follows that
ei =
8<:


(1  s)  (1  )
h
1 + s (1 + r) wit
wit+1
i
if zit > zb
1


1  s  cs
withit

if zit  zb
(5.24)
To conclude, all individuals whose subsistence consumption constraint is not binding
will invest a certain amount in their education in order to make careers and gain income at
the second working period at the level of ei =


(1  s)   (1  )
h
1 + s (1 + r) wit
wit+1
i
.
In this case, the chosen level of education ei , is negatively dependent on the quotient of
the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further education  , and on
the world interest rate r (since in this model it is assumed that the economy is small and
open to the world capital market and capital is perfectly mobile, r is therefore dened as
exogenously given) which reects the opportunity gain, if an individual i invests in savings.
Moreover, it is positively dependent on the preference parameter  of the second period and
negatively dependent on the ratio of the present wage rate to the expected wage rate in the
next period. The chosen level of education ei , is, in the main, considered and calculated
by evaluation of the balance between the following two terms. First, the decision on the
chosen level of education ei , is positively affected by the rst term on the right hand side
of the equation 

(1  s), which represents the importance of the setting of consumption
rate in the rst period, inuenced by the preference parameter, the costs of education and
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savings. Second, it is affected by the second term (1  )
h
1 + s (1 + r) wit
wit+1
i
, which
denotes potential earnings in the second period in negative association with gains from the
savings reected by the world interest rate and ratio of the present wage rate wit, to the
expected wage rate in the next period wit+1.
The rst concern of individuals who earn a low level of income is their subsistence
consumption level. In other words, as long as the potential income of an individual i zit 
withit, is lower than zb, then this individual will secure his or her subsistence consumption
before paying attention to his or her career. It follows that the chosen level of education
is highly dependent on the subsistence consumption level cs. The fraction of time invested
in further education is conditioned on the remaining budget, depending on the saving rate
and the ratio of the subsistence consumption level cs to the potential income of individual
i withit, ei  = 1  s  c
s
withit
() ei = 1

1  s  cs
withit

.
The level of an individual's income plays a major role in the decision on the optimal
education level, for individuals whose budget constraint is binding. If the wage rate per
efciency unit of labor rises, individuals can cover subsistence consumption with smaller
labor force participation. As a result, the fraction of time invested in further education will
rise, the individuals will invest more in education and their human capital will increase.
The optimal education level is, in the main, positively dependent on the individuals' income
withit, and negatively on the costs of education (fraction of the individual's unit usage time
endowment required for each unit of further education)  , and the subsistence consumption
level cs.
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Simulations and Analyzes
This section presents simulations of the individuals' optimized levels of investment
in education ei . The simulations distinguish two cases: the case of individuals who earn an
amount of income at a certain high level, greater than zb and the case of individuals who
earn an amount of income at a certain low level, lower than or equal to zb.
As an example for the simulations in this section, modeling of situation within a coun-
try is illustrated. In this case, the parameters used in the model are based on Thai statistics.
Parameter change is included, in order to study the consequences of the development be-
tween the two period. The constant saving rate is set to 10%. Subsistence consumption
level cs, is evaluated by estimating the average consumption rate for the year 2000. This is
estimated with the help of an analysis by Andrew J. Healy and Somchai Jitsuchon (2004)
which provided the rst comprehensive estimates of Thai poverty and inequality and di-
vided the region into rural and urban218. Average consumption is 76% for the rural area and
69% for the urban area. To estimate the subsistence consumption level cs, the model uses
the average consumption in percent between both rural and urban areas, which amounts
to 72.5%. Multiplying this value with the weighed average of nominal salaries of blue-
collar workers219 for the year 2000 (7530.70 Baht or 188.27 US dollars) gives 5,459.76
Baht or 136.50 US dollars. So this is the level of subsistence consumption. The average
monthly income of 12,150 Baht or 303.75 US dollars is estimated using the exchange rate
218 For simplicity, the model utilizes the Socio-Economic Survey (SES) average and not from the Map aver-
age.
219 For more about the wage rates of the blue-collar workers, see the coming sections
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in 2000220. Actually, in the model the expected real wage rate in period t+1must be deter-
mined by the equation @Yt+1
@Hjt+1
= (1  )

Kjt+1
Ajt+1Hjt+1

Ajt+1 = wjt+1; j = h; l: However,
for simplicity in the simulations, the expected real wage rate in the period t+1 is estimated
using the real wage growth with the wage rate at the period t as a benchmark. This means
that wjt+1 = wjt(1 + expected real wage growth rate). The wage rate at period t is ap-
proximately 6,714 Baht per month in the fourth quarter (October-December) or 167.85 US
dollars per month221. The expected rate of real wage growth for Thailand was estimated to
-2.49% from 2000-2004. For calculation of the expected ve-year-real-interest-rate, the de-
posit rate for Thailand is used, estimated at 16.03% from January 2000 to January 2004222.
For simplicity, the model sets the individual's weighed preference at the rate of 0.5 in the
rst work period (1  ); this is equal to weighed preference in the second work period
, meaning that individual's preferences are indifferent regarding earnings in one period as
opposed to the other.
Case No. 1: Simulations for the case of individuals with income higher than zb
Figures 5.1-5.4 show simulations of the optimal level of education of individuals who
earn income higher than zb under varied parameters. Figure 5.1 simulates the individual's
optimal level of education for different fractions of the individual's unit time endowment
required for each unit of further education. This shows that the lower the costs of each
unit of further education, the (progressively) higher the level of education individuals will
choose. Notably, above a certain (high) level of cost for each unit of further education (in
220 National Statistical ofce Thailand, see http://www.eppo.go.th/indicators/indicator-labor.html
221 Report of the Labor Force Survey, 1999-2000, National Statistical ofce, see http://www.nso.go.th/eng/stat/lfs/lfstab7/.htm
222 E-Thailand Monthly Economic Review by Economic Information Section, Fiscal Policy Ofce, see Bank
of Thailand, Economic Data, www.bot.or.th
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Figure 5.1: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the individuals whose budget
constraint is not binding) x = level of the costs of each unit of further education (x =
0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of
eduation meaning that e = 0.)
this simulation, 0.79), the individuals have no incentive to invest in their further education.
Figure 5.2 shows that the higher (lower) the time preference for the next period, the higher
(lower) the individuals' incentive to invest in their further education. Figure 5.3 shows that
the lower the saving rate set by an individual, the higher his or her investment in education.
In addition, at a high saving rate, individuals have no incentive to further their education.
One factor that affects the decision on the level of further education is the expected real
wage growth. It is reasonable that the higher the expected real wage growth, the higher
the individuals' incentive to invest in further education, as illustrated by Figure 5.4. This
factor, however, has only a moderate effect on individuals' decisions.
Case No. 2: Simulations for the case of individuals with income lower than zb
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Figure 5.2: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of preference parameter (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is not binding)
x = level of preference parameter for both working time periods (x = 0,...,1), e  0 (if
the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
Figure 5.3: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of saving rate (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is not binding) x = level of
saving rate (x = 0,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses
no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.4: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of real wage growth in a ve-year-interval (case of the individuals whose budget constraint
is not binding) x = level of real wage growth in a ve-year-interval (x = -0.5,...,1), e  0 (if
the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
Figure 5.5: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of subsistence consumption (dollars per month) (case of the individuals whose budget con-
straint is binding) x = level of subsistence consumption in dollars per month (x = 90,...,170),
e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation mean-
ing that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.6: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the individuals whose budget
constraint is binding) x = level of costs of each unit of further education (x = 0.1,...,1),
e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation
meaning that e = 0.)
Figures 5.5-5.9 show the simulations of the optimal level of education of those indi-
viduals who earn less than zb under varied parameters. Since the budget constraint of these
individuals is binding, the level of subsistence consumption is very relevant for their deci-
sion on further investment in education. Figure 5.5 shows that the lower the level of the
subsistence consumption, the higher the incentives of the individuals to invest in further
education. Individuals who have decits in subsistence consumption will not be able to in-
vest in education. Hence, the government can support the individuals' education by ceteris
paribus reducing the costs of subsistence consumption. This action will provide an impulse
to increase the number of people who develop the quality of their human capital. Reducing
costs of subsistence consumption can be achieved, for instance, by supporting market com-
petition, hindering and eliminating monopoly and oligopoly, as well as taking advantage of
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Figure 5.7: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of effective unit of labor of an individual (case of the individuals whose budget constraint
is binding) x = level of effective unit of labor of an individual (x = 0.7,...,1), e  0 (if
the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
the potential for specialization, economies of scale and economies of scope. International
trade is a relevant factor that supports this undertaking, in particular by means of economic
cooperation or/and economic integration. As soon as subsistence consumption is covered,
individuals may have opportunities to invest in education and also in savings. Other fac-
tors, besides the subsistence consumption level, that affect the individuals' decisions are
the costs of each unit of further education, the level of individuals' effective unit of labor
at the starting period and the wage rate of the individuals at the starting period. Figure 5.6
shows that the higher the costs of each unit of further education, the lower the level of in-
vestment in education. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 illustrate that the higher the level of effective
unit of labor and the wage rate of the individual at the starting period, the higher, although
degressively, the investments in education. Similarly to the case of individuals whose in-
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Figure 5.8: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of wage rate (dollars per month) (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is binding)
x = level of wage rate in dollars per month (x = 160,...,270), e  0 (if the simulation shows
that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
Figure 5.9: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of saving rate (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is binding) x = level of
saving rate (x = 0,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses
no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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come is higher than zb, the higher the saving rate set by the individuals, the lower the level
of investment in further education. Notably, at a high saving rate, the individuals do not
have large enough budgets to invest in further education, as shown in Figure 5.9.
5.2.3 Theoretical Analysis of Short-Term Development under
Inequality among Labor Groups: Application for the
East-Southeast Asian Countries (in particular the ASEAN)
This section analyzes a possibility for short-term economic development in the East-Southeast
Asian countries, in particular the ASEAN. The structure of the modeling is derived from
the basic model presented earlier. This section includes analyzes of division between the
two labor groups. The main characteristic of this model refers to reduction of inequality in
skills and wage rates between labor groups within and among the countries. This leads to a
decrease in income disparity, supports domestic and regional economies and enhances the
prospect of economic integration.
Preferences, Budget Constraints and Optimization
Conguration of the utility function and the budget constraint remain the same as the
basic utility introduced in the previous section. In this section, individuals are divided into
two groups, one high-skilled, the white-collar workers and one low-skilled, the blue-collar
workers. Notably, the higher the level of economic disparity, the higher the difference be-
tween the levels of education and technologies used in the two groups and vice versa. The
discrepancy between individuals from these two different groups lies in the income dispar-
ity which is reected by disparity in wage rates and qualities of human capital. When it
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comes to the quality of human capital or the effective unit of labor hit, in the model, the
pre-result of the rate of effective unit of labor can only be compared within the respective
worker's group. This means that the rate of effective unit of labor of an individual i, who
works in the white-collar group (blue-collar group) hiht (hilt), can only be directly com-
pared with a white-collar worker (blue-collar worker). It is assumed that there is a level of
qualication that a blue-collar worker has to achieve (through education, training or expe-
rience), in order to work in the white-collar sector and transform into a white-collar worker
with time. Therefore, in order to make a comparison of the qualities of human capital
between both groups, following calculation has to be made; to compare the level of the ef-
fective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt to the one of the white-collar hiht, the effective
unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt, has to multiply with the ratio between wage rate of the
blue- and white-collar: hilt wiltwiht .
Utility function and budget constraint of an individual i with high-skills are
Uiht = (wihthiht (1  ei   si))(1 ) (wiht+1hiht+1 + si (1 + r)wihthiht) (5.25)
s:t:wihthiht (ei + si) + ciht  wihthiht
Utility function and budget constraint of an individual i with low-skills are
Uilt = (wilthilt (1  ei   si))(1 ) (wilt+1hilt+1 + si (1 + r)wilthilt) (5.26)
s:t:wilthilt (ei + si) + cilt  wilthilt
Under a given saving rate s, individuals choose the level of investment in education
and as a result, choose their own consumption level and their future assets; maximizing
their own utility function. Simultaneously, they have to assure subsistence consumption as
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well. This can be written as
max
ei
Uijt (5.27)
= max
ei
(wijthijt (1  ei   s))(1 ) (wijt+1hijt (1 + ei) + s (1 + r)wijthijt)
s:t:wijthijt (ei + s) + cijt  wijthijt; ei  0; j = h; l
Optimization with respect to ei implies
@Uijt
@ei
= 0; j = h; l (5.28)
This represents the interior solution (for the case of zijt > zb, with j = h; l):
ei =


(1  s)  (1  )

1 + s (1 + r)
wijt
wijt+1

; j = h; l (5.29)
For a sufciently low level of income, the subsistence consumption constraint is bind-
ing and there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption level. In contrast to the
interior solution which comes to play for any individual who earns enough salary or in other
words zijt > zb, the corner solution exists for an individual who earns a sufciently low in-
come level, meaning that zijt  zb. Subject to the budget constraint, with s = max [0; s],
wijthijt (1  ei   s)  cs; j = h; l (5.30)
the corner solution for an individual with zijt  zb is
ei =
1


1  s  c
s
wijthijt

; j = h; l (5.31)
Considering both cases, it follows that
ei =
8<:


(1  s)  (1  )
h
1 + s (1 + r)
wijt
wijt+1
i
; j = h; l if zijt > zb
1


1  s  cs
wijthijt

; j = h; l if zijt  zb
(5.32)
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Theoretical Analysis of Short-Term Development
The model in this section presents strategies which aim to develop the foundations
of the economy including convergence of income and human capital development. Two
issues considered, which are in equilibrium, are as follows:
a) The decision on investment in education made by an individual i
ei =
8<:


(1  s)  (1  )
h
1 + s (1 + r)
wijt
wijt+1
i
; j = h; l if zijt > zb
1


1  s  cs
wijthijt

; j = h; l if zijt  zb
b) and the optimal wage rate of both sectors dened by
marginal product of white-collar workers in the sector h
@Yt
@Hht
= (1  )

Kht
AhtHht

Aht = wht
and marginal product of blue-collar labors in the sector l
@Yt
@Hlt
= (1  )

Klt
AltHlt

Alt = wlt
Equations shown in (a) and (b) indicate the relationship between the production sector
and the labor sector in equilibrium. In the short-run, individuals take wage rates for granted
(exogenously given). Therefore they simply decide on their level of human capital, in order
to enhance income. The predominant factor that affects this decision is the level of the
individuals' expenditure. This depends mainly on the level of consumption, which is, in
turn, dependent on savings and investment in education. Since the saving rate is assumed to
be exogenous, the level of investment in education plays the major role of decisive factor.
Equation shown in (a) denotes that the chosen level of education ei , of individuals
who earn income higher than zb is negatively dependent on the fraction of the individual's
unit time endowment required for each unit of further education  , and on the world interest
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rate r. In addition, it is dependent on the preference parameter of the second work period
, and also on the ratio of the present wage rate and the expected wage rate in the next pe-
riod. The chosen level of education ei , is considered by weighed evaluation between the
two terms. The rst term on the right represents the importance of setting the consumption
rate in the rst period, inuenced by the preference parameter, costs of education and in-
vestment in savings. The second term denotes preference of earning in the second period,
in association with gains from savings reected by the world interest rate r and the ratio of
the present wage rate wit, and expected wage rate in the next period wit+1. In contrast, an
individual i, who earns income at a low level, lower than zb, is concerned primarily with
his or her subsistence consumption. The chosen level of education is highly dependent on
the subsistence consumption level cs. The fraction of time spent on investment in further
education is conditioned on the saving rate, the ratio of subsistence consumption level cs,
and the individual potential income withit.
According to the aforementioned outcomes, ways to support development and con-
vergence of the economy include structuring wage rates, in particular, convergence of wage
rates. In addition, raising income and reducing the costs of subsistence consumption cs, are
also relevant, since these assist all individuals, particularly those who earn less than zb.
Case No. 1: Structuring the wage rate
The model implies that structuring the wage rate seems difcult to achieve in the
short-run. Equations shown in (b) indicate that convergence of wage rate ratio can be
augmented through changes to technology parameters. However, it is assumed that the
technology parameter can not be signicantly improved by R&D in the short-term; there-
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fore, convergence of wage rates cannot be supported this way. One way to structure wage
rates and/or promote their convergence is to support economic integration, which can bring
about technological enhancement, for instance, through joint ventures with countries that
possess higher technology. This is one of the reasons to encourage economic integration.
Notably, individuals cannot change working sectors in the short-run. So, without the inu-
ence of economic integration, the wage rates of both sectors remain the same. Even though
structuring wage rates is hard to pursue, in the short-run, economic development may be
supported through investment in education in both sectors. This action, however, only sup-
ports individuals whose level of participation in education is positive, ei  0. This raises
the level of production and the individuals' income, brings about growth in GDP and in-
creases standards of living. Enhancement of labor qualities can be augmented by reducing
costs of education  , the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of further education ei . Measures to this end can be initiated and supported by the
government, as well as by rms and NGOs.
Since the world interest rate and saving rate are exogenously given, the model shows
that every individual earning more than zb will invest at the same rate in education ei , as
show on equation shown in (a). This means that, the effective unit of labor of the blue-
collar and the one of the white-collar, will not converge. And if there is disparity of the
effective unit of labor of the blue-collar and the one of the white-collar, the absolute gained
effective unit of labor of workers hihtei and hiltei, even continues to diverge. In this case,
convergence of wage rates and income cannot be achieved within the groups of individuals
earning more than zb.
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Case No. 2: Raising income and reducing the costs of subsistence consumption
This strategy supports income earners who gain income below zb. The optimization
result shows that these individuals choose their optimal level of education, which is subject
to ei = 1

1  s  cs
wijthijt

; j = h; l. These individuals are concerned about their sub-
sistence consumption rst, before deciding on their education level. It can be concluded
that the higher the income and the lower the costs of subsistence consumption, the higher
the chosen level of an individual's investment in education. This points out the fact that
if there are many low-income earners (below zb) in the economy, then this does not only
reect high income disparity, but also gradually leads to an increase in divergence. This
happens because actually low-income earners have less means to invest in education than
the high-income earners do and for individuals who earn less than zb, the chosen level of
investment in education depends on income which is much lower than income of the high-
income earners and the costs of subsistence consumption. This situation makes the income
gap bigger. In other words, without an effective distribution system, the higher the number
of the low-income-earners, the more disparity and divergence problems arise.
A strategy that an economy with disparity in income, labor skills and wage rates
should pursue is to support the low-skilled workers, in particular those with signicantly
low income, in order to hinder divergence in the economy. According to this model, stimu-
lating incentives to invest in education is one of the most signicant factors. In association
with equations shown in (a) and (b), this plan of action can be carried out by reducing costs
of subsistence consumption and/or increasing the income of low-income-earners.
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To conclude, in the short-term, the wage rate ratio remains the same, ignoring the ef-
fects of economic integration. So the only way to raise income is to increase the level of
quality of human capital. This, however, can only be improved by investment in educa-
tion. A proper approach is to reduce the costs of subsistence consumption. While reducing
the costs of education only supports the individuals whose ei  0, reducing the costs of
subsistence consumption, on the other hand, benets all individuals, particularly those who
are not able to invest in education. Reduction of the costs of subsistence consumption very
much gives a start-up for very low earners to enter human capital development. Soon af-
ter, they are able to gain benet from support, through reduction of the costs of education,
i.e. in the same way in which the higher income earners benet. Reduction of the costs of
subsistence consumption directly increases the value of a given income level and improves
the standard of living, since the individuals have more income remaining to spend in other
ways, for example on education. The smaller the costs of subsistence consumption, the
higher the chosen level of investment in education. Consequently, improvement in educa-
tion raises the quality of labor and raises income which in turn, reinforces the chosen level
of education.
Simulations and Analyzes
This section presents simulations of the individual i's optimized level of investment
in education ei . In the simulations, two distinct cases are considered; namely, the case
of white-collar workers and the case of the blue-collar workers. As aforementioned, there
is no job-switching between sectors in the short-run, since there are time constraints on a
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blue-collar worker investing in education and becoming a white-collar worker. However,
there can be job-switching within a group, for instance, an agricultural laborer can invest in
education and gain enough knowledge to switch to a higher-wage job within the blue-collar
group, for instance, becoming a manufacturer. Respectively, an employee in clerical, sales
or service jobs can invest in education and gain enough knowledge to switch to a higher
wage job within the group, for instance becoming a proprietor, a technical or a professional.
In the simulations an analysis of one country is done (in the forthcoming part an
analysis of a regional grouping is illustrated under simulation of ASEAN). Thai economy
is used as an example. The economic indicators of Thailand are set as follows.
a) The constant saving rate is set at 10%.
b) The subsistence consumption level cs is evaluated by estimating the average
consumption rate for the year 2000. The outcome is estimated with help of an analysis by
Andrew J. Healy and Somchai Jitsuchon (2004) which reveals that the average consump-
tion is 76% for the rural area and 69% for the urban area. The average consumption in the
urban area is less than that in the rural area, since wages are higher in the urban area and
therefore people in the urban area have more money left, despite higher consumption. The
model uses the percentage average consumption for rural and urban areas which amounts to
72.5%. The nominal monthly wage by occupation in 2000 is derived from the National Sta-
tistical Ofce. The model distinguishes these data into two groups, the rst being the group
of white-collar workers, encompassing professional and technical workers, proprietors and
employees in clerical, sales, and service jobs. The second group consists of blue-collar
workers, encompassing manufacturing workers, miscellaneous workers, agriculture (own
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account, in other words; self-employed) and agriculture (agricultural laborers), see Table
5.1-5.2. The national average of nominal salaries in Thailand in 2000 was 12,150 Baht in
2000 or 303.75 US dollars (estimated using the year 2000 exchange rate)223. The weighed
average of nominal salaries of the white-collar workers in 2000 was 18,242.43 Baht or
456.06 US dollars. The weighed average of nominal salaries of blue-collar workers in
2000 was 7,530.70 Baht or 188.27 US dollars. Obviously, there is a discrepancy between
the wage rates of white-collar workers and blue-collar workers; the wage rate of the latter
group is about 2.4 times less than that of the white-collar workers. To calculate the level of
subsistence consumption, the model uses data on average consumption from Healy and Jit-
suchon (2004). An average is taken between rural and urban areas (72.5%) and multiplied
with the income of the blue-collar workers whose effective unit of labor hilt, amounts to 1.
The resulting level of subsistence consumption is 5,459.76 Baht or 136.50 US dollars.
Occupation Monthly salaries
Percentage share of workers
to total workers
Professional and
technical
31,366 Baht
784.15 US dollars
6.60%
Managerial and
administrative
- 3.10%
Proprietors
17,039 Baht
425.98 US dollars
-
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
14,678 Baht
366.95 US dollars
Clerical 3.90%
Sales 14.90%
Services 5.50%
Source: National Statistical Ofce, Report of the Household Socio-Economic and
National Statistical Ofce Survey Labour Force
Table 5.1: Nominal monthly salaries and percentage share of employed persons of white
collar workers to total workers in Thailand, 2000 (in baht and US dollars)
223 National Statistical ofce Thailand, see http://www.eppo.go.th/indicators/indicator-labor.html
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Occupation Monthly salaries
Percentage share of workers
to total workers
Manufacturing workers
10,500 Baht
262.50 US dollars
21.90%
Transportation and
communication
- 4%
Miscellaneous
6,869 Baht
171.70 US dollars
-
Agriculture
Self-employed
7,014 Baht
175.35 US dollars
Agricultural
laborers
3,575 Baht
89.36 US dollars
40%
Source: National Statistical Ofce, Report of the Household Socio-Economic and
National Statistical Ofce Survey Labour Force
Table 5.2: Nominal monthly salaries and percentage share of employed persons of the
blue-collar workers to total workers in Thailand, 2000 (in Baht and US dollars)
c) The wage rate of each group is set by calculating the average monthly salaries
of the workers in the respective group. This means that the wage rate of a white-collar
worker amounts to 18,242.43 Baht or 456.06 US dollars and the wage rate of a blue-collar
worker is 7,530.70 Baht or 188.27 US dollars. The different income among workers in
different occupations is dened through different levels of the effective unit of labor of an
individual i, hit, which encompasses the quantity and quality of work. The calculation of
hit for each occupation is dened by the ratio of the monthly salary of an individual i to the
wage rate of the respective group, see Table 5.3 and 5.4.
d) Actually the expected real wage rate in period t + 1 must be determined by
the equation @Yt+1
@Hjt+1
= (1  )

Kjt+1
Ajt+1Hjt+1

Ajt+1 = wjt+1; j = h; l. For simplicity in
this simulation, the expected real wage rate in period t + 1 is estimated using real wage
growth, with the wage rate at period t set as a benchmark, which means that wjt+1 = wjt(1
+ expected real wage growth rate). The wage rate at period t is estimated in US dollars
per month and differs between white- and blue-collar groups. These are subdivided by
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Occupation Monthly salaries
Individual i's effective units of labor of
the white-collar group
[ratio between monthly salary and
benchmark wage-rate
(average wage-rate of
the white-collar workers)]
Professional and
technical
31,366 Baht
784.15 US dollars
1.72
Managerial and
administrative
- -
Proprietors
17,039 Baht
425.98 US dollars
0.93
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
14,678 Baht
366.95 US dollars
0.80
Source: The data of the monthly salaries are based on National Statistical Ofce,
Report of the Household Socio-Economic and National Statistical Ofce Survey Labor Force,
Survey for monthly salaries of Thai workers
Table 5.3: Individual's effective units of labor working in the white-collar workers' group
in Thailand, 2000, by occupation (in baht and US dollars)
Occupation Monthly salaries
Individual i's effective units of labor of
the blue-collar group
[ratio between monthly salary and
benchmark wage-rate
(average wage-rate of
the blue-collar workers)]
Manufacturing workers
10,500 Baht
262.50 US dollars
1.39
Transportation and
communication
- -
Miscellaneous
6,869 Baht
171.70 US dollars
0.91
Agriculture
Self-employed
7,014 Baht
175.35 US dollars
Agricultural
laborers
3,575 Baht
89.36 US dollars
Self-employed 0.92
Agricultural
laborers
0.47
Source: The data of the monthly salaries are based on National Statistical Ofce,
Report of the Household Socio-Economic and National Statistical Ofce Survey Labour Force,
Survey for monthly salaries of Thai workers
Table 5.4: Individual's effective units of labor working in the blue-collar workers' group in
Thailand, 2000, by occupation
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occupations within a group. The real wage growth rate of Thailand is estimated using data
from 2000 to 2004 provided by a labor force survey from the National Statistical Ofce224.
In this case, the value is -2.49%. Although the real wage growth rate is negative in this
case, it does not have a large effect on optimal education level, see Figure 5.4.
e) The expected 5-year real interest rate (in this case deposit rates are used) from
2000-2004225 was calculated and estimated to 16.03%
f) For simplicity, the model sets the individual's weighed preference in the rst
work period (1  ), at the same rate as the weighed preference in the second work period
, namely 0.5 ( = 0.5). This means that individual's preferences are indifferent, regarding
earnings in one period as opposed to the other.
g) The fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of
further education  , is taken as a variable in the model, in order to analyze the development
of the economy under different levels of  .
In the model, simulations of the chosen optimal education level are analyzed under
varying parameters to nd feasible strategies that can bring about economic convergence
and development. Assuming  = 0.5, since zb = cs
1 ei  s , it follows that z
b = 187.05 US
dollars. This indicates that all white-collar workers and manufacturing workers from the
blue-collar group earn income more than zb and their budget constraints are not binding. In
224 Real wage (average wage of employed person) growth in Thailand in 2000 was 1.4%, in 2001 0.6%,
in 2002 1.5%, in 2003 0.4%(estimate) and in 2004 0.6%(quarter 1), from Labor force survey, National
Statistical Ofce.
225 E-Thailand Monthly Economic Review by Economic Information Section, Fiscal Policy Ofce, see Bank
of Thailand, Economic Data (deposit rates: 4.375% (estimated from 4%-4.75%) for 2000, 4% for 2001,
3.25% for 2002, 1.75% for 2003 and 1.75% for 2004, these rates are from January each year), www.bot.or.th
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Figure 5.10: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the white-collar workers and
the manufacturing workers from the blue-collar group in Thailand) x = level of the costs of
each unit of further education (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the
individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
the contrary, the rest of blue-collar workers earn less than zb and their budget constraints
are binding.
Figure 5.10 shows the chosen percentage education level of the workers whose in-
come is above zb in Thailand under different levels of cost for each unit of further education.
The gure illustrates that the lower the costs of education, the (progressively) higher the
chosen level of education investment on the part of the workers. While, under the same rate
of parameters, those who earn above zb choose the same level of education ei , the chosen
optimal level of education diverges among individuals with different occupations whose
income is below zb. The miscellaneous and self-employed agricultural workers choose a
much lower education level, see Figure 5.11-5.12. It is clearly apparent that, agricultural la-
borers do not have enough income to invest in education. Their income does not even cover
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Figure 5.11: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different lev-
els of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the blue-collar workers, mis-
cellaneous workers, in Thailand) x = level of costs of each unit of further education (x =
0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of
eduation meaning that e = 0.)
Figure 5.12: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different lev-
els of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the blue-collar workers, agri-
culture (on own account), in Thailand) x = level of costs of each unit of further education
(x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of
eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.13: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different lev-
els of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the blue-collar workers, agri-
cultural laborers, in Thailand) x = level of costs of each unit of further education (x =
0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of
eduation meaning that e = 0.)
the subsistence consumption level and savings set in the model, see Figure 5.13. Moreover,
the simulations reveal that whereas white-collar workers and the manufacturing workers
stop investing in further education at a certain level of costs of education, the rest of the
blue-collar workers, in the contrary, always invest in education at any rate of the costs of
education. However, they can only do so if they have enough income remaining to invest
in education; the lower the costs of education, the higher the investment in it. Yet, due to
the budget constraint, this situation hardly comes to play.
The results of the simulations (shown in the Tables 5.5) can be analyzed as follows.
Under identical parameters, the workers who choose the same rate of the level of further
education ei , are; all the white-collar workers (consisting of professional, technical, man-
agerial and administrative workers, proprietors and employees in clerical, sales and service
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Occupation
Chosen level of education ei ;
Absolute gained level of investment in education hite

i ;
Effective unit of labor period t+ 1; hit+1
Comparison of individual i's
effective units of labor
no comparison hit;
comparable hit;
comparable hit+1
Professional and
technical
0.34 (0.3405);
0.59 (0.5857);
2.31 (2.3057)
1.72;
1.72;
2.31 (2.3057)
Managerial and
administrative
- -
Proprietors
0.34 (0.3405);
0.32 (0.3167);
1.25 (1.2467)
0.93;
0.93;
1.25 (1.2467)
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
0.34 (0.3405);
0.27 (0.2724);
1.07 (1.0724)
0.80;
0.80;
1.07 (1.0724)
Manufacturing workers
0.34 (0.3405);
0.47 (0.4733);
1.86 (1.8633)
1.39
0.57 (0.5738)a;
0.77 (0.7692)a
Transportation and
communication
- -
Miscellaneous
0.21 (0.2065);
0.19 (0.1879);
1.10 (1.0979)
0.91;
0.38 (0.3757)a;
0.45 (0.4532)a
Agriculture
Self-employed
0.22 (0.2239);
0.21 (0.2060);
1.13 (1.1260)
Agricultural
laborers
0;
0;
0.47
Self-employed
0.92;
0.38 (0.3798)a;
0.47 (0.4648)a
Agricultural
laborers
0.47;
0.19 (0.1940)a;
0.19 (0.1940)a
a: In the model, in order to make a comparison of the qualities of human capital between both groups, following calculation has to be made;
to compare the level of the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt to the one of the white-collar hiht,
the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt has to multiply with the ratio between wage-rate of the blue- and white-collar: hilt
wilt
wiht
.
Table 5.5: Comparison of the individual's effective units of labor working in the blue-collar
workers' group and in the white-collar workers' group calculated in the model in Thailand,
2000, by occupation (under the benchmark of the white-collar workers)
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jobs) and in addition, from the blue-collar group, the manufacturing workers. It must be
noted that even though the chosen levels of further education of the individuals earning
above zb are identical, the absolute levels of human capital of different occupations di-
verge. Since hit+1 = hit (1 + ei ), after investment in education, the human capital in the
period t + 1 of individuals who possessed higher human capital in the period t will be
higher. This can be interpreted by the higher ability of the higher educated individuals
to absorb knowledge. And since the higher income earners possess higher income in the
beginning, this means that they have higher potential to invest more in education regard-
ing qualitative issue for instances. According to the group of low-income-earners earning
below zb, the chosen levels of further education are not identical, but diverge, thus the
absolute level of human capital of different occupations in this group diverge to a higher
extent. In Thailand the chosen level of education ei , of the individuals earning above zb
accounts to 0.34 (0.3405), hence for professional and technical the absolute level of invest-
ment in education hitei , is 0.59 (0.5857) and the human capital in the period t + 1 hit+1,
raises from 1.72 to 2.31 (2.3057), for proprietors is 0.32 (0.3167) and raises from 0.93 to
1.25 (1.2467), and for employees in clerical, sales and service jobs is 0.27 (0.2724) and
raises from 0.80 to 1.07 (1.0724) and in addition, from the blue-collar group, for the manu-
facturing workers is 0.47 (0.4733) and raises from 1.39 to 1.86 (1.8633). The chosen level
of education of the individuals earning below zb accounts to 0.21 (0.2065) for miscella-
neous, 0.22 (0.2239) for self-employed agricultural workers and 0 for agricultural laborers.
They are all from the blue-collar group. Due to these results, for miscellaneous the ab-
solute level of investment in education hitei , is 0.19 (0.1879) and the human capital in the
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period t+1 hit+1, raises from 0.91 to 1.10 (1.0979), for self-employed agricultural workers
is 0.21 (0.2060) and raises from 0.92 to 1.13 (1.1260), and for agricultural laborers is 0 and
remains 0.80. The results from both groups illustrate the divergent trend of the economy,
particularly divergent trend is much higher among individuals earning below zb.
In order to compare the level of human capital of the both worker-groups together,
calculation226 must be done. Table 5.5 also shows the adjustment of the results of the level
human capital, in order to make a comparison among the two labor groups The results
of the white-collar workers remain the same, whereas the results of the blue-collar work-
ers will be adjusted. The comparable absolute human capital of a manufacturing worker
changes from 0.57 (0.5738) in the rst period to 0.77 (0.7692) in the second period, of a
miscellaneous changes from 0.38 (0.3757) to 0.45 (0.4532), of a self-employed agricultural
worker changes from 0.38 (0.3798) to 0.47 (0.4648) and of an agricultural laborer remains
0.19, since he or she is not able to invest in education. To conclude, the results illustrate
that without support the divergence movement of an economy with disparity in wage rates
and qualities of workers continues.
Considering the results of the simulations for Thailand, the model shows two cases of
economic development and reveals relevant opportunities for development. The path this
development follows should create a balance between a signicant increase in the qual-
ity of human capital, leading to a signicant increase in income and, on the other hand,
convergence of quality of human capital and thus convergence of income.
226 In the model, in order to make a comparison of the qualities of human capital between both groups, following calculation has to be made; to compare
the level of the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt to the one of the white-collar hiht, the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt has to
multiply with the ratio between wage-rate of the white- and blue-collar: hilt
wilt
wiht
.
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1) If the costs of education are low and do not exceed the rate of about 0.7 (the
rate at which the level of investment in education on the part of individuals who earn above
zb in Thailand is higher than the level of investment in education by those who earn below
zb), the economy succeeds in enhancing human capital quality considerably. The lower the
costs of education, the higher the quality of human capital that results and hence, the higher
the individuals' income.
2) If the costs of education are high and exceed the rate of about 0.7 (the rate at
which the level of investment in education by individuals who earn above zb in Thailand is
lower than the level of investment in education by those who earn below zb), then the quality
of human capital and the income of those who earn above and below zb converge. However,
once the costs of education have reached a certain high level, at which those individuals
earning above zb stop investing in education, the individuals earning below zb reduce their
level of investment in education and the convergent trend slowly decreases. Another point
is the fact that there is no convergence within the group of individuals earning below zb; in
fact, there is divergence within the group. In addition, the total development of the quality
of human capital in the economy, thus the total income, is much lower in this case. The
higher the costs of education, the lower the total development of human capital quality and
the higher the divergence within the group of individuals earning below zb. However as
asserted, due to the budget constraint, this situation hardly comes to play.
The results illustrate that, even though there is a way to achieve convergence between
the two sectors, this seems to slow down the development process of total human capital
quality signicantly, and in turn, the total income. So the convergence process might be
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very slow and insignicant. On the other hand, it is easier to achieve a higher total gain
for the economy through an overall increase in total human capital quality. The simula-
tions show that total increase in human capital quality can be achieved by reducing the
costs of education. This, however, leads to divergence. The wage rate discrepancy between
white- and blue-collar workers, or precisely between individuals earning above and below
zb, is not eased. In contrast, the divergence in human capital quality and income increases.
This happens as a consequence of a greatly slower improvement in the quality of labor in
the blue-collar sector, while the white-collar workers invest in further education at a much
higher rate. Even though, due to the model, manufacturing workers choose the level of ed-
ucation at the same rate as the white-collar workers, it must be noted that this rate cannot be
compared with the rate of the white-collar workers directly, since this rate must be adjusted
rst. After the adjustment, it can be observed that the rate of the level of education of the
manufacturing workers is much lower than the one of the white-collar workers. Moreover,
the absolute gained education is still lower and the manufacturing workers only make up
21.9% of the active population. The largest percentage share belongs to the agriculture sec-
tor, with 40%. Self-employed agricultural workers and the miscellaneous workers invest
at a much lower rate in education. Agricultural laborers can only afford to be concerned
about their subsistence; they do not have sufcient means to invest in further education.
Without any support, there can be a trade-off between rapid economic development
and increasing divergence within and between labor-groups. For this reason, distribution
strategies must be implemented, in order to ease divergence and support convergence.
These strategies are increasing the income of low earners and reducing subsistence con-
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sumption and education costs. Economic cooperation and integration are other potential
means to achieve convergence and growth.
In the short-run, a strategy that may be able to bolster income level for all workers is
to support education. In particular, effective distribution policies should be implemented in
order to support income convergence. Accordingly, the blue-collar workers should receive
the most support in particular for those who earn a very low income. In the case of Thai-
land reduction of the costs of education, however, will not affect or help the agricultural
laborers, since these workers have to secure their subsistence consumption and do not have
enough means left to invest in education. Therefore, another point that should be seriously
considered is to secure the subsistence level of the people, which is one of the most rele-
vant foundations for the development of the economy. The government has to solve this
foundation problem directly through subsidies or indirectly by decreasing the subsistence
consumption level, which would stand all the people in good stead. A remarkably achieved
result should be the situation, in which all the people gain income higher than zb.
To conclude, the analysis and simulations reveal two important strategies that should
be pursued in the short-run.
1) Reducing the costs of education and implementing income distribution
This leads to high investment in further education. The higher the reduction of educa-
tion costs, the higher the investment in education. This brings about an increase in quality
of human capital and also an increase in income. Yet, in the short run, this strategy has
a shortcoming. It is the fact that the high income earners generally invest more in educa-
tion than the lower income earners, and again, the higher the reduction of education costs,
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the higher the investment in education of the high income earners and the higher the di-
vergence movement. This leads to divergence in the economic structure, in particular in
human capital quality and income. One possible way to counteract or even overcome this
shortcoming is to invest specically more in education and distributing income for the low
income earners, the blue-collar workers. The higher the income distribution in favor of in-
dividuals earning below zb, the higher the investment in education. Notably, the best move
is asserted to distribute or bolster the economy so that all the people gain income higher
than zb.
2) Reducing the costs of subsistence consumption
This is a relevant strategy to ease economic divergence. It does not discriminate be-
tween the two groups, since every individual receives the resulting advantages. While re-
ducing the costs of education only benets individuals who are able to invest in education,
reducing the costs of subsistence consumption, on the other hand, supports all individuals.
If this reduction is high enough, individuals who previously were not able to invest in edu-
cation will be able to invest in education after the reduction. This implies that the quality of
human capital and income will rise and the number of individuals who receive advantages
from the educational support will increase. Moreover, economic divergence will be less-
ened, since, according to the model, while the high income earners, i.e. the white-collar
workers and the manufacturing workers, (under the same rate of parameters) invest at the
same rate in education ei , despite different occupation and income, the level of low-income
earners' investment in education depends on the level of subsistence consumption.
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Combining the reduction of subsistence consumption costs with higher investment in
educational support for low-income earners not only increases the number of individuals
who invest in education and the quality of human capital in the blue-collar group, but also
reduces the divergence movement.
5.2.4 Theoretical Analysis of Short-Term Development under
Inequality between Labor Groups: A Political Economy Issue
The previous section analyzed short-term strategies that should be implemented in order
to strengthen the economic structure and indicated proper distribution strategies that are
needed. The results showed that without support there is divergence problem in an econ-
omy with human capital, technology, wage rate and income disparity. What should be done
are reducing costs of education and costs of subsistence consumption in order to support the
human capital development. In particular, reduction of subsistence consumption will ease
divergence movement as well. Technology improvement brings about economic develop-
ment and also positively inuence wage rate. Economic improvement is not difcult to be
achieved, contrarily to economic convergence which will necessitate support-mechanism.
Distribution is one relevant mechanism that can initiate convergence or at least hinder the
divergent trend of the economy. The government is an institution that plays a relevant role
in contributing to development of the economy. This is a decisive factor for convergence
and distribution; in particular, supporting education and implementing strategies that lower
the costs of subsistence consumption will secure the foundation of the economy and bolster
short and long-term development.
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This section analyzes the role of the government in developing the economy, includ-
ing convergence and augmentation of the quality of human capital and income. The section
is divided into two parts. The rst part presents an analysis of the individual's choice of an
optimal education level under existence of the government sector. The individuals are con-
cerned with a trade-off between paying income tax and gains from government spending.
Modeling the individual's optimal chosen level of education under inclusion of the gov-
ernment sector and the determination of individual's preferred level of income tax rate are
described rst. Afterwards, the simulations and analyzes of the both cases are presented.
The second part describes a theoretical outcome of the political decision-making process
by means of the Median Voter Theorem. This decision-making process applies to deci-
sions on political strategies that indirectly affect the development of economic growth and
economic convergence. It shows that this outcome might not be the rst best solution, since
political decisions can be distorted by the motivation of obtaining the majority of votes for
the coming election period. The model mainly examines spending on education, individ-
uals' income level and distribution issues. The political strategies taken into consideration
are restricted to one dimension, namely the chosen rate of income tax.
Preferences and Budget Constraints
Conguration of the utility function and the budget constraints are the same as the
utility function and budget constraints of individuals in the previous sections. An addi-
tional factor that has to be further analyzed is the rate of taxation. It is assumed that each
individual has to pay income tax at rate t (0  t  1), on which the government spending
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is dependent. Part of the government spending is invested in educational support which is
denoted in percentage of . The rest of government spending will be provided for direct
income distribution, denoted by g. However, the government budget collected through tax-
ation bears the deadweight-loss of taxation, thus a part of the taxed amount is lost and
cannot be transferred to the people. This can be expressed using the equation:
total government spending =

tt   t
2
t
2

wtht,
where wtht is the average income per worker in the period t.
Hence, the utility function and budget constraints of an individual i with high-skills
are
Uiht =
(wihthiht (1  ei   s  tt) + gt)(1 )
(wiht+1hiht+1 (1  tt+1) + s (1 + r)wihthiht + gt+1) (5.33)
s:t:wihthiht (ei + s+ tt) + ciht   gt  wihthiht
The utility function and budget constraints of an individual i with low-skills are
Uilt =
(wilthilt (1  ei   s  tt) + gt)(1 )
(wilt+1hilt+1 (1  tt+1) + s (1 + r)wilthilt + gt+1) (5.34)
s:t:wilthilt (ei + s+ tt) + cilt   gt  wilthilt
Optimization
Optimization in this case is subdivided into two situations. From the individual's
viewpoint, it is assumed that both situations considered are independent of each other. The
rst is optimization of the level of education level and the second optimization of the tax
rate.
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1) With regard to the decision on the optimal education level, individuals con-
sider the tax rate as given and take the costs of education and own net income into account.
2) When it comes to the decision on optimal tax rate, individuals  particularly
during the voting period  will make a decision about the optimal tax rate. This happens
after each individual has already made a decision about household planning. Political par-
ties offer programs which should achieve the best voting results. In the model, the political
program is reduced to one dimension and is assigned to the income tax rate. As this time
comes, each individual will evaluate his or her preference on the political programs offered
by parties and vote for the party which has policies that best suit his or her preference. Each
individual has already chosen levels of consumption, savings and investment in education
and takes his or her level of income after expenses (these expenses include consumption,
savings and investment in education) and the advantages attaining from public goods into
account to nd his or her preferred political program.
Optimizing the Education Level
It is assumed that, choosing an education level, each individual only takes his or
her net income as a benchmark, which refers to the income after tax and savings. The
individuals do not endogenize the tax rate in the optimization of their education level, but
take the tax rate as given. Under given saving rate s and tax rate, an individual i chooses the
level of his or her investments in education and chooses his or her own consumption and
future assets that maximize the utility function. Simultaneously, individual i has to assure
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his or her subsistence consumption. This can be formulated as
max
ei
Uijt (5.35)
= max
ei
(wijthijt (1  ei   s  tt) + gt)(1 )
(wijt+1hijt (1 + ei) (1  tt+1) + s (1 + r)wijthijt + gt+1)
s:t:wijthijt (1  ei   s  tt) + gt  cijt; ei  0;
gt = (1  )

tt   t
2
t
2

wtht; gt+1 = (1  )

tt+1   t
2
t+1
2

wt+1ht+1;
 =   

tt   t
2
t
2

; j = h; l
It is assumed that the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for
each unit of further education (the cost of the education unit)  , depends positively on
xed costs , and negatively on the share of government budget for investment in educa-
tion, which can be formulated as 

tt   t
2
t
2

. Government support for education has both
qualitative and quantitative characteristics, for instance the provision of new schools, new
materials for study, reduction in tuition fees or no fees at all and also increase in instruc-
tors' qualities. This government support also bears the deadweight-loss of taxation. Thus,
the function of  can be written as  =   

tt   t
2
t
2

.
Optimization with respect to ei implies
@Uijt
@ei
= 0; j = h; l (5.36)
This represents the interior solution (for the case of zijt > ztb, with j = h; l):
ei =

 

tt  t
2
t
2
 1  s  tt + (1  )tt   t2t2  wthtwijthijt 
(1 )
(1 tt+1)
h
1  tt+1 + s (1 + r) wijtwijt+1 + (1  )

tt+1   t
2
t+1
2

wt+1ht+1
wijt+1hijt
i ; j = h; l
(5.37)
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where zijt is the level of potential income of an individual i at the period t and
ztb the level of potential income at which the subsistence constraint is just binding, with
ztb = c
s gt
1 ei  s tt . It should be noted that the level of potential income at which the subsis-
tence constraint is just binding under inclusion of income tax and government spending ztb,
might not be the same as the level of potential income at which the subsistence constraint
is just binding without income tax and government spending zb, calculated in the previous
section. The additional variables that the potential income of an individual now encom-
passes are additional expense due to income tax and gain from public goods. Assuming
 = 0.5, it follows that ztb = 184.58 US dollars. This indicates that all of the white-collar
workers and the manufacturing workers from the blue-collar group earn income more than
ztb, therefore their budget constraints are not binding. This means that there is an inte-
rior solution for these high income earners. In the contrary, the rest of the blue-collar
workers earn less than ztb and their budget constraints are binding. For a sufciently low
level of income, the subsistence consumption constraint is binding and there is a corner
solution with respect to the consumption level. The corner solution exists exclusively for
individuals who earn a sufciently low income level. So subject to the budget constraint
wijthijt (1  ei   s  tt) + gt  cs; j = h; l, with s = max [0; s], the corner solution for
an individual is
ei =

  

tt   t
2
t
2
 1  s  tt + (1  )tt   t2t
2

wtht
wijthijt
  c
s
wijthijt

; j = h; l
(5.38)
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It follows that
ei =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:

 
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2
 1  s  tt + (1  )tt   t2t2  wthtwijthijt 
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)
(1 tt+1)
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1  tt+1 + s (1 + r) wijtwijt+1 + (1  )

tt+1   t
2
t+1
2

wt+1ht+1
wijt+1hijt
i
;
j = h; l
if zijt > ztb

 

tt  t
2
t
2
 1  s  tt + (1  )tt   t2t2  wthtwijthijt   cswijthijt
; j = h; l
if zijt  ztb
(5.39)
Equation 5.39 shows the results of the chosen level of education ei , of individuals
who earn income higher and lower (or equal to) than ztb. The chosen level of education ei ,
of individuals who earn income higher than ztb is negatively dependent on the fraction of
the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further education  and on
the world interest rate r. The structure is quite similar to the former case where government
spending and income tax are not included. ei is positively dependent on the preference
parameter of the second work period , and negatively on the ratio of today's wage rate to
the expected wage rate in the next period. In this case (with government interference) ei in
addition depends negatively on the level of income tax rates of both periods, since income
tax decreases the remaining income an individual can use for investment in education. The
level of public goods of period t, weighted by the average individual's income level in
the same period, supports the decision on the chosen level of education, whereas the level
of public goods of period t + 1, weighted by the wage rate of the period t + 1 and the
effective unit of labor of individual i, hampers the decision. To conclude, the chosen level
of education, ei , is considered by the weighted evaluation between, positively, the rst term
on the right hand side of the equation, which represents the consumption potential in the
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rst period, and, the second term which denotes the earning potential in the second period.
This earning potential (the second term) includes, the gains from saving reected by the
world interest rate r, and weighted by the ratio of today's wage rate wijt and the expected
wage rate at the next period wijt+1, which negatively affect the chosen level of education.
It also includes the distribution effect denoted by the ratio of the average income in the next
period and the net expected income in the next period  by the calculation of the net the
expected income in the next period, the tax rate of the next period also has to be concerned.
For both terms (the rst and the second terms), the preference parameter of the second work
period  and expenses due to income tax and gains from government spending are taken
into account as well.
The rst concern of an individual i, who earns an amount of income at a low level,
is his or her subsistence consumption. In other words, as long as the potential income of
an individual i (zit  wijthijt) is below ztb, then the individual i has to secure his or her
subsistence consumption in the rst place and pays attention to his or her career only as a
secondary priority. The chosen level of education level is highly dependent on the subsis-
tence consumption level cs. The fraction of time spent on investment in further education
is, therefore, conditioned on the saving rate, the income tax rate levied and in particular
the ratio of subsistence consumption level cs, to the potential income of the individual i,
wijthijt, and the ratio of support through government spending to the potential income of
the individual i, wijthijt.
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Optimization of the Tax Rate
Optimization of the tax rate is an issue that is of interest not only to individuals, but in
the short-term case, also to political parties who focus on the decisions of individuals in or-
der to make plans for political programs that suit the majority's preferences. In this model,
individuals pay precise intention to political programs, in particular to the offered income
tax rate, government spending on public goods and support of investment in education.
Under a given saving rate s and an already chosen education level, the individuals
choose their optimal tax rate, so as to maximize their own utility function. In doing so, they
take the level of government spending on public goods and share of support of investment in
education into account. Simultaneously, they have to assure their subsistence consumption.
This can be written as
max
tit
Uijt (5.40)
= max
tit
(wijthijt (1  ei   s  tit) + gt)(1 )
(wijt+1hijt (1 + ei) (1  tt+1) + s (1 + r)wijthijt + gt+1)
s:t:wijthijt (1  ei   s  tit) + gt  cijt; ei  0;
gt = (1  )

tt   t
2
t
2

wtht; gt+1 = (1  )

tt+1   t
2
t+1
2

wt+1ht+1;
 =   

tt   t
2
t
2

; j = h; l
it follows that
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max
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Optimization with respect to tit implies that
@Uijt
@tit
= 0; j = h; l (5.42)
This represents the interior solution (for the case of zijt > ztb, with j = h; l):
tit = 1 
1
(1  ) wtht
wijthijt
+ ei
; j = h; l (5.43)
There is an interior solution for an individual i who possesses high skills, earns a
higher wage and gains income that is high enough to secure his or her subsistence con-
sumption level. On the other hand, there is the corner solution which exclusively exists
for low-income earners, who earn a sufciently low level of income
 
zijt  ztb

and are
subject to the budget constraints wijthijt (1  ei   s  tit) + gt  cs. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the low-income earners, who earn a sufciently low income level
 
zijt  ztb

,
do not analyze their budget constraint thoroughly while making decision on their preferred
tax rate. That means they do not internalize the deadweight-loss of taxation in their de-
cision. Hence, the budget constraint, with s = max [0; s], regarded by these individuals
is
wijthijt (1  ei (  tit)  s  tit) + (1  ) tit wtht  cs (5.44)
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The corner solution for an individual with zijt  ztb, with j = h; l is
tit =
1 

s+ ei+
cs
wijthijt

1 

ei + (1  ) wthtwijthijt
 (5.45)
It follows that
tit =
8>>><>>>:
1  1
(1 ) wtht
wijthijt
+ei
; j = h; l if zijt > ztb
1 

s+ei+
cs
wijthijt

1 

ei+(1 ) wt
ht
wijthijt
 ; j = h; l if zijt  ztb (5.46)
To conclude, equations 5.43 and 5.46 show that the preferred tax-rate in the rst
period tit of individuals who earn income higher than ztb is positively dependent on the ratio
of average income in the economy wtht to individual's income wijthijt. This characterizes
an income distribution system, since, on the one hand, an individual whose income is below
average prefers a higher tax rate, the lower his or her income. On the other hand, an
individual with income higher than average prefers a lower tax rate. Besides, tit depends
positively on the level of government support for investment in education , weighted by
the level of investment in the education of the respective individual ei. The term in the
numerator on the right-hand-side term in the equations, (1  ) wtht
wijthijt
+ ei, shows two
decisive factors for the determination of individual's preferred tax rate.
1) The rst term (1  ) wtht
wijthijt
, indicates an income distribution system.
2) The second term ei, denotes the level of government support of investment
in education , weighted by the level of investment in education.
An individual i who earns an amount of income at a low level (the potential income
of an individual i (zit  wijthijt) is below ztb), has to take care of his or her subsistence
consumption in the rst place, as well as his or her other expenses, (in the model) encom-
284 5 Theory on Economic Development and Integration
passing savings and investment in education. The tax rate is, therefore, highly dependent
on the level of these expenses and their determinants. Equations 5.45 and 5.46 show that
choosing the preferred level of the tax rate depends on the ratio between the individual's
income after expenses and the received government support. In the equations, the term on
the right hand side can be interpreted as follows.
1) The denominator 1  

s+ ei+
cs
wijthijt

shows the individual's income af-
ter expenses, which depends negatively on the following expenses: savings at the rate s,
individual's own shared-expense on education without government support ei, and the
subsistence consumption level cs.
2) The numerator 1  

ei + (1  ) wthtwijthijt

shows the importance of the re-
ceived government support, which is weighted by the individual's gains from income distri-
bution and gains from the government share of investment in educational support. Finally,
the ratio of these two terms brings about the individuals' decision on the chosen tax rate.
5.2.5 Simulations and Analyses of the Education Level Chosen by
Individuals under Consideration of Tax rates and Advantages
Brought About by Government Spending
This section presents simulations and analyses of the optimized level of investment in
education, including considerations of paying income tax and gains through government
spending, as shown by the equation 5.39. The role of the government is emphasized in
association with two relevant policies, namely bolstering economic convergence and de-
velopment through support for education and income distribution. The simulations are
divided into the case of the white-collar and the case of the blue-collar workers.
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Indicators used in these simulations are the same as the ones used in previous sim-
ulations, where data from Thailand are applied. Additional indicators in this section are
the levels of expected income tax rate, and government support for investment in educa-
tion in percent . The model uses the personal income tax of Thailand as a benchmark.
This is imposed on an individual's net income at progressive graduated rates (notably, this
progressive tax rate assists income distribution directly). The net income is calculated as
follows: taxpayers are granted a standard deduction of 40% of their wage or salary earned
from employment, but not exceeds a maximum deduction of 60,000 Baht. There are more-
over granted a personal allowance of 30,000 Baht per individual, on which they pay no
tax, including allowances for a spouse, children, contributions to provident funds, the so-
cial security fund and charitable contributions, which normally play a role in reality; these
however are ignored in the model. The tax rates calculated for diverse occupations are pre-
sented in Table 5.6-5.7. Data for government support for investment in education in percent
for 2000 was estimated using the ratio of government expenditure on education affairs and
services (218.6 billion Baht) to total government expenditure (850.6 billion Baht). This
comes to 25.70% ( = 0.2570).
Due to the progressiveness of income tax rate, it is assumed that individuals with
different income levels have to pay different rates of income tax. Each individual, however,
receives the same and equal amount of advantages from the total government spending
tt   t
2
t
2

wtht, where tt is the average tax rate weighed by the share of the tax payers. tt
is estimated as follows227; tt = 0:16:6+0:0524:3+0:0521:9+0:0520+0206:6+24:3+21:9+20+20 = 0:0428. Markedly,
227 It is assumed that the percentage share of workers in the agriculture sector (40%) consists of own account
20% and agricultural laborers 20%.
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Occupation Monthly salaries Annual net incomea Income tax rateb
Professional and
technical
31,366 Baht
784.15 US dollars
286,392 Baht
7159.80 US dollars
10%
Managerial and
administrative
- - -
Proprietors
17,039 Baht
425.98 US dollars
114,468 Baht
2861.70 US dollars
10%
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
14,678 Baht
366.95 US dollars
86,136 Baht
2153.40 US dollars
5%
Source: National Statistical Ofce, Report of the Household Socio-Economic and
National Statistical Ofce Survey Labour Force, Survey and e-Thailand
a: Annual net income to be taxed = (monthly salary 12)  min[40% (monthly salary 12), 60,000]
b: Average income tax rate = 4.28%
Table 5.6: Income tax rate of white-collar workers in Thailand, 2000 (in baht and US
dollars)
Occupation Monthly salaries Annual net incomea Income tax rateb
Manufacturing workers
10,500 Baht
262.50 US dollars
75,600 Baht
1,890 US dollars
5%
Transportation and
communication
- - -
Miscellaneous
6,869 Baht
171.70 US dollars
49,456.8 Baht
1,236.40 US dollars
0%
Agriculture
Self-employed
7,014 Baht
175.35 US dollars
Agricultural
laborers
3,575 Baht
89.36 US dollars
Self-employed
50,500.8 Baht
1262.52 US dollars
Agricultural
laborers
25,740 Baht
643.50 US dollars
Self-employed 5%
Agricultural
laborers
0%
Source: National Statistical Ofce, Report of the Household Socio-Economic and
National Statistical Ofce Survey Labour Force, Survey and e-Thailand
a: Annual net income to be taxed = (monthly salary 12)  min[40% (monthly salary 12), 60,000]
b: Average income tax rate = 4.28%
Table 5.7: Estimated income tax rate of employed persons of the blue-collar workers in
Thailand, 2000 (in Baht and US dollars)
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the average income tax rate determined in this model (4.28%) deviates slightly from the
real average income tax rate of Thailand of 5%. Further, it is assumed for simplicity that
the expected personal income tax rate in the next period is equal to the rate in the rst
period.
Results of the simulations illustrate the effect of the distribution system by means
of income tax. On the one hand, there is direct distribution of income, which is imple-
mented through g, and on the other hand, there is indirect distribution conducted by ed-
ucational support, which includes government support for education nanced by income
tax. The government support for education is assumed to help the individuals by reduc-
ing the cost of each unit of further education. This can be interpreted by the equation
 =   

tt   t
2
t
2

, where  is the share of government spending on educational support,
estimated to be 25.70% for Thailand in the year 2000, and  is the real costs of educa-
tion before the introduction of government support. Tax rate t stands for the tax rate which
individuals have to pay individually and t is the average tax rate which is used in the calcu-
lation of the government spending. Hence, the equation of optimal education level can be
written as
ei =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
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2
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; j = h; l
if zijt  ztb
(5.47)
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Figure 5.14: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different lev-
els of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the white-collar workers, occu-
pation: professional and technical, in Thailand) x = level of the real costs of each unit of
further education (before including support from the government) (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if
the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
The results are illustrated by Figures 5.14-5.16, Figures 5.17-5.20, Tables 5.8, 5.9
and Tables 5.10, 5.11. Regarding the calculations, the expected individual's tax rate and
average tax rate in the period t + 1 are taken to be at the same rate as the tax rate in the
period t. Further, it is assumed that the individuals' expected real income growth rate in
the short-run is 0%, thus the real average income in the period t+ 1 is estimated by taking
the average income the present period.
The cases with and without introduction of income tax can be compared as follows.
The character of the simulations regarding the individuals' decision on the level of educa-
tion under inclusion of a tax rate in both sectors is, in the main, nearly equivalent to the
case without the income tax rate in the previous section. This is conrmed by the com-
parison of the Figures 5.14-5.16 and Figures 5.17-5.20 with the Figure 5.10 and Figures
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Figure 5.15: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment that is required for each unit of
further education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the white-collar workers,
occupation: proprietors, in Thailand) x = level of the real costs of each unit of further
education (before including support from the government) (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the
simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
Figure 5.16: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different lev-
els of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the white-collar workers, occu-
pation: employees in clerical, sales and service jobs) x = level of the real costs of each unit
of further education (before including support from the government) (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0
(if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning
that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.17: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different lev-
els of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the blue-collar workers, manu-
facturing workers, in Thailand) x = level of the real costs of each unit of further education
(before including support from the government) (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation
shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
Figure 5.18: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different lev-
els of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of further
education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the blue-collar workers, miscel-
laneous, in Thailand) x = level of the real costs of each unit of further education (before
including support from the government) (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that
e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.19: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment that is required for each unit of
further education (cost of each unit of further education) (case of the blue-collar workers,
self-employed agricultural workers, in Thailand) x = level of real cost of each unit of further
education (before including support from the government) (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the
simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
Figure 5.20: Simulation of the individual's optimal level of education under different levels
of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment that is required for each unit of
further education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the blue-collar workers,
agricultural laborers, in Thailand) x = level of real costs of each unit of further education
(before including support from the government) (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation
shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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5.11-5.13. So in general, the strategies that should be pursued are reduction of the costs of
education, particularly for the blue-collar workers, precisely the low skilled and the low in-
come workers. In addition, the reduction of the costs of subsistence consumption must not
be neglected. Both strategies can bring about an increase in the quality of human capital
and an increase in income. Combination of both strategies will be able not only to increase
the number of individuals who invest in education, hence increasing the quality of human
capital in the blue-collar group, but also counteract divergence.
While the analyses of the two cases, with and without income tax rate, are almost
equal under a rough estimation, the calculated comparisons of both cases analyzed in Ta-
bles 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10, 5.11 display precise differences and interesting results. The results
of the model illustrate that the government is limited in combining both aforementioned
strategies. On the one hand, easing divergence is likely, but on the other hand, bolstering
convergence is difcult to pursue. The Tables show data of the chosen level of further ed-
ucation and the utility of the individuals in the two different cases. In association with the
data of Thailand in 2000, the case with income tax has a total utility per worker of 270.35.
This is slightly less than the case without taxation, for which the gure is 277.61. In addi-
tion, taxation in Thailand also has a slightly negative effect on the result of the total level
of investment in further education per worker. The total level of investment in further edu-
cation per worker in the case with income tax is 0.23 (0.2290) which is less than the case
without taxation which amounts to 0.24 (0.2420). The reduction of total utility and level of
investment in education per worker in the case where income tax is introduced are partly
explained by the inherent deadweight-loss of taxation and distortion due to the govern-
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ment interference. On the other hand, as a positive trade-off, government actions (taxation
and support of education) have brought about distribution and have bolstered investment
in the education of the low income group. Both initiatives primarily lessen economic di-
vergence and assist convergence by increasing the human capital quality and income of the
low wage earners (it should be noted that the convergence in wage rates between sectors
will not be achieved in the short-run, since this can be brought about only by convergence
of technology parameters). In Thailand, signicant winners are workers who are levied in-
come tax at a low progressive rate or are exempt from paying tax. These include many
occupations from the blue-collar group, namely the miscellaneous workers, the agricul-
tural laborers and, to a lesser extent, the self-employed agricultural workers. In contrast,
all white-collar workers face a signicant loss of their utilities, particularly those who pay
income tax at a high rate. A group of the blue-collar workers, the manufacturers, also
undergo utility-loss, although only to a moderate extent. This matter of fact reveals that
government interference has an income-distributing and convergence effect, in particular
due to progressiveness of income tax.
According to the results, it can be concluded that without introduction of distribution
support (in this case, taxation, direct government spending and support in reduction of the
costs of education), the economic diversity gradually increases. The introduction of distri-
bution system eases the divergence movement; yet, economic convergence is very difcult
to pursue. Moreover, in the case of Thailand there is the trade-off between exerting distri-
bution and higher gain in total level of education and utility. In other words, introducing
taxation leads to distribution-effect and eases divergence, but this leads to the reduction
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Occupation Income tax rate
Chosen level of education ei ;
Absolute gained human capital hite

i ;
New Effective unit of labor hit+1
Utility
(under introduction of income tax)
Professional and
technical
10%
0.26 (0.2567);
0.44 (0.4415);
2.16 (2.1615)
728.9960
Managerial and
administrative
- - -
Proprietors 10%
0.26 (0.2610);
0.24 (0.2427);
1.17 (1.1727)
400.6743
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
5%
0.31 (0.3179);
0.25 (0.2543);
1.05 (1.0543)
367.5219
Level of further education per white-collar worker with introduction of income tax or with governmental interference = 0.2951
Utility per white-collar worker with introduction of income tax or with governmental interference = 444.7300
Level of further education per worker with introduction of income tax or with governmental interference = 0.2290
National utility with introduction of income tax or with governmental interference per worker = 270.3547
Table 5.8: Chosen level of education and utility of white-collar workers in Thailand, 2000
(with introduction of income tax)
Occupation
Chosen level of education ei ;
Absolute gained human capital hite

i ;
New Effective unit of labor hit+1
Utility
(without introduction of income tax)
Professional and
technical
0.34 (0.3405);
0.59 (0.5857);
2.31 (2.3057)
808.2400
Managerial and
administrative
- -
Proprietors
0.34 (0.3405);
0.32 (0.3167);
1.25 (1.2467)
439.1483
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
0.34 (0.3405);
0.27 (0.2724);
1.07 (1.0724)
378.0248
Level of further education per white-collar worker without introduction of income tax or without governmental interference = 0.3454
Utility per white-collar worker without introduction of income tax or without governmental interference = 469.9154
Level of further education per worker without introduction of income tax or without governmental interference = 0.2420
National utility without introduction of income tax or without governmental interference per worker = 277.6106
Table 5.9: Chosen level of education and utility of white-collar workers in Thailand, 2000
(without introduction of income tax)
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Occupation Income tax rate
Chosen level of education ei ;
Absolute gained human capital hite

i ;
New Effective unit of labor hit+1
Utility
(under introduction of income tax)
Manufacturing workers 5%
0.32 (0.3227);
0.45 (0.4486);
1.84 (1.8386)
264.1971
Transportation and
communication
- - -
Miscellaneous 0%
0.32 (0.3239);
0.30 (0.2948);
1.21 (1.2048)
187.1234
Agriculture
Self-employed 5%
Agricultural
laborers
0%
Self-employed
0.24 (0.2381);
0.22 (0.2191);
1.14 (1.1391)
Agricultural
laborers
0;
0;
0.47
Self-employed 178.5911
Agricultural
laborers
98.3569
Level of further education per blue-collar worker with introduction of income tax or with governmental interference = 0.1911
Utility per blue-collar worker with introduction of income tax or with governmental interference = 183.3079
Level of further education per worker with introduction of income tax or with governmental interference = 0.2290
National utility with introduction of income tax or with governmental interference per worker = 270.3547
Table 5.10: Chosen level of education and utility of blue-collar workers in Thailand, 2000
(with introduction of income tax)
Occupation
Chosen level of education ei ;
Absolute gained human capital hite

i ;
New Effective unit of labor hit+1
Utility
(without introduction of income tax)
Manufacturing workers
0.34 (0.3405);
0.47 (0.4733);
1.86 (1.8633)
269.7977
Transportation and
communication
- -
Miscellaneous
0.21 (0.2065);
0.19 (0.1879);
1.10 (1.0979)
175.8663
Agriculture
Self-employed
0.22 (0.2239);
0.21 (0.2060);
1.13 (1.1260)
Agricultural
laborers
0;
0;
0.47
Self-employed 177.9841
Agricultural
laborers
88.8612
Level of further education per blue-collar worker without introduction of income tax or without governmental interference = 0.1929
Utility per blue-collar worker without introduction of income tax or without governmental interference = 181.6135
Level of further education per worker without introduction of income tax or without governmental interference = 0.2420
National utility without introduction of income tax or without governmental interference per worker = 277.6106
Table 5.11: Chosen level of education and utility of blue-collar workers in Thailand, 2000
(without introduction of income tax)
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of total investment in education and utility comparing to the case without taxation. In the
case with government interference, considering the results displayed, there are two relevant
points that should be considered in putting together development strategies.
1) Although the introduction of income tax initiates income distribution and sup-
ports education for most workers, there is still a lack of support for investment in education
for workers who despite income distribution cannot secure their subsistence consumption
and are not be able to invest in education, in this case: the agricultural laborers. Hence,
securing the subsistence consumption for all people in the economy is one of the most
relevant basic necessities and policies to achieve it should be simultaneously implemented.
2) It is questionable whether this policy  income tax structure and/or the rate of
share of government support  is the rst best solution or not. If it is not, why is it that this
rate or better solutions are not implemented?
The second point is an issue that should be further considered in depth. The Table5.12
and 5.13 show the results of possible changes to the government share of educational sup-
port (both higher than the normal case, at 40%, and lower, at 10%; the normal case is
25.70%) based on the income tax structure of Thailand. When the share of government
support for education is increased (in this case to the rate of 40%), a distribution effect
can be observed, whereby there is better distribution and higher gains on the total level
of investment in further education compared to the normal case (25.70%). Compared to
the normal case, in which the level of total individuals' education amounts to 0.2290, the
increase of the share of government support for education to a higher level (40%) brings
about higher total individuals' education at rate of 0.2298, contrary to the case of lower
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Occupation
Chosen level of
education
under  = 10%
Chosen level of
education
under  = 25%
(normal case)
Chosen level of
education
under  = 40%
Chosen level of
education
without
government interference
Professional and
technical
0.2467 0.2567 0.2659 0.3454
Managerial and
administrative
- - - -
Proprietors 0.2518 0.2610 0.2695 0.3454
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
0.3085 0.3179 0.3267 0.3454
Total per white-collar worker 0.2951 0.2951 0.3137 0.3454
Manufacturing workers 0.3141 0.3227 0.3306 0.3454
Transportation and
communication
Miscellaneous 0.3431 0.3239 0.3059 0.2067
Agriculture, self-employed
Agricultural laborers
0.2582
0
0.2381
0
0.2194
0
0.2240
0
Total per blue-collar worker 0.1946 0.1911 0.1879 0.1929
Total per worker 0.2281 0.2290 0.2298 0.2420
Table 5.12: Comparison of the chosen level of education of white- and blue-collar workers
in Thailand, 2000 (under different rate of share of government support for education and
no government interference, short-term)
government support for education (10%), in which the education rate amounts to 0.2281.
Nonetheless, none of the three cases is conducive to a higher level of education than the
case without government interference.
Examining the results in the Table 5.12 precisely, in Thailand government support
for education leads to a moderate distribution effect and hardly to convergence. Com-
pared to the case without government interference, the very low income earners, including
the self-employed agricultural workers and the miscellaneous workers, invest more in ed-
ucation. The agricultural laborers still do not have enough means to invest in education.
These are workers whose income is below ztb. The increase in government support for ed-
ucation leads to the decline of the level of investment in education for these individuals.
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The increase in government support for education only benets those individuals who earn
income above ztb in distributive and development aspects. Additionally, due to the progres-
sive income tax rate, those who pay low income tax benet more, the lower the income tax
rate they have to pay. These are the employees in clerical, sales and service jobs and the
manufacturing workers, whose levels of investment in education are 0.3179 and 0.3227 re-
spectively in the normal case and 0.3267 and 0.3307 respectively under high government
support for education. This leads to an effective distribution effect, however only for the
group of individuals earning above ztb. In contrast, the individuals earning below ztb ob-
tain no advantages, and this leads to the reduction of their level of investment in education.
This is due to the fact that the individuals earning below ztb take only the remaining income
in the present period, or period t, into account when determining their optimal level of ed-
ucation, while the individuals earning above ztb consider two periods (period t, the present
and period t + 1, the future). Furthermore, these poorer workers prefer direct distribution
via g over indirect distribution via a reduction of education costs. This is a trade-off that
the government should concern. Reduction of the costs of education may increase the in-
centives of the individuals to invest in education and raise the level of education. But if the
costs of the reduction of the costs of education are nanced by income tax which bears the
deadweight-loss and cut a part of the direct support from the government, the incentives of
the individuals earning less than ztb will decrease, and so does their chosen level of educa-
tion. Contrarily to the behavior of individuals from the group of income earners above ztb,
despite the deadweight-loss, this action leads to distribution among this group. This result
suggests that a proper strategy to develop the economy is to support the poor individuals to
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overcome the income level of ztb, since at this point the distribution effect of the education
support from the government action is very effective and convergence will be easier bol-
stered. In addition, the result shows that reducing the costs of education at the expense of
levied income tax leads to the disadvantages of the group of individuals earning less than
ztb. This leads to the fact that in order to increase the incentives of investment in and the
level of education by reduction of the costs of education, this should be done by increas-
ing quality for example via cooperation and joint-venture with advanced economy and/or
economic integration superior to taxation. Since this action will fully benet all individu-
als who are able to invest in education, no matter to which group they belong and distortion
in the decision on the chosen level of education of the individuals earning less than ztb will
be removed.
Changes in utility are depicted in the Table 5.13. Due to the deadweight-loss, none of
these three cases brings about higher utility to any individual whose income is higher than
ztb, compared to the case without government interference. It is those individuals whose
income is below ztb who gain advantages from government interference, in particular those
whose pay income tax at a very low rate. This explains the distribution effect by means
of taxation. But notably, the higher the government support for education, the lower the
total utility. This decline of the utility is explained by the fact that the individuals regard the
share of government support for education as indirect support. The individuals, in particular
those earning less than ztb, predominately prefer direct support from the government, since
this directly increases their income, denoted by g in the model. The equation 5.39 explains
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Occupation
Utility
under  = 10%
Utility
under  = 25%
(normal case)
Utility
under  = 40%
Utility
without
government interference
Professional and
technical
730.2309 728.9960 727.8948 808.2400
Managerial and
administrative
- - - -
Proprietors 402.3034 400.6743 399.2005 439.1483
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
369.1251 367.5219 366.0712 378.0248
Total per white-collar worker 446.2545 444.7300 443.3540 469.9154
Manufacturing workers 266.9490 264.1971 263.6089 269.7977
Transportation and
communication
Miscellaneous 189.0719 187.1234 185.3022 175.8663
Agriculture, self-employed
Agricultural laborers
180.6372
100.3981
178.5911
98.3569
176.6766
96.4936
177.9841
88.8612
Total per blue-collar worker 185.2486 183.3079 181.5261 181.6135
Total per worker 272.1586 270.3547 268.7080 277.6106
Table 5.13: Comparison of the utility of white- and blue-collar workers in Thailand, 2000
(under different rate of share of government support for education and no government in-
terference, short-term)
this and indicates that the main factor that determines the level of further education of an
individual is the level of his or her income.
There are two relevant issues implied by the model that have a trade-off characteristic.
This explains the difculty of achieving signicant economic convergence by means of
government action.
1) First, due to the distribution effect of taxation, the individuals earning less than
average benet from the progressive taxation structure. The lower the individual's tax rate,
the higher the benets for him or her. Since the level of investment in education depends
positively on individuals' income, this leads to an increase in the level of investment in
education by the low income earners. The model indicates that direct supports from the
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government are more effective than indirect supports for the group of individuals earning
less than ztb. Direct support could be in the form of an increase in income or a reduction of
the costs of subsistence consumption. These are main strategies that can particularly affect
the low income earners, since individuals' income level is the decisive factor in choosing
the education level and the investment in further education by the low income earners only
depends on their remaining income after all other expenses and only the present period is
concerned. This rst issue explains the increase of the level of investment in education and
utility of the individuals with very low income (below ztb) under government interference.
2) Second, an increase of government support for education only benets those
individuals who earn income above ztb, while individuals who earn income below ztb are
disadvantaged. Additionally, due to the progressive income tax rate, those individuals (who
earn income above ztb) who pay low income tax benet more, the lower their income tax
rate they have to pay. Due to the increase of government support for education, the levels
of investment in education by the individuals earning above ztb, encompassing professional
and technical workers, proprietors, employees in clerical, sales and service jobs and man-
ufacturing workers rise from 0.2567, 0.2610, 0.3179 and 0.3227 respectively in the case
when the share of government support for education is 25.7% (normal case) to 0.2659,
0.2695, 0.3267 and 0.3306 respectively in the case when the share of government support
for education is 40%.
The results of the model show that, in order to bolster human capital and economic
welfare and implement distribution, both the policies that provide direct support to increase
income of the low income earners and those that reduce the costs of education should be
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applied. Yet, as outlined above, in the case of Thailand in 2000 the higher the government
support in education, the lower the total utility. There is still a trade-off between increas-
ing of the level of education and distribution and aiming at higher utilities. Particularly
economies with a high level of disparity may suffer from this problem. Hence, a strategy
that should be pursued can be concluded as follows. As a rst step, the government should
aim for a situation in which not only the individuals' subsistence consumption is secured,
but their budget constraints are not binding which means that individuals' income must be
at least ztb, at rst place. Thus, individuals will earn higher income and they can invest
more in education. In addition the budget constraints of all individuals will not be binding
and the educational support provided by the government will benet all individuals. This,
in turn, increases investment in education and income. Consequently, economic conver-
gence and development will be easier to achieve, since direct as well as indirect supports
will have their full impact on all individuals (since the budget constraints of all individ-
ual are not binding). Nonetheless, this does not mean that while there are some individuals
earning below ztb, support for education should be neglected. Such support always eases di-
vergence, potentially leads to convergence and assists investment in education in the group
of individuals earning above ztb. This will become more and more effective and more and
more individuals from the low income group can take advantage of the support, as soon as
their budget constraints cease to be binding.
Due to the relevance of individual's income level, taxation is one of the powerful
instruments that inuence the distribution system of the economy. An effective taxation
strategy will bring about distribution, leading to the improvement and convergence of hu-
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Occupation
ei under
average
income
tax rate
= 6.48%
ei under
average
income
tax rate
= 3.15%
ei under
average
income
tax rate
= 1.01%
ei under case
without
government
interference
ei Thailand's case
under average
income tax rate
= 4.28%
Professional and
technical
0.2123
(15%)
0.2506
(10%)
0.2931
(5%)
0.3405
0.2567
(10%)
Managerial and
administrative
- - - - -
Proprietors
0.2752
(10%)
0.3086
(5%)
0.3210
(2.5%)
0.3405
0.2610
(10%)
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
0.3339
(10%)
0.3098
(5%)
0.3214
(2.5%)
0.3405
0.3179
(5%)
Total per white-collar worker 0.3079 0.2972 0.3153 0.3405 0.3049
Manufacturing workers
0.3412
(5%)
0.3407
(2.5%)
0.3493
(0%)
0.3405
0.3227
(5%)
Transportation and
communication
- - - - -
Miscellaneous
0.3325
(2.5%)
0.2929
(0%)
0.2342
(0%)
0.2065
0.3239
(0%)
Agriculture, self-employed
0.2968
(5%)
0.2588
(2.5%)
0.2514
(0%)
0.2240
0.2381
(5%)
Agricultural laborers
0
(2.5%)
0
(0%)
0
(0%)
0
0
(0%)
Total per blue-collar worker 0.2166 0.2042 0.2048 0.1929 0.1911
Total per worker
0.2470
(6.48%)
0.2531
(3.15%)
0.2416
(1.01%)
0.2420
0.2290
(4.28%)
Table 5.14: Comparison of the chosen level of education of white- and blue-collar work-
ers in Thailand, 2000 (under different income tax rate and no government interference,
short-term)
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Occupation
Utility
under
average
income
tax rate
= 6.48%
Utility
under
average
income
tax rate
= 3.15%
Utility
under
average
income
tax rate
= 1.01%
Utility
without
government
interference
Utility
under
Thailand's case
average
income tax rate
= 4.28%
Professional and
technical
690.2785
(15%)
681.3403
(10%)
765.2441
(5%)
808.2400
728.9959
(10%)
Managerial and
administrative
- - - - -
Proprietors
406.0839
(10%)
422.4254
(5%)
429.3101
(2.5%)
439.1483
400.6743
(10%)
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
351.4129
(10%)
364.6707
(5%)
369.8942
(2.5%)
378.0248
367.5219
(5%)
Total per white-collar worker 423.7920 432.3089 454.3379 469.9154 444.7300
Manufacturing workers
270.5545
(5%)
270.2915
(2.5%)
257.2217
(0%)
269.7977
264.5611
(5%)
Transportation and
communication
- - - - -
Miscellaneous
187.3062
(2.5%)
184.2345
(0%)
178.6030
(0%)
175.8663
187.1235
(0%)
Agriculture, self-employed
184.0647
(5%)
180.9804
(2.5%)
178.6351
(0%)
177.9841
178.5911
(5%)
Agricultural laborers
100.9390
(2.5%)
95.8438
(0%)
91.0041
(0%)
88.6812
98.3567
(0%)
Total per blue-collar worker 187.8064 184.9998 182.3878 181.6135 183.3079
Total per worker
266.3835
(6.48%)
267.3473
(3.15%)
272.9402
(1.01%)
277.6106
270.3547
(4.28%)
Table 5.15: Comparison of the utility of white- and blue-collar workers in Thailand, 2000
(under different income tax rate and no government interference, short-term)
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man capital and, in turn, the augmentation and convergence of income and living-standards.
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 lead us to realize that this income tax rate levied in Thailand in 2000
does not induce an optimal solution, since the results show that the overall utility of the
economy can be improved (compared with the case of Thailand in which average rate of
progressive income tax rate is 4.28%) under alternative programs with a progressive in-
come tax rate at an average rate of 1.01%. In particular, the overall level of education
a worker chooses can be improved (compared with the case of Thailand in 2000 and even
with the case without government interference) under alternative programs with income tax
rates of 6.48% and 3.15%. Moreover, under alternative programs with income tax rates of
6.48%, 3.15% distribution of utility, particularly among the group of low-income-earners is
augmented and under all three alternative programs with income tax rates of 6.48%, 3.15%
and 1.01% divergence of income and human capital quality are lessened considerably. This
implies that the economy is able to achieve both income and utility distribution and a total
increase in the quality of human capital by implementing a proper distribution program (in
this model, by means of income taxation).
One may ask why the data of Thailand do not reveal the political program that brings
about convergence and higher total utility. One explanation can be the fact that the model
merely concentrates on education and income distribution, while several relevant political
programs or political aims are neglected. Another relevant explanation is the fact that there
are distortions of government decisions regarding implementing political programs. The
coming section will analyze a possible reason for the distortion of the rst best solution
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for the economy in terms of income distribution and explain the outcome with help of the
Median Voter Theorem.
Theoretical Outcome of Political Decision Process under the Median Voter Theorem
This section presents a theoretical analysis of a political decision on economic devel-
opment. This would typically include decisions on political programs, particularly involv-
ing the level of taxation and government support.
In a short-term development, political economy is very relevant, particularly consid-
ering the fact that the political parties are interested in being voted in for the next period of
ofce. Hence, it is possible that the government is not purely social welfare oriented, but
instead is looking for strategies that lead to it becoming the party the population votes for
the most and thus winning the election again. In analogy, the opposition will nd strate-
gies that lead to election victory as well. As a consequence, the chosen political programs
may not be the rst best solution and this can be one of the relevant explanations for the
distortion of utility within the economy that was illustrated in the previous section.
For simplicity, the political programs offered by each party are reduced to one-
dimension: the chosen rate of income tax. Also for simplicity, it is assumed that, for the
maximization of the individuals' optimal income tax rate, the income tax structure of the
rst period is not progressive as used in the Thai economy, but instead, the income tax rate
of the rst period used in this model is equal for every individual. This allows the compar-
ison of tax rates chosen by individuals with different occupations and income levels. The
income tax rate structure in the second period remains progressive. Under these assump-
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tions, it is possible to nd and analyze the outcome of the decision on political program in
this economy using the Median Voter Model. However, as a consequence of the linear tax
structure assumed for the rst period, the result may deviate from the real income tax rate
in Thailand.
This section analyzes the short-term economic development in terms of political
economy using the Median Voter Theorem. Notably, the Median Voter Theorem can only
be applied effectively to an economy with democracy and a strong two-party system. Hence
some countries in East-Southeast Asian, in particular China and the countries within the In-
dochina region cannot be considered by this model. The Median Voter Theorem focuses
on an abstract model of voting behavior and bears explicit and implicit assumptions228. The
explicit assumptions are as follows. First, there must be two political parties or candidates,
between which all voters have to choose and cannot abstain. Second, the political programs
or positions of the parties can be summarized on a one dimensional scale. Third, the vot-
ers will choose the parties closest to their preferences on the one dimensional scale, and
if both parties offer exactly the same policy, the voters will choose randomly between the
two parties. The implicit assumptions are as follows. First, the voters recognize the po-
litical programs offered by both parties exactly and believe these announcements, as the
parties or parties or candidates declare their positions. Conversely, both parties have infor-
mation on the exact position of all voters as well. Second, all parties or candidates aim at
being elected and take the political position that maximizes their possibility of getting the
most votes and winning the election. These conditions ensure that any election will be de-
228 See http://www.rysa.com/polisci/MVT.htm
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cided by the median voter, and both parties will consequently offer the political program
that suits median voter's preference.
In this model, there are four possible cases that can occur in an economy. The rst
case denotes the situation in which the median voter is a white-collar worker who earns
income higher than ztb. The second case denotes the situation in which the median voter
is a white-collar worker who earns income below ztb. In the third case, the median voter
is a blue-collar worker who earns income higher than ztb. And the fourth case denotes the
situation in which the median voter is a blue-collar worker who earns income below ztb.
Two-Stage Decision
The model is characterized by a two-stage decision.
First stage
In the rst stage, the individuals determine and choose their personal level of savings,
investment in education and other expenses. In order to dene these numbers, the individ-
uals use the expected tax rates for both periods as basis factors. Since it is assumed that
saving rate is exogenously dened, the level of further education is dened by the equation
5.47.
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Second stage
The second stage presents the situation in which the individuals have to dene their
preferred political programs (in this model, political programs refer to income tax). In this
stage, the individuals have already dened their personal rate of expenses, including the
saving rate and education level. Under these parameters, each individual will dene his
or her personal preferred tax rate to maximize his or her utility. It should be noted that
the individuals optimize only the tax rate of the present period and take the tax rate of the
coming period as given, so the latter can be dened by an expected number. This solution
is presented by the equation 5.46.
tit =
8>>><>>>:
1  1
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1 

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ei+(1 ) wt
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 ; j = h; l if zijt  ztb
When it comes to the optimal personal tax rate for the individuals earning below ztb,
this section analyzes two cases. The rst case is the normal situation, in which the budget
constraints of the earning below ztb are binding. So, the equation of the optimal tax rate for
the individuals earning below ztb is
tit =
1 

s+ei+
cs
wijthijt

1 

ei+(1 ) wt
ht
wijthijt
 ; j = h; l if zijt  ztb
The second case examines the situation in which the individuals earning below ztb do
not pay attention to their budget constraints which means that the budget constraints are not
binding. The chosen tax rate corresponds to the same equation as the one of the individuals
earning above ztb, which is tit = 1   1(1 ) wtht
wijthijt
+ei
; with j = h; l. After the individuals
have chosen their personal preferred tax-rate, each individual will give his or her vote to
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the political party whose offered political program (in this case, the rate of the income tax)
is nearest to his or her preference. The results are as follows:
White-collar workers' group
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the professional and tech-
nical occupation group is 0% (-182.61%).
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the occupation group of
proprietors is 0% (-67.53%).
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the occupation group of
employees in clerical, sales and service jobs is 0% (-43.43%).
Blue-collar workers' group in the normal case, in which their budget constraints
are binding (only the budget constraints of manufacturing workers are not binding, since
they earn income above ztb)
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the occupation group of
manufacturing workers is 0% (-5.78%).
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the miscellaneous occupa-
tion group is 14.65%.
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the occupation group of
self-employed agricultural workers is 1.89%.
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the occupation group of
agricultural laborers is 41.45%.
Blue-collar workers' group in the second case, in which they do not concern
their budget constraints (meaning that their budget constraints are not binding)
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The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the occupation group of
manufacturing workers is 0% (-5.78%).
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the miscellaneous occupa-
tion group is 28.60%.
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the occupation group of
self-employed agricultural workers is 26.70%
The optimal income tax rate for an individual working in the occupation group of
agricultural laborers is 60.79%.
Simulations and Analyzes
The Figures 5.21-5.23 and 5.24-5.27 illustrate the results of the simulations of utility
under different tax rates for the white-collar and the blue-collar workers respectively. No-
tably, for the simplicity of the simulations, Figures 5.25-5.27 assume that the budget con-
straints of the blue-collar workers earning below ztb are not binding. The single-peakness
of the function conrms the implementation of the Median Voter Theorem. It should be
noted that, even though the simulations show the results of the utility levels under a nega-
tive tax rate, the real tax rate is set at the range of 0 to 1 and the range of negative tax rate
is irrelevant. Figures 5.21-5.23 show that all occupations from the white-collar group pre-
fer no taxation, since they all earn income higher than average and have no incentives to
share with the low-income earners. Contrarily, the blue-collar workers welcome the distri-
bution by means of taxation, however in different degrees, shown by the Figures 5.24-5.27.
Only the manufacturing workers among them prefer no taxation. The lowest income earn-
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ers, the agricultural laborers, prefer the highest tax rate for the economy, which amounts
to 60.79%, since they have the incentive that they would benet from high distribution.
Less extensive are the tax rates preferred by the miscellaneous and by the self-employed
agricultural workers, which amount to 28.60% and 26.70% respectively. Considering the
normal case in which the budget constraints of the blue-collar workers earning below ztb
are binding, the preferred tax rate is much lower for individuals from every occupation
(within group of blue-collar workers earning below ztb) compared to the case when bud-
get constraints are not binding. The preferred tax rates of the agricultural laborers, the
miscellaneous and the self-employed agricultural workers are 41.45%, 14.65% and 1.89%
respectively. The reason is that, under binding budget constraints, the individuals take their
income after expenses into account in the calculation of their own preferred income tax
rate. The expenses they have to consider include savings, costs of education and the costs
of subsistence consumption. Moreover, the chosen level of education also plays a relevant
role. This is obvious in the case of the preferred tax rate of the self-employed agricul-
tural workers, whose education level is low compared to the miscellaneous workers, whose
gross income is slightly lower. But due to fact that self employed agricultural workers pay
income tax at a rate of 5% in Thailand  contrarily to the agricultural laborers and the mis-
cellaneous workers who are exempt from taxation  the real income (after taxation) of the
self-employed agricultural workers is lower than the real income (after taxation) of the mis-
cellaneous workers. This leads to the self-employed agricultural workers choosing a much
lower level of education compared to the case, where budget constraints are not binding.
This is why the preferred tax rate of the self-employed agricultural workers is much lower.
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Figure 5.21: Simulation of the individual's utility under different levels of income tax rate
(case of the white-collar workers, occupation: professional and technical, in Thailand) x =
income tax rate (x = -2,...,1)
To conclude, the individuals take the constraint of their pay-ability into account, when they
make the decision on their preferred tax-rate.
Data for the Thai economy in the year 2000 are used for calculation. Notably, the
results do not correspond to the Thai economy precisely. This can be explained as follows.
On the one hand, the model does not use a progressive tax structure in the rst period, but
an identical tax rate for every individual. As already mentioned, this allows the comparison
of tax rates chosen by individuals with different occupations and income levels. The tax
rate structure of the period t + 1, on the other hand, remains progressive and is taken as
given for each individual in the tax rate optimization for the period t. This means that the
tax rate of the period t + 1 does not affect the decision of the individuals in the period t.
Furthermore, the division into occupational groups is quite rough.
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Figure 5.22: Simulation of the individual's utility under different levels of income tax rate
(case of the white-collar workers, occupation: proprietors, in Thailand) x = income tax rate
(x =-1,...,1)
Figure 5.23: Simulation of the individual's utility under different levels of income tax rate
(case of the white-collar workers, occupation: Employees in clerical, sales and service
jobs) x = income-tax-rate (x = -1,...,1)
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Figure 5.24: Simulation of the individual's utility under different levels of income tax rate
(case of the blue-collar workers, manufacturing workers, in Thailand) x = income tax rate
(x = -1,...,1)
Figure 5.25: Simulation of the individual's utility under different levels of income tax rate
(case of the blue-collar workers, miscellaneous, in Thailand) x = income tax rate (x =
-1,...,1)
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Figure 5.26: Simulation of the individual's utility under different levels of income tax rate
(case of the blue-collar workers, agriculture: self-employed, in Thailand) x = income tax
rate (x = -1,...,1)
Figure 5.27: Simulation of the individual's utility under different levels of income tax rate
(case of the blue-collar workers, agricultural laborers, in Thailand) x = income tax rate (x
= -1,...,1)
5.2 Modeling a Short-Term Strategy 317
Using the data of percentage share of the workers to total workers [white-collar work-
ers 34% (of which professional and technical 6.6%, proprietors 3.1%, employees in clerical
jobs 3.9%, employees in sales 14.9%, employees in services 5.5%) and blue-collar work-
ers 65.9% (manufacturing workers 21.9%, transportation and communication 4%, self-
employed agricultural workers together with agricultural laborers 40%)], it is revealed that
the median voter belongs to the group of the manufacturing workers  the only workers
from the blue-collar group in Thailand whose income is above ztb. According to the Me-
dian Voter Theorem, the political parties will set the political programs that are preferred
by the most individuals, which correspond to the preference of the median voter.
The comparison of the results in this section, which were calculated according to
the Median Voter Theorem, with the calculated result derived in the previous section and
with the real average income tax rate of Thailand seems disappointing at rst sight. Com-
pared to the result of estimated average income tax rate from the previous sections which
amounts to 4.28% and, particularly, in comparison to the real average income tax rate of
Thailand in the year 2000, which amounts to 5%, the Median Voter Theorem used for this
model concludes a considerably lower outcome value of only 0% for the optimized income
tax rate of a manufacturing worker. Nevertheless, analyzing the result precisely, the model
actually shows a very good outcome. From the results of model, it is shown that an indi-
vidual from the group of manufacturing workers is the median voter. In reality, individuals
in an occupation group possess different levels of education and quality of human capi-
tal which also leads to different levels of income. The model, however, only deals with a
rough estimation. So, if an assumption is made that the median voter is a manufacturing
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worker who possesses a slightly lower quality of human capital than the average for man-
ufacturing workers applied in the model 1.39, say at the rate of 1.25 (1.2470), the result of
the model becomes very satisfying. This individual sets his or her education level at 0.33
(0.3246) and his or her income amounts to 234.77 US dollars, which is above ztb, meaning
that the budget constraint is not binding. Finally, this individual's preferred income tax rate
is 4.28%, which corresponds to the result of the estimated average income tax rate from the
previous sections. In addition, if an assumption is made that the median voter is a manu-
facturing worker who possesses slightly lower human capital quality than is average for the
group of manufacturing workers, blue-collar workers earning below ztb at the rate of 1.24
(1.2370), this individual sets his or her education level at 0.33 (0.3248) and his or her in-
come amounts to 232.89 US dollars. This is above ztb, meaning that the budget constraint
is not binding. This individual prefers an income tax rate of 5% which corresponds to the
real average income tax rate of Thailand, 2000. In the end, this last point conrms the de-
viation of the government's action from the rst-best solution, explained by the preference
of the majority and the government's desire to be voted in again, instead of aiming at total
social welfare.
The main conclusion of this section is to reveal one of the relevant explanations why
the political programs diverge from the rst best solution. The results show the conse-
quence of the distortion of the government's decision brought about by its predominant
interest in winning votes. It can be observed that there are several opportunities for politi-
cal programs that are more efcient and could lead to higher utility in the economy, if the
government were more social welfare oriented, instead of being interested in being elected.
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In addition, this model also shows that if there is no inequality in the economy, government
interference is not needed, since this merely brings about distortion due to the deadweight-
loss. However, if there are disparities in the economy, it is worth taking the deadweight
loss on board, in order to achieve distribution, convergence and sustainable development.
5.3 Modeling of a Long-Term Strategy
This part presents a model of long-term economic development, in which education, skill-
improvement of labor forces and technological progress play a relevant role in achieving
economic convergence and sustainable development. In addition, various opportunities
for the government to support these aims are highlighted. In the same way as the model
of the short-term development, the model studies a small, open economy that functions
in a perfectly competitive world, where international capital movements are unrestricted,
contrarily to labor movements which are only free within the country.
This long-term model adopts the unied growth model of Oded Galor and David
N. Weil (1999), which examines the endogenous transition between a Malthusian regime,
a Post-Malthusian regime and a Modern Growth regime, based on historical evolution of
population, technology and output. This growth model is modied and adapted in order to
analyze the long-term development of the economy under inequality between labor groups
and to nd strategies that will strengthen economic fundamentals and assist the economic
integration within the region.
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5.3.1 Basic Preferences
The model concentrates on two generations of individuals. In each period t, there is a
generation which consists of Lt individuals who join labor forces. Members of generation
t live for two periods. The period t 1 refers to childhood, in which individuals as children
consume a fraction of their parents' time. The time required for childrearing increases
with the quantity of children and the level of human capital each child will acquire. The
period t refers to parenthood, in which individuals are endowed with one unit of time
which they allocate between working and childrearing. The individuals choose the optimal
combination between work, through which they receive their income depending on the
wage rate and human capital, and investment in their children, both in terms of number and
quality time spent with each. Further, it is assumed that the individuals possess no assets
from previous savings.
The utility of the individuals of generation t are dened in terms of, rst, present
consumption and second, utility in the future period encompassing the potential aggregate
income of their children in the future accompanied by their own savings from the work
period, augmented by the appropriate interest rate  this savings can be viewed as an old-
age-pension. The present consumption dened in the individual's utility needs to be above
subsistence level cs > 0which is assumed to be identical for every individual. So the utility
function is denoted by
Uit = (cit)
(1 ) (wit+1nthit+1 + si (1 + r)withit)
 (5.48)
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where cit is the consumption, nt is the number of children of an individual from period t,
hit+1 is the level of human capital of each child, wit+1 is the wage rate per efciency unit
of labor at time t + 1, si is the saving rate and r is the interest rate. The utility function is
strictly monotone increasing and strictly quasi-concave; it satises the conventional bound-
ary conditions that assure that, for sufciently high income, an interior solution exists for
the utility maximization problem. Nonetheless, for a sufciently low level of income, the
subsistence consumption constraint is binding; there is then a corner solution with respect
to the consumption level.
In the rst generation's work period (parenthood), the consumption potential of the
individuals depends on their chosen amount of savings and expenses for their investment
in childrearing. Each person is endowed with one unit of time which is allocated between
labor force participation, savings and investment in childrearing. Hence, the utility function
of an individual i can also be written as
Uit = (withit (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si))(1 ) (wit+1nthit+1 + si (1 + r)withit) (5.49)
 q +  eei is the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for raising
a child with ei  0 unit of education.  q is the fraction of the individual's unit time en-
dowment required to raise a child, regardless of school and higher education.  e is fraction
of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of school and higher edu-
cation for each child, therefore,  eei is the time cost for an individual i to invest in school
and higher education of a child. wit is the wage rate per efciency unit of labor for indi-
vidual i at the rst work period and the level of efciency unit of individual i in the rst
work period is hit. wit+1 is the expected wage rate per efciency unit of labor in the second
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(new) generation work period. Actually the expected real wage rate in period t+1must be
determined by the equation @Yt+1
@Hjt+1
= (1  )

Kjt+1
Ajt+1Hjt+1

Ajt+1 = wjt+1; j = h; l. For
simplicity in the simulations of the model, the expected real wage rate in period t + 1 can
be evaluated by applying real wage growth to the wage rate of the rst period. hit+1 is the
efciency unit of human capital of a second (new) generation adult.
The estimation will work on the basis that children of a high income earner give rise
to high childrearing costs. This is plausible, since, on the one hand, children of high income
earners have a high standard of living and on the other hand, their parents try to give them
a high standard of education; for instance the parent nance their children's studies in a
famous school or/and university, which often means higher costs. The higher the income,
the higher the expenditure on childrearing. Besides the investment in education supported
by the parents, the level of human capital the children attain depends partly on the level of
human capital of their parents as well. As previously mentioned, this can be interpreted
as the inuence of the direct education from the parents. The higher the parents' human
capital, the higher the human capital passed on the children. The children of higher income
earners gain higher human capital than the children of the lower income earners under the
same rate of ei. This can be explained by the fact that higher income earners have, in
general, higher human capital which will be passed on their children.
For a sufciently high income, an interior solution exists for the utility maximization
problem. Nonetheless, for a sufcient low level of income, the subsistence consumption
constraint is binding; there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption level. If
an individual i devotes his or her entire time endowment to labor force participation, the
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amount of income that he or she would earn in the rst work period would be withit.
The potential income in the rst period is divided between expenditure on childrearing
nt (
q +  eei), savings at the saving-rate si, and consumption cit, thus an individual i will
meet the following budget constraint
withit (nt (
q +  eei) + si) + cit  withit (5.50)
The level of human capital of members of generation t, hit+1, is dependent on the
level of the human capital of the parents hit, and is an increasing function of the level of
education ei, and a decreasing function of the rate of progress in the state of technology
from period t to period t+ 1, Tt+1 with
Tt+1  At+1   At
At
(5.51)
The higher quality of the children's human capital, the smaller is the adverse effect
of technological progress. Therefore,
hit+1 = h (ei; Tit+1) (5.52)
h (ei; Tit+1) > 0; he (ei; Tit+1) > 0; hee (ei; Tit+1) < 0; hT (ei; Tit+1) < 0;
hTT (ei; Tit+1) > 0; heT (ei; Tit+1) > 0;8 (ei; Tit+1)  0
In the model, the function of the children's level of human capital is dened by
hit+1 = h (ei; Tit+1) = hit
 
 + eai + T
b
it+1 + e
c
iT
d
it+1

(5.53)
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This function is conditioned by, 8 (ei; Tit+1)  0229,
h (ei; Tit+1) > 0
() hit
 
 + eai + T
b
it+1 + e
c
iT
d
it+1

> 0
he (ei; Tit+1) > 0
() he (ei; Tit+1) = hit

ae
(a 1)
i + ce
(c 1)
i T
d
it+1

= hite
(a 1)
i

a+ ce
(c 1)
(a 1)
i T
d
it+1

> 0
hee (ei; Tit+1) < 0
() hee (ei; Tit+1) = hit

a (a  1) e(a 2)i + c (c  1) e(c 2)i T dit+1

= hite
(a 2)
i

a (a  1) + c (c  1) e
(c 2)
(a 2)
i T
d
it+1

< 0
hT (ei; Tit+1) < 0
() hT (ei; Tit+1) = hit

bT
(b 1)
it+1 + dT
(d 1)
it+1 e
c
i

= hitT
(b 1)
it+1

b+ dT
(d 1)
(b 1)
it+1 e
c
i

< 0
hTT (ei; Tit+1) > 0
() hTT (ei; Tit+1) = hit

b (b  1)T (b 2)it+1 + d (d  1)T (d 2)it+1 eci

= hitT
(b 2)
it+1

b (b  1) + d (d  1)T
(d 2)
(b 2)
it+1 e
c
i

> 0
heT (ei; Tit+1) > 0
() heT (ei; Tit+1) = hitcde(c 1)i T (d 1)it+1 > 0 =) cd > 0
The children's level of human capital is an increasing strictly concave function of
education and a decreasing strictly convex function of the rate of technological progress.
229 a; b; c and d must be chosen, so that these following conditions are fullled.
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Education reduces the adverse effect of technological progress.  is the parameter of the
external effect of parents' human capital on the children's human capital. a is the pa-
rameter for education and b is the parameter of adverse effect of technological progress
regarding human capital level. Respectively, c and d are also parameters of education and
technological progress, and in the equation 5.53 parameters c and d, in addition, reect the
interrelation of education and technology. Although the number of efciency unit of labor
per worker is diminished during the transition from one technology state to another, the ef-
fective number of the efciency unit of labor per worker (the product of the workers' level
of human capital and the state of technology in the economy)  inherent in the wage rate
per efciency unit of labor (marginal product of labor) , is assumed to be higher as a re-
sult of positive technological progress. For simplicity, it is assumed that c = 1 and d = 1.
Therefore, the function of the children's level of human capital in this model can be written
as
hit+1 = h (ei; Tit+1) = hit
 
 + eai + T
b
it+1 + eiTit+1

(5.54)
This function is conditioned by, 8 (ei; Tit+1)  0230,
h (ei; Tit+1) > 0() hit
 
 + eai + T
b
it+1 + eiTit+1

> 0
he (ei; Tit+1) > 0() he (ei; Tit+1) = hit

ae
(a 1)
i + Tit+1

> 0
hee (ei; Tit+1) < 0() hee (ei; Tit+1) = hit

a (a  1) e(a 2)i

< 0
hT (ei; Tit+1) < 0() hT (ei; Tit+1) = hit

bT
(b 1)
it+1 + ei

< 0
230 a and b must be chosen, so that these following conditions are fullled.
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hTT (ei; Tit+1) > 0() hTT (ei; Tit+1) = hit

b (b  1)T (b 2)it+1

> 0
heT (ei; Tit+1) > 0() heT (ei; Tit+1) = 1 > 0
5.3.2 Optimization
Optimization with Respect to Education Level e under Exogenous Saving Rate
An individual iwho earns an amount of income at a certain (high) level, meaning that
the subsistence consumption constraint is not binding, will set his or her own saving-rate
at the rate which is assumed to be exogenously given. In contrast, for individuals whose
income is low, the subsistence consumption constraint is binding. Their rst concern will
therefore be expenditure on subsistence consumption cs. The remaining income will be left
for savings which will not exceed the saving-rate s. If any of their income still remains
after calculating expenses on subsistence consumption and savings, then the individuals
will invest in education. This is summarized under the equation
s =

s if zit > zb
max [0; s] if zit  zb (5.55)
where zit is the level of potential income of an individual i at the period t withit, and
zb the level of potential income at which the subsistence constraint is just binding, with
zb =
cs
1  nt ( q +  eei)  s (5.56)
Under the aforementioned assumptions of an exogenous saving rate  equation 5.55
and 5.56 , an individual i chooses the level of investment in education and therefore, sets
his or her own consumption and future assets to maximize the utility function. Simulta-
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neously, the individual i has to assure the level of subsistence consumption. This can be
written as
max
ei
Uit (5.57)
= max
ei
(withit (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s))(1 )
(wit+1nth (ei; Tit+1) + s (1 + r)withit)

s:t:withit (nt (
q +  eei) + s) + cit  withit
() max
ei
(withit (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s))(1 ) 
wit+1nthit
 
 + eai + T
b
it+1 + eiTit+1

+ s (1 + r)withit

s:t:withit (nt (
q +  eei) + s) + cit  withit
Optimization with respect to ei implies
@Uit
@ei
= 0 (5.58)
This gives the following interior solution
(1  )  e
(1  nt ( q +  eei )  s)
=


ae
(a 1)
i + Tit+1

nt
 
 + eai + T
b
it+1 + e

iTit+1

+ s (1 + r) wit
wit+1
(5.59)
For a sufciently low level of income, as previously mentioned, the subsistence con-
sumption constraint is binding and there is a corner solution with respect to the consump-
tion level. Subject to the budget constraint, with s = max [0; s],
withit (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s)  cs (5.60)
the corner solution is
ei =
1
nt e

1  nt q   s  c
s
withit

(5.61)
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It follows that
(1 )e
(1 nt(q+eei ) s)
=


ae
(a 1)
i +Tit+1

nt(+eai +T bit+1+ei Tit+1)+s(1+r)
wit
wit+1
if zit > zb
ei =
1
nte

1  nt q   s  cswithit

if zit  zb
(5.62)
The Figures 5.28-5.35 illustrate the relation between various parameters and the cho-
sen optimal level of investment in children's education for the case where there is an in-
terior solution, i.e. for individuals who earn income higher than zb. These are analyzed
as follows. On the one hand, the level of investment in children's education is positively
affected by the rate of technology progress T , the parameter of adverse effect of technolog-
ical progress regarding human capital level b (since b is negative) and slightly by the real
wage growth. Also the education parameter a positively affects the level of investment in
children's education, but only at the low to middle range, contrarily at the high range of
the level of the education parameter, the level of investment in children's education is neg-
atively affected. On the other hand, optimal level of investment in children's education is
negatively affected by, to a great extent, the number of children nt, the costs of childrea-
ring in terms of both quantitative and qualitative measures regarding parental- and school
and higher education  q and  e, the saving rate s, and to a lesser extent, the parameter of
the external effect of parents' human capital on the children's human capital  and, only
slightly, the interest-rate r.
These results suggest that, in order to encourage the level of human capital of the next
generation and therefore the income level, support should be offered to help cover the costs
of childrearing, in particular the costs of education. The number of children and the saving
rate are also decisive factors that negatively affected the rate of investment in education,
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Figure 5.28: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of further education (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the individuals
whose budget constraint is not binding) x = level of the costs of each unit of further edu-
cation (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no
level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.29: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of childrearing without schooling costs (costs of each unit of childrearing without
schooling costs) (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is not binding) x = level
of the costs of each unit of childrearing without schooling costs (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if
the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
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Figure 5.30: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of population-growth-rate (case of the individuals whose budget constraint
is not binding) x = level of the population-growth-rate (x = 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5), e  0 (if
the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
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Figure 5.31: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of parameter on parents' ability (case of the individuals whose budget con-
straint is not binding) x = level of parameter on parents' ability (x = 0.1,...,0.9), e  0 (if
the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
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Figure 5.32: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of education parameter (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is
not binding) x = level of the education parameter (x = 0.1,...,0.9), e  0 (if the simulation
shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
-0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 0
x
e
Figure 5.33: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of technology parameter (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is
not binding) x = level of the parameter of the adverse effect of technology to human capital
(x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of
eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.34: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of technological progress (case of the individuals whose budget constraint
is not binding) x = level of the technology progress (x = 0.1,...,0.9), e  0 (if the simulation
shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.35: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of preference parameter (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is
not binding) x = level of the preference parameter (x = 0.1,...,0.9), e  0 (if the simulation
shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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but both are viewed as exogenously given in the model. Other crucial factors are the rate
of technological progress and its parameters, which increase the incentive for individuals
to support their children's education231.
Individuals who earn an amount of income at a low level will rst devote their atten-
tion to their subsistence consumption level. In other words, as long as the potential income
of an individual i (zit  withit), is lower than zb, then this individual will secure his or
her subsistence consumption before concerning him or herself with utility in the future pe-
riod. It follows that the chosen education level for the children is highly dependent on the
subsistence consumption level cs. The fraction of time spent on investment in children's
education is conditioned on the saving rate, the costs of childrearing and the ratio of the
subsistence consumption level cs, to the potential income of individual i withit. These re-
sults are revealed in Figures 5.36-5.40. The level of individual's income plays a major role
in the decision on the optimal education level of the children for those individuals whose
budget constraint is binding. If the wage rate per efciency unit of labor rises, individuals
can cover subsistence consumption with smaller labor force participation. As a result, the
fraction of time spent on investment in further education will rise and individuals will in-
vest more in the education of their children. The optimal education level is, in the main,
positively dependent on individuals' income withit, and negatively on the price of educa-
231 Today, the technology issue is very relevant, since in the era of globalization and high technologies,
new and high technologies are constantly being invented and/or taken over from technologically advanced
countries. In particular, the developing countries are coping with rapid economic development including the
utilization of new technologies in economic and social sectors. This leads to the situation in which human
capital has to be intensively improved and new technologies have to be brought into the economy. The
developing countries that ignore the rapid technology improvement can easily lose their path in the world
economic competition.
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Figure 5.36: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of subsistence consumption (dollars per month) (case of the individuals
whose budget constraint is binding) x = level of subsistence consumption in dollars per
month (x = 90,...,170), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no
level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
tion  e, costs of childrearing without school education  q, and the subsistence consumption
level cs.
5.3.3 Theoretical Analysis of Long-Term Development under
Inequality between Labor Groups
This section analyzes long-term development under inequality among the two labor groups.
First, the model shows the consequence of inequality in skills and wage rates between
the labor groups. Simulations and analyzes are illustrated in order to nd out strategies
coping with inequality-problems. These refer to reduction of income disparity, supporting
domestic and regional economies and enhancement of economic cooperation. Finally, in
the second part, the model shows government's abilities implement the aforementioned
development strategies and to bolster the economic convergence and economic integration.
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Figure 5.37: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of costs of unit of further education (case of the individuals whose budget
constraint is binding) x = level of costs of each unit of further education (x = 0.1,...,1),
e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation
meaning that e = 0.)
Figure 5.38: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of costs of each unit of childrearing without schooling (case of the indi-
viduals whose budget constraint is binding) x = level of costs of each unit of childrearing
without schooling (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual
chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.39: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of population-growth-rate (case of the individuals whose budget constraint
is binding) x = level of population-growth-rate (x = 0.1,...,2.5), e  0 (if the simulation
shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
Figure 5.40: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of wage rate (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is binding)
x = level of wage rate (x = 150,. . . ,250), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the
individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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Preferences, Budget Constraints and Optimization
Individuals are divided into two groups, one high-skilled, the white-collar workers
and one low-skilled, the blue-collar workers. The discrepancy between different groups
lies in income disparity, which is reected by disparity in wage rates and the quality of
human capital. In the model, the level of economic disparity is characterized by differences
in human capital, wage rates and income based on the difference between the levels of
education and technologies used by both groups.
The utility function and budget constraint of an individual i with high-skills are
Uiht =
(wihthiht (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si))(1 )
(wiht+1nthiht+1 + si (1 + r)wihthiht)
 (5.63)
s:t:wihthiht (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si)  ciht
The utility function and budget constraint of an individual i with low-skills are
Uilt =
(wilthilt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si))(1 )
(wilt+1nthilt+1 + si (1 + r)wilthilt)
 (5.64)
s:t:wilthilt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si)  cilt
Under a given saving rate s, individuals choose the level of investment in their chil-
dren's education; as a result, they choose their own consumption level and their future
assets that maximize their own utility function. Simultaneously, they have to assure subsis-
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tence consumption as well. This can be written as
max
ei
Uijt (5.65)
= max
ei
(wijthijt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s))(1 )
(wijt+1nth (ei; Tijt+1) + s (1 + r)wijthijt)

s:t:wijthijt (nt (
q +  eei) + s) + cijt  wijthijt
ei  0; j = h; l
() max
ei
(wijthijt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s))(1 ) 
wijt+1nthijt
 
 + eai + T
b
ijt+1 + eiTijt+1

+ s (1 + r)wijthijt

s:t:wijthijt (nt (
q +  eei) + s) + cijt  wijthijt
ei  0; j = h; l
Optimization with respect to ei implies
@Uijt
@ei
= 0; j = h; l (5.66)
This gives the interior solution (for the case of zit > zb, with j = h; l),
(1  )  e
(1  nt ( q +  eei )  s)
=


ae
(a 1)
i + Tijt+1

nt
 
 + eai + T
b
ijt+1 + e

iTijt+1

+ s (1 + r)
wijt
wijt+1
; j = h; l
(5.67)
For a sufciently low level of income, the subsistence consumption constraint is bind-
ing and there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption level. The interior so-
lution comes into play for any individual who earns enough income higher than zb. The
corner solution, therefore, exists for an individual who earns a sufciently low income
level, meaning that zit  zb. Subject to budget constraint, with s = max [0; s],
wijthijt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s)  cs; j = h; l (5.68)
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the corner solution is
ei =
1
nt e

1  nt q   s  c
s
wijthijt

; j = h; l (5.69)
Considering both cases, it follows that
(1 )e
(1 nt(q+eei ) s)
=


ae
(a 1)
i +Tijt+1

nt(+eai +T bijt+1+ei Tijt+1)+s(1+r)
wijt
wijt+1
; j = h; l if zit > zb
ei =
1
nte

1  nt q   s  cswijthijt

; j = h; l if zit  zb
(5.70)
Theoretical Analysis of Long-Term Development
The model presents long-term strategies aimed at developing the foundations of the
economy, including development and convergence of income, wage rates and human capi-
tal. Three main issues in equilibrium are:
a) Decision on investment in education
(1 )e
(1 nt(q+eei ) s)
=


ae
(a 1)
i +Tijt+1

nt(+eai +T bijt+1+ei Tijt+1)+s(1+r)
wijt
wijt+1
; j = h; l if zit > zb
ei =
1
nte

1  nt q   s  cswijthijt

; j = h; l if zit  zb
b) Optimal wage rates for both sectors;
marginal product of white-collar labors in the sector h (period t)
@Yt
@Hht
= (1  )

Kht
AhtHht

Aht = wht
marginal product of blue-collar labors in the sector l (period t)
@Yt
@Hlt
= (1  )

Klt
AltHlt

Alt = wlt
marginal product of white-collar labors in the sector h (period t+ 1)
@Yt+1
@Hht+1
= (1  )

Kht+1
Aht+1Hht+1

Aht+1 = wht+1
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marginal product of blue-collar labors in the sector l (period t+ 1)
@Yt+1
@Hlt+1
= (1  )

Klt+1
Alt+1Hlt+1

Alt+1 = wlt+1
c) Technological progress leading to development of human capital and change
in wage rates in the second period
hijt+1 = h (ei; Tijt+1) = hijt
 
 + eai + T
b
ijt+1 + e
c
iT
d
ijt+1

Tjt+1  Ajt+1   Ajt
Ajt
; j = h; l
The equations from a) and b) show the relationship between the labor sector and the
production sector in equilibrium. They refer to the determination of optimal education
level and wage rate of the two sectors. The equations from c) denote the determinants of
human capital of the new generation and the development of technological progress. In
the long-term, the technological progress can be assisted by for instance, R&D and/or by
taking over foreign technology due to economic cooperation and integration. Advancement
in technology affects the level of human capital of the new generation and in addition,
bolsters the wage rate in the respective sector. As asserted in the rst section Production
Relations, the relation between the wage rate and technological development is reasoned
as follows: Due to the assumption that capital is perfectly mobile between sectors, in a
competitive equilibrium, the marginal product of capital must be identical in each sector.
This implies that @Yt
@Kht
= @Yt
@Klt
. Applying the Cobb-Douglas production function, this can
be written as 

Kht
AhtHht
( 1)
= 

Klt
AltHlt
( 1)
. The capital market equilibrium condition
implies that the capital stock per total efciency unit of labor must be identical in each
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sector; therefore Kht
AhtHht
= Klt
AltHlt
. From the equations in b), it is revealed that the wage rate
is positively dependent on the technology parameter in the respective period.
Assuming individuals believe that they have no inuence or ability to support tech-
nological progress and that they take the wage rate for granted, the predominant factor that
affects the individuals' decision is the level of their income and expenditures. The income
depends on the wage rate and human capital, while the expenditures depend mainly on the
level of consumption, which is, in turn, dependent on savings and investment in childrear-
ing. Since these factors are assumed as given, the individuals simply decide on the level of
human capital of their children, in order to enhance income and maximize their utility.
According to the equations in a), b) and c), two ways to support economic develop-
ment and convergence are structuring wage rates and supporting the low income earners.
Wage rates can be structured by assisting technological progress and convergence of the
technologies used in different sectors. This not only brings about higher wage rates and out-
put, but also leads to convergence of wage rates in the two sectors and leads to a decline in
income inequality. On the other hand, raising income and reducing the costs of subsistence
consumption level cs, are also relevant, since these assist all individuals and particularly
those who earn less than zb. As previously mentioned in the discussion of the short-term
case, reducing the costs of subsistence consumption benets all individuals, particularly
those who are not able to invest in education. A reduction of the costs of subsistence con-
sumption will enable very low income earners to enter human capital development for the
rst time. Soon after, their children will be able to benet from education support. Re-
duction of costs of subsistence consumption directly increases income level and improves
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the standard of living, since the individuals have more income remaining to spend on other
issues. The lower the costs of subsistence consumption, the higher the chosen level of in-
vestment in education. Consequently, improvement in education will augment the quality
of labor and income which, reecting back, reinforces the chosen level of education.
Simulations and Analyzes
This section presents simulations and analyses of the individual i's optimized level
of investment in children's education ei under long-term development. As in the short-
term case, the Thai economy is used as example in the simulations. Most parameters
used here are the same as the parameters used in the short-term case. The constant sav-
ing rate is set at 10% and the subsistence consumption level cs is evaluated at 5,459.76
Baht or 136.50 US dollars. The wage rate of each group is set by calculating the aver-
age monthly salaries of the workers in the respective group. The wage rate of a white-
collar worker amounts to 18,242.43 Baht or 456.06 US dollars and the wage rate of a
blue-collar worker is 7,530.70 Baht or 188.27 US dollars. The different income among
workers in different occupations is dened through different levels of effective unit of la-
bor of an individual i, hit. The calculation of hit for each occupation is dened by the
ratio of the monthly salary of an individual i to the wage rate of the respective group. Ac-
tually the expected real wage rate in period t + 1 must be determined by the equation
@Yt+1
@Hjt+1
= (1  )

Kjt+1
Ajt+1Hjt+1

Ajt+1 = wjt+1; j = h; l. However, for simplicity the ex-
pected real wage rate in period t+1 applied in this simulation is estimated using real wage
growth. The wage rate for period t is set as a benchmark, which means that wit+1 = wit(1+
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expected real wage growth rate). The wage rate for period t is estimated in US dollars per
month and a distinction is made between wage rates of white- and blue-collar workers.
In the long-term case, the real wage growth rate of Thailand is estimated for a 15-year-
interval, using data from 2000 to 2004232 and the data from 2004 is used to extrapolate
expected data for the period 2005-2014. The real wage growth rate provided by estimat-
ing the data from the Labor force survey from the National Statistical Ofce233 amounts to
6.42%. The 15-year-real-interest-rate (deposit rate) from 2000-2014 (the data from 2004
is also used for 2005-2014) is estimated at 16.20%. The population growth n, is estimated
at 0.65. The rate of technology progress T is 2%. The parameter of the level of education
a is 0.5, the parameter of adverse effect of technological progress regarding human capital
level b is -0.05, the parameter of the external effect of parents' human capital on the chil-
dren's human capital  is 0.7 and it is assumed for simplicity that c = 1 and d = 1. Therefore
the conditions h (ei; Tit+1) > 0, he (ei; Tit+1) > 0, hee (ei; Tit+1) < 0, hT (ei; Tit+1) < 0,
hTT (ei; Tit+1) > 0 and heT (ei; Tit+1) > 0, 8 (ei; Tit+1)  0 are fullled. The fraction of
the individual's unit time endowment required for raising a child without school and higher
education  q is 18%234. For simplicity, the model sets the individual's weighed preference
232 E-Thailand Monthly Economic Review by Economic Information Section, Fiscal Policy Ofce, see Bank
of Thailand, Economic Data (deposit rates: 4.375% (estimated from 4%-4.75%)) for 2000, 4% for 2001,
3.25% for 2002, 1.75% for 2003 and 1.75% for 2004, these rates are from January each year), www.bot.or.th
233 Real wage (average wage of employed person) growth in Thailand in 2000 was 1.4%, in 2001 it was 
0.6%, in 2002 1.5%, in 2003 0.4%(estimate) and in 2004 0.6%(quarter 1), from Labor force survey, National
Statistical Ofce.
234 Estimated expenses vary considerably by household income level. Depending on age of the child, the
expenses range from 6,280-7,380 US-dollar for families in the lowest income group (2000 before-tax income
less than 38,000), from 8,740-9,860 US-dollar for families in the middle income group (2000 before-tax
income between 38,000 and 64,000),and from 13,000-14,260 for families in the highest income group (2000
before-tax income more than 64,000). See http://www.usda.gov/cnpp/Crc/Crc2000.pdf. In the model, 18%
is calculated by the ratio of the estimated expenses of the families in the middle income group to the average
income level.
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in the rst work period at the same rate as the weighed preference in the second work pe-
riod , at 0.5 ( = 0.5). This means that individuals have no preference for earning in one
period over the other.
Since zb = cs
1 nt(q+eei) s , and assuming that 
q = 0.8 and  e = 0.5, it follows that
zb = 189.20 US dollars. This indicates that all white-collar workers and the manufacturing
workers from the blue-collar group earn income above zb and the rest of the blue-collar
workers earn less than zb. This leads to the conclusion that the budget constraints of all
white-collar workers and the manufacturing workers are not binding, in contrast with the
budget constraints of the rest of the blue-collar workers.
The simulations are depicted in Figures 5.41, Figures 5.42, Figures 5.43-5.45 and the
Figures 5.46-5.48. The simulations show that all white-collar workers and the manufactur-
ing workers from the blue-collar group invest at the same rate in their children's education
ei , (however it must be noted that the absolute gained human capital of the children are
different despite the same rate of ei , due to the different rate of parents' human capital),
whereas the rest of the blue-collar workers are not eager or even not able, on their own ac-
count, to offer their children the opportunity to attend school and higher education. This
will lead to signicant divergence between the individuals earning above and below zb. As
in the short-term case, a long-term strategy that may be able to support the economic de-
velopment is income distribution. This should give a good opportunity for the group of
low income earners to advance the human capital of their children which will increase their
utility and lead to the reduction of economic divergence in the generation of their children.
This can be achieved by reducing the costs of subsistence consumption and education. It
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Figure 5.41: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of further education (long-term) (costs of each unit of further education) (case of the
individuals whose budget constraint is not binding: these are all the white-collar workers
and the manufacturing workers) x = level of the costs of each unit of further education (x
= 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of
eduation meaning that e = 0.)
can be concluded that the strategies that should be implemented both in the long-run as
well as in the short-run comprise reducing the costs of subsistence consumption as well as
reducing the costs of education and implementing distribution.
In the long-term development, there is another signicant measure or aspect re-
lated to economic development that will support the convergence movement and economic
progress. This is the augmentation of the wage rates of the two labor-groups, which can
be encouraged by technological development. Progress in technology bolsters the produc-
tion sector and in addition increases the wage rate. Both effects bring about economic
development. However, since there are two labor and production sectors, relatively higher
technological development in the lower wage group will enhance economic convergence,
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Figure 5.42: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of childrearing without schooling-costs (long-term) (costs of each unit of childrearing
without schooling-costs) (case of the individuals whose budget constraint is not binding:
these are all the white-collar workers and the manufacturing workers) x = level of the costs
of each unit of childrearing without schooling-costs (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation
shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
Figure 5.43: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of further education (long-term)(costs of each unit of further education)(case of mis-
cellaneous) x = level of costs of each unit of further education (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if
the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
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Figure 5.44: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of further education (long-term) (costs of each unit of further education) (case of self-
-employed agricultural worker) x = level of costs of each unit of further education (x =
0.1,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of
eduation meaning that e = 0.)
Figure 5.45: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of further education (long-term) (costs of each unit of further education) (case of agri-
cultural laborers) x = level of costs of each unit of further education (x = 0.1,...,1), e  0 (if
the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that
e = 0.)
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Figure 5.46: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of childrearing without schooling (costs of each unit of childrearing without schooling)
(case of miscellaneous) x = level of costs of each unit of childrearing without schooling (x
= 0,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of
eduation meaning that e = 0.)
Figure 5.47: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of childrearing without schooling (costs of each unit of childrearing without school-
ing) (case of agricultural workers on their own account) x = level of costs of each unit of
childrearing without schooling (x = 0,...,1), e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the
individual chooses no level of eduation meaning that e = 0.)
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Figure 5.48: Simulation of the optimal level of an individual's children's education under
different levels of the fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each
unit of childrearing without schooling (long-term) (costs of each unit of childrearing with-
out schooling) x = level of costs of each unit of childrearing without schooling (x = 0,...,1),
e  0 (if the simulation shows that e  0, the individual chooses no level of eduation
meaning that e = 0.)
and on the contrary relatively higher technological development in the high wage group
will increase economic divergence. Hence, in the long-term development, an additional
strategy that should be implemented, besides reducing the costs of subsistence consump-
tion and reducing the costs of education and implementing distribution can be summed up
as follows:
1) The technology of both groups should be improved, in order to encourage
overall economic development
2) If there is economic inequality, considerable support should be given to the
low wage sector, which has lower technology. This support should be relatively greater
than that offered to the higher wage sector. The technology in the low wage sector should
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be advanced relatively more, in order to keep up with the higher technology sector. This
will assist economic convergence.
3) The strategies 1) and 2) should be implemented simultaneously. Moreover,
the progression of technology can only be fully achieved if the new technology can be
implemented by the existing human capital. This fact leads to the realization that the human
capital has to be simultaneously developed. This can be achieved by reducing the costs of
subsistence consumption and reducing the costs of education and implementing distribution
 as shown in the analyzes of the short-term strategy. These are relevant strategies for the
short- as well as the long-term development.
The main factors that are conducive to technological development are research and
development (R&D) and economic integration. Economic integration in particular is a very
signicant strategy. Whereas R&D needs a high investment in nance and a certain time,
to gain technology through economic integration require less time, has more impact and is
more efcient. This includes, for instance, taking over higher foreign technologies. More-
over, economic integration also lays a foundation for more effective R&D, for example by
joint ventures or international R&D and production.
5.3.4 Theoretical Analysis of Long-Term Development under
Inequality between Labor Groups and Introduction of Income tax
and Government Spending
The previous section shows strategies that should be implemented in order to strengthen the
economic structure. This section focuses on the role of government which is one of relevant
institutions that contribute to development of the economy, in particular regarding conver-
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gence and distribution. Supporting education and implementing strategies that lower the
costs of subsistence consumption will secure the foundation of the economy. In addition,
supporting convergence of technological progress will bring about economic development
and convergence in wage rates and income within the two sectors.
This section shows the role of the government in developing the economy, including
convergence and augmentation of wage rates, human capital quality, income and techno-
logical progress. First, the individual's choice of an optimal education level under exis-
tence of the government sector is analyzed. In this case, the individuals take the trade-off
between paying income tax and gains from government spending into account while maxi-
mizing their utilities. Second, possible strategies initiated by the government to strengthen
the economic structure will be analyzed. These consist of bolstering technological progress
and convergence of technologies, as well as the enhancement of the level of human capi-
tal and its convergence, which is supported by education. Both issues will lead to increases
in income and the standard of living and can be regarded as distribution and development
policies.
Preferences and Budget Constraints
The conguration of the utility function and the budget constraints are the same as
for the preferences and budget constraints of individuals in the previous sections. Addi-
tional factors are now the rate of taxation and advantages from government spending. It
is assumed that each individual has to pay income tax at rate t (0  t  1), on which the
government spending is dependent. Part of this government spending is invested in ed-
352 5 Theory on Economic Development and Integration
ucational support which is denoted in percentage of , and in research and development
(R&D), which leads to improvement of technology, denoted in percentage of . The rest
of the government spending will be used to provide other public goods g. For simplicity,
it is assumed that the individuals do not internalize the effect of government support in ed-
ucation and technology progress. The individuals take technological progress, the wage
rates and also the costs of education  e, as exogenously given. The government's budget
collected through taxation bears the deadweight-loss of taxation, by which a part of the
taxed amount is lost and cannot be transferred to the people. This can be expressed using
the following equation:
total government spending =

tt   t
2
t
2

withit and gt = (1     h   l)

tt   t
2
t
2

withit,
where withit is the average income per worker in the period t.
The cost of education with government support  e is dened by
 e =   

tt   t
2
t
2

The technology in the second period is dependent on the government support for
technology in the respective labor-group. This is dened by
Ajt+1 = f (j)
f (j) > 0; f (j) < 0; j = h; l
and therefore, the technological progress is written as
Tjt+1  Ajt+1 (j)  Ajt
Ajt
; j = h; l
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The utility and budget constraint of an individual i with high skills are
Uiht =
(wihthiht (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si   tt) + gt)(1 )
(wiht+1nthiht+1 (1  tt+1) + si (1 + r)wihthiht + gt+1) (5.71)
s:t:wihthiht (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si   tt) + gt  ciht
The utility and budget constraint of an individual i with low skills are
Uilt =
(wilthilt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si   tt) + gt)(1 )
(wilt+1nthilt+1 (1  tt+1) + si (1 + r)wilthilt + gt+1) (5.72)
s:t:wilthilt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si   tt) + gt  cilt
Optimization
When it comes to deciding on the optimal education level, the individuals consider
the tax rate as given and take the costs of education and their own net income into account.
Each individual only takes his or her net income as a benchmark. Net income in this case
shall be dened as income after tax and savings. In addition, the individuals take the wage
rate, the costs of education and technological progress for granted when they maximize
their utility.
Under given saving rate s and tax rate, an individual i chooses the level of his or
her investment in children's education and chooses his or her own consumption and future
assets that maximize the utility function. Simultaneously, individual i has to assure his or
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her subsistence consumption as well. This can be formulated as
max
ei
Uijt (5.73)
= max
ei
(wijthijt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s  tt) + gt)(1 )
(wijt+1nth (ei; Tijt+1 (j)) (1  tt+1) + s (1 + r)wijthijt + gt+1)
s:t:wijthijt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s  tt) + gt  cijt
ei  0; gt = (1     h   l)

tt   t
2
t
2

wtht;
gt+1 = (1     h   l)

tt+1   t
2
t+1
2

wt+1ht+1;
 e =   

tt   t
2
t
2

; Tjt+1  Ajt+1 (j)  Ajt
Ajt
; j = h; l
Optimization with respect to ei implies
@Uijt
@ei
= 0; j = h; l (5.74)
This represents the interior solution (for the case of , j = h; l), with
(1 )e
(1 nt(q+eei ) s tt)+ gtwijthijt
=


ae
(a 1)
i +Tijt+1

(1 tt+1)
nt(1 tt+1)(+eai +T bijt+1+ei Tijt+1)+s(1+r)
wijt
wijt+1
+
gt+1
wijt+1hijt
ei  0; gt = (1     h   l)

tt   t
2
t
2

wtht;
gt+1 = (1     h   l)

tt+1   t
2
t+1
2

wt+1ht+1;
 e =   

tt   t
2
t
2

; Tjt+1  Ajt+1(j) AjtAjt ; j = h; l
(5.75)
where zit the level of potential income of an individual i at the period t is and ztb
the level of potential income at which the subsistence constraint is just binding, with ztb =
cs gt
1 nt(q+eei) s tt . It follows that z
tb = 198.42 US dollars for the Thai economy. This
indicates that all white-collar workers and the manufacturing workers from the blue-collar
group earn income above ztb and the rest of the blue-collar workers earn less than ztb. This
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leads to the conclusion that, contrary to the budget constraints of the rest of the blue-collar
workers, the budget constraints of all white-collar workers and the manufacturing workers
are not binding. So there is interior solution for these individuals.
For a sufciently low level of income, the subsistence consumption constraint is bind-
ing and there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption level. The corner solution
exists exclusively for individuals who earn a sufciently low income level smaller than ztb.
So subject to the budget constraint, with s = max [0; s],
wijthijt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s  tt) + gt  cs (5.76)
the corner solution for individuals with zit  zb, is
ei =
1
nte

1  nt q   s  tt + (1     h   l)

tt   t
2
t
2

wtht
wijthijt
  cs
wijthijt

;
j = h; l
(5.77)
It follows that
(1 )e
(1 nt(q+eei ) s tt)+ gtwijthijt
=


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(a 1)
i +Tijt+1

(1 tt+1)
nt(1 tt+1)(+eai +T bijt+1+ei Tijt+1)+s(1+r)
wijt
wijt+1
+
gt+1
wijt+1hijt
ei  0; gt = (1     h   l)

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2

wtht;
gt+1 = (1     h   l)

tt+1   t
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
wt+1ht+1;
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
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; Tjt+1  Ajt+1(j) AjtAjt ; j = h; l
if zit > zb
ei =
1
nte

1  nt q   s  tt + (1     h   l)

tt   t
2
t
2

wtht
wijthijt
  cs
wijthijt

;
j = h; l
if zit  zb
(5.78)
It should be recognized that, actually, in the model, the expected real wage rate in
period t + 1 must be determined by the equation @Yt+1
@Hjt+1
= (1  )

Kjt+1
Ajt+1Hjt+1

Ajt+1 =
wjt+1; j = h; l. However, for simplicity the expected real wage rate in period t+ 1 applied
in this simulation is estimated using real wage growth. The wage rate for period t is set as
a benchmark, which means that wit+1 = wit(1+ expected real wage growth rate). Since
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the effect of the investment in technological progress on the wage rate conducted by R&D
is very moderate, the model ignore this effect for simplicity. This is allowed, since these
simulations are based on empirical data, but for model equilibrium the real wage growth
must be dened by the function derived from the marginal product of labor.
Simulations and Analyzes
The Tables 5.16-5.17 show the results of simulations for comparison between the case
of long-term development with government interference and the case without government
interference. The term government interference refers to taxation, support of education
costs, investment in technological development and general government spending. The rel-
evant factors that additionally inuence economic development are now the income tax rate
and the share of government spending on education support and on research and develop-
ment. Implementing taxation and public spending brings about distribution and bolsters
education in the low-income sector. This already supports economic convergence to some
extent. In addition, in the long-term, convergence of the economy can be assisted by in-
vesting in research and development. This bolsters the technology level and in turn, raises
wage rates and income. Intensive investment in research and development to upgrade the
technology of the low-income sector, which initially has a low technology level, will in-
crease the wage rate and individuals' income in this sector. This, in turn, assists economic
convergence. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the progression of technol-
ogy must be compatible with the existing human capital in the sector. In the case without
government interference, the rate of technology progress T is 2%. In this case with gov-
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ernment interference and investment in technology h and l, it is assumed for simplicity
that in the normal case with government interference h=0.1 and l=0.1, and change of T
due to government interference and investment in technology is dened as follows: Tech-
nology progress with government interference and investment in technology = Technology
progress without government interference T + investment in technology deadweight-loss
of taxation j

tt   t
2
t
2

; j = h; l.
Tables 5.16-5.17 provide a precise result analysis of the relationship between and de-
velopment of children's education level, individuals' utility, taxation, government spend-
ing, and government support for education and investment in research and technology. The
results can be summed up as follows.
1) Table 5.16 illustrates that progressive taxation and government spending not
only increase the overall level of investment in education, gains from distribution effect can
also be observed. First, the distribution-policy gives opportunities to invest in education for
the children of low income earners, who without government support were not able to
invest in education, in this case the miscellaneous. And second, distribution-policy leads
to a distribution effect in the level of investment in education for the individuals' children,
although the model implies that this happens only in the group of individuals earning above
ztb.
2) For the group of individuals whose income is above ztb (budget constraints
are not binding), convergence can be bolstered by a relatively higher advancement of tech-
nology in the low-income sector than in the high-income sector with h=0.05 and l=0.15.
This leads to increases in the wage rate, investment in children's education and utility in
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the respective sector compared to the normal case of Thailand with h=0.1 and l=0.1.
By a similar mechanism, a relative higher advancement of technology in the high-income
sector than in the low-income sector will lead to the opposite effect, of divergence. Al-
though convergence can be achieved among the individuals earning above ztb, the increase
in the share of government support for research and development leads to reduced total pre
worker utility, despite the distribution of utility is augmented. This is a relevant trade-off
that the government should bear in mind. In other words, reduction of the costs of educa-
tion may raise the level of education of the children, but if the costs of the reduction of the
costs of education are nanced by income tax which bears the deadweight-loss, the utility
of the economy will decrease. Yet, despite the deadweight-loss, this action leads to dis-
tribution of level of education and utility among the economy. This result suggests that a
proper strategy to develop the economy is to support the poor individuals to overcome the
income level of ztb, since at this point the distribution effect of the education support from
the government action is very effective and convergence will be easily bolstered.
3) Even though, Table 5.16 shows that government interference based on Thai
data only brings about a distribution-effect in education and that the total per-person level
of investment in education increases. Due to the model, the convergence of the two sec-
tors' wage rates and education levels can be slowly achieved by national efforts. It is more
effective and more rapid to achieve this aim by international cooperation and integration,
particularly by means of convergence of technologies between countries and economic sec-
tors. This strategy is effective in both short- and long-term development and will lead to
more efcient and more rapid economic convergence. In other words, the improvement
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of technology (leading to the augmentation of wage rates, the standard of living and in-
come) by means of research and development is moderate compared to the convergence
and improvement of technologies brought about by economic integration. This is a reason
to engage in economic cooperation and integration. And this conrms the mutual positive
relationship and support between economic convergence and economic integration.
4) Table 5.17 shows that, despite, progressive taxation and government spend-
ing bring about a signicant increase of the incentives of investment in and the level of
education. There is a trade-off due to the not-optimal tax structure of Thailand and the
deadweight-loss of taxation which leads to decline in the total per worker individuals'
utility. The total utility amounts to 274.97 compared to 291.24 without government inter-
ference. Nevertheless, government interaction induces an apparent distribution effect. The
lower the tax rate one has to pay, the lower the utility declines. The losers are those who are
faced with a high tax-rate, including professional, technical workers and proprietors, whose
utility falls from 878.24 and 769.98 to 477.09 and 421.76 respectively and, to a lesser ex-
tent, employees in clerical, sales and service jobs from 410.98 to 388.64. The other losers,
who suffer a slight loss, are manufacturing workers and self-employed agricultural workers
whose utility falls from 294.00 and 185.95 to 280.19 and 177.52 respectively. The winners
are and miscellaneous workers, and agricultural laborers whose utility rises from 182.08
and 94.78 to 191.81 and 99.01 respectively. Moreover the Table illustrates that the rel-
atively higher increase in the share of government support for research and development
leads to relatively higher increase of the utility in the respective group.
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To conclude, the importance of taxation and government spending lies in their dis-
tributive nature. Importantly, despite the decline in the total per worker individuals' utility
with an appropriate tax rate and use of government spending, economic convergence and
sustainable growth can be achieved. These advantages are pronounced if there is a great
deal of disparity in the economy. The higher the inequality, the higher the potential ad-
vantages of a distribution system in terms of achieving economic convergence and growth.
The most relevant policy is to secure individuals' income at a level at which they can look
forward to their future, in terms of their own standard of living and that of their children. In
the model this is expressed as the decision on education. As soon as the budget constraints
of the individuals are no longer binding, the policy of supporting the reduction of the costs
of education can be implemented with its full distribution potential. In addition, it can be
observed that, if there is no government interference, many individuals from the blue-collar
group, including miscellaneous workers, self-employed agricultural workers and agricul-
tural laborers, have no incentives or are not able to provide education for their children.
After government interference, some of them are able to invest in their children's educa-
tion, but some are still incapable. This may be one reason why in the reality the government
has to introduce a policy of compulsory minimum education, in order to reduce the trend
of divergence.
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Occupation
ei ;
ht;
ht+1;
comparable ht+1
under progressive tax,
h=0.1 and l=0.1
ei ;
ht;
ht+1;
comparable ht+1
under progressive tax,
h=0.05 and l=0.15
ei ;
ht;
ht+1;
comparable ht+1
under progressive tax,
h=0.15 and l=0.05
ei ;
ht;
ht+1;
comparable ht+1
under case without
government
interference
Professional and
technical
0.2181;
1.72;
1.9388;
1.9388
(10%)
0.2175;
1.72;
1.9388;
1.9388
(10%)
0.2187;
1.72;
1.9388;
1.9388
(10%)
0.1975;
1.72;
1.9321;
1.9321
Managerial and
administrative
- - - -
Proprietors
0.2205;
0.93;
1.0488;
1.0488
(10%)
0.2199;
0.93;
1.0487;
1.0487
(10%)
0.2211;
0.93;
1.0488;
1.0488
(10%)
0.1975;
0.93;
1.0446;
1.0446
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
0.2509;
0.80;
0.9071;
0.9071
(5%)
0.2503;
0.80;
0.9075;
0.9075
(5%)
0.2516;
0.80;
0.9072;
0.9072
(5%)
0.1975;
0.80;
0.8986;
0.8986
Total per white-collar worker 0.2439 0.2433 0.2446 0.1975
Manufacturing workers
0.2535;
1.39 (0.57);
1.5769;
0.6510
(5%)
0.2542;
1.39 (0.57);
1.5770;
0.6510
(5%)
0.2528;
1.39 (0.57);
1.5767;
0.6509
(5%)
0.1975;
1.39 (0.57);
1.5614;
0.6446
Transportation and
communication
- - - -
Miscellaneous
0.0453;
0.91 (0.38);
1.0694;
0.4415
(0%)
0.0453;
0.91 (0.38);
1.0698;
0.4416
(0%)
0.0453;
0.91 (0.38);
1.0691;
0.4413
(0%)
0
Agriculture, self-employed
0
(5%)
0
(5%)
0
(5%)
0
Agricultural laborers
0
(0%)
0
(0%)
0
(0%)
0
Total per blue-collar worker 0.0897 0.0899 0.0894 0.0699
Total per worker
0.14104
(4.28%)
0.14098
(4.28%)
0.14120
(4.28%)
0.11236
Table 5.16: Comparison of the chosen level of education of white- and blue-collar workers
in Thailand, 2000 (under different situations, long-term)
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Occupation
Utility under
progressive tax,
h=0.1 and l=0.1
Utility under
progressive tax,
h=0.05 and l=0.15
Utility under
progressive tax,
h=0.15 and l=0.05
Utility under case
without
government
interference
Professional and
technical
769.9769
(10%)
769.8018
(10%)
770.1518
(10%)
878.2410
Managerial and
administrative
- - - -
Proprietors
421.7550
(10%)
421.6652
(10%)
421.8453
(10%)
477.0938
Employees in clerical,
sales and service jobs
388.6394
(5%)
388.2903
(5%)
388.9888
(5%)
410.9807
Total per white-collar worker 448.2444 469.7782 470.4023 484.6038
Manufacturing workers
280.1881
(5%)
280.4392
(5%)
279.9372
(5%)
293.9977
Transportation and
communication
- - - -
Miscellaneous
191.8132
(0%)
191.9630
(0%)
191.6634
(0%)
182.0755
Agriculture, self-employed
177.5163
(5%)
177.6461
(5%)
177.3870
(5%)
185.9461
Agricultural laborers
99.0061
(0%)
99.0770
(0%)
98.9353
(0%)
94.7758
Total per blue-collar worker 188.4744 188.6281 188.3208 194.7170
Total per worker
274.9711
(4.28%)
282.2438
(4.28%)
282.2467
(4.28%)
291.2418
Table 5.17: Comparison of the utility of white- and blue-collar workers in Thailand, 2000
(under different situations, long-term)
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5.4 Application of the Model on an International and Regional
Basis
Until now, the model has been implemented to analyze national development, more pre-
cisely to simulate the national development of Thailand. Notably, this model can be ap-
plied to the convergence and development progress of regional groupings as well; it can
be used to analyze and calculate convergence and economic development within a country,
among countries or within a regional grouping and also between regional groupings under
economic integration. This, in turn, suggests the prospect of integration progress among
economies. The conguration of the model remains largely the same and changes in the
interpretation of the assumptions and parameters can be made as follows.
- Now instead of one country, interaction between a country and another country
or a regional grouping is considered.
- Instead of disparity within a country, there is economic disparity between two
economies.
- The group of white-collar workers is interpreted to the group of workers work-
ing in the higher developed countries. In analogy, the group of blue-collar workers is now
the group of workers who work in the less developed countries.
There are groups of labor forces in country a and country b or regional grouping
a or b (for simplicity the thesis uses the terms economy a and economy b). At time t,
workers from economy a work with technology Aht, while workers from economy b work
with technology Alt. It is assumed that there is disparity between the income and wage
rate of groups of workers from different economies; workers from economy a are educated
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to a higher level, possess a higher quality of human capital and utilize higher technology.
The high level of economic disparity, notably, leads to a larger difference in the levels of
education and income among the two groups.
The aggregate output of the united economy (when the two countries or a regional
grouping and a country are integrated), in time period t, given by the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction kernel is
Yt = K

ht (AhtHht)
(1 ) +Klt (AltHlt)
(1 ) ; 0    1
While the structure of the model remains the same, the interpretation of the model
is modied in order to analyze the prospect of economic integration between countries or
within a regional grouping. In equilibrium, the following conditions must be fullled.
Capital is perfectly mobile between economies. This implies that
@Yt
@Kht
=
@Yt
@Klt
() 

Klt
AltHlt
( 1)
= 

Kht
AhtHht
( 1)
The capital market equilibrium condition implies that under economic integration
the capital stock per total efciency unit of labor must be identical in each economy;
therefore
Klt
AltHlt
=
Kht
AhtHht
As already mentioned, it is assumed that the economy is small and open to the world
capital market. It follows that


Klt
AltHlt
( 1)
= 

Kht
AhtHht
( 1)
= r
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In economy a, the marginal product and wage rate of the workers is
@Yt
@Hht
= (1  )

Kht
AhtHht

Aht = wht
and the marginal product and wage rate of the workers in economy b is
@Yt
@Hlt
= (1  )

Klt
AltHlt

Alt = wlt
5.4.1 Prospect of Short-Term Development of Economic Integration
The conguration of the utility function, the budget constraint and the maximization result
remain the same.
The utility function and budget constraint of an individual i in economy a are
Uiht = (wihthiht (1  ei   si))(1 ) (wiht+1hiht+1 + si (1 + r)wihthiht)
wihthiht (ei + si) + ciht  wihthiht
The utility function and budget constraint of an individual i in economy b are
Uilt = (wilthilt (1  ei   si))(1 ) (wilt+1hilt+1 + si (1 + r)wilthilt)
wilthilt (ei + si) + cilt  wilthilt
Under a given saving rate s, individuals choose their level of investment in education.
As a result, they choose their own consumption level and their future assets; maximizing
their own utility function. Simultaneously, they have to assure subsistence consumption as
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well. This can be written as
max
ei
Uijt
= max
ei
(wijthijt (1  ei   s))(1 ) (wijt+1hijt+1 + s (1 + r)wijthijt)
s:t:wijthijt (ei + s) + cijt  wijthijt; ei  0; j = h; l
For a sufciently low level of income, the subsistence consumption constraint is bind-
ing and there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption level. In contrast to the
interior solution which comes to play for any individual who earns enough salary or in other
words zijt > zb, the corner solution exists for an individual who earns a sufciently low
income level, meaning that zijt  zb. Subject to the budget constraint, with s = max [0; s],
wijthijt (1  ei   s)  cs; j = h; l
Optimization with respect to ei implies
ei =
8<:


(1  s)  (1  )
h
1 + s (1 + r)
wijt
wijt+1
i
; j = h; l if zijt > zb
1


1  s  cs
wijthijt

; j = h; l if zijt  zb
Simulations and Analyzes
This section presents simulations of the individual i's optimized level of investment in
education ei . The simulations distinguish two cases; namely, the case of workers working
in a higher developed economy and the case of workers working in a less developed econ-
omy. As already mentioned, there is no job-switching between economies in the short-run.
This conrms the assumption of immobility of labor between economies in the short-run.
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However, within an economy there can be job-switching meaning that labor mobility exists
on this level.
In the simulations, the prospect of ASEAN integration is considered. By analyzing
the convergence between the original ASEAN-5 members and the Indochinese countries,
the basis of ASEAN integration is captured. In addition, by means of modeling the progress
of convergence of quality of human capital, technology and income, the outlook of ASEAN
integration will be suggested. The economic indicators of the ASEAN members are set as
follows.
a) The constant saving rates of the ASEAN-5 countries are set at 16% for Indone-
sia, 30% for Malaysia, 21% for the Philippines, 38% for Singapore and 10% for Thailand.
For the Indochinese countries saving rates are set as follows: 10% for Cambodia, 9% for
Laos and 21% for Vietnam. The data of Brunei and Myanmar are not complete; therefore
the simulations will not consider both countries, for the sake of simplicity. Notably, now in
the simulations of the ASEAN the saving rates from different countries are different con-
trarily to the saving rate used in the simulations of Thai economy which is identical for
every individual. This leads to different outcome.
b) The subsistence consumption level cs is evaluated by estimating 70% of the
average consumption rate of the group of low-income earner countries, in this case the
Indochinese countries, which amounts to 98.41 US dollars.
c) The wage rate of each group is set by calculating the average monthly salaries
of the workers in the respective group. This means that the wage rate of a worker working
in the higher developed countries, the ASEAN-5, amounts to 767.15 US dollars and the
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wage rate of a worker working in the less developed countries, the Indochinese countries,
is 136.30 US dollars. The different income among workers from different countries with
different development status is dened through different levels of the effective unit of labor
of an individual i, hijt, which reects the quality of the individual's work. The calculation
of hijt for each occupation is dened by the ratio of monthly salaries of an individual i to
the wage rate of the respective group.
d) Actually the expected real wage rate in period t + 1 must be determined by
the equation @Yt+1
@Hjt+1
= (1  )

Kjt+1
Ajt+1Hjt+1

Ajt+1 = wjt+1; j = h; l. For simplicity in
this simulation, the expected real wage rate in period t + 1 is estimated using real wage
growth. The wage rate at period t set as a benchmark, which means that wjt+1 = wjt(1
+ expected real wage growth rate). For simplicity, since Thailand's development status is
close to the average for of all the ASEAN economies, the real wage growth rate of Thailand
is estimated using data from 2000 to 2004235 and amounts to -2.49%.
e) The expected 5-year real interest rate (in this case deposit rates are used) from
2000-2004 was calculated and estimated at 16.03%
f) For simplicity, the model sets the individual's weighed preference in the rst
work period (1  ), and the weighed preference in the second work period , to the same
rate, i.e. both are at 0.5 ( = 0.5). This means that individuals are indifferent in that they
have no preference for earning in one period rather than the other.
235 E-Thailand Monthly Economic Review by Economic Information Section, Fiscal Policy Ofce, see Bank
of Thailand, Economic Data (deposit rates: 4.375% (estimated from 4%-4.75%)) for 2000, 4% for 2001,
3.25% for 2002, 1.75% for 2003 and 1.75% for 2004, these rates are from January each year), www.bot.or.th
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g) The fraction of the individual's unit time endowment required for each unit of
further education  , is set at 0.4 in the model.
In the model, simulations of the chosen optimal education level are analyzed under
varying parameters to nd out feasible strategies that can bring about economic devel-
opment and convergence. Assuming  = 0.4, since zb = cs
1 ei  s , it follows that z
b =
149.13 for Indonesia, 157.94 for Malaysia, 152.16 for the Philippines, 163.45 for Singa-
pore, 148,54 for Thailand, 145.65 US dollars for Cambodia, 145.08 US dollars for Laos and
152.16 US dollars for Vietnam. Since the average income of Indonesia comes to 251.58 US
dollars, Malaysia 791.42 US dollars, the Philippines 330.58 US dollars, Singapore 1946.33
US dollars, Thailand 551.83 US dollars, Cambodia 110.50 US dollars, Laos 131.33 US
dollars and Vietnam 167.17 US dollars, this means that all the workers from the ASEAN-5
and Vietnam earn income more than zb and their budget constraints are not binding. In the
contrary, the workers from the rest Indochina countries earn less than zb and their budget
constraints are binding.
The results of the simulations can be analyzed as follows. First of all, it should
be recognized that the structure of the model is identical to the previous sections, and
so are the shapes of the graphs induced from the models and simulations. Assuming 
= 0.4, the chosen level of education of workers in Indonesia is 0.46 (0.4548), Malaysia
0.20 (0.1965), the Philippines 0.36 (0.3626), Singapore 0.05 (0.0489) and Thailand 0.47
(0.4733). The workers in the Indochina countries choose their level of education as follows:
0.03 (0.0277) for Cambodia, 0.40 (0.3999) for Laos and 0.36 (0.3626) for Vietnam. Since
hit+1 = hit (1 + e

i ), after investment in education, the chosen level of education will be
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augmented by the human capital workers possess in the period t. This, in turn, increases the
human capital in the period t+ 1  the higher the human capital in the period t, the higher
the positive effect. This can be interpreted by the higher ability of the higher educated
individuals to absorb knowledge. In the period t+1, the following values for human capital
are estimated: in Indonesia the absolute gained level of investment in education hitei and
effective unit of labor in period t + 1; hit+1 are 0.15 (0.1501) and 0.48 (0.4801), Malaysia
0.20 (0.2024) and 1.23 (1.2324), Philippines 0.16 (0.1559) and 0.59 (0.5859), Singapore
1.16 (1.1552) and 2.66 (2.6640), and Thailand 0.32 (0.3171) and 0.99 (0.9871)  this can be
compared only among the group of high developed countries. And the absolute gained level
of investment in education hitei and human capital in the period t + 1; hit+1 the workers
in the Indochinese countries are as follows; 0.02 (0.0224) and 0.83 (0.8324) for Cambodia,
0.38 (0.3839) and 1.34 (1.3439) for Laos and 0.45 (0.4460) and 1.68 (1.6760) for Vietnam
 this can be compared only among the group of low developed countries. In order to make
a comparison of the qualities of human capital between both groups, following calculation
has to be made; to compare the level of the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt
to the one of the white-collar hiht, the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt has
to multiply with the ratio between wage rate of the blue- and white-collar:

wilt
wiht

hilt.
According to the group of income-earners earning above zb the results of hit+1 and hitei
remain, while the results of comparable hit and hit+1 of the group of income-earners below
zb, are as follows: 0.14 (0.1439) and 0.15 (0.1480) for Cambodia, 0.17 (0.1706) and 0.24
(0.2388) for Laos and 0.22 (0.2185) and 0.30 (0.2978) for Vietnam, see Table 5.18.
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Country
Average income;
Saving rate
Chosen level of education ei ;
Absolute gained level of
investment in education hite

i ;
Effective unit of labor period t+ 1; hit+1
Comparison of individual i's effective units of labor
no comparison hit;
comparable hit;
comparable hit+1
Indonesia
251.58;
16%
0.4548;
0.1501;
0.4801
0.33;
0.33;
0.4801
Malaysia
791.42;
30%
0.1965;
0.2024;
1.2324
1.03
1.03;
1.2324
Philippines
330.58;
21%
0.3626;
0.1559;
0.5859
0.43;
0.43;
0.5859
Singapore
1946.33;
38%
0.0489;
1.1552;
2.6640
2.53;
2.53;
2.664
Thailand
515.83;
15%
0.4733;
0.3171;
0.9871
0.67;
0.67;
0.9871
Brunei Darussalam - - -
Cambodia
110.50;
10%
0.0277;
0.0224;
0.8324
0.81;
0.1439a;
0.1480a
Laos
131.33;
9%
0.3999;
0.3839;
1.3439
0.96;
0.1706a;
0.2388a
Myanmar - - -
Vietnam
167.17;
21%
0.3626;
0.4460;
1.6760
1.23;
0.2185a;
0.2978a
a: In the model, in order to make a comparison of the qualities of human capital between both groups, following calculation has to be made;
to compare the level of the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt to the one of the white-collar hiht,
the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt has to multiply with the ratio between wage rate of the blue- and white-collar:

wilt
wiht

hilt.
Table 5.18: Comparison of the individual's effective units of labor working in the workers'
group from ASEAN-CLMV countries and in the workers' group from ASEAN-5 counties
calculated in the model in ASEAN, 2000
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The Table 5.19 illustrates a rough simulation of the positive effect of economic in-
tegration on economic convergence and development. The short-term case of ASEAN
is captured as an example. The model in this thesis analyze the possible effect of eco-
nomic integration on economic convergence and development via technological progress
in the less developed economy brought about by integration with higher developed econ-
omy. Actually in the model, theoretically, the functions from the Production Relations:
@Yt
@Hjt
= (1  )

Kht
AjtHjt

Ajt = wjt; j = h; l must be fullled. However, since produc-
tion function has not been explicitly dened in the simulations of this thesis, for simplicity,
merely possible cases of the increase in wage rate in the low developed sector are examined
and consequently, the changes in the level of investment in education and human capital
will be compared to the cases introduced in the previous sections. Due to the equations in
the Production Relations the effect of the technological progress on the wage rate is the
product of A(1 )jt ; j = h; l, but for simplicity, situations in which economic integration has
brought about technology progress in the low developed sector and in turn the increase in
wage rate in the period t at the rate of 5%, 10%, and 20% are contemplated. This means that
the wage rate of the low-earner-sector increases from 136.30 US dollars to 143.12, 149.93
and 163.56 for the case of 5%, 10%, and 20% respectively. Thus, the average income of
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia increases from 167.17, 131.33 and 110.50 to 175.53, 137.90
and 116.03 US dollars in the case of 5%, to 183.89, 144.46 and 121.55 US dollars in the
case of 10% and to 200.60, 157.60 and 132.60 US dollars in the case of 20%. Since zb for
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are 152.16, 145.08 and 145.65 US dollars, this means that
the budget constraints of workers in Vietnam remain not-binding and in Cambodia binding
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for all three cases. In Laos, the increase of wage rate due to economic integration, pre-
cisely due to the augmentation of technology progress, of 5% and 10% does not change
the binding condition of budget constraints, but the increase of wage rate of 20% to 157.60
does improve budget constraints of the workers in Laos to not-binding status. The results
of the increased wage rate led by integration show that integration is a signicant factor to
bring about convergence in economic structure. The increased wage rate led by integra-
tion rstly increases the income and utility of the individuals working in the low developed
sector. And secondly, it also raises the level of investment in education of the individuals
whose budget constraints are binding, while the level of investment in education of those
whose budget constraints are not binding remains. Moreover the convergence movement of
wage rate also brings about convergence in the level of human capital among both sectors.
This effect is illustrated in the augmentation of the level of comparable hit+1 of the low de-
veloped sector, which rises the more its wage rate increases, see Table 5.19. Therefore, the
economic divergence among high developed and low developed sectors will be eased, and
convergence will be supported. Moreover, it can be observed that if the increase of wage
rate is high enough, more and more individuals from the low developed sector will have
there budget constraints unbound and as shown in the previous simulations, divergence will
be hampered and distribution will be easier to implement in order to achieve economic con-
vergence and sustainable development. This reveals one of the relevant positive effects of
economic integration on economic development.
Considering the results of the simulations in the case of ASEAN, the model shows
that, in general, convergence of the chosen level of education can be observed. Particularly,
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Country
Chosen level of education ei ;
Absolute gained level of
investment in education hite

i ;
Effective unit of labor period t+ 1; hit+1
(normal case, increase of wage rate 5%, 10%, 20%)
Comparison of individual i's effective units of labor
no comparison hit;
comparable hit;
comparable hit+1
Indonesia
0.4548;
0.1501;
0.4801
0.33;
0.33;
0.4801
Malaysia
0.1965;
0.2024;
1.2324
1.03
1.03;
1.2324
Philippines
0.3626;
0.1559;
0.5859
0.43;
0.43;
0.5859
Singapore
0.0489;
1.1552;
2.6640
2.53;
2.53;
2.664
Thailand
0.4733;
0.3171;
0.9871
0.67;
0.67;
0.9871
Brunei Darussalam - -
Cambodia
0.0277, 0.1335 (5%), 0.2297 (10%), 0.3981 (20%);
0.0224, 0.1081 (5%), 0.1861 (10%), 0.3224 (20%);
0.8324, 0.9181 (5%), 0.9961 (10%), 1.1324 (20%)
0.81;
0.1439a;
0.1480, 0.1713 (5%), 0.1947 (10%), 0.2414 (20%)a
Laos
0.3999, 0.4892 (5%), 0.5704 (10%), 0.5840 (20%);
0.3839, 0.4696 (5%), 0.5477 (10%), 0.6839 (20%);
1.3439, 1.4296 (5%), 1.5076 (10%), 1.6439 (20%)
0.96;
0.1706a;
0.2388, 0.2667 (5%), 0.2946 (10%), 0.3505 (20%)a
Myanmar - -
Vietnam
0.3626;
0.4460;
1.6760
1.23;
0.2185a;
0.2978, 0.3127 (5%), 0.3275 (10%), 0.3573 (20%)a
Average income of Cambodia: 110.50, 116.03 (5%), 121.55 (10%), 132.60 (20%);
Average income of Laos: 131.33, 137.90 (5%), 144.46 (10%), 157.60 (20%);
Average income of Vietnam: 167.17, 175.53 (5%), 183.89 (10%), 200.60 (20%);
a: In the model, in order to make a comparison of the qualities of human capital between both groups, following calculation has to be made;
to compare the level of the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt to the one of the white-collar hiht,
the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt has to multiply with the ratio between wage rate of the blue- and white-collar:

wilt
wiht

hilt.
Table 5.19: Comparison of the individual's effective units of labor working in the workers'
group from ASEAN-CLMV countries and in the workers' group from ASEAN-5 counties
under different wage rates of the low developed sector brought about by economic integra-
tion (via technology progress), 2000
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the further developed of the Indochina countries, such as Vietnam and Laos, make sig-
nicant progress. Nonetheless, the convergence might vary between the economies from
the two poles, because of the signicant differences of the level of ex-ante human capi-
tal. Very rich workers in highly developed countries, for instance Singapore, continue to
increase their already high level of human capital despite their lower rate of investment in
education. At the same time, the very poor or less developed countries, for instance Cam-
bodia, can hardly catch up. This result has some important practical implications: rstly,
it is advisable to support the least developed economies in the regional grouping, in order
to maintain stable economic integration, if there are very low developed economies in the
group. Moreover, this indicates the necessity of entrance criteria for a regional grouping,
such as those applied in the form of the EU convergence criteria, since this will avoid the
divergence problem in the long-run. As in the previous sections, due to the model, diver-
gence will be hindered or convergence can be achieved by reducing the costs of education
and subsistence consumption in the less developed sector. An efcient distribution policy
will contribute greatly to an effective outcome. Yet, it should be noted that a region-wide
policy is often difcult to implement, although this can be a rst step towards regional
political cooperation and integration. Nevertheless, the simulation shows that it is very dif-
cult for the less developed countries to catch up with the more developed economies in
the short-run, since highly developed economies do not wait for the other members of the
same regional grouping, but forge ahead with their development, making use of the very
high capacity they already possess from previous time periods.
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5.4.2 Prospect of Long-Term Development of Economic Integration
This section analyzes long-term development under inequality among countries within
economies on the road to integration or in a state of integration. Individuals are divided
into two categories, one high-skilled, the workers from economy a and one low-skilled, the
workers from economy b. The structure and result of the model remain the same.
The utility function and budget constraint of an individual i from economy a are
Uiht = (wihthiht (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si))(1 ) (wiht+1nthiht+1 + si (1 + r)wihthiht)
s:t:wihthiht (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si)  ciht
The utility function and budget constraint of an individual i economy b are
Uilt = (wilthilt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si))(1 ) (wilt+1nthilt+1 + si (1 + r)wilthilt)
s:t:wilthilt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  si)  cilt
Under a given saving rate s, individuals choose the level of investment in their chil-
dren's education. As a result, they choose their own consumption level and their future
assets to maximize their own utility function. Simultaneously, they have to assure subsis-
tence consumption as well. This can be written as
max
ei
Uijt
= max
ei
(wijthijt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s))(1 )
(wijt+1nth (ei; Tijt+1) + s (1 + r)wijthijt)

s:t:wijthijt (nt (
q +  eei) + s) + cijt  wijthijt; ei  0; j = h; l
() max
ei
(wijthijt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s))(1 ) 
wijt+1nthijt
 
 + eai + T
b
ijt+1 + eiTijt+1

+ s (1 + r)wijthijt

s:t:wijthijt (nt (
q +  eei) + s) + cijt  wijthijt; ei  0; j = h; l
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For a sufciently low level of income, the subsistence consumption constraint is bind-
ing and there is a corner solution with respect to the consumption level. The corner solution
exists exclusively for individuals who earn a sufciently low income level smaller than ztb.
So subject to the budget constraint, with s = max [0; s],
wijthijt (1  nt ( q +  eei)  s  tt) + gt  cs
Optimization with respect to ei implies
(1 )e
(1 nt(q+eei ) s tt)+ gtwijthijt
=


ae
(a 1)
i +Tijt+1

(1 tt+1)
nt(1 tt+1)(+eai +T bijt+1+ei Tijt+1)+s(1+r)
wijt
wijt+1
+
gt+1
wijt+1hijt
ei  0; gt = (1     h   l)

tt   t
2
t
2

wtht;
gt+1 = (1     h   l)

tt+1   t
2
t+1
2

wt+1ht+1;
 e =   

tt   t
2
t
2

; Tjt+1  Ajt+1(j) AjtAjt ; j = h; l
if zit > zb
ei =
1
nte

1  nt q   s  tt + (1     h   l)

tt   t
2
t
2

wtht
wijthijt
  cs
wijthijt

;
j = h; l
if zit  zb
Moreover, the following conditions must be fullled. Optimal wage rates for both
countries are dened by:
the marginal product of white-collar labors in economy a (period t)
@Yt
@Hht
= (1  )

Kht
AhtHht

Aht = wht
the marginal product of blue-collar labors in economy b (period t)
@Yt
@Hlt
= (1  )

Klt
AltHlt

Alt = wlt
the marginal product of white-collar labors in economy a (period t+ 1)
@Yt+1
@Hht+1
= (1  )

Kht+1
Aht+1Hht+1

Aht+1 = wht+1
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the marginal product of blue-collar labors in economy b (period t+ 1)
@Yt+1
@Hlt+1
= (1  )

Klt+1
Alt+1Hlt+1

Alt+1 = wlt+1
Technological progress, which leads to development of human capital and change in
wage rates in the second period, and human capital in the second period, are dened by
Tjt+1  Ajt+1   Ajt
Ajt
; j = h; l
hijt+1 = h (ei; Tijt+1) = hijt
 
+ eai + T
b
ijt+1 + e
c
iT
d
ijt+1

The constant saving rate s, subsistence consumption level cs and wage rate are set
at the same rate as in the short-term case and it is assumed that c = 1 and d = 1. The
parameter of the level of education a is 0.5 the parameter of adverse effect of technolog-
ical progress regarding human capital level b is -0.05 and the parameter of the external
effect of parents' human capital on the children's human capital  is 0.7. Therefore the
conditions h (ei; Tit+1) > 0, he (ei; Tit+1) > 0, hee (ei; Tit+1) < 0, hT (ei; Tit+1) < 0,
hTT (ei; Tit+1) > 0 and heT (ei; Tit+1) > 0, 8 (ei; Tit+1)  0 are fullled. In the long-term
case, for simplicity some of following data are taken from of data of Thailand  since Thai-
land's development status is close to the average for of all the ASEAN economies. The
real wage growth is estimated for a 15 year interval, using data from 2000 to 2004. The
data from 2004 is used to extrapolate expected data for 2005-2014. The real wage growth
rate is provided by estimating the data from the Labor force survey from the National Sta-
tistical Ofce236 and amounts to 6.42%. The 15 year real interest rate (deposit rates) from
236 Real wage growth (average wage of employed person) in Thailand in 2000 was 1.4%, in 2001 0.6%,
in 2002 1.5%, in 2003 0.4%(estimate) and in 2004 is 0.6%(quarter 1), from Labor force survey, National
Statistical Ofce.
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2000-2014237 (the data from 2004 is also used for 2005-2014) is estimated at 16.20%. The
rate of technological progress is 2%. The fraction of the individual's unit time endowment
required for raising a child without school and higher education is 18%238. The popula-
tion growth n in Indonesia is 1.45, Malaysia 1.80, the Philippines 1.84, Singapore 1.56 and
Thailand 0.87. In the Indochina countries, population growth n is as follows; 1.81 for Cam-
bodia, 2.42 for Laos and 1.04 for Vietnam. For simplicity, the model sets the individual's
weighed preference in the rst work period at the same rate of the weighed preference in
the second work period , at 0.5 ( = 0:5) . This means that individual's preferences are
indifferent, i.e. they have no preference for earning in one period rather than the other.
Since zb = cs
1 nt(q+eei) s , assuming that  = 0.4, it follows that z
b = 177.60 for
Indonesia, 267.85 for Malaysia, 220.77 for the Philippines, 296.65 for Singapore, 152.45
for Thailand, 178.02 US dollars for Cambodia, 212.67 US dollars for Laos and 172.50 US
dollars for Vietnam. Since the average incomes Indonesia is 251.58 US dollars, Malaysia
791.42 US dollars, the Philippines 330.58 US dollars, Singapore 1946.33 US dollars, Thai-
land 551.83 US dollars, Cambodia 110.50 US dollars, Laos 131.33 US dollars and Vietnam
167.17 US dollars, this indicates that all workers from the Indochina countries earn income
237 E-Thailand Monthly Economic Review by Economic Information Section, Fiscal Policy Ofce, see Bank
of Thailand, Economic Data (deposit rates: 4.375% (estimated from 4%-4.75%)) for 2000, 4% for 2001,
3.25% for 2002, 1.75% for 2003 and 1.75% for 2004, these rates are from January each year), www.bot.or.th
238 Estimated expenses vary considerably with household income level. Depending on age of the child, the
expenses range from 6,280-7,380 US-dollar for families in the lowest income group (2000 before-tax income
less than 38,000), from 8,740-9,860 US-dollar for families in the middle income group (2000 before-tax
income between 38,000 and 64,000),and from 13,000-14,260 for families in the highest income group (2000
before-tax income more than 64,000). See http://www.usda.gov/cnpp/Crc/Crc2000.pdf. In the model, 18%
is calculated by the ratio of the estimated expenses of the families in the middle income group to the average
income level.
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less than zb. The budget constraints of all ASEAN-5 workers are not binding, contrary to
the budget constraints of the workers from Indochina countries.
The simulation shows an interesting result239. Assuming  = 0.4, the chosen level of
investment in education for the children of workers in Indonesia is 0.05 (0.0456), Malaysia
0.01 (0.0133), the Philippines 0.02 (0.0194), Singapore 0.01 (0.0134) and Thailand 0.14
(0.1427). The workers in the Indochina countries choose their level of education as fol-
lows: 0 for Cambodia, 0 for Laos and 0.04 (0.0419) for Vietnam. And the effective unit
of labor of the children in period t + 1; hit+1 in Indonesia is 0.70 (0.7030), Malaysia 2.10
(2.0927), Philippines 0.88 (0.8840), Singapore 5.14 (5.1414), and Thailand 1.54 (1.5388)
 this can be compared only among the group of high developed countries. The children's
human capital in the period t + 1; hit+1 of the workers in the Indochinese countries are as
follows;1.55 (1.5520) for Cambodia, and 1.84 (1.8394) for Laos and 2.61 (2.6094) for Viet-
nam  this can be compared only among the group of low developed countries. In order to
make a comparison of the qualities of human capital between both groups, following cal-
culation has to be made; to compare the level of the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar
hilt to the one of the white-collar hiht, the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt has
to multiply with the ratio between wage rate of the blue- and white-collar:

wilt
wiht

hilt. Ac-
cording to the group of income-earners earning above zb the results of hit+1 remain, while
the results of comparable hit+1 of the group of income-earners below zb, are as follows:
0.28 (0.2757) for Cambodia, 0.33 (0.3268) for Laos and 0.46 (0.4636) for Vietnam, see
Table 5.20.
239 It must be noted that the data used in this simulation are not very precise, therefore deviations might occur.
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The results relating to the chosen level of education for the children of workers in
ASEAN show that there is, on the one hand, convergence movement of the level of educa-
tion within the ASEAN-5 countries. And the national policies might play a great role in the
acceleration of convergence, encompassing saving rate, population growth and technologi-
cal development for instance. In the case of ASEAN, Thailand reveals the best development
of the group followed by Indonesia and the Philippines. Singapore and Malaysia were al-
ready positioned at a high development status but invest at a lower rate of education, yet
highly developed countries, for instance Singapore, the children absorb the already high
level of human capital of their parents despite the lower rate of investment in education. So
it is very difcult for the other ASEAN member to catch up. Nonetheless, among the rest
of the ASEAN members, encompassing particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and
Thailand there is potential of convergence movement. On the other hand, the Indochinese
countries have difculties in catching up with the ASEAN-5 countries. Due to their budget
constraints, they are not eager to support their children's educational development. Work-
ers from Cambodia and Laos invest nothing in education for the children, while the workers
from Vietnam, even whose economic situation is further developed, invest merely at a low
rate in education for their children. Therefore for these less developed countries, the gov-
ernment has to make serious concern about policy of compulsory minimum education, in
order to develop their economies and reduce the trend of divergence.
To conclude, in the long-term development of ASEAN, the higher developed coun-
tries (where budget constraints are not binding) converge among each other. Difculties lie
in the development of the lower developed countries (where budget constraints are bind-
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Country
Average income;
Saving rate;
Population growth
Chosen level of education ei ;
Childrend's effective unit of labor hit+1
Comparison of effective units of labor
no comparison hit;
comparable hit;
comparable hit+1
Indonesia
251.58;
16%;
1.45
0.0456;
0.7030
0.33;
0.33;
0.7030
Malaysia
791.42;
30%;
1.80
0.0133;
2.0927
1.03
1.03;
2.0927
Philippines
330.58;
21%;
1.84
0.0194;
0.8840
0.43;
0.43;
0.8840
Singapore
1946.33;
38%;
1.56
0.0134;
5.1414
2.53;
2.53;
5.1414
Thailand
515.83;
15%;
0.87
0.1427;
1.5388
0.67;
0.67;
1.5388
Brunei Darussalam - - -
Cambodia
110.50;
10%;
1.81
0;
1.5520
0.81;
0.1439a;
0.2757a
Laos
131.33;
9%;
2.42
0;
1.8394
0.96;
0.1706a;
0.3268a
Myanmar - - -
Vietnam
167.17;
21%;
1.04
0.0419;
2.6094
1.23;
0.2185a;
0.4636a
In the model, in order to make a comparison of the qualities of human capital between both groups, following calculation has to be made;
to compare the level of the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt to the one of the white-collar hiht,
the effective unit of labor of the blue-collar hilt has to multiply with the ratio between wage rate of the blue- and white-collar:

wilt
wiht

hilt.
Table 5.20: Comparison of the individual's effective units of labor working in the workers'
group from ASEAN-CLMV countries and in the workers' group from ASEAN-5 counties
calculated in the model in ASEAN, long-term
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ing), whose economic developments diverge. This observation, again, reects the necessity
of conditions for entry into an economic grouping, for instance the convergence criteria.
However, if the low developed economies are already in the regional grouping, as in the
case of ASEAN, these economies must be supported, in order to run a sustainable regional
economic integration. The measurements are the same as asserted in the previous sec-
tions, encompassing in particular reducing the costs of subsistence consumption, reducing
the costs of education and implementing distribution, increasing technological progress
and wage rate in the low developed economies. For example, reducing of the costs of
subsistence consumption to an extent which stops the budget constraints of the Indochina
countries from being binding has the effect of increasing the investment level in children's
education signicantly; in Cambodia from 0 to 0.0317, in Laos from 0 to 0.0134 and in
Vietnam from 0.0419 to 0.0814.
The simulations in this thesis show that the model presented in the thesis can be ap-
plied to the economic development within a country with economic disparity among sec-
tors, as well as between economies, encompassing a relation between a regional grouping
and a country or between two countries. Eventually, simulation of the development of bi-
lateral economic integration can also be applied, for instance using data from ASEAN and
Japan, Singapore and Japan, or China and Thailand etc. The model will show the prospects
of convergence and, in turn, the chance of success within an integrated regional group-
ing. In addition, the model analyzes the possible opportunities for efcient management of
economic integration, in that it predicts the convergence aspect in the end.
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5.5 Relation of Economic Integration and Convergence and
Model's Results
The previous chapter suggests a feasible proposition towards effective economic integration
in the East-Southeast Asian region, particularly from the standpoint of the ASEAN. This
involves nding a possible plan of action to counteract contemporary difculties, partly
as a result of the uncertainty of the new surge of regionalism, and to lay down a foun-
dation for further economic integration. The East-Southeast Asian regionalism and eco-
nomic relations on a bilateral and sub-regional basis have been developing signicantly,
but it seems that the collective movement towards global economic integration has been
neglected. The new surges of bilateral arrangements have led to a situation of competitive
hub and spoke bilateralism. This, in addition, has been exacerbated by the domino effect
and by the problems concerning politically sensitive sectors resulting in an increasingly se-
rious spaghetti bowl effect. Besides contemporary complexities emerging from the new
surges of bilateral agreements, there have always been numerous hindrances and compli-
cations to integration, encompassing internal deciencies and external environments.
Strategies for coping with the external shocks or external threats and insuring suc-
cessful economic integration are a necessity for a good foundation. Such strategies work
and are strengthened in economic, political and social spheres. Besides these, exibility is
also important, in order to cope with and adjust to inevitable shocks as they emerge. Fun-
damental key strategies, that might be able to further both the contemporary economic rela-
tions and their development towards global economic integration in the long run, are open-
ing and deepening regionalism and strengthening economic structure. Both schemes
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should be supported by the strength of the region's ability to adjust to external pressures,
in other words by the strength of East-Southeast Asian exibility.
This chapter concentrates on strengthening economic structure and presents a model
of strategies that bring about strength in economic foundations as well as convergence.
The model shows that strengthening the economic structure assists and in turn, is simul-
taneously supported by opening and deepening regionalism. The model concentrates on
the handling of coping with economic disparity within and between countries. In particu-
lar, discrepancy in human capital, wage rates among blue- and white-collar workers and in
technologies used in different production sectors are contemplated. Economic convergence
and distribution are needed to solve recent economic problems on their root within the re-
gion and create a prospect of further economic integration. Internal economic structures
will be strengthened and become an important underlying ground to solve the problems of
the sensitive sectors. Sustainable development can then be easily achieved and the econ-
omy will be, to a certain extent, immune to external pressure. Negative effects from hub
and spoke bilateralism will be lessened or hindered and bilateral regionalism will become
a stepping stone towards economic integration. By means of economic cooperation within
the region, these strategies will support regional economic convergence and strengthen
economic fundamentals, which allow countries to achieve regional and global economic
integration in the long run.
One of decisive supporting measures which can assist economic convergence and
distribution are improvements in education and technology. The short- and long-term ef-
fects created by increasing the quality of human capital are captured and strategies for the
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development of an economy with inequality between labor groups are suggested. These
strategies are, rstly, augmentation of and convergence in the quality of human resources
within and between sectors and, secondly, assisting technological progress and fusing tech-
nology levels in the two economic sectors which in turn will augment the level and parity
of wage rates in different sectors.
Augmentation and convergence in the quality of human resources are strategies that
should be implemented at all times and continuously  both in the short- and long-run.
The means to achieve augmentation and convergence in the quality of human resources
are provided through two relevant strategies that should be simultaneously implemented.
The rst of these is reducing the costs of education and implementing distribution, which
brings about an increase in qualities of human capital and also an increase in income. The
second is reducing the costs of subsistence consumption, which is a relevant strategy to
prevent economic divergence. While, on the one hand, reducing the costs of education only
benets individuals who are able to invest in education, reducing the costs of subsistence
consumption, on the other hand, supports all individuals. If this reduction is high enough,
individuals who were previously unable to invest in education, will consequently be able
to invest in education after the costs of subsistence consumption have been reduced. This
implies that the quality of human capital and income will rise and the number of individuals
who receive advantages from the educational support will increase. Economic divergence
will be reduced, since, according to the model, under the same rate of parameters the high
income earners, the white-collar workers, invest in education at a constant rate, regardless
of different occupation and income. Conversely, the level of investment in education by
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the low-income-earners depends on the level of subsistence consumption and their own
income. Combining a reduction of subsistence consumption costs with higher investment
in educational support for low income earners not only increases the number of individuals
who invest in education and the quality of human capital in the blue-collar group, but also
augments convergence.
Even though, convergence and improvement in human capital help to bring about
convergence and improvement in income, disparity in wage rates among labor groups still
exists and this can be solved by means of convergence of the technology levels in the two
sectors. Augmentation of technology will, in addition, assist economic development by
increasing income and total production. Considering the viewpoint that strengthening the
economic structure assists and is simultaneously supported by the strategies of opening
and deepening regionalism, the model shows that technological progress is one of the key
means to link up these two strategies. The increase in technology brings about increases in
production and the wage rate, and leads to improvement in individuals' income. However,
if there are diversities in the economy, unbalanced technological improvement between
sectors can lead to economic divergence. On the contrary, a proper development of tech-
nological progress in the two sectors, or in other words, technological progress in both
sectors accompanied by the catching up of the technology level in the low-wage sector (us-
ing low technology) with the high-wage sector (using high technology), can bring about
convergence in wage rates and income which are fundaments of the economic structure.
Notably, improvement in technology must be compatible with the existing human capital
in the economy; therefore, strategies that bolster the quality of human capital must not be
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neglected. We have seen that there are problems regarding sensitive sectors that hinder fur-
ther economic integration. Economic convergence will ease these problems and a stable
economic structure will facilitate the further development of economic integration.
This leads to the point that economic cooperation and integration are simultaneously
relevant factors that bolster and assist economic development and convergence. Besides
showing traditional advantages gained through economic integration, as analyzed in the
rst chapters, the model indicates that economic cooperation and integration trigger a rele-
vant indirect positive effect on economic convergence and development. Again, improve-
ment of technology is the main key for this progress. The results of the model favor the
explanation that, besides reducing the costs of subsistence consumption and costs of edu-
cation, economic cooperation and integration will lead to development of technology af-
fecting the wage rate positively and, consequently, income. The model presents the mutual
interrelated advantages between economic cooperation and integration and convergence
and distribution which can be concluded as follows:
- As already mentioned, economic cooperation or/and integration, in addition,
leads to a reduction in the costs of subsistence consumption and the costs of education.
This is achieved for instance, by supporting free market competition, hindering and elim-
inating monopoly and oligopoly, as well as taking advantage of specialization, economies
of scale and economies of scope. International trade is a relevant factor that supports this
undertaking, and as soon as subsistence consumption is covered, individuals may have op-
portunities to invest in education, in savings and in gaining a higher standard of living.
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- The progress and convergence in technology will bring about progress and con-
vergence in wage rates and income. Regarding the model, changes in technology, on the
one hand, can be assisted by research and development. This, however, needs a certain time
to proceed and has only a moderate effect. On the other hand, technology progress is more
easily and better achieved by joint ventures, taking over foreign technologies or research
and development under the auspices of multinational rms. This can be achieved through
economic cooperation and integration.
- Moreover, as asserted in the chapter 3, income convergence is one of the indi-
cators that show the potential for economic integration. Higher levels of integration and
openness are related to higher mobility of the factors of production, resulting in more in-
come convergence (in the model however, it is assumed that there is no mobility of labors
between two economies contrarily to capital mobility). The gains from economic inte-
gration are larger among the countries with more similar levels of income and economic
development, since they have incentives to trade and invest more with each other. Further-
more, convergence supports the prospect of strong economic interaction and coordination
in the long run, whereas divergence may bring about tensions and conicts in the short run
All of these additional viewpoints are due to the model, which conrms the posi-
tive effect of the scheme to open and deepen regionalism on the aim of strengthening the
economic structure.
Moreover, the government plays a signicant role in implementing distribution and
achieving convergence. Its main tools are taxation and public spending. In the short-run,
taxation and direct government support (including distributing income from the rich to the
390 5 Theory on Economic Development and Integration
poor individuals) lead to income distribution, bringing about an increase of the education
level in the low-income sector. Convergence through indirect support (reduction of the
costs of education) has the effect of increasing and distributing the level of investment in
education among the individuals earning above ztb (whose budget constraints are not bind-
ing). However, there is a trade-off, since this leads to a reduction of the level of investment
in education of the individuals earning below ztb (whose budget constraints are binding).
This is a signicant trade-off that the government should concern. Reduction of the costs of
education may increase the incentives of the individuals to invest in education and raise the
level of education. But if the costs of the reduction of the costs of education are nanced
by income tax which bears the deadweight-loss and cut a part of the direct support from
the government, the incentives of the individuals earning less than ztb will decrease, and
so does their chosen level of education. Contrarily to the behavior of individuals from the
group of income earners above ztb, despite the deadweight-loss, this action leads to distrib-
ution among this group. This result suggests that a proper strategy to develop the economy
is rst to support the poor individuals to overcome the income level of ztb, since at this
point the distribution effect of the education support from the government action is very
effective and convergence will be easily bolstered. And second, in order to increase the in-
centives of investment in and the level of education by reduction of the costs of education,
this should be done by increasing quality for example via cooperation and joint-venture
with advanced economy and/or economic integration superior to taxation.
The results of the short-term development guided by government interference are as
follows. Government interference in Thailand, which has an average progressive income
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tax rate of 4.28%, has a distribution effect, but also leads to a reduction of the total per-
person level of investment in education and utility. This tax structure is not optimal, since
under another tax structure total per-person level of investment in education and utility can
be signicantly increased. By means of the Median Voter Theorem, the model implies that
this sub-optimal tax rate and structure can be explained as a consequence of the distortion of
government decisions due to their predominant interest in winning votes. In the long-run,
taxation and direct government support (including distributing income from the rich to the
poor) leads to income-distribution, bringing about an increase in children's education level
in the low-income sector. Convergence through indirect support leads to an increase in the
level of investment in children's education among the group of individuals earning above
ztb and to better distribution within the group. Convergence can be bolstered by a relatively
higher augmentation of technology in the low-income sector than in the high-income sector.
This leads to increases in the wage rate, in the level of investment in children's education
and in utility in the respective sector. A relatively higher augmentation of technology in the
low-income sector than in the high-income sector leads to an increase in the wage rate, in
the level of investment in children's education and in utility and is conducive to divergence.
This, however, affects only individuals earning above ztb. There is then a trade-off, since
in the long-run (case of Thailand), government interference leads to economic distribution
and convergence. However the total per-person level of utility declines, yet this can be
augmented by a better tax rate and tax structure.
To conclude, the existence of relevant mutual positive relations between economic
cooperation and integration and economic convergence is borne out. Convergence sup-
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ports economic integration by assuaging the problems of sensitive sectors and hub and
spokes bilateralism. Obviously, economic convergence is not only assistance for economic
integration, but also a general foundation for sustainable development. The fact that eco-
nomic cooperation and integration simultaneously support economic convergence and de-
velopment (in this model, by means of convergence and augmentation of technologies and
reduction of subsistence consumption and costs of education) conrms the importance of
the movement towards economic integration. According to the model, economic integra-
tion between countries always brings about advantages, as soon as there are technology
differences in any sector or production, regardless of whether this integration is between
two industrial countries, two developing countries or between industrial and developing
countries.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents models of strategies to solve integration hardships and assist further
economic integration, particularly among the economies with different economic structures
and levels of development. The model focuses on strategies that aim to ease the problems
of sensitive sectors and support further economic integration. The main challenge any so-
lution must meet lies in coping with economic disparity within and between countries.
Key supporting measures are human capital and technology enhancement. These serve as
profound foundations for economic, political and social structures. Advancement and con-
vergence in education and technology will assist economic convergence and distribution by
raising income and living-standards, particularly in the low-wage, low-technology sector.
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Consequently, development in economic structure and economic convergence will support
and strengthen economic integration in the region. Due to positive spill-over effects, eco-
nomic integration will, in turn, enhance education quality and technological development
which, in turn, will support the strengthening of the economic structure and bolster eco-
nomic development in the end.
The model considers short- and long-term development and concludes that augmen-
tation and convergence in the quality of human resources among sectors and assisting tech-
nological progress and fusing technology levels in the two economic sectors are the main
strategies that should be simultaneously implemented. In addition, regarding the short-term
model, a theoretical analysis is carried out under inequality between labor groups from a
political economy perspective. The role of the government is analyzed, in terms of achiev-
ing convergence and augmentation of human capital quality and income. In this case, the
individuals want to get the best out of a trade-off between income tax and gains from gov-
ernment spending. By means of the Median Voter Theorem, it was possible to capture a
theoretical outcome of the political decision-making process in association with decisions
on political strategies, which indirectly affect the development path of economic growth
and economic convergence. The main outcome of this issue is the revelation of one of the
relevant explanations why political programs diverge from the rst-best solution. The re-
sult shows the consequence of the distortion through the fact that the government's decision
is predominately based on its interest in winning votes. It can be observed that there are
several opportunities that are more efcient and that will bring higher utility to the econ-
omy, if the governments are social welfare oriented. The model also shows that if there is
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no inequality in the economy, the government interference is not needed, since this merely
brings about distortion due to the deadweight-loss. Nonetheless, if there are disparities in
the economy, it is worth taking on the deadweight-loss in order to achieve convergence,
better distribution and sustainable development.
The means to achieve augmentation and convergence in human qualities are found
in two relevant strategies: rstly, reducing the costs of education and implementing dis-
tribution and, secondly, reducing the costs of subsistence consumption. Convergence and
improvement in human capital partly bring about convergence and improvement in in-
come. Yet, disparity in wage rates among labor groups still exists and this can be solved by
means of convergence of the two sectors' technology levels. Improving technology will,
in addition, assist economic development by increasing income and total production. The
model shows that, besides reducing the costs of subsistence consumption via advantages
from economic integration, technological progress is one of the key means that link up the
strategy of strengthening the economic structure with that of opening and deepening re-
gionalism. The higher level of technology brings about increases in production and the
wage rate and leads to improvement in individuals' income. Ensuring that the technology
in the low-wage sector, which uses low technology, catches up with that in the high-wage
sector, which starts with higher technology, can bring about convergence in wage rates
and income, which are fundaments of the economic structure. Importantly, any improve-
ment in technology must be compatible with the existing human capital in the economy.
Therefore, the strategies that bolster human capital quality must not be neglected. Another
relevant point is that economic cooperation and integration will bolster economic devel-
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opment and can assist economic convergence through the development of technology. As
well as by means of research and development, changes in technology can be assisted by
economic cooperation and integration. There are ways to facilitate and accelerate these, for
instance by joint-venture, taking over of foreign technologies or research and development
conducted by multinational rms. As already asserted, development of the level of technol-
ogy will affect the wage rate and income positively. Convergence of the different sectors'
levels of technology will eventually bring about convergence in wage rates and income.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis puts forward a feasible proposal for working towards effective economic
integration in the East-Southeast Asian region, particularly from the point of view of ASEAN.
It involves nding a possible plan of action to counteract contemporary difculties (which
partly result from the uncertainty of the new surge of regionalism) and lay down a foun-
dation for further economic integration. The East-Southeast Asian regionalism and eco-
nomic relations on a bilateral and sub-regional basis have been developing signicantly,
but it seems that the collective movement towards global economic integration has been
neglected. The new surges of bilateral arrangements have led to a situation of competi-
tive hub and spoke bilateralism. This has been further exacerbated by the domino effect
and by the problems of politically sensitive sectors resulting in an increasingly serious
spaghetti bowl effect. Besides contemporary complexities emerging from the new surges
of bilateral agreements, there have always been numerous hindrances and complications to
integration, encompassing internal deciencies and external environments.
One of strategies for coping with external shocks or external threats and insuring
successful economic integration refers to achieving a good economic foundation. Such
strategies also strengthen political and social spheres. Besides a good economic foundation,
exibility is also important, in order to cope with and adjust to inevitable shocks as they
emerge. Fundamental key strategies put forward in this thesis, that might be able to further
both the contemporary economic relations and their development towards global economic
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integration in the long run, are opening and deepening regionalism and strengthening
economic structure. Both schemes should be supported by the strength of the region's
ability to adjust to external pressures, in other words by the strength of East-Southeast
Asian exibility.
The thesis concentrates on strengthening economic structure and presents a model
of strategies that bring about strength in economic foundations as well as convergence. The
model of this thesis shows that strengthening economic structure assists and in turn, is si-
multaneously supported by opening and deepening regionalism. Economic convergence
and distribution are needed to solve recent economic problems within the region and create
a prospect of further economic integration. Internal economic structures will be strength-
ened and become an important underlying ground to solve the problems of the sensitive
sectors. Sustainable development can then be achieved easily and the economy will be, to a
certain extent, immune to external pressure. Negative effects from hub and spoke bilater-
alism will be lessened or hindered and bilateral regionalism will become a stepping stone
towards economic integration. By means of economic cooperation within the region, these
strategies will support regional economic convergence and strengthen economic fundamen-
tals, which in turn, allow countries to achieve regional and global economic integration in
the long run.
The model focuses on ways of coping with economic disparity within and between
countries. In particular, the discrepancy between the wage rates of blue- and white-collar
workers and between technologies used in different production sectors are contemplated.
Decisive supporting measures which can assist economic convergence and distribution are
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improvements in education and technology. Short- and long-term effects of an increase in
the quality of human capital are captured and strategies are suggested for the development
of an economy with inequality between labor groups. These strategies are, rstly, aug-
mentation and convergence in the quality of human resources within and between sectors
and, secondly, assisting technological progress and fusing the technology levels in the two
economic sectors.
Augmentation and convergence in the quality of human resources are strategies that
should be pursued at all times and continuously, both in the short- and long-run. The means
to achieve augmentation and convergence in the quality of human resources are provided
through two relevant strategies that should be simultaneously implemented. The rst of
these is reducing the costs of education and implementing distribution, which brings about
an increase in qualities of human capital and also an increase in income. The second is
reducing the costs of subsistence consumption, which is a relevant strategy to prevent eco-
nomic divergence. While, on the one hand, reducing the costs of education only benets
individuals who are able to invest in education, reducing the costs of subsistence consump-
tion, on the other hand, supports all individuals. If this reduction is high enough, individuals
who were previously unable to invest in education, will consequently be able to invest in
education after the costs of subsistence consumption have been reduced. This implies that
the quality of human capital and income will rise and the number of individuals who re-
ceive advantages from the educational support will increase. Further economic divergence
can be reduced, since, according to the model, under identical saving and interest rates the
high income earners invest in education at the same rate, despite different occupation and
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income  however, this depends also on the extent of the level and disparity of human cap-
ital in the rst period hit, which affect the absolute gained level of human capital hitei .
Conversely, the level of investment in education by low income earners depends on the
level of subsistence consumption and their own income. Combining a reduction of sub-
sistence consumption costs with higher investment in educational support for low income
earners not only increases the number of individuals who invest in education and the quality
of human capital in the blue-collar group, but also augments convergence and sustainable
development.
Convergence and improvement in human capital help to bring about convergence and
improvement in income, but they do not help to ease disparity in wage rates among labor
groups which still exists. This disparity in wage rates can be alleviated by means of conver-
gence of the technology levels in the two sectors. In addition, augmentation of technology
will assist economic development by increasing income and total production. Consider-
ing the viewpoint that strengthening the economic structure assists and is simultaneously
supported by the strategies of opening and deepening regionalism, the model shows that
technological progress is one of the key means to link up these two strategies. The increase
in technology brings about increases in production and the wage rate, and leads to improve-
ment in individuals' income. However, if there are diversities in the economy, unbalanced
technology improvement between sectors can lead to economic divergence. On the con-
trary, a proper development of technological progress for the two sectors, which would
consist of technological progress in both sectors accompanied by the catching up of the
technology level in the low-wage sector (using low technology) with the high-wage sector
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(using high technology), can bring about convergence in wage rates and income which are
fundaments of the economic structure. Notably, improvement in technology must be com-
patible with the existing human capital in the economy; therefore, strategies that bolster the
quality of human capital must not be neglected.
Since technological improvement and enhancement can be derived from economic
integration, we can see that economic cooperation and integration are simultaneously rel-
evant factors that bolster and assist economic development and convergence. Besides the
traditional advantages of economic integration, the model indicates that economic coopera-
tion and integration trigger a relevant indirect positive effect on economic convergence and
development. As already mentioned, economic cooperation or/and integration, in addition,
leads to a reduction of the costs of subsistence consumption and the costs of education:
This is achieved, for instance, by supporting free market competition, hindering and elim-
inating monopoly and oligopoly, as well as taking advantage of specialization, economies
of scale and economies of scope. International trade is a relevant factor that supports this
undertaking, and as soon as subsistence consumption is covered, individuals may have
opportunities to invest in education, in savings and in gaining a higher standard of liv-
ing. Progress and convergence in technology will bring about progress and convergence in
wage rates and income. Regarding the model, changes in technology, on the one hand, can
be assisted by research and development. This, however, needs a certain time to proceed
and has only a moderate effect. On the other hand, technology progress is more easily and
better achieved by joint ventures, taking over foreign technologies or research and devel-
opment under the auspices of multinational rms. This can be achieved through economic
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cooperation and integration. Higher levels of integration and openness are related to higher
mobility of the factors of production (in the model however, it is assumed that there is no
mobility of labors between two economies contrarily to capital mobility), resulting in more
income convergence. The gains from economic integration are larger among the countries
with more similar levels of income and economic development, since they have incentives
to trade and invest more with each other. Furthermore, convergence supports the prospect
of strong economic interaction and coordination in the long run, whereas divergence may
bring about tensions and conicts in the short run These additional viewpoints are due to
the model, that conrms the positive effect of the scheme to open and deepen regionalism
on the aim of strengthening the economic structure. Due to the model, economic integra-
tion between countries always brings about advantages, as soon as there are technology
differences in any sector or production, regardless of whether this integration is between
two industrial countries, two developing countries or between industrial and developing
countries.
Support for the results can be found in the way the EU functions. The EU has set
convergence criteria  stable prices, stable exchange rates, sound government nances,
low interest rates and legislation  as requirements for prospective members. Even though
the measurements of the EU convergence criteria are not the same measurements used in
this thesis, the comparison illustrates that the convergence concept is very signicant and
plays a great role in the integration process. In this way, the consequences of divergence are
hindered from the outset. Unfortunately, ASEAN does not implement convergence criteria
in accepting new members. As a result of this, members' economies are in a disparate state.
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The distribution mechanism plays a major role for the creation of convergence in ASEAN.
The thesis has proved that the distribution mechanism should be controlled by a third party.
At the national level, that country's government should take on this role. It should, however,
be noted that sometimes, based on Median Voter Theorem, the government diverges
from the rst best solution for the economy. This is because the government's decision is
distorted. The reason for this distortion is the government's predominant interest in winning
votes. At the international level, the distribution mechanism may be harder to operate as
each member is autonomous. The EU has shown us that a supranational or multi-national
institution is not impossible. ASEAN, therefore, might take EU as a supporting model in
creating a similar institution, although the institution should be better adapted to ASEAN's
characteristics. It should be borne in mind that as on the national level, the decision of the
supranational or multi-national body might be distorted as well.
To sum up, the existence of relevant mutual positive relations between economic co-
operation and integration and economic convergence is borne out. Convergence supports
economic integration by assuaging the problems of sensitive sectors and hub and spokes
bilateralism. Obviously, economic convergence does not only assist economic integration,
but also is a general foundation for sustainable development. The fact that economic coop-
eration and integration simultaneously support economic convergence and development (in
this model, by means of convergence and augmentation of technologies and reduction of
subsistence consumption and costs of education) conrms the importance of the movement
towards economic integration.
The model shows the following results:
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1) There are two relevant strategies that should be simultaneously implemented,
rstly the augmentation and convergence in qualities of human resources within a sector
and between sectors leading to increase and convergence of income and, secondly, techno-
logical progress and the fusing of technology levels in the two economic sectors, leading to
increase and convergence in wage rates which also results in an increase and convergence
in income.
2) Economic cooperation and integration and economic convergence are inter-
related. Convergence supports economic integration by easing the problems of sensitive
sectors and hub and spokes bilateralism. Economic cooperation and integration simul-
taneously support economic convergence and development; in this model, by means of
convergence and augmentation of technologies and reduction of the costs of subsistence
consumption and costs of education.
3) Convergence criteria are important. Differences in education and/ or income
amongst members of an economy are obstacles to development in general and to the
prospect of integration. Members whose standard of education and income does not reach
a certain level (calculated under the model relying upon various factors) do not have any
potential for development or convergence. In contrast, those whose standard of education
and/ or income reach or exceed the level will develop and have potential to converge.
4) Those regional groupings, one of which is ASEAN, that do not apply conver-
gence criteria require a distribution mechanism in order to achieve promising integration.
This shows that a supranational or multi-national institution is signicant. For the sake of
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better understanding, this thesis uses Thailand's economy and its government as an exam-
ple in the model to explain the distribution mechanism.
5) Furthermore, the Median Voter Theorem is applied to capture a theoretical
outcome of the political decision-making process in association with decisions on politi-
cal strategies that indirectly affect the development path of economic growth and economic
convergence. The main conclusion of the issue is to reveal one of the relevant explana-
tions as to why several political programs diverge from the rst best solution. The result
shows the consequence of distortion in government's decision. This distortion is predomi-
nately inuenced by the government's interest in being elected. There are several political
programs that are more efcient. If the governments are social welfare oriented, the econ-
omy can gain better distribution and development. The model illustrates that government
interference entails a deadweight-loss and the simulation shows that if there is no inequal-
ity in the economy, government interference is not needed, since this merely brings about
distortion due to the deadweight-loss. However, if there are disparities in the economy, it
is worthwhile to bear the deadweight-loss, in order to achieve convergence and sustainable
development.
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